IR 05000029/1979005
| ML19209A282 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Yankee Rowe |
| Issue date: | 06/18/1979 |
| From: | Baunack W, Kister H, Lazarus W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19209A277 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-029-79-05, 50-29-79-5, NUDOCS 7910030298 | |
| Preceding documents: |
|
| Download: ML19209A282 (1) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT Region I Report No.
50-29/79-05
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Docket No.
50-29 License No.
DPR-3 Priority Category C
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Licensee:
v,nu,, u n,4r v3 ce.4c ccm,,ny 20 Turnpike Road Westborough, Massachusetts 01581 Facility Name:
Yankee Nuclear Power Station (Yankee Rowe)
Inspection at:
Rowe, Massachusetts Inspection conducted: May 1-4 and 8-11, 1979 W
/ f' 7 Inspectorsl gW.
~Baunhck, Reactor Inspector
/dat$ signed
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d &JAl W S
W. p zar
, Reac~ter Inspector ddte signed (May 9-10, 79 only)
da e s gned Approved by:
[,/[~79
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5.
Afs tbF, Chlet, Auclear support
'Matd S'igned Section No. 2, RO&NS Branch Inspection Summary:
Inspection on May 1-4 and 8-11, 1979 (Report No. 50-29/79-05)
Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection to verify that the licensee has taken the action required by IE Bulletins 79-06,79-06A and 79-06A Revision No. 1.
Specific areas of review included: operator training and assessment of operating procedures; valve / breaker / switch alignment procedures of engineered safety features (ESF); verification of valve / breaker / switch alignment for ESF; system operability following maintenance; plant surveillance test procedures; surveillance test results; EST operability following extended outages; licensee's utilization of independent verification; emergency boiler feedwater system operability; and f acility tours. The inspection involved 60 inspector-hours on site by two regional based inspectors.
Results: Of the ten areas inspected, no items of noncompliance were found in nine areas; one apparent item of noncompliance was found in one area (Infraction -
failure to perform a required surveillance, Paragraph 4.b(4)).
-[ 3 0'S Region I Fom 12 1087 264 O
(Rev. April 77)
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DE'iAILS 1.
Persons Contacted R. Aron, Technical Assistant
- H. Autio, Plant Scperintendcnt G. Baird, Control Room Operator
- T. Danek, Operations Supervisor
- L. French, Engineering Assistant L. Fritz, Control Room Operator J. Grillo, Control Room Operator D. Joyce, Auxiliary Operator K. Jurentkuff, Shift Supervisor B. Kirk, Shift Supervisor P. Laird, Maintenance Supervisor A. LePage, Shift Supervisor
- L. Reed, Operations Quality Assurance
- J. Staub, Technical Assistant to Plant Superintendent
- N. St. Laurent, Assistant Plant Superintendent D. Vassar, Assistant Operations Supervisor The inspectors also interviewed other licensee employees including reactor operators and technical support personnel.
- Denotes those present at the exit interview.
2.
Purpose This inspection was conducted to verify that the licensee has taken the actions required by IE Bulletins 79-06, 79-06'
and 79-06A Revision No. 1 relating to a review of their faci __
es and opera-tions, and that the operaters are aware of any procedural changes resulting from the Bulletins.
3.
Review of Operator Training and Assessment of Operating Procedures All licensed operators have received the special NRC briefing on the events at the Three Mile Island (TMI) station.
One operator, who had missed the briefing conducted by the NRC on April 22, 1979, was briefed by the NRC during this inspection.
The licensee stated and the inspector observed that operating procedures are currently being reviewed to determine adequacy for coping with transients and accidents. The licensee further stated that during this review and revision, IE Bulletin No.79-06A requirements will be incorporated into operating procedures, and fc..
wing revision and issuance of the subject operating procedures, a training session will be conducted for all operators.
During this training session, operators will be instructed on procedure changes and IE Bulletin requirements.
The 1087 265
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-2-revised procedures are expected to be issued during the week of May 13, 1979 and the additional operator training is expected to be completed by May 18, 1979. This item is unresolved pending action by the licensee as indicated above and subsequent review by NRC RI (29/79-05-01).
The inspector noted that in the interim, until the revised operating procedures are issued, guidance has been provided for the operators by Operating Memos, Special Orders, and Management Directives.
The foll, wing directives relating to the TMI incident have been issued:
Special Order 344 (April 12,1979).
Provides the operators
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instructions under certain conditions, for ECCS operation, possible pressurizer level error, securing the dumping of the vapor containar drain tank, use of the pressurizer relief valve isolation valve, manual initiation of ECCS on low prsssurizer pressure, cautions against premature securing of ECCS, operation of main coolant pumps, and establishment of feedwater flow to steam generators.
Special Order 346 (April 12, 1979).
Provides instruction for
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main coolant pump operation following a loss of feedwater.
Special Order 347 (April 12, 1979).
Provides instruction for
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a loss of feedwater incident and provides for an extra dedicated operator to initiate auxiliary feedwater to steam generators when necessary.
Special Order 352 (April 20, 1979).
Provides instructions
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relative to operability of redundant equipment prior to taking equipment out of service for maintenance.
Special Order 353 (April 26, 1979).
Specifies testing shall
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be performed immediately following completion of maintenance on safety classified systems.
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Special Order 354 (April 26, 1979).
Provides instructions for early NRC notification of serious events.
Operating Memo Dhy 1, 1979).
Additional instruction for
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early ND.C uotification.
Management Directive (Undated).
Provides plant indications
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which are available to identify a failed open pressurizer relief valve. Also, provides instructions for closing relief valve manual block valve.
1087 266
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-3-Other aspects of facility operation which were reviewed included a determination that:
(1) The licensee does not require partial activation of safety injection to assist in level control of the pressurizer during routine operation event induced pressurizer level transients.
(2) Licensee procedures do not permit feeding a dry steam generator.
(3) No special instructions for placing tags are specified procedurally.
However, the main control board configuration is such that a potential for obscuring status indication with tags is remote.
The usual means of placing tags was observed by the inspectors and does not obscure status indication.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
4.
Inspection of Engineered Safety Features (ESF)
a.
General An on-site inspection of the ESF was conducted which encompassed the following systems and components:
High Pressure Safet7 Injection System
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Low Pressure Safety Injection System
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Diesel Generators and Fuel Oil System
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Emergency Boiler Feedwater System
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Post Accident Fans
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Containment
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Post Accident Hydrogen Control System
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Electrical Breaker Alignment for Off-Site Power The specific areas inspected are as follows.
(1) Review of Valve / Breaker / Switch Alighment Procedures The inspector performed a comparison of the valve / breaker /
switch alighment procedures against current piping and instrument diagrams and single-line diagrams for the previourly mentioned ESF systems and components to verify their adequacy. The following procedures were reviewed:
OP 2100, Plant Startup from Cold Shutdown, Revision
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16.
OP 2652, Preparation of the Emergency Core Cooling
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System fot Normal Operation, Revision 12.
1087 267
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-4-OP4203, Monthly Valve Check, Revision 11.
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OP 4204, Monthly Test or Special Operation of the
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Safety Injection Pumps, Revision 14.
OP 2101, Plant Startup from Hot Standby, Revision
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10.
OP 4207, Surveillance of the Station Power System
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and Emergency Diesel Generator, Revision 10.
OP 2670, Operation of the Diesel F.0. System, Revision
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1.
OP 2502, Operation of the 120 V. A.C. Vital Bus
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System, Revision 2.
OP 2503, Operation of the 125 V. D.C. System, Revision
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0P 2504, Operation of the Station Power System,
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Revision 2.
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OP 4211, Emergency Boiler Feedwater System 6perability Test, Revision 7.
OP 4216, Testing of the Post Accident Hydrogen
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Venting System, Revision 7.
(2) Verification of Valve / Breaker / Switch Alignment for Accessible Components The inspector verifie aSF systems valve / breaker / switch alignments by physically observing that valre, breaker, and switch positions were as required by c>- following procedures.
OP 2100, Plant Startup from Cold Shutdown, Revision 16.
OP 2652, Preparation of the Emergency Core Cooling System for Normal rperation, Revision 12.
(3) System Operability Following Maintenance Activities The inspector reviewed, for adequacy, the administrative controls imposed by the licensee to assure proper " return to service" of ESF components following maintenance 1087 268
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-5-activities. The following administrative controls were reviewed:
AP 0205, Maintenance Request, Revision 6.
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AP 0204, Safety Classification of Systems, Components
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and Structures, Revision 4.
AP 0222, Job Orders, Revision 3.
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AP 0017, Switching ani Tagging of Plant Equipment,
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Revision 5.
AP 0214, Maintenance and Chan;e of Safety Classified
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Systems, Components and Structures, Revision 5.
It was noted that all safety-related maintenance is controlled through the use of Maintenance Requests and Job Orders, these control measures specify the return to service of equipment, consequently, individual maintenance procedures were not reviewed.
(4) Review of Plant Surveillance Test Procedures The inspector reviewed the rollowing surveillance test procedures to verify that when the surveillance test is completed, the system under test will have been returned to an operable condition.
OP 4203, Monthly Valve Check, Revision 11.
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OP 4204, Monthly Test or Special Operation of the
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Safety Injection Pumps, Revision 14.
OP 4205, Safety Injection System Operation Check,
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Revision 6.
OP 4206, Flow Test of Two HPSI Pumps on AC Power,
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Revision 8.
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OP 4207, Surveillance of the Station Power System and the Emergency Diesel Generators, Revision 10.
OP 4208, Flow Test of Two LPSI Pumps on AC Power,
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Revision 7.
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OP 4211, Emergency Boiler Feedwater System Operability Test, Revision 7.
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-6-OP 4214, Chemical Shutdown System Operability Check,
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Revision 6.
OP 4215, Surveillance of Boron Injection Flow Path,
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Revision 1.
OP 4216, Testing of the Post Accident Hydrogen
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Venting System, Revision 7.
OP 2670, Operation of the Diesel Fuel Oil System,
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Revision 1.
DP 2656, Recharging the ECCS Accumulator Power
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Operated Valve Nitrogen Supply Bottles, Revision 1.
OP 2657, Filling of the High Pressure Nitrogen
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Cylinders, Revision 4.
OP 2502, Operation of the 120 Volt A.C. Vital Bus
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System, Revision 2.
OP 2503, Operation of the 120 Volt D.C. System,
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Revision 5.
OP 2504, Operation of the Station Power System,
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Revision 2.
(5) Surveillance Test Results Review The following surveillance test results were reviewed to verify that acceptable criteria were satisfied for the system under test:
OP 4203, Monthly Valve Check, Revision 11.
Performed
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April 25,1979.
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OP 4205, Safety Injection System Cperation Check, Revision 14.
Performed November 28, 1978.
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OP 4204, Monthly Test or Special 0~ ration of the Safety Injection Pumps, Revision 14.
Perfomed April 26, 1979 (Train 3), April 19, 1979 (Train 2),
and April 12, 1979 (Train 1).
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OP 4207, Surveillance of the Station Power System and Emergency Diesel Generators, Revision 10.
Performed April 17, 19'i9 (EDC 2), April 10, 1979 (EDG 1), and April 3, 1979 (EDC 3).
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OP 4211, Emergency Boiler Feedwater System Operability
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Teso, Revision 7.
Performed April 26, 1979.
OP 4216, Testing of the Post Accident Hydrogen
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Venting System, Revision 7.
Performed April 24, 1979.
OP 2670, Operation of the Diesel Fuel Oil System,
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Revision 1.
Performed March 1, 1979.
(6) ESF System Operability Following Extendeo Cutages The inspector reviewed OP 2100, Plant Startup from Cold Shutdown, Revision 16, along with Attachments A and B and all referenced procedures.
It was verified that the procedure assures the plant is meeting all Technical Specification requirenents during a plant startup.
OP 2100 is performed following any cold shutdown regardless of duration.
(7) Licensee's Utilization of Independent Verification The inspector reviewed this area and noted that the licensee utilizes indep adent verification (in addition to fuel handling procedures) only in the switching and tagging of plant equipment (AP 0017) and in the blocking or bypassing of safety functions (AP 0018).
(8) Emergency Boiler Feedwater System Operability The inspector verified by observation that all valves in the emergency boiler feedwater system are in the proper position and that all valves in the system identified by the licensee as requiring locking are actually locked.
b.
Findings Resulting from the above Review (1) The need exists for the clarification of the operation and positioning of safety infection system valve SI-dOV-535 in the various steps, and referenced procedures, in which it appears during the performance of Procedure OP-2100, Plant Startup from Cold Shutdown.
In the procedures, as written, the valve pssitioning in accordance with procedure OP 2652, Preparatica of the Emergency Core Cooling System for Normal Operation, is not considered in procedure OP 2100; consequently, the time at which the valve is made electrically operable is not clear.
This matter will be reviewed during a future inspection.
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-8-(2) Da several occasions during the inspection, discrepancies were noted between procedural requirements relating to locked valves and the actual status of the valves.
In no instances were valves incorrectly positioned; however, discrepancies in the locked status of valves were noted as fcilows:
The emergency boiler feedwater pump had several
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valves in the suction line locked open which are not specified locked in Procedure OP 4211, Emergency Boiler Feedwater System Operability Test.
A number of valves included in Procedure OP 2562,
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Preparation of the Emergency Core Cooling System for
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Normal Operation, are actually locked but are not required to be locked in the procedure.
Three closed and capped fuel oil drain valves, which
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are required to be locked closed in Procedure OP 2670, Operation of the Diesel Fuel Oil System, were checked as locked and closed on March 1, 1979, but identified by the licensee as unlocked and closed on April 20, 1979. They were subsequently relocked as required.
The inspector noted that, with the exception of Technical Specification required locked valves, the licensee does not maintain a " locked valve list" for valves locked in the plant. The licensee stated the matter of locked valve status would be reviewed.
The results of the licensee's review will be evaluated during a future inspection.
(3)
Procedure OP 4211, Emergency Boiler Feedwater System Operability Test, Step 2.b records the emergency nitrogen cylinder pressure of the auxiliary trip valve and nuclear steam control valve. The inspector noted that there appeared to be some confusion among operators as to the purpose for the nitrogen cylinder.
The licensee stated that the proper use of the nitrogen cylinder would be included in the operator training. The completion of this training will be reviewed during a future inspection.
(4) Technical Specification 4.7.1.2.a.4 requires that the emergency boiler feedwater system shall be demonstrated operable at least once per 15 days by cycling each testable manual valve in the flow path through at least one complete cycle of full travel. A review of surveillance procedure OP 4211, Emergency Boiler Feedwater System Operability Test, and discussions with personnel shows that DW-V-608, a testable manual valve in the flow path, is not being 1087 2/2
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cycled each 15 days as required. The valve was, however, locked in the correct position. This is considered to be an item of noncompliance at the infraction level (29/79-05-02).
(5) A number of valves in the safety injection system, including the loop injection valves, are required to be electrically disconnected at the valve motor starter.
Electrically disconnecting these valves removes the position indication for the valves in the control room.
Correct positioning and locking in position of these valves is controlled by procedure.
Correct positioning of these valves is casse-quently the sole responsibility of the single individual performing the valve check-off.
In view of the safety significance of these valves, the inspector questioned if independent verification of correct positioning should not be considered. The licensee stated this matter would be considered further.
This item will be reviewed during a future inspection.
5.
Facility Tours The inspectors toured the facility on various occasions during the inspection. Areas toured included the turbine building, screen house, relay rooms, primary auxiliary building, emergency diesel generator rooms, and the security fence.
The inspectors also observed control room operation on both day and evening shifts for proper control room manning, and facility operation in accordance with administrative and Technical Specification requirements.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
6.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, items of noncompliance or deviations. An unresolved item identified during the inspection is discussed in Paragraph 3.
7.
Exit Interview The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1) at the conclusion of the inspection on May II, 1979.
The inspec-tor summarized the purpose and the scope of the inspection and the findings.
1087 273