IR 05000010/1981012
| ML17194A242 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Dresden  |
| Issue date: | 10/15/1981 |
| From: | Jordan M, Reimann F, Robinson D, Tongue T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17194A240 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-010-81-12, 50-10-81-12, 50-237-81-24, 50-249-81-18, NUDOCS 8110290440 | |
| Download: ML17194A242 (9) | |
Text
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
REGION III
Reports No. 50-10/81-12; 50-237/81-24; 50-249-81-18 Docket Nos. 50-10; 50-237 50-249 License.No. DPR-02; DPR-19 DPR-25 Licensee:
Commonwealth Edison Company P.O. Box 767 Chicago, IL 60690 Facility Name:
Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Units 1, 2 and 3 Inspection At:
Dresden Site, Morris, IL'
~~"A~
Approved B *
Reimann, Acting Chief 10**-l~-'?)
Reactor Projects Section IC Inspection Summary Inspection on August 1 through September 4, 1981 (Reports No. 50-10/81-12; 50-237/81-24; 50-249/81-18)
Areas Inspected:
Routine unannounced Resident Inspection of Followup of previous inspection findings, operational safety verification, Monthly Maintenance Observation, Monthly Surveillance Observation, Licensee Event Report followup, Immediate Action Letter, Plant Trips, Drills and Training.,
and Inspection during long term shutdow The inspection involved a total of 249 inspector-hours onsite by two NRC inspectors and Regional Support from NRC Inspector including a total of 65 inspector-hours onsite during off shif Results:
Of the nine areas inspected there were no items of noncompliance in eight area There was one item of noncompliance (Severity Level IV -
failure to have a procedure - Paragraph 6) in one are *
- DETAILS Persons Contacted
- D. Scott, Station Superintendent
- R. Ragan, Operations Assistant Superintendent
- J. Eenigenburg, Maintenance Assistant Superintendent
- D. Farrar, Administrative Services and Support Assistant Superintendent J. Brunner, Technical Staff Supervisor C. Sargent, Unit 1 Operating Engineer J. Wujciga, Unit 2 Operating Engineer M. Wright, Unit 3 Operating Engineer D. Adam, Waste Systems Engineer G. Myrick, Rad-Chem Supervisor B. Saunders, Station Security Administrator B. Zank, Training Supervisor
- E. Wilmer, QA Coordinator
- R. Stobert, QA Engineer The inspector also talked with and interviewed several other licensee employees, including members of the technical and engineering staffs, reactor and auxiliary operators, shift.engineers and foremen, electrical, mechanical and instrument personnel, and contract security personne *Denotes those attending one or more exit interviews conducted on August 14, 19, September 4, 1981 and informally on several occasions throughout the report perio.
Followup on Previous Inspection Findings 'Noncompliance Items 50-010/80-09-04, 50-237/80-21-01, 50-249/80-25-01'
(Closed):
Through routine plant inspections, the inspectors have coti-cluded that the level of cleanliness has improved and control of combustible material in areas containing safety related equipment/
structures to be upgraded to acceptable condition These previous items of noncompliance are considered*closed, however, plant clean-liness and control of combustible materials will continue to be observed by the inspector Open Inspection Item 50-237/81-11-01 (Closed}:
Procedures used in the startup of the Cycle 8 test program of Unit 2 were reviewed by a Region III Inspector and found to be technically adequat No items of noncompliance were identifie Operational Safety Verification The inspector observed control room operations, reviewed applicable logs and conducted discussions.with control room operators during*the period of August 1 through September 4, 198 The inspector verified the operability of selected emergency systems, reviewed tagout records
- 2 -
and verified proper return to service of affected component Tours of Unit 2 and 3 reactor buildings and turbine buildings were conducted to observe plant equipment conditions, including potential fire hazards, fluid leaks, and excessive vibrations and to verify that maintenance requests had been initiated for equipment in need of maintenanc The inspector by observation and direct interview verified that the physical security plan was being implemented in accordance with the station security pla The inspector observed plant housekeeping/cleanliness c6nditions and verified implementation of radiation protection control During the period of August 1 through September 4, 1981, the inspector walked down the accessible portions of the Unit. 2 LPCI, Core Spray, and HPCI, and Unit 3 LPCI systems to verify operabilit The inspector also witnessed portions of the radioactive waste system controls associated with radwaste shipments and barrelin These reviews and observations were conducted to verify that facility operations were in conformance with the requirements established under technical specifications, 10 CFR, and admini~trative procedure During a routine walkdown of the Unit 2 control room panels, the Senior Resident Inspector noted the temperature monitoring unit on local panel 902-21, had nine temperature alarm bypass switches in the bypass posi-tion with no indicating lights on to indicate the bypassed conditio The bypass switches for five additional temperature detectors were in the bypass position with the appropriate indicating lights o A design intent of this temperature monitoring panel is to provide the capability to acknowledge an ala.rm condition and bypass the temperature element causing the alarm on the 902-21 panel allowing the operator to
.reset the existing single alarm on the main control panel (902-4) so that any subsequent alarm conditions detected would annunciate on the main control pane In the above situation (nine detectors bypassed and not indicating the bypassed condition on panel 902-21) it is possible to have an alarm condition clear and not have the bypass switch returned to the normal positio In this case an alarm condition could occur and escape detection because it would not be annunciated on the main control boar A later evaluation determined that the indicating lamps for the nine temperature detectors of concern were burned ou The situation was brought to the attention of the Shift Control Roo Engineer (SCRE/STA) and the unit operating enginee Both agreed to conduct a followup revie The licensee stated that including a check of these indicating lamps would be considered as an additional item to be included in the shift surveillance log form The defective indicating lamps were replace This is considered to be an open inspection.ite (50-237/81-24-01)
No items of noncompliance were identifie.
Monthly Maintenance Observation Station maintenance activities of safety related systems and com-ponents listed below were observed/reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides and industry codes or standards and.in conformance with technical specification The following items were considered during this review:
the limiting conditions for operation were met while components or systems were removed from service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work; activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were inspected as applicable; functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems to service; quality control records were maintained; activities were accomplished by qualified personnel; parts and materials' used were properly certified; radiological controls were implemented; and, fire prevention controls were implemente Work requests were reviewed to determine status of outstanding jobs and to assure that priority is assigned to safety related equipment maintenance which may affect system performanc The following maintenance activities were observed/reviewed:
Unit 2:
Replacement of 2D LPCI Pump and Seal, Scram Discharge Volume Level Instrumentation Logic Component Units 2/3:
Replac~ment of Air Pressure Start Switch on Unit 2/3 Diesel and replacement of Sta~k Radiation Monitor Recorder Following completion of maintenance on the Unit 2/3 diesel start switch, the scram discharge volume instrumentation logic components and 2D LPCI pump seal, the inspector verified that these systems had been returned to service properl No items of noncompliance was identifie.
Monthly Surveillance Observation The inspector observed technical specifications required surveillance testing on the Unit 2:
SRM Rod Block Logic, IRM Rod Block Logic, Reactor Protection System, and Hi Drywell Pressure switch setting Unit 3:
SRM Rod Block Logic, IRM Rod Block and Scram Logic, Hi Drywell Pressure switch settings, Off Gas Radiation Monitor Calibration, and Area Radia-tion Monitor Calibration and verified that testing was performed in accordance with adequate procedures, that test instrumentation was calibrated, that limiting conditions for operation were met, that removal and restoration of the affected components were accomplished, that test results conformed with technical*specifications and procedure requirements and were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test, and that any deficiencies identified during the
- 4 -
. -
testing were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate management personne No item of noncompliance was identifie.
Licensee Event Reports Followup Through direct observations, discussions with licensee personnel, and review of records, the following event reports were reviewed to deter-mine that reportability requirements were fulfilled, immediate corrective action was accomplished, and corrective action to prevent recurrence had been accomplished in accordance with technical specification Unit 1 80-01 (Closed)
80-04 (Closed)
Unit 2 81-01 (Closed)
81-04 (Closed)
81-05 (Closed)
81-06 (Closed)
. 81-07 (Closed)
81-09 (Closed)
81-10 (Closed)
81-11 (Open)
81-13 (Closed)
81-14 (Open)
81-16 (Closed)
81-17 (Closed)
81-30 (Open)
"A" Holdup tank not sampled within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />
"A" Holdup tank not sampled within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> Failure of SDV'water level monitors to alarm locally during a scra /4" drain line degradation down stream of 2-3406-500 (condensate system minimum flow line).
Containment vent valve, A0-2-1601-23, *failed LLR Feedwater check valves failed LLR MSL area temperature switch failed - TS-2-261-18D.
2B-RPS-MG set breaker failure to tri Hydraulic snubbers from D/W failed functional Tes Unplanned discharge to rive HPCI steam piping does not meet safe operability criteria for safe shutdown earthquak Discharge of "B" FSDT samples not within 10% of averag Missed surveillance-rad waste effluent monitor functional tes Failure to meet D2 & D3 battery surveillance require-ment Temperatures of cells adjacent to pilot cells were not take HPCI steam line partially filled with wate _. 5 -
81-35 (Open)
81-37 (Closed)
81-38 (Closed)
81-39 (Closed)
81-40 (Closed)
81-41 (Closed)
81-43 (Closed)
81-44 (Closed)
81-45 (Closed)
81-46 (Closed)
81-47 l
(Closed)
81-48 (Closed)
81-49 (Closed)
Stack gas activity monitor-sample line disconnecte Loss of one drywell to suppression chamber vacuum breaker indicatio Drywell to suppression chamber vacuum breaker bindin Turbine first stage pressure 45% scram bypass-pressure switch setpoint drif Turbine first stage pres*sure 45% scram bypass relay 590-123D trip failur Reactor water level-containment spray interlock level instrument hanging u Generator load reject and stop valve closure scram bypass relay 590-123B failure to rese APRM Channel 6 rod block failur Loss of power to process monitors (Channel B).
Channel "B" process monitors down scale due to high voltage failur Failure to take reactor coolant samples every four hour Turbine first stage pressure 45% scram bypas MSIV' s 2-203* lA and 2..:.203-ID cl.osure less than Technical Specification limi With respect to LER 50-237/81-11/03L-O, CECo is in the process of reviewing a modification whereby the fill and discharge valves for a Floor Drain Storage Tank, cannot be open simultaneousl Since this modification is under review and implementation, the LER remains ope During the review of *LER 50-237/81-14/03L-O, it was found that the chemistry procedure modification committed to in the corrective*action has not been. complete Therefore this LER remains ope With respect to LER 50-237/81-30/0lT-O, review of the event revealed that the HPCI steam supply line was partially filled with water, possibly as a result of the disc in valve M02-2301-3 being installed improperl Review of the maintenance work package for valve M02-2301-3 (Number D08505) verified that no mention of the importance of proper valve disc orientation was made in any procedure or document controlling the work, nor was reference made to other procedures, documents, or equipment manuals which provide such informatio The inspector determined thru interviews that the work supervisors were knowledg~able
- 6 -
..
of the importance of proper disc orientation, but it is questionable that the information was.adequately passed on to t,he. work cre Technical Specification 6.2.A.6 requires detailed written procedures, including checkoff lists, to be prepared, approved, and adhered to for the completion of work which could affect the safety of the facilit Because this event resulted in the HPCI system being in a degraded condition for approximately three weeks, it constitutes an apparent item of noncompliance with Technical *specification 6.2. (50-237/81-24-02).
This event is further discussed in Paragraph No additional items of noncompliance were identifie LER' s Unit 3 81-03 (Closed)
81-04 (Closed)
81-05 (Closed)
81-07 (Closed)
81-08 (Closed)
81-09 (Closed)
81-13 (Closed)
81-14 (Closed)
81-15. (Closed)
81-17 (Open)
81-18 (Closed)
Isolation condenser condensate line Hi Flow isolation switch trip setpoint greater than Technical Specifi-cation limi EHC low oil pressure scram surveillance interval exceede SRM /121 hi rod block setpoint greater than 10 CPS (Technical Specification limit).
"A" refuel floor ARM high trip setpoint greater than Technical Specification limi Surveillance interval exceeded for Unit 3 battery weekly measurement "A" recirculation pump run back, failure of scoop tube lockou *Reactor vessel low level half stram and low-low isolation instrument setpoint drif Instrument air header pressure scram-pressure switch below Technical Specification limi Isolation condenser condensate line high flow isolation flow switch trip setpoint greater than Technical Specifi-cation limi B RPS MG set failed to trip on under voltage signa Reactor low low water level ECCS initiate level switch setpoint drif With respect to LER 50-249/81-17/031-0, the licensee has committed to a supplemental LER upon determining the cause of the relay failur Therefore, this LER remains ope One item of noncompliance was identifie... Immediate Action Letter On September 3, 1981, the licensee declared the Unit 2 HPCI inoper-able as a' result of discovering several steam line hangers and high energy line break supports broken, damaged or with degraded anchor The portion of the steam line in the torus basement was found with two high energy line break (HELB) whip restraint's concrete anchors partially or fully pulled out of the concrete and about five spring loaded hangers broken or with abnormal displacemen The licensee reported the findings to the NRC and initiated a review to determine the cause of the damage, and to identify any further damag Region III issued an Immediate Action Letter (IAL) to document the agreements reached with the licensee as to actions and repairs which must be completed prior to returning HPCI to servic The IAL also docu-mented the requirements for a long term comprehensive study, including evaluations and remedial actions, to prevent recurrenc These matters were reviewed by a Region III piping specialist and the findings will be the subject of a special inspection report (50-237/81-25).
No items of noncompliance were identifie.
Plant Trips Following the plant trips on September 1 and 4, 1981, on Unit 3 the inspector ascertained the status of the reactor and safety systems by observation of control room indicators and discussions with licensee personnel concerning plant parameters, emergency system status and reactor coolant chemistry. The inspector verified the establishment of proper communications and reviewed the corrective actions taken by the license All systems responded as expected, and the plant was returned to operation on September 4, 198 No item of noncompliance was identifie.
Drills and Training The licensee is in the process of conducting a series of inhouse drills in preparation for the full scale GSEP drill to be performed on September 30, 198 The inspectors observed two such drills on August 5 and 19, 1981, noting communications, responses, coordination of personnel, et The inspectors also observed licensee personnel conduct a simulated reactor accident at the General Electric BWR Simulator at Morris, Illinois, for data to be used during the upcoming GSEP drill on September 30, 198 No item of noncompliance was identifie '.....
1 Inspection During Long Term Shutdown The inspector observed control room operations, reviewed applicable logs and conducted discussions with control room operators during the period of August 1 through September 4, 198 The inspector verified surveil-lance tests required during the shutdown were accomplished, reviewed tagout records, and verified applicability of containment integret Tours of Unit 1 accessible areas, including exterior areas were made to make independent assessments of equipment conditions, plant conditions, radiological controls, safety, and adherence to regulatory requirements and to verify that maintenance requests had been initiated for equipment in need of maintenanc The inspector observed plant housekeeping/clean-liness conditions, including potential fire hazards, and verified implementation of radiation protection control The inspector by observation and direct interview verified that the physical security plan was being implemented in accordance with the station security pla No items of noncompliance were identifie.
Meetings, Training, and Off-site Functions During this period, the SRI was absent for two weeks for military and annual leav The Resident Inspector provided site coverag. Exit Interview The inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in Para-graph 1) throughout the month and at the conclusion of the inspection on September 4, 1981, and summarized the scope and findings of the inspection activitie The licensee acknowledged the findings of the inspeetio