IR 05000010/1981007
| ML17194A035 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Dresden  |
| Issue date: | 07/16/1981 |
| From: | Jordan M, Reimann F, Tongue T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17194A034 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-010-81-07, 50-10-81-7, 50-237-81-18, 50-249-81-10, NUDOCS 8107280448 | |
| Download: ML17194A035 (7) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
REGION III
Report Noa. 50-10/81-07; 50-237/81-18; 50-249/81-10 Docket Nos. 50-10; 50-237; 50-249 DPR-25 Licensee:
Commonwealth Edison Company P. 0. Box 767 Chicago, IL 60690 License Nos. DPR-02; DPR-19; Facility Name:
Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Units 1, 2, and 3 Inspection At:
Dresden Site, Morris, IL
- Inspection Conducted:
May 9 - June 5, 1981 (}\\ c -f:;~-r ~~
Inspectors:
T. M. Tongue Approved By:
J{c~~~-
M. J. Jordan
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F. W. Rei"mann, Actinig/chief Projects Section lC Inspection Summary Inspection on May 9 - June 5, 1981 (Reports No. 50-10/81-07; No. 50-237/81-18; and No. 50-249/81-10)
Areas Inspected:
Routine, unannounced resident inspection of operational safety verification, monthly maintenance observation, monthly surveillance observation, licensee events report followup, IE Bulletin followup, and inspection during long-term shutdow The inspection involved a total of 167 inspector-hours onsite by two NRC inspectors including 47 inspector-hours during off-shift Results:
Of the six areas inspected,* there were no items of noncompli'anc PDR ADOCK 05000010 G
DETAILS Persons Contacted
- D. Scott, Station Superintendent
- R. Ragan, Operations Assistant Superintendent
- D. Farrar, Administrative Service and Support Assistant Superintendent
- J. Brunner, Technical Staff Superviso*r G. Myrick, Rad-Chem Supervisor B. Saunders, Station Security Administrator B. Zank, Training Supervisor
- E. Wilmer, QA Coordinator The inspectors also talked with and interviewed several other licensee employees,_ including members of the technical and engineering staffs, reactor.and auxiliary operators, shift engineers and foremen, electrical, mechanical and instrument personnel, and contract security personne *Denotes those attending one or more exit interviews conducted on May 22, May 29, and June 5, 198.
Operational Safety Verification The inspectors observed control room operations, reviewed applicable logs and conducted discussions with control room operators during *
the period of May 9 - June 5, 198 The inspectors verified the operability of selected emergency systems, reviewed tagout records and verified proper return to service of affected component Tours of Units 2 and 3 reactor buildings and turbine buildings were conducted to observe plant equipment conditions, including*potential fire hazards, fluid leaks_, and excessive vibrations and to verify that maintenance requests had been initiated for equipment in need of maintenanc The inspector by observation and direct interview verified that the physical security plan was being implemented in accordance with the station security pla The inspectors ~bserved plant housekeeping/cleanliness conditions and verified implementation of radiation protection controls. During the period of May 9 - June 5, 1981, the inspector walked down.the accessible portions of the Units 2 and 3; HPCI, LPCI, CS, and SBLC systems to veri"fy operabilit The inspei:tor also witnessed por-tions of the radioactive waste system controls associated with radwaste shipments and barrelin These reviews and observations were conducted to verify that facility operations were in conformance with the requirements established under Technical Specifications, 10 CFR, and Administrative Procedure During the inspection, the inspectors identified several concerns in the radiation protection such as inadequate posting of semitrailers used for storage of used torus baffles, radiation control ropes down
- 2 - at* several control areas, and poorly maintained step-off pad The inspectors also identified a security post with the guards' view.
obstructe These items were pointed out to the station health physicists and head of security and the items corrected within one to two work days and verified by the inspector While operating at nearly full power, Unit 2 experienced a trip of the 2A recirculation MG set on May 23, 1981, which placed the license in a 24-hour LCO for single loop operatio CECo applied for and received an emergency Technical Specification change to continue single loop operation for eight days and later applied for and received a twenty-eight day authorization for continued single loop operatio The authorization placed conservative restrictions on power level, Minimum Critical Power Ration (MCPR), MCPR-LCO, Minimum Average Planer Linear Heat Generation Rate (MAPLHGR), APRM Scram and Rod Block Settings. It *also required the idle loop suction valve to be closed, and monitoring of APRM flux noise and* core plate delta P nois with allowable limits on eac The inspectors verified compliance with the~e restrictions by observing licensee activitie No item of non-compliance were identifie Monthly Maintenance Observation Station maintenance activities of safety related systems and com-ponents listed below were observed/reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides and industry codes or standards and in conformance with technical specification The following items were considered during this review:
the limiting conditions for operation were met while components or systems were removed from service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work; activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were inspected as applicable; functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems to service; quality control records were maintained; activities were accomplished by qualified pe.rsonhel; parts and materials used were properly certified; radiological controls were implemented; and, fire *pre-vention controls were implemente The following.maintenance activities were observed/reviewed:
Unit 2 TIP machine repair Diesel Generator Unit 3 Isolation Condenser Snubbers
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9" Units 2 and 3 Diesel Generator SRM and IRM Inoperative Bypass I~stallatio Following completion of maintenance on the Units 2 and 3 Diesel generator, the inspector verified that these systems had been returned to service properl No items of noncompliance were identifie.
Monthly Surveillance Observation The inspectors observed technical specifications required surveil-lance testing on the Units 2 and 3 LPRMs, SRMs, IRMs, and the Unit 2 Automatic Blowdown System and verified that testing was performed in accordance with adequate procedures, that test instrumentation was calibrated, that limiting conditions for operation were met, that removal and restoration of the affected components were accomplished, that test results conformed with technical specifications and pro-cedure requirements and were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test, and that any deficiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by* appropriate management personnel.*
The inspector also witnessed portions of the following test activ-ities: Unit 2 CRD Scram time test, Isolation condenser high flow test, LPRM Plateaus, and the Unit 3 Drywall - Torus pumpback calibration, HPCI operability.tes Following the HPCI Operability Test, the inspectors noted that Technical Specification Surveillance 4.3.C.l requires that the HPCI Subsystem test shall demonstrate capacity. of at least 5,000 gpm against a system head corresponding to a reactor vessel pressure of 1150 to 150 psig. It is not clear whether ~t is necessary or not to operate the HPCI turbine steam supply pressures ranging from normal operating pressure to 150 psi to adequately demonstrate operabilit This matter will be forwarded to Headquarters for evaluation and resolutio (Unresolved Item 50-249/81-10-01; 50-237/81-18-01)
During a review of Control Rod Drive scram time testing prior to Unit 2. startup following refueling, it was noted that Technical Specification 4.3.C.l requires that "After each *refueling outage and prior to power operation with reactor pressure above 800 psig, all control rods shall be subject to scram time tests from the fully withdrawn position." The licensee fullfilled this requirement by performing the testing with t~e reactor depressurize A ieview of the Technical Specification bases and control rod drive operating data indicates that the wording of 4.3.C.l may better be interpreted to mean "perform* the tests at ")' 800 psig, but before power operation".
The licensee performed additional testing from rated reactor pressure to satisfy the possibility that* the inspectors' interpretation. is
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the correct on The licensee will continue to research for docu-mentation which he believes exists to support the current testing progra This item will be forwarded to Headquarters for interpre-tatio (Open Item 50-237/81-18-02; 50-249/81-i0-02)
No items of noncompliance were identifie.
Licensee Event Reports Followup Through direct observations, discussions with licensee personnel, and review of records, the following event reports were reviewed to determine that reportability requirements were fulfilled, immediate corrective action was accomplished, and corrective action to prevent recurrence had been accomplished in accordance with technical specifi-cation LER 81-18 81-19 81-20 81-21 81-22 81-27 LER 81-12 81-13 Unit 2 Pipe Failure - thru.wall leak on 3/4 inch equalizer line around LPCI testable check valve A0-1501-2S Close Pipe Failure - leak in 3/4 inch vent line for the isolation condenser condensate return lin Close Pipe Failure - thru wall leak in the head spray lin Close Drywell sampling valve 2-9208-A failed to clos Close Pipe socket weld failure on bonnet leak off line to MO 2-202-S Close Unit 2 diesel generator found inoperative due to detached lube oil pump failure, while*the Unit 2/3 diesel generator was out of service for quarterly maintenanc Close Unit 3 Drywell oxygen analyzer low fl9w due to worn belts on the sample pum Close Grinnel. hydraulic snubbers in isolation condenser pipe way possibly inoperative due.to low oil leve Close With respect to LER 50-237/81-20, although the cause of pipe failure (crack) has not been determined at this time, a mettalurgical analysis is being conducted and the results will be forthcoming under a revised LE Since the licensee removed, replaced, and satisfactorily tested the affected pipe, this LER is considered close No items of noncompliance were identifie ** IE Bulletin Followup For the IE Bulletins listed below the inspector verified that the
.written response was within the time period stated in the bulletin, that the written response included the information required to be reported, that the written response included adequate corrective action commitments based on information presentation in the bulletin and the licensee's response, that licensee management forwarded copies of the written response to the appropriate onsite management representatives, that information discussed in the licensee's written response was accurate, and that corrective action taken by the licensee was as described in the written respons IEB 79-02, Rev. 1 (Open)
IEB 79-03A (Closed)
IEB 79-07 (Open)
Pipe Support Base Plate Designs Using Concrete Expansion Anchor Bolt Longitudinal Weld Defects in ASME SA-312, Type 302 Stainless Steel Pip Seismic Stress Analysis of Safety Related Pipin IE Bulletins 79-02 and 79-07 have been referred to Region III for analysis by.inspectors with expertise commensurate with the subject matter addressed in the No items of noncompliance were identifie.
Inspection During Long Term Shutdown The inspector observed control room operations, reviewed applicable logs and conducted discussions with control room operators during*
the period of May 9 - June 5, 1981, on Unit 1 and May 9 - May 11, 1981, on Unit The inspector verified surveillance tests required during the shutdown were accomplished, reviewed tagout records,. and verified applicability of containment integret Tours of Unit 1 accessible areas, including exterior areas were made to make inde-pendent assessments of equipment conditions, plant conditions, radiological controls, safety, and adherence to regulatory require-ments and to verify that maintenance requests had been initiated for equipment in need of maintenanc The inspector observed plant housekeeping/cleanliness conditions, including potential fire hazards, and verified implementation of radiation protection control The inspector by observation and direct interview verified that the physical security plan was being implemented in accordance with the station security pla The inspector reviewed the licensee's jumper/bypass controls to verify there were no conflicts with technical specifications and verified the implementation of radioactive waste system control * r
~*
During a routine review of the Unit 1 activities, the SRI questioned licensee personnel with respect to measures which are currently taken to assure that adequate water level is maintained in the steam drum, and to verify that the level detector reference legs are maintained full of wate The question arose as a result of the March 5, 1981 incident on Unit 2, where an individual received in excess of 20 Rems whole body exposure as a result of an undetected reduction in reactor vessel water level due to aloss of water in a level detector reference le Although there doesn't appear to be a situation where an incident that serious could evolve at Unit 1 at this time, the SRI feels that, if water level becomes reduced, and the condition is not detected because of reduced reference leg level, it could aggravate any corrosion occuring in the piping and components above the reactor due to the combination of air and moisture being sim-.
ultaneously presen Licensee personnel have committed to develop a surveillance to routinely verify water in the level reference leg and calibration of the level instrument This is an open inspection ite (50-10/81-07-01)
No items of noncompliance were identifie.
Meetings, Training and Off-Site Functions The resident inspectors met with Mr. W. B. Menczer of Region III, attended the Shabbona Fire District's monthly meeting in Coal City, on May 18, 1981, to present an overview of the NRC followed by a question and answer perio The resident inspectors also attended a
~eminar at the NRC Region III office on May 13, 14, and 15, 198.
Exit Interview The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1) throughout the inspection period and at the conclusion of the inspection on June 5, 1981 and summarized the scope and findings of the inspection activities. The licensee acknowledged the findings of the inspectio