IR 05000010/1976018
| ML19340A837 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Dresden  |
| Issue date: | 09/20/1976 |
| From: | Johnson P, Knop R, Kohler J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19340A833 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-010-76-18, 50-10-76-18, 50-237-76-21, 50-249-76-19, NUDOCS 8009040660 | |
| Download: ML19340A837 (17) | |
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR RECULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
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REGION III
Report of Operations Inspection
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IE Inspection Report No. 050-010/76-18 IE Inspection Report No. 050-237/76-21 IE Inspection Report No. 050-249/76-19 Licensee:
Commonwealth Edison Company P. O. Box 767 Chicago, Illinois Dresden Nuclear Power Station License No. DPR-2
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Units 1, 2 and 3 License No. DPR-19 Morris, Illinois License No. DPR-25 Category:
C Type of Licensee:
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Type of Inspection:
Routine, Unannounced
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Dates of Inspection:
August 18-20 and 24-26, 1976 CNwk 9(2),6
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Principal Inspector:
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hnson (Date)
Accompanying Inspectors: R. C. Knop (August 18)
SMX f5wf J. E. Kohler
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(August 18-20)
(date)
Other Accompanying Personnel:
W. E. Converse Division of Operating Reactors, NRR R. C. Knop,;"C ief l w C'
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Reviewed By:
Reactor Projects Section No. 1 (Date)
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SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
.O Inspection Summary Inspection on August 18-20 and 24-26, 1976, (Unit 1, 76-18; Unit 2,
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76-21; and Unit 3, 76-19): Review of surveillance and calibration pro-grams (Unit 1 only), refueling outage preparations (Unit 3 only), non-licensed training, and. licensee actions related to previous noncompliance and miscellaneous followup items.
Enforcement Items None.
Licensee Actions on Previously Identified Enforcement Items
Licensee corrective actions related to five previor.s noncompliance items
'were found to have been completed.
(Paragraph 8, leport Details)
Other Significant Items A.
Systems and Components The licensee has taken action to prevent possible itoperability of the Unit 2/3 standby gas treatment system as the result of a single-l component failure.
(Paragraph 9.h, Report Details)
B.
Facility Items None.
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C.
Managerial Items None.
D.
Noncompliance Identified and Corrected by Licensee None.
E.
Deviations None.
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F.
Status of Previously Reported Unresolved Items 1.
The licensee has determined that operation of the Unit I core spray system satisfies performance requirements with or with-out the diesel fire pumps in operation.
(Paragraph 4.b, Report Details)
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2.
Existing volume-concentration requirements for the Unit I standby liquid control system are consistent with system design.
(P5ragraph 9.a. Report Details)
3.
The licensee had completed a review of documentation related to Unit 2/3 flood protection modifications.
(Paragraph 6,
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Report Details)
4.
The licensee has approved facility modifications which call for replacement of the Units 2 and 3 main steam line temper-ature switches with an improved design.
(Paragraph 9.d, Report Details)
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5.
Adminstrative Procedures provide for required documentation of assignments to onsite review activities.
(Paragraph 9.f.
Report Details)
Management Interview A management interview was conducted with Messrs Stephenson (Station Superintendent), Roberts (Assistant Superintendent), Abel (Administra-
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tive Assistant), and other members of the station staff at the con-clusion of the inspection.
The following matters were discussed:
A.
The inspector stated that a review of Unit I calibration and surveillance programs had been conducted with no noncompliance identified. The following specific comments were presented:
1.
The setpoint being used for the pressure switch which indicates reactor pressure greater than core spray header pressure for core spray injection was discussed.
It was noted that the setpoint of 20 + 5 psig being used appeared reasonable in consideration of the instrument range, although no specific Technical Specifications limit was provided.
The licensee stated that a proposed setpoint would be included in the next Unit 1 Technical Specifications change request.
(Paragraph 3, Report Details)
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2.
Completed check sheets for one surveillance test and the remaining portion of a second surveillance test were not available for review. The inspector noted that operating logs
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had documented satisfactory performance of the surveillance tests, although additional attention should be given to the maintenance of surveilla.co records. The licensee acknowledged
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the inspector's comment.
(Paragraph 4, Report Details)
B.
The status of the licensee's commitment to revise station pro-cedures was discussed. The inspector noted that although reformat-ing by the licensee's consultant was stated to have been completed in June, over half of the instrument surveillance procedures were still undergoing review and revision prior to issue.
Licensee representatives stated during the interview that a letter to the
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Division of Operating Reactors would update the status of the commitment and indicate a planned completion date.
(Paragraph 9.1, Report Details)
C.
The inspector noted
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previous inspectionyphat the management interview following a s
had included discussion of entry into the drywell with the reactor critical and the inspectors' observation that a governing procedure had not been provided. ~It was noted'
that because of union agreements, such entries are made only by management personnel. After further discussion, licensee repre-sentat$ves stated that an Administrative Procedure would be issued to provide guidance to management personnel making entries into primary coJ*ainment during reactor operation.
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D.
The inspector stated that a considerable backlog of deviation report investigations and reviews were noted to remain outstanding, including 23 deviation reports (mostly related to instrumentation)
for events which occurred in 1975. The licensee stated that efforts were being made to reduce the backlog by combining similar reviews where possible. The licensee stated after further discussion that consideration would be given to establishing a time limit for the investigation and review of non-reportable deviations.
(Paragraph 9.j, Report Details)
E.
The licensee was informed that a review had been conducted of documentation related to modifications installed to protect vital equipment from flooding. The inspector stated that the commitment 2/
to the Division of Operating Reactors was considered to have been completed, although minor changes remained to be made to facilitate operation and/or testing.
(Paragraph 6, Report Details)
1,/ IE Inspection Rpts No. 050-010/75-16, No. 050-237/75-22 and No. 050-249/75-19.
2,/ Ltr, Abel to Ziemann, dtd 8/23/73.
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F.
The inspector stated that non-licensed training activities and some Unit 3 refueling outage preparations had been reviewed during the inspection without comment.
(Paragraphs 5 and 11-17 Report Details)
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G.
The inspector stated that licensee actions in response to five
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i previous noncompliance items were determined to have been completed.
(Paragraph 8, Report Details)
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The licensee was advised that additional review had shawn actions i
related to IE Bulletin No. 76-01, Isolation Condenser Tube Failure, to have been completed, although it was understood that shell side
i water sampling would continue at a biweekly frequency until the
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inspector concurred that a valid base level had been established.
It was also noted that further review was to be given to vent monitor alarm setpoints.
(Paragraph 7, Report Details)
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REPORT DETAILS Part I
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Prepared By:
P. H. Johnson and R. C. Knop
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1.
Persons Contacted B. Stephenson, Station Superintendent A. Roberts, Assistant Superintendent J. Abel, Administrative Assistant
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E. Budzichowski, Unit 1, Operating Engineer R. Campbell, Intrument Foreman T. Ciesla, Enginer V. Danese, Nuclear Station Operator J. Eenigenburg, Maintenance Engineer J. Harrison, Engineer
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R. Herbert, Unit 1, Leading Engineer W. Hildy, Instrument Engineer J. Kolanowski, Unit 2, Leading Engineer T. Kraakevik, Engineer T. Lang, Engineer E. Montanus, Nuclear Station Operator R. Nimmer, Surveillance Coordinator
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J. Phillips, Instrument Mechanic D. Ringo, Engineering Assistant
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G. Romba, Engineer C. Schiavi, Modifications Coordinator N. Scott, Unit 2, Operating Engineer B. Spelde, Procedures Coordinator (Prospective)
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7. Watts, Technical Staff Supervisor R. Weidner, Procedures Coordinator 2.
General
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Units 1, 2 and 3 were operating routinely at the time of this inspection.
3.
Calibration (Unit 1)
The inspection included a review of safety related calibrations for Unit 1.
The review included examination of selected calibrations against procedural and Techncial Specifications requirements,
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verification of calibations on selected test instruments, and observation of a functional test performed on an off-gas monitor channel. The only comment resulting from the review was related to
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I the setpoint used for pressure switches which verify reactor pressure greater than core spray header pressure for injection
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valve actuation. The Technical Specifications do not provide a required setpoint for this parameter. The licensee was using a setpoint of 20 1 5 psig, to keep the setpoint within the mid range
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of the 50 psig ipstrument.
Following discussion of this item in the management interview, licensee representatives stated that a proposed setpoint would be included with the next Unit 1 Technical Specifications change request.
4.
Surveillance (Unit 1)
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A review was conducted to verify that Cait 1 surveillance activities during the past year had been conducted in accordance with Technical Specifications and procedural requirements. The review included examination of documents related to several selected surveillance requirements, as well as review of the procedures used in the per-formance of the required surveillance. The following comments resulted from the reviaw:
a.
Completed surveillance checklists for one monthly diesel generator functional test (March 31, 1976) and a portion of a weekly control rod exercise (July 11, 1976) were not available
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for review; however, the Shift Engineer or Reactor Log for these dates showed the required tests to have been satisfactorily
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completed, i
b.
Documentation of the core spray flow rate test (Technical Specifications, Paragraph 4.5.A.l.b) was included in the doc-unentation of the core spray system auto initiation test.
Documentation of
..is test has been missing since the com-pletion of the last Unit I refueling outage; noncompliance previous inspection report. yntation was identified in a related to the missing docug Examination showed that the approved procedure, if satisfactorily completed, would have verified proper system flow rates, and a representative who reviewed the completed test prior to its mislocation stated previous inspection report fsatisfactorily completed.
that the procedure had beeg A
noted that core spray flow rates were not acceptable without the die.ael-driven fire pumps in operation. A subsequent facility change which provided for
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3/ IE Inspection Rpt No. 050-010/76-02.
4/ IE Inspection Rpt No. 050-010/74-15.
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J automatic operation of the core spray pump minimum flow valves was expected to remedy this situation. An engineer who participated in the conduct of the last core spray flow rate
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test presented a photocopy of portions of the test data which showed that all two-pump combinations of the core spray system provided the required discharge head and flow rate with or
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without the diesel-drive fire pumps in operation.
5.
Preparation for Refueling (Unit 3)
This review included examination of selected procedures related to refueling, fuel inspection and fuel sipping activities scheduled to be performed during the forthcoming refueling outage. No comments resulted from the review.
6.
5rotection of Critical Equ'- ment from Flooding (Units 2 and 3)
During a recent inspection,E! the licensee committed to perform an onsitc review of August 1, 1976, of all plant modifications installed i
to prevent flooding of safety related components to verify that such modifications have been properly installed, tested and doc-umented. The inspector verified that an onsite review was com-pleted on July 19, 1976, and that the review determined that the original modifications had been properly installed, tested and documented. Related modifications involving replacing the LPCI pump room doors (both units) and the Unit 3 CCSW vault door permanent test fixture modification are scheduled to be completed during subsequent outages.
(Both Unit 3 modifications are scheduled to be
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completed during the fall 1976 refueling outage.) The inspector i
noted that these were supplemental modifications to facilitate testing or operation, and that the licensee's commitment to protect equipment from flooding had been completed.
a.
The inspector verified selected procedures had been revised and approved to include flood protection provisions. Proceduces reviewed were:
38-030-S-11 DOA-902(3)7 A10 1500-S-IV DOA-902(3)7 A16 DOA-4400-3 DOA-902(3)7 F16 DOA-4400-4 DOA-902(3)7 H15 DOA-4400-5 DOS-4400-1 b.
The inspector also reviewed selected modifications to verify testing documentation. Modifications reviewed were:
i 5/ IE Inspection Rpts No. 050-010/76-14, No. 050-237/76-17 and No. 050-249/76-15.
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M-12-3-72-111 M-12-2-72-85 (
M-12-2-76-29 M-12-3-76-29 M-12-2-73-162
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The inspector stated that he had no further questi irus regarding this matter.
7.
IE Bulletin No. 76-01, Isolation Condenser Tube Failure In followup of previous inspection activity,6/ the inspector reviewed the status of completion of required actions for IE Bulletin No. 76-01.
The review indicated:
a.
Unit 1 procedure DOA 1300-2 and Unit 2/3 procedure DOA 1300-1, High Level in Emergency Condenser, have been revised to include statements of action required should review of
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measured variables indicate a leaking tube in the condenser.
b.
The licensee has instituted shell side water sampling at least biweekly to monitor activity for the purposes of estab-lishing a background reading. This sampling program is to continue at this frequency until a satisfactory base level has been established. Samples will thereafter be taken at a monthly frequency.
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c.
Daily surveillance sheet entries document the daily level and j
temperature of the water in the shell side of the isolation condenser, d.
The licensee stated that additional evaluation would be made to determine appropriate shell side vent monitor alarm setpoints.
Except for the review related to vent monitor alarm setpoints, the above completed required actions by the licensee in response to IE Bulletin No. 76-01.
8.
Followup on Items of Noncompliance The review of licensee actions in response to previous items of noncompliance considered assignment of responsibility for corrective actions and accomplishment of corrective actions and measures identified to avoid recurrence. This inspection included review of corrective actions outlined in licensee responses to three enforcement letters as follows:
6/ IE Inspection Rpts No. 050-010/76-11, No. 050-237/76-14 and No. 050-249/76-12.
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a.
Response Da'ed May 21, 1976 ('
This response discussed one infraction related to an isolated pressure switch. The inspector noted during initial review of the event that the problem hsd been discussed with the instrument mechanic who performed the surveillance. Review during the
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current inspection showed that procedure 33-200-III had been revised to provide verification that the instrument valves are reopened following each test. The licensee's' review of similar procedures will be followed as part of the licensee's procedure upgrade commitment to NRR.
Item resolved.
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b.
Response dated June 1, 1976 (1) Infraction No. 1 - Satisfactory functional test of the Unit 2 refueling interlocks on March 28, 1976, was doc-umented as part of a Refueling Prerequisites Checklist (DFP 800-S3) Although no specific documentation was
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provided the Assistant Superintendent stated that the
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noncompliance item had been review with the three operating engineers, and that the types of refueling grapple maintenance which would require subsequent functional test of t!.e refueling interlocks had been specifically discussed.
Item resolved.
(2) Infraction No. 3 - The inspector verified that the Unit
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1 control rod exercise procedure (DOS 30G-1) had been revised as described in the licensee's response.
Item
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(3) Deficiency No. 1 - The inspector verified that the Unit 2/3 Master Refueling Procedure had been revised as described in the licensee's response to require verification that personnel are not within line-of-sight of the reactor grip prior to control rod movements.
Item resolved.
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c.
Response dated August 9, 1976 Infraction No. 2 - LPCI pump and valve operability were verified to have been successfully completed on June 1 and 2, 1976. The Operating Engineer stated that the matter had been discussed with shift foreman and shift. engineers. The licensee 2/ IE Inspection Rpt No. 050-237/76-06.
8/ IE Inspection Rpts No. 050-010/76-07 and No. 050-237/76-07.
9/ IE Inspection Rpts No. 050-237/76-14.
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also stated that in'11ght of more recent development, additional consideration was being given to improvements in the computer
'gs program used for scheduling surveillance so that the latest acceptable date for performance of each required surveillance i
test would be more clearly indicated.
Item resolved.
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9.
Miscellaneous Followup Items a.
Standbv Liquid ' Control SystemmVolume/ Concentration (Unit 1).
lf' identified an unresolved item A previous inspection report related to an increase in standby liquid control (SBLC) system volume resulting from back-leakage from the reactor. The
. report noted a resulting decrease-in boron concentration in the high pressure tank and an increase in volume in the low
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pressure tank. A modification installed during the 1975-76 refueling outage provided easier removal for maintenance of three valves installed between the SBLC system and the reactor.
The referenced report also noted that back-leakage had been stopped by allowing pressure in the high pressure tank to
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equalize with reactor pressure. Subsequent review has also shown that the relative concentration between the high pressure and low pressure tanks is not a consideration in system performance; system design is rather based upon injection of the total volume of both tanks within a specified time interval.
Technical Specifications also do not establish requirements for concentration of periodic sampling of both tanks. The
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a specifications call for periodic sampling of the concentration
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in the low pressure tank, combined with recirculatior. of the two tanks together during each refueling outage. This is-i considered adequate to assure system operation within design
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requirements.
Item resolved, b.
Modification of TIP Ball Valves (Units 2 and 3).
Correspondence between General Electric and AEC Regulatory Operations in 1973 discussed the failure of a traversing in-core probe (TIP) ball valve to isolate at ar.other facility when the TIP was retracted with the containment pressurized. The correspondence stated that this resulted from the design of the gravity-operated l
limit switch which initiates valve closure after TIP retraction.
This information was passed to BWR licensees as CE Service
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10/ IE Inspection Rpt No. 050-010/74-15.
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Laformation Letter No. 49, which called for replacement of the gravity-operated limit switch with a magnetic-type f
proximity switch. Station records showed this modification to have been installed in Unit 2 during the 1976 refueling outage (Modification 74-107). The modification had also been
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approved for installation in Unit 3 during the fall 1976 refueling outage (Modification 75-124).
Item resolved.
c.
Diesel Generator Shutdown Procedure (Units 2 and 3).
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previous inspection report discussed procedure changes which were to be made to provide for proper speed droop settings when returning diesel generators to a standby con-dition. Review of procedures during the current inspection showed that appropriate procedure revisions had been issued.
Item resolved.
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Replacement of Main Steam Line Temperotyre Switches (Units 2 id! identified an unresolved and 3).
A previous inspection report
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matter in that the Fenwal series 17000 thermoswitch used to monitor main steam line and HPCI steam line temperatures appeared to be a misapplication of the switch. This report stated that the licensee was A
subsequent inspection report g7 viewing an alternate system.
y-noted that the HPCI temperature switches had been replaced. A licensee representative stated during the current inspection that Modification No.74-175 had been approved for Units 2 and 3.
This modification could not
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be installed during the 1976 Unit 2 refueling outage due to
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parts unavailability. Parts were stated to be on hand for (
installing the new temperature sensors in Unit 3 during the forthcoming fall 1976 refueling outage, e.
Freezigg,of Valve 363M6 (Unit 1).
A previous inspection ill report discussed the licensee's actions to prevent freezing of valve 363M6. This valve, a manual drain valve on a contaminated condentate storage tank, froze in December,1974, as a result of exposure to cold weather. Review of facility records and examination of the previous valve location established that the valve had been removed during the past refueling outage as part of Unit 1 Modification No. 73-21.
Item resolved.
11/ lE Inspection Rpts No. 050-237/76-17 and No. 050-249/76-15.
12/ RO Inspection Rpts No. 050-237/74-10 and No. 050-249/74-12.
13/ IE Inspection Rpts No. 050-237/75-22 and No. 050-249/75-19.
14/ IE Inspection Rpt No. 050-010/75-05.
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Documegration of Onsite Review Functions. A previous inspection reportad' identified unresolved matters associated with the assignment of personnel to the onsite review function and
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documentation of their review of investigation findings and recommendations associated with abnormal occurrences.
Review of related practices during the current inspection showed
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documentation of these areas to be consistent with require-meats. A list of persons appointed to c-
..e review activities is maintained, showing areas of expertise for each individual.
This list is periodically updated by a formal onsite review which is approved by the Station Superintendent. Selection of individuals to perform a review of a particular item is issued in writing with the Station Superintendent's approval.
Station practices have also for some time called for deviations reports and related occurrence reports to be formally reviewed by the onsite the review function before the occurrence report is dispatched. This provides for documentatica of the onsite function review of recommendations resulting from investigation of the occurrence.
Item resolved.
g.
Change in Core Spray Piping Design Pressure (Unit 2).
The licensee stated during a previous inspection 1E'
that the need for a change to the bases of Technical Specifications Section 1.2 would be reviewed. The reason for the review was a decrease indesignpressureofasectionofcorespraypipingfromlp ~ to 1150 psig, as discussed in an earlier inspection report.--- The licensee stated during the current inspection that the _ review had determined a change to the Technical Specifications bases to be in order, and that the proposed change had been i processed through onsite and offsite review in preparation for submission to the NRC.
Item resolved.
h.
Single Failure of Standby Gas Treatment System (Units 2 and 3).
AnunygyaleventreportedbytheQuad-CitiesstationinJune, 19 75,--- discussed a situation in which the standby gas treatment system (SGTS) was rendered inoperable by a single failure.
The inspector inquired during the current inspection whether the problem was also applicable to Dresden. Licensee repre-sentatives stated by telephone subsequent to the inspection that review had shown the design of the Dresden SGTS to be similar, in that operability of the Dresden SGTS to be similar, in that operability of Dresden SGTS could also be defeated by 15/ RO Inspection Rpts No. 050-010/74-08, No. 050-237/74-05 and No. 050-249/74-08.
16/ IE Inspection Rpt No. 050-237/75-19.
]]/IEInspectiobRptNo. 050-237/75-15.
18/ Ltr, Kalivianakis to NRC, dtd 6/20/75.
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. a single failure.
Representatives stated that both inlet valves to the SGTS had been blocked in the open position until I permanent corrective actions could be completed. The inspector stated that the licensee should also consider whether the matter was reportable and why earlier notification of the - problem had been received as a result of the discovery at Quad-Cities.
Resolution of this matter will be reviewed during a future inspection.
Review of S'ation Procedures. Reviewwascogg mine the status of the licensee's commitment-ycted to deter-i.
t to revise and reformat station procedures consistent with requiremenggjof Regulatory Guide 1.33.
The most recent correspondence-- ~ with the Division of Operating Reactors was noted to have called for completion of the revisions by June, 1976. Licensee representatives stated that revision of these procedures by their consultant, General Physics, had been completed by this date, although further review and revision of instrument , surveillance procedures was determined to be necessary prior ' to issue. Approximately 60% of the instrument surveillance procedures remained to be issued. The licensee stated during the management interview that a letter updating the status of the commitment would be forwarded to the Division of Operating Reactors. The inspector stated that completion of the licensee's procedure revision commitment would be reviewed at a later date.
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Review of Deviation Reports. A previous inspection report-
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, tions remained to be investigated and reviewed.
Review during the current inspection showed that the backlog had been reduced, although 23 deviation reviews for 1975 events were still outstanding, most of these related to instrumentation problems.
This matter was discussed further during the management interview.
, 19/ Ltr, Butterfield to O' Leary, dtd 3/1/73.
20/ Ltr, Abrel to Goller, dtd 4/15/76.
21/ IE Inspection Rpts No. 050-010/76-02, No. 050-237/76-01 and No. 050-249/76-01.
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.. & REPORT DETAILS / Part II#6 -
Prepared By: J.
. Kohler ,/ /(Datd)
Reviewed By: W.
ittle /($d@d . (batr6)
10.
Persons Contacted B. Zank L. Davis T. Checca 11.
Formal Training / Retraining The inspector verified that formal training and retraining pro-grams, as described in the Dresden Personnel Training Program (DPP) procedures, exists for the following personnel: a.
New employees (DPP 1) - b.
Temporary maintenance or service personnel (DPP 8) ~ c.
Nonlicensed personnel , d.
Licensed personnel (DPP 4) e.
Technicians (DPP 9) f.
Craf t Personnel (DTP 6) 12.
Formal Training Program Content The inspector examined the DPP 1 procedure titled Orientation, and determined that the following items were addressed: a.
Radiological health and safety b.
Industrial safety
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Controlled access and security procedures d.
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Initial Quality Assurance training 13.
Retraining Program -,
The inspector verified that a retraining program for technicians . .and craft personnel included training in the following areas.
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On the job training (DPP 6 and 9) b.
Formal techn'ical training c.
Fire fighting training (given to station personnel by the R. Leas Company) 14.
Training Responsibilities The inspector verified that responsibility for administering the training program has been assigned to the following key personnel: a.
Station Superintendent b.
Training Supervisor c.
Maintenance Engineer d.
Technical Staff Supervisor } e.
Station Security Officer _ ' Each individual above coordinates the scheduling of courses, lectures and on-the-job training with Training Supervisor.
15.
Periodic Program Reevaluation By inspecting the training files of several individuals chosen at random, the inspector verified that provisions had been made for the periodic evaluation of the training individual records by the Training Supervisor.
16.
Independent Audit The inspector selected two new employees and audited their training record by cross checking the training file with attendance sheets.
The files of V. Howard, Stationman and D. Farrar, Technical Staff were examined and it was determined that they had received training in the following areas: - 16 - r !- . - , ,,..
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Security ' General Station Emergency Plan Quality Assurance - In addition, the inspector audited the training records of two existing employees, R. Nimmer, Surveillance, and G. Reimers, Technical Staff,,and discussed their training history with the Training Supervisor. Since these employees reported for duty before January, 1976 their training folders did not have document ation to show that training in all of the above specified areas had been administered. The Training Superviser stated that no attempt - would be made to backfit new training documentation forms for all station personnel reporting for duty before the present trainir.g program implementation date.
The inspector has no further questions regarding this item.
. The inspector reviewed and audited the training records of the following individuals and determined that they had been admin-istered fire training and formal training. Female employees also received prenatal training.
R. Colegrove, Maintenance . C. Philling, Maintenance G. Bridge, Maintenance - K. Brown, Operating L. Scott, Technical Staff 17. Modified Off-gas Training The inspector attended a training session in the Dresden Unit 1 off-gas system.
The course included both lecture and system tour.
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