IR 05000010/1976020
| ML19340A660 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Dresden  |
| Issue date: | 10/28/1976 |
| From: | Johnson P, Knop R, Shafer W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19340A657 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-010-76-20, 50-10-76-20, 50-237-76-22, 50-249-76-21, NUDOCS 8009020600 | |
| Download: ML19340A660 (25) | |
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:* . . . , - . UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY CO>DfISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT -
REGION III
Report of Operations Inspection IE Inspection Report No. 050-010/76-20 IE Inspection Report No. 050-237/76-22 IE Inspection Report No. 050-249/76-21 Licensee: cam.c.vealth Edison Company P. O. Box 167 Chicago, Illinois 60690 Dresden Nuclear Power Station License No. DPR-2 Units 1, 2, and 3 License No. DPR-19 Morris, Illinois License No. OPR-25 Category: C Type of Licensee: BWR (GE) 200 and 810 SNe Type of Inspection: Routine, Unannounced - Dates of Inspection: September 30, October 5-8 and 12-14, 1976 oCS4 a Principal Inspector: W. D. Shafer, /[ .2, ,7d p (Date) / Z-3 ( 7 () Accompanying Inspcetors: J son (Date) E. II. Essig C. M. Erb Other Accompanying Personnel: None (Iw, a Reviewed By: R. C.YKnop, Chief II/[7L Reactor Projects Section 1 (Date) ,8009020 (O O - ,
. . . ... . . - < SUMMARY OF FINDINGS . Inspection Summary . Refueling Radiation Protection Inspection for Unit 3 on September 30 and October 5, 1976, (76-21): Inspection included a review of noncom-pliance and commitment follow-ups, review of selected records and pro-cedures related to the radiation protection program, observation of radiation protection work in progress and independent measurements of radiation fields at selected locations. No items of noncompliance were identified.
Inspection on October 5-8, and 12-14, (Unit 1, 76-20), (Unit 2, 76-22), and (Unit 3, 76-21): Review of plant operations, nonroutine event ' reports, maintenance (Unit 3 refuel), noncompliance follow-up, independent inspection effort and torus modifications on Units 2 and 3.
No items , of noncompliance were identified.
Enforcement Items None.
_ Licensee Action on Previous 1v Identified Enforcement Items A.
Licensee corrective actions with respect to the enforcement item identified in the IE:III letter of April 23, 1976, were reviewed.
This item remains open, pending establishment by the licensee of a means for adequately segregating survey instruments which are due for calibration.
(Paragraph 4.a, Part II, Report Details) B.
Licensee corrective actions with respect to enforcement Item A.2 identified in the IE:III letter of July 8, 1976, were reviewed.
This matter appears to have been resolved.
(Paragraph 4.b, Part II, Report Details) C.
Licensee corrective actions related to three previo'is noncompliance items and one deviation were verified to have been completed.
(Paragraph 6, Part I, Report Details) Other Significant Items A.
Systems and Components A licensee representative indicated that a second GeLi spectrometer and associated data processing equipment installed in the chemistry laboratory was undergoing preoperational testing.
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. . . B.
Facility Items (Plans and Proce.dures) . None.
C.
Managerial Items . A fourth chemist was added to the radiation chemistry department staff.
(Paragraph 2, Part II, Report Details) D.
Noncompliance Identified and Corrected by Licensee None within the scope of this inspection.
E.
Deviations None.
F.
Status of Previously Reported Unresolved Items The licensee has purchased and has pat into service NIOSH-approved filter cartridges for use on respiratory protection equipment. This item, identified in IE:III Inspection Report No. 050-010/75-06, is 'now considered resolved.
(Paragraph 4.C, Part II, Report Details) ~ Management Interview The following items were discussed on October 5,1976, with Messrs.
Stephenson, Farrar, Adam and Willaford: A.
The inspector stated that no items of noncompliance were identified during this inspection.
B.
The inspector stated that he had reviewed corrective actions taken with regard to an infraction related to flow calibration of contin-uous air monitors (CAMS), and that he had no further questions.
(Paragraph 4.b, Part II, Report Details) C.
The inspector stated that he had reviewed corrective action taken with regard to the neutron survey instrument calibration infraction, and that this item would remain open pending establishment of a means for segregating survey instruments which are due for calibration. The licensee acknowledged the problem and indicated that the licensee's internal auditing program had also indicated that survey instruments due for calibration were not being adequately segregated, and that the making available of additional space for these instruments was under consideration.
(Paragraph 4.a, Part II, Report Details) -3- , .
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The inspector noted that the licensee had purchased and put into , service, NIOSH-approved filter respirator cartridges, and stated this item heretofore considered unresolved, would now be considered closed.
(Paragraph 4.c, Part II, Report Details) E.
The inspector noted that radiological protective clothing and respirator filter cartridges appeared to be in rather short supply.
The licensee indicated that the latter problem would be solved when the remainder of the NIOSH-approved cartridges were shipped from the manufacturer (1000 were ordered initially and 5000 are due to be shipped).
The licensee indicated that the continuing problem with the protective clothing was not as serious as it might appear, since contractor personnel frequently stockpile clothing at job sites, i F.
The inspector noted several efforts to reduce personal radiation exposure during the outage by use of shielding and flushing of equipment. The inspector indicated that such effort should be con-tinued and expanded whenever feasible.
(Paragraphs 3.a, 3.b and 3.c, Part II, Report Details) At the conclusion of the inspection on October 8,1976, a management interview was conducted with Mr. Roberts, Assistant Superintendent and other licensee representatives. The inspectors discussed the following: - A.
Cleanliness in the Unit 1 containment appeared adequate, however, ceasiderable improvement on Units 2 and 3 cleanliness is in order.
A licensee representative stated that plant cleanup assignments are being given a priority rating.
B.
Standby Gas Treatment System.
(Paragraph 3.b, Part I, Report Details) C.
Diesel t enerator Cooling Water Pump.
(Paragraph 3.c, Part I, Report Details) D.
The licensee was informed that a review of Unit 2 refueling outage maintenance activities had been performed with no comments result.ing from the review.
E.
The inspector noted that corrective actions related to one deviation and three previous noncompliance items had been completed, and pre-sented the following comments related to other follow-up items.
1.
The inspector noted that the methods being used to Jeak r st the Units 2 and 3 feedwatcr check valves may not be giving realistic results, but that results received in the recent past have frequently indicated excessive leakage. He expressed his inten-tion to refer the matter to IE:HQ for further review, recom-mending that either a more realistic test method be used or that _4_ . .
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test frequency be increased. The licensee was encouraged to pursue a similar course with NRR.
The licensee acknowledged ~ the inspector's comments.
(Paragraph 7.b, Part I, Repor t Details) 2.
Follow-up reports for two previous reportable occurrences were discussed. The licensee stated that a report describing the results of an analysis of broken jet pump tack welds would be provided shortly af ter Jcnuary 1,.1977, and that a follow-up report would be submitted to outline intended actions with respect to torus /drywell vacuum breaker bushings.
(Paragraphs 7.1 and J, Part I, Report Details) At the conclusion of the inspection on October 14, 1976, a management inter-view was conducted with Mr. Stephenson, Station Superintendent and other licensee representatives. The following was discussed.
A.
The improvement in housekeeping in general was noted. The inspector encouraged the licensee to continue their effort.
B.
The diesel generator cooling water pumps were again discussed.
(Paragraph 3.c, Part I, Report Details) .
C.
The standby gas treatment was discussed.
(Paragraph 3.b, Part I, - Report Details) D.
The inspector stated that the measurements taken on Units 2 and 3 toruses has been accomplished. Additional discussion on main-taining the drywell to torus differential pressure was conducted.
(Paragraph 4, Part I, Report Details) E.
The inspector informed the licensee that Mr. W. D. Shafer is the Principal Inspector effective November 1, 1973.
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. _ _ _ . ____ .. . o ) ( REPORT DETAILS . Part I - Prepared by W. Shafer and P. H. Johnson 1.
Persons Contacted B. Stephenson, Station Superintendent-A. Roberts, Assistant Superintendent J. Abel, Administrative Assistant T. Watts, Technical Staff Supervisor C. Iawton, Office Supervisor E. Budzichowski, Operating Engineer, Unit 1 N. Scott, Operating Engineer, Unit 2 R. Ragan, Operating Engineer, Unit 3 D. Adam, Radiation Chemistry Supervisor J. Dolter, Leading Nuclear Engineer J. Kolanowski, Lead Engineer, Unit 2 C. Sargent, Lead Engineer, Unit 3 B. Coen, Engineer C. Schiavi, Staff Assistant or Modification Coordinator J. Toscas, Engineer - J. Testa, Radwaste Engineer G. Romba, Engineer R. Mirochna-Engineer , , J. Bauer, Shift Engineer R. Thomas, Instrument Foreman V. Danese, Senior Control Operator R. Campbell, Instrumerv arenan R. Dyer, Maintenance Planner J. Eenigenburg, Maintenance Engineer D. Maxwell, Quality Control Engineer B. Spelde, Procedures Coordinator T. Schneider, Chemistry M. Evans, Nuclear Station Operator J. Parry, Health Physics M. Terrell, Engineer ' Sargent and Lundy (S&L) J. Dunkelberg, Construction Engineer 2.
Review of Plant Operations, Units 1, 2 and 3 A review of the licensee's routine plant operations was a.
conducted by inspecting the following records. No significant concerns were identified.
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. . . (. t (1) Control room log books, July 1, 1976 to present.
- (2) Auxiliary log sheets, July 1,1976 to present.
(3) Shift supervisor log books, July 1, 1976 to present.
(4) Operating orders and daily orders in effect.
(5) Bypass logs and hold card logs.
(6) Water chemistry records, July 1, 1976 to present.
b.
The inspectors conducrea a tour of accessible areas and noted the following: (1) Monitoring instrumentation was recording as required.
(2) Radiation controls were properly established.
(3) Fluid leaks and pipe vibrations were minimal.
(4) Seismic restraint oil levels in the torus area were . adequate.
_ (5) Equipment caution and hold cards agreed with control room records.
, The inspectors conducted discussions with control room operators relating to the reasons for various lighted annunciators and also noted that control room manning conformed with the facility's Technical Specifications. No concerns were identified.
3.
Review of Monroutine Event Reports a.
The following Licensee Eient Reports were reviewed to verify that reporting requirements were met, management evaluations were conducted and corrective action was complete and correct.
Unit 1 RO 76-8, Setpoint Drift-Pouer Range Monitor No. 3 Unit j[ RO 76-59, Standby Gas Treatment System Single Failure Potential RO 76-53, Non-conservative Error in Appendix K, ECCS Analysis RO 76-50, Unit 2 Diesel Generator Cooling Water Pump Trip RO 76-49, Failure of Core Spray Valve 1402-24B-7- .
w.. . . ... . . (~ Unit 3 - RO 76-13, Unit 3 Diesel Generator Cooling Water Pump Failure RO 76-11, High Peactor Pressure Switch Setpoint Drift RO 76-10 Clear.up System Heat Exchanger Diaphragm Leak b.
In reviewing R0 }6-59, the inspectar noted that surveillance testing of the SGT system has alwrys been conducted with both Units 2 and 3 ventilation systems isolated, however, an auto signal to the SGTS from one of tFe units will only close that unit's ventilation system. The inspector established that the licensee has initiated a modification request (M12-2/3-76-33) to automatically isolate both ventilation systems. A licensee representative stated that until this modification is made, each ventilation system will continue to operate independ-ently. The licensce's opinion is that because of the large volume of air being moved by the nonisolated ventilation system, any high radiation signal causing SGTS initiation and isolation of one unit's ventilation system, will quickly cause automatic closure of the other ventilation system.
. In a telephone conversation with a licensee representative subsequent to this inspection, the inspector informed the - licensee that any radioactivity rcicased thru the nonisolated ventilation system would be considered an uncontrolled relense until such time as the ventilation system was isolated. The ,' inspector stated that until modification M12-2/3-76-33 is complete an interim measure muit be established. A licensee representative stated that an operating order will be issued to require manual isolation of the ventilation system not closed automatically.
No other concerns were identified.
c.
In reviewing R0 76-50, the inspector determined that if the diesel generator cooling water pump fails when the pump switch is in the manual position, there is no pump failure alarm to alert the control room or the equipment operator. Failure of the pump would not annunciate until the diesel generator specd was greater than 200-RPM. The licensee reported, in RO 76-50 that the pump had been operating for several days in the manual mode for HPCI and LPCI room cooling before the pump breaker uas discovered tripped. To prevent recurrence, louvers have been added to the motor control center cover, however, no corrective action was taken to increase personnel awareness of a pump failure. In discussing this weakness with the licensee the inspector was informed that a modification will be generated to install an alarm for pump f ailure annunciation when the pump is used for LPCI room cooling in the manual mode.
During the interim, this problem will be controlled administra-tively. No other concerns were identified.
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. . a gs \\ In reviewing RO 76-13, Unit 3 Diesel Generator Cooling Water , Pump Failure, the inspector noted that the replacement submersible cooling water pump was used on the Unit 2 diesel generator.
The non-submersible pump on Unit 3 remains installed and an operating order, requiring Unit 3 shut down in the event of flooding in the crib house, remains in effect. A licensee representative stated that a submersible pump will be installed for the Unit 3 diesel generator as soon as parts are available.
4.
Mark 1 EWR Containment Torus Support Inspection The inspectors conducted an inspection on the Units 2 and 3 a.
toruses to obtain measurements on three inner and three outer column support structures on each torus. In addition, a review of the licensee's records indicated that the torus differential pressure is being maintained except during vacuum breaker tests. Most vacuum breaker tests require at least 2 hours for completion, however, the licensee has experienced situation when a 2-hour test period is inadequate.
One example of this occurred on the Unit 2 torus on July 17, 1976, when the dif ferential pressure was not maintained for 915 hours.
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b.
Previous inspection reports noted that facility procedures - did not include requirements establishing when the 1.0 psid drywell-torus differential pressure is required and the extent I to which it may be relaxed for surveillance tests. The inspector noted during the current inspection that Unit 2/3 procedures DOP 1600-5 and DOP 1600-6 had been revised to require estab-lishment of the 1.0 psid consistent with inerting requirements (i.e., within 24 hours after going into the the run mode).
Proced"re 1600-9 also had been revised to allow a two-hour lapse in differential pressure for vacuum breaker testing.
Item resolved.
S.
Refueling Outage Maintenance Activities (Unit 3) The inspection included review of selected maintenance efforts to verify that maintenance, system release, rost-maintenance testing, and related activities were acomplished in s cordance with established ' procedures. Maintenance activities selecte' were: (1) removal of E-9 control rod drive, including cutting of index tube, (2) reactor vessel jet pump inspection, and (3) replacement of 3A recirculation pump seals. The review included observation of a portion of the jet pump inspection. No discrepancies were identified during the review.
. ' 1/ IE Inspection Rpts No. 050-234/76-17 and No. 050-249/76-15.
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Follow-up on Previous Deviations and Noncompliance Items . This inspection included review of one deviation and three previous noncompliance items discussed in the licensee's responses identified below. The review considered assignment of responsibility tor cor-rective actions. review of the items by the licensee and accomp-lishment ct corrective actions and measures identified to avoid recurrence.
2/ a.
Response dated June 1, 1976 Infraccion No. 2 The incore level switch located on the - reactor console was observed to have been labeled as identi-fled in the licensee's response. Review of the licensee's training records showed that the training diacussed in the licensee's response had been provided, and that quizzes to determine the effectiveness of the training were also in pro-gress. A representative number had been quizzed, and follow-up on an individual bcsis was being done where necessary.
Item resolved.
1! - b.
Response dated July 26, 197G Deficiency - The inspector verified that written confirmation - of the necessary data related to the Unit 2 shutdown nargin test had been received by the licensee.
The related procedure, DTS 8134, had also been revised to require written control rod worth information prior to performing a shutdown margin demonstration.
Item resolved.
b! c.
Response dated August 20, 1976 Deviation - Relay 595-117C was verified to have been repaired on September 1, 1976, which was the next outage following the lic?.nsee's response.
Internal distribution of LER's had also been modified as described in the licensee's response.
Item resolved.
5! d.
Responsa dated August 20, 1976 Infraction - Explanatory notes had been placed ir. rork request packages 3846 and 2984 as described in the response.
A revision to warehouse procedure DPR-3 had also been provided to describe the process for changing material for safety related to non-safety related. This procedure was approved for issue on September 22, 1976.
2/ IE Inspection Rpt No. 050-010/76-07.
3/ IE Inspection Rpt No. 050-237/76-13.
4/ IE Inspection Rpt No. 050-249/76-15.
5/ IE Inspection Kpts No. 050-237/76-18 and No. 050-249/76-16.
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Miscellaneous Follow-up Items , a.
Revision of Discharge Cards (Units 2 and 3).
A previous inspection r,eport ' noted that improved discharge card formats E had been provided for Unit I radwaste systtms'. The licensee stated at that time that Unit 2/3 discharge cards would be reviewed for possible similar revision. A licensee represent-ative stated during the current inspection that further review had shown similar revisions for Unit 2/3 to be unwarranted, in view of the very inf requer t discharge of radioactive liquids from Unit 2/3. The representative noted that the maximum recycle liquid waste system was working effectively, and that only one discharge of liquid waste had been made in recent months. The inspector expressed no concern with the licensee's conclusions.
b.
LLRT Frequency for Feedwate, Check Valves (Units 2 and 3).
A previous inspection reporti' discussed excessive feedwater check valve leakage measured during refueling outages by the air pressure test method. The inspector noted that leak-age rates on three of the four feedwater check valves in Unit 2 had subsequently been found excessive during the 1976 refueling , ' outage, and that the first two feedwater check valves tested during the current Unit 3 refueling outage had also shown - excessive as-found leakage rates. The Management Interview section of the referenced inspection report included a dis-cussion of possible means of providing improved reliability of the feedwater check valves, such as increasing test frequency l or installing an additional stop valve.
I.icensee representatives stated that one of the Unit 3 feedwater check valves tested during the current refueling outage had shown excessive leakage during the ini*.ial test, but had given acceptable results when retested following flushing and reseating of the check valve with water.
It was also noted that testing of the feedwater check valves using the air pressure method does not give repre-sentative test results, since the feedwater lines would be filled with water under foreseeable accident conditions. The inspector stated that actions should be initiated to determine whether the air pressure test method was the most appropriate method of leak rate testing for the feedwater check valves.
If , not, actions should be initiated to provide a more representative test, if the air pressure test method is considered to be the most acceptable, then increased frequency of valve testing or other action should be considered to provide added assurance of valve leak-tightness. 'The inspector stated that these concerns would be relayed to IE:HQ, and encouraged the licensee to purse resolution of the question through licensing channels.
6/ IE Inspection Rpt No. 050-010/75-05.
2/ IE Inspection Rpts No. 050-237/75-22 and No. 050-249/75-19.
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Surveillance of Five Protection Equipment. A previous - inspection report ' identified a need for additional
attention to surveillance of fire protection equipment, particularly fire hoses and fire extinguishers.
Licensee records showed that all station fire hoses had been pressure tested in early 1976. Although no records were available, a licensee representative stated that all fire extinguishers
had also been weighed in January 1976. A spot check of fire extinguisher record tags during a plant tour showed the monthly inspections to be current.
Item resolved.
d.
Maintenance of Cable penetrations. A previous inspection report 9/ noted that the licensee's program for assuring the fire-tight , integrity of existing cable penetrations had been essentially completed, although it did not provii'c for proper maintenance of the penetrations in the event of ! uture station modifications.
During the current inspection, it was noted that the licensee had issued a maintenance procedure, DMP-534, which provides guide-lines for the installation of modifications of existing cable penetrations. Licensee representatives stated that a copy of this procedure was included with the modification package of any design change which involves cable penetration work.
Item , resolved.
, e.
Refueling Procedures (Unit 1).
A previous inspection report- /
presented comments related to Unit I refueling activities con-I ducted during the 1975-76 refueling outage. Review showed resolution of the previously identified comments to have been provided, as follows: (1) Revisions to procedures DTS 8471 and DTS 8472 had been issued to provide consistent methods of changing the refueling sequence.
(2) Procedure DFP 800-1 had been revised to require all con-trol rods to be fully inserted during fuel insertion. A Technical Specifications change request had also been initiated to correct an apparent error identified in , Section 3.10.A of the Technical Specifications.
(3) Procedure DFP 800-1 had been revised to require 100 cpm indication on two source range channels prior to control rod withirawal during refueling.
(4) Procedure DOA 800-1 had been issued to define required actions by the refueling crew in the event an evacuation alarm should sound while refueling activities are in p rogress.
8/ IE Inspection Rpts No. 050-010/75-22, No. 050-237/75-27 and No. 050-249/'3-24.
- - 9/ Ibid.
J0/ IE Inspection Rpt No. 050-010/75-22.
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Processing of Deyfation Reportg.
It was noted during a pre-il/ vioaa inspection that a backlog of nonreportable deviation , report reviews had accumulated, and that efforts were being made to restore the review schedule to a more current con-dition. Review during the current inspection showed the backlog to have been largely eliminated, with remaining older reviews in progress. A licensee representative also stated that a precedure change in routing for review would establish a normal time limit of 30 days for submission of deviation report evaluations for final review, although the Technical Staff Supervisor would be authorized to extend this period in special situations. The inspector stated that this itea was considered to be resolved, but that the status of deviation report reviews would be a matter of continued interest during conduct of the regular inspection program, g.
Increased Coolant, Sampling During Startup (Unit 1).
A Previous inspection report :' noted that procedure changes shculd be con-i sidered to assure that coolant sampling frequency is increased during startup conditions. Review during the current inspection showed procedure DGP 1-1 to have been revised to require notification to Radiation Protection when increased sampling frequency is required.
Item resolved.
h.
Diesel,Gonerator As-Built Drawing (Unit 1).
A previous inspection ~ 227 report identified a needed correction to diesel generator as-build drawing No. 12-416.
Revieu showed the aperature card for this drawing to have been stamped " revision pending," and a marked-up copy of the drawlag had been placed in the pending file.
Item resolved.
1.
Tcrus/Drywell Vacuun Breaker Bushings (Units 2 and S) The licensee's Abnormal Occurrence Report No. 237/74-2712 stated that phosphorous-bronze bushings had been installed in one torus /drywell vacuum breaker as part of a study to resolve a sticking problem. The licensec's report stated that if the neu bushing werked satisf actorily, all vacuum breakers would receive the same modification.
Licensee representatives confirmed during this inspection that the phosphorous-bronze bushing was still installed, but that no further actions had been tak .t since no recurrence of the sticking problem had been experi<.tced.
Licensee representatives stated that a follow-up to the abnormal occurrence report would be provided to clarify the licensee's intentions with regard to vacuum breaker bushings.
J1/ IE Inspection Rpts No. 050-010/76-18, No. 050-237/76-21 and No. 050-249/76-19.
12/ IE Inspection Rpt No. 050-010/76-02.
lj3/ IE Inspection Rpt No. 050-010/76-06.
14/ Ltr Stephenson to O' Leary, dtd 7/29/74.
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_ Follow-up Report on Jet Pump Tack Welds (Unit 2).
The inspector ~ inquired about the status of a follow-up report which was established as a commitment in Licensee Event Report No. 237/76-19.
Licensee representatives stated that a report on the analysis of two brcken we]ds sent to General Electric for examination was due on January 1, 1977, and that a follow-up report would be submitted to the NRC shortly theteafter, k.
Functional Tes t o{d'_Euel Shipping Cask Cooling System. A previous inspection report-noted that improvements to procedure SOP-119 were needed to provide for verification of cask cooling system operability prior to releasing the cask for shipaient. Review during the current inspection showed that appropriate verifica-tions had been incorporated into a recent revision of the procedure.
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15/ IE Inspection Rpt No. 050-237/76-13.
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D '3' } f - . Wo c . . .2 ( '. REPORT DETAILS . Part II ! Prepared By: T. 'd. Essig.
, IO Ff hp (Date) Revieeted By: W. L. Fisher /d[19!76 h (Date) , g . 1.
Persons Contacted B. Stephenson, Station Superintendent D. Farrar, Assistant Technical Staff Supervisor F. W111aford, Quality Assurance Inspector D. Adam, Radiation Chemistry Supervisor D. Sicipson, Health Physicist J. Parry, Health Physicist V. Chaney, Radiation Protection Foraman R. Schumacher, Radiation Protection Foreman T. Schnieder, Chemist R. Regan, Operating Engineer J. McGee, General Electric Company - R. Hudapeth, Ceneral Electric Company
2.
Radiation Protection Organization - Staff Changes, A chemist, whose qualifications include BS and MS degrees, was added to the radiation chemistry department staf f.
3.
Unit 3 Outage Unit 3 began a refueling outage on September 19, 1976, about three weeks later than planned, due to unscheduled cutages at other facilities on the Cea.r.onwealth Edison system. At the time of the inspection, all of the fuel unloading from Unit 3 had been completed.
The inspector observed ongoing work at various locationc in the reactor building, drywell, and turbine building. Nearly all work was under continuous radiation pratection coverage, including collection of air camples, perform.ance of nnear surveys, measurement of exposure rates, and timekeeping,. The inspector used an instrument to veri.t'y Itcensee ceasurements of external radits bn fields.
No problems were noted. Radiation protection aspects of specific jobs observed by the inspector are discussed '.410w: l - 15 -
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Reactor Building - The inspector observed the out-of-core sipping work in progress.
Measurements by the inspector of exposure rates within the radi-ation area ranged from 25-40 ml/hr through the' lead blanket at the valve panel used for sipping (50-100 mR/hr without the lead blanket) to about 1 R/hr at two inches from the spent millipore filters used for sipping (measurement inside of a lead storage container).
Continuous health phynica coverage was provided and the radiation safety cor.trols appeared adequate.
Airberne radioactivity concentrations on the refueling floor generally ranged from 3E-12 to 2E-11,pC1/ml (beta-gamma) and IE-11 to IE-10 pCi/a1 (radiciodine). The inspector nico examined the new CRD repair cage on the third floor.
It was posted as a hjgb radiation area and adequate ettention appeared to hava - been given to decontamination facilitics and ventilation of work surfaces. Contamination levels on CRD components ranged from 40-100 kepm and exposure rates up to 40 mR/hr on contact existed according to the licensee.
b.
Drvwell- . Exposure rates measured by the inspector on the first level in the drywell were 70-100 mR/hr (general field). The inspector - observed contractor personnel cetting up for a job which consisted of grinding welds on a CRD return line in preparation for an in-service inspection. According to a licensee representative, , i the exposure rate in the vicinity of the subject'line was 600 mR/hr. Respiratory protection was to be worn during grinding.
The inspector also observed the job site of the recirculation pump seal replacement, it was noted that lead blanket shielding had been used. Airborne radioactivity levels were typically about IE-11 pCi/ml (gross beta-gamma), although for two specific jobs, concentrations were 7E-10 and 3C-9 pCi/ml. Radioiodine concentrations were about SE-11 pCi/ml. health physics coverage was continuous and radiation safety centrols appeared adequate.
c.
Turbine Building The inspector reviewed the work which was being performed en various turbine components. According to the licensee, radiation conditions for maintenance of turbine components were as follows: general exposure rate at job site, 2-5 mR/hr; exposure rate inside turbine stop valve, 1-2 R/hr; contamination levels on components, 1-100 kepm (the latter inside piping and valves); airborne radioactivity concentrations (beta-gamma), 1E-11 to 1E-10 pC1/ml. The inspector noted that an attempt had been made to reduce contamination levels in the turbine by running the hood spray system for several days before opening the turbine. Continuous health physics coverage was provided.
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. _ _ _. _ . . - . ( The inspector also reviewed the steamline restraint installation ' work in progress in the "X" Area.
Exposure rates up to 50 mR/hr near process piping were noted.
Lead shielding was in place on , much of the piping.
Intermittent health physics coverage was required in this instance.
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4.
Facilities and Equipment a.
Radiation Survev Instrument Storage Area While reviewing the number of instruments available for
monitoring during the outage, the inspector noted that the storage bin for instruments needing calibration was not very well segregated from the storage bin for operational instru-ments and that the space provided was relatively small. The space was too small to accommodate a neutron monitoring instru- ' ment which had just become due for calibration. The lack of calibration for neutron moggyoring instruments had previously resulted in an infract *on.- b.
Flow Calibratica of CAMS The 1,spector reviewed the relevant procedure (DRP-1350-12, " Air Flew Calibration of NMC CAMS," Revision 0, July 1976), - the results of the July 16, 1976 calibration, and examined the equipment used to perform the calibration of the flow ( meter on the CAM. No problems were noted.
(The lack of a flow calibration 1 CAMS had previously resulted in an infraction.-{97)the Unit The licensee indicated that the precision rotometer used for the calibration will itself be calibrated annually in the licensce's corporate headquartere laboratory.
c.
Filter Cartridges for Respirators The licensee indicated that they had purchased NIOSH-approved filter cartridges (MSA Type H Ultrafilter, NIOSH Approval No.
TC 21C-135) and had retired the combination cartridges (filter plus charcoal) which they had previously been using and which hadnotbeenapprovedggjNIOSH, an item which the inspector considered unresolved.-- Approximately 1000 cartridges had been received and 5000 more were on order.
The inspector noted that the new cartridges were in service during his review.
The licensee also indicated that it was still their desire to obtain NIOSE approval of the combination cartridges ar.d that they would continue to pursue this through their supplier.
l l i 16/ IE Inspection Rpt No. 050-010/76-05.
l 17/ IE Inspection Rpt No. 050-010/76-12.
! 18/ IE Inspection Rpt No. 050-010/76-05.
, . - 17 - _ _.
.- . . s-e t . ( . REPORT DETAILS PART III IlsfAl l /tupt Prepared By: C. M. Erb (Date) [ f J,, .'<!: M 70/,g 9lpc Reviewed By: E L' Jordan / (Date) Persons Contacted The following were contacted during this inspection.
Commonwealth Edison Company CECO T. Bor:ym, Quality Assurance M. Terrell, Staff Engineer - Maintenance R. Zentner, Station Construction Engineer . Sargent and Lundy (S&L) , J. Dunkelberg, Construction Engineer Results of Inspection 1.
Quality Assurance Records The torus installation was originally made by Chicago Bridge and Iron Company (CBI). The support modifications were performed by Midwest Power Company (HPC).
The inspector examined the NDE reports and reviewed NCR-136 pertain-ing to modification cf three inside columns No. 10, No. 9 and No. 3.
Magnetic inspection of welds using a Parker Yoke at the top and bottom of the above pipe columns showed indications, which required repair. The welds were repaired to weld precedure 1141-S-1-4 and magnetically inspected to procedure NDT-B.
The corrective action for this problem was acceptable. The welders were qualified and certified for the fillet weld test by Taussig Associates.
Certifications for the pipe used were on file from U. S. Steel and Lakeside Bridge Company. Plates for shims were certified by Ryerson and the weld rod was certified by Lincoln Electric and McKay Company.
All caterial certifications were accepted by S&L Quality Control.
- 18 - .
, . . . -.. -. ... . .. . . . . e , (T . 2.
Mark 1 C1R Containment Torus Support System Modification . I The interim modifications to the torus support system for Dresden-2 and Dresden-3 were complete prior to the start of the IE dimensional checks o'n October 12, 1976. A check of the modifications was made onthree!insidecolumnsNo. 13, No. I and No. 6 and installation was asspect;fied. Certain as built dimensions were checked on inner columns Fo. 13, No. I and No. 6 and on outer columns No. 3, No. 7 and No. 11 on Dresden-2, inner columns No. 16, No. 13 and No. 8, and outer columns No. 16, No. 5 and No. 7 were dimensionally checked on Dresden'3. Drywell to torus differential pressure records for , several!weeksonbothplantswerecheckedandthedpwasmaintained adequately.
The following CBI drawings were used to establish original dimensional requiren'ents for the torus supports: Drawingho.F-1, Revision 2 Drawing No. 206, Revision 1 Drawing No. 207, Revision 0 Drawing No. 205, Revision 1 . The base. plate, web plate and gusset dimensions met drawing specifications. _ Clevis plates, anchor bolts and clevis pins met drawing dimensions.
Fillet weld sizes were rather difficult to determine and there ucre variatiohs above und below the specification.
There was no evidence / of any gap or separation in the base assembly. Tabulation of the dimensichs is given on the attached sheets.
< Attachments:, 1.
Inspectidn Torus Support Structdre, Unit 2 2.
Inspectidn Torus Support Structure, Unit 3 - 19 -
.
. . _ -. . _ _.. . -. _. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _. . _ , . , En epe eh., n Th a Sy4 art strae.bure . , pia n i Dies de n._ Unit 2 -
p oant GCD.3.3 'J-- . , % er Glan $ cater Givmn llc . . Iten Inspected /~3 /
Ji '7 _ f. I.sn q % % S t z e Welds - csluntn Torus Si, ell Inferrection (3 (.y g,z y . (a) web plate, T y F F t (b) Upper Guss e i
- 'e E '+,f,,
3't & 7' $y, 7'- - Middle G sse t !! A WA 6'A 1G 96,,,
(C) l.o w e r Guss e t, EO S fc4
- k, 1f 7yt
fa ogg
% (d) Patch ?b'les /1/4 Nd atchit eAc-tot n
- rhtt.u N 2, Leng% 4 Stze Pipe aluv.n Welas 300 l
(a) T. Sh b A ss'y flved b i P st* flued to pla l (b) To base A SS Y S'a,ne Sni e ' - - -. _... - - _ -. _. . _ -. -.. _ _ ._ __ _ 3. Colunm - 8 ase Join t (3) %e Clens pin S" f s 6( 6 ', V P ofe3 /( /i /t [
- .
(b) TMcKn er: Clev t3 l [C) ^l.cng(h Cfuts pfaic len:icn plwy see AJJn,],,,,, 'l fu A ddca:/uns I , (c)) S f,ea r Itddespliam / 44deadyn>I o
i.
(e).Si z e T] a s s 'pf a t e 13E KIf I 'l ; x s o
Jame.
(f) Size 1 Leyth Dese p/de we/d k k k 3h sa i,,% ? . _ _ _ _ _ _. .____ _ - _ 4,//unth(r1'Sint Anchor Colt S
2
2 2.
/tJia /t.
/t /i.
Il / - - ~ ~ - - - - - - - - -
a.----asmm..-._-.
-:-- ( 5-Qi> 1 n e ss Anchor [hli3 (-{gudf,}lit Ha n d fig! t f IAo e vid eac e f ca rigir /c3diny on wc,w,
.. - -. - --
- '
' .-
r,' . . A . , . -2- , [3 OUTER COLUMil i IfitiER COLUMN ' '// hispECTED " I3 i f,
7 ,E < ,, . '# * ' Adequate Contact Between Base Plate /'M k8 , ' .
an'd Base Slab , Y" b6 'YN Status o.f Modifications fj" I 7.
Supp rt Blocks Installed as Indicated N/A (a)
%v W Nu - N[A - ! (b) Wedges kleided in Place , .
fliv (W ^ML > . . ! l (c) Pipe Columns Reinforced , g/A Size of Uelds at Column-Torus Shell jjjg i (d) Intersection Increased y/A , Additional Anchor Bolts Installed gjg (e)
(IndicatesizeandType) N/A N[A (f) Size of Web Reinforcing Plates N/A N/S _ > Size of Welds on Ueb Reinforcing Plates ( g)A (g) y/4 , (h) Additional Saddles - Existence and Magnitude of Wetwell to- ' 8.
Drywell Differential Pr, essure Adeguate i (695\\0PSM ' t 0 ;- crdcl(s due (a (en tg e g3 ( n{ S I C S igi1 O f, ga ps . I r1 3:1l (, [ (be ( o /u nt r; 5 jn g p,c f e d'. - . i10TE: d be given An asterick (*) indicates that the item is crucial to design a (1) greater emphasis by the inspector.
i improper The inspector should be on the lookout for any signs of deterio i isalignment, construction of the structure, such as, weld defects, corros on, m ! (2) loose bolts, cracking, etc.
Items not applicable to a specific plant mark il/A.
, (3) o .. l .. ' _ _ _ ._
... . \\ ,.'. 7,_ e . - = ,, , . . - . ~
g - ' Q Lencths of. Clevis 31ste Shear Planc. l .
~(T . tain indicated le.gths "a,b,c_ & d f: ,
intersection at hole perime'ter to e< ,
o, uter Clevis Plate regardlesi of C12 di Plate geometry. M1ere possible, ind:
L h on plant specific diagram the locati l 4 _[, measurements taken.. (_I n s o. Item 3D) , Inner Clevis Plate ' - e - ~ , y - . . . v , ' t g ' "l', ' Ag, l~
4-p Clevis Tc'nsion Plane Length-- ,, Outer Clovis, Plate j/", Determine minimum distance L_ between outer hole perimeter q .g and edge of Clevis plate on - both sides, "e" and "f"(Insp. Item 3C) Base Plate Ucid - ' ' (Inso. item 30 I ,, ^ Column Base Base Plate -' (In sn, y r m,,, ) ~^ g Contact Between Bas'c Plate and Base Slab ,, y. (Insp. Item 6)
, . _TYPICAi,COLUMNC1.EVISJohNT '
. - . . f . . f A J J,,,~2 f a m - f . 0 " i _, [ Af r.)g R oft!::: tic U,W ',1I - l .p=. I 3 ?_L 'L
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"7 ' __ l O-- /M .2 / 4' 3"
. d'
b-
3k 2. 3 ' I:> l yy 2.h
. C 2j %$ % C
3t
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3h
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x (S- /[ h 3Nj bih 3*? y ' . - D**D."D ~ T YQ ' , .S inL, wo o ,
. _ _ - - _ _ _ _
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t. - tr,spn. tion Ter u x % ppore Strue.Lu_re w... PI a n t Deea de a.1h2i t 3 ~ ' . ( s.
n sex +- G5h.= 20- . , % ce Gleinn //o.
culer Column ' . . Item Enspected
13
li.
5~ [ t.c.n g a 4 s t :. e Welds k 63$ S Column Tories SI' ell InferretiiO y{ pQ t,q# " (a) we6 pla t e-(P- %.t H "? ' (b) Upper Guss e i 'n '4
- "4 Middle Gasse t
!!if M4 AOl "* '^ " (C) Lower C uss et Wy 29( E'i '/*$fy
% (d) Patch plafes -- - - -.- _ _ _z - 2. LsyLh 4 5t:e Pipe colanin We tds ,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, y; ;;.a,a,ee,,,.
flared Th P'n (a) T. Sh b A ss'y {tered Ic y/ne < I ~ - - - - - - - - -... ' (b) To base A ssy Sam e sam e -- -- .. _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _. __ _ 3. Colu nu n - 8 ase Join t d" gi g ~ (2) Si e C{erts pin
.f .g N T6icrnen c/eva pIsf es . / f" ft fg g , (_c) Leng th Clevis plaie Tension plai,e%. nssc.,Ja,n i 3;.,,;.,,.,,, , (d) i <- '- c-s h ear r.
wc.,, s.,,, i nism:s ,s.- (e) 3i= e 13 as s pla t e / 3 E x if~ trt'xz.o'\\ ~ Sct M* e <ls d b r o t' .S a m e (0 Siz e 1' Len4, Be:e phle r/eia' q y, g y g g
ff ' _. - __ s}, //u m b e r n' Si: s A n c h or C olt s J-
1
/ t d<a.
/i /t /i /i / . ... - - -..... __ l
Tij h t n e ss /ket,or thiis It a,, i -t i,x r it.in s t,, i t D W }D fff a Wy A q de ey;Je,,ce ten sion t :a di,i"s ' on OGA VUj gi < '
ba.t e /Issy.
,
.- .- --. _ _ _ _ ~., c, . _ _. _ _ _ - ' ,. ,
. , -2- .,, '
(\\ If1NEP COLUMN g.
,,,7,0UTE(,COLUMit9 ' .____.- - g g ,EM INSPECTED g y
9, - 6.' Adequate Contact Between Base Plate ~ , , i and Base Slab
, t N
f ltodifications
7.
Status o.
' UN Wu ML9 Support Blocks Installed as Indicated N/A _ , (a) <o, .% iw .n (b) WedgesileldedinPlace N/A _ R.# 4e . Icv v (c) Pipe Columns Reinforced - y u g/A Size of Welds at Column-Torus Shell jjjg
l (d) - Intersection Increased , , y/A Additional Anchor Bolts Installed gjg , l . (e)
(IndicateSizeandType) M/A _ M/A [ Size of Web Reinforcing Plates M/S (f) N/A Size of Welds on Ueb Reinforcing Plates
- !
(g) N/A y/A (h) Additional Saddles
- Existence and Magnitude of Uetstell to A d e,qgg fe 8.
i Drywell Differential Pressure U (bP.0 psi @ \\ - i i !C ] cf S 0 0.$ l C l] b3 0Y Y Y'AO '$ { i) g ) I r) \\ f l
- $f fj
$ . fcun d in n n y c; { ffe (cfuntn5, . - . I[0TE: i An asterick (*) indicates that the item is crucial to design an , (1) greater emphasis by the inspector.
improper The inspector should be on the lookout for any signs of deterior lignment, ., construction of the structure, such as, weld defects, corrosion, m (2) ~ '
. loose bolts, cracking, etc.
(3) ' Items not applicable to a specific plant mark U/A.
i L ' .. .
.._, _.
_ --
. O .
- .
. . c, , ' ,,,.
Lencths of.Clovis Plate Shear Planc-- . tain indicated lengths "a b,c & d"frcr "~ [ intersection at hole perim,e'ter to cdte ( ~ '
o. uter Clevis Plate regardless of Clev; d' Plate geometry. khere possible, indict ~ ' . on plant specific diagram the locatie-I I measurements taken.. (_In s o. Item 3D) - ,
y . Inner Clevis Plate % "2 hi ,
% - er ,1 - . . ., M.h J.. - 5 1 ' .'
tp , Clevis Tc'nsion Plane Length--
, ... Outer Clevis Plate g / De termine minimu:a dis tance . / k q{ between outer hole perimeter - and edge of Clevis plate on
both sides, "c" and "f"(I_nso. Item 3C) Base Plate t'cld h - ' .l (Inso. Item 3f) I J -: ^ Column Base Base Plate g k (J_n s n, p,,,, % )
Contact Between Base Plate and Base Slao (Insp. Item 6) . 4.p , , _ TYPICAL COLUMN CLEVIS JOINT . ' '* _ . e $ I r - _ N# % lO ~
t, . [J f. W$ Q* .g y t _.. n - . - . W G-R; l ?Al 2.*$?
3 . 2?$ . b,
a.$ 2i bl 2$
O ' . . t
2t ri t 2.S 2$
_ m ,
7 , y 17[ ' O 3 /y
21 _ e - O l f/l,. e e _. r, , e e
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