IR 05000010/1976027

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IE Insp Repts 50-010/76-27,50-237/76-28 & 50-249/76-30 on 761221-23 & 770117-21.Noncompliance Noted:Unit 2 Moisture Separator Room High Rad Door Found Unlocked & Unattended During Plant Cleanliness Tour
ML19340A992
Person / Time
Site: Dresden  Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 02/01/1977
From: Knop R, Shafer W
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML19340A991 List:
References
50-010-76-27, 50-10-76-27, 50-237-76-28, 50-249-76-30, NUDOCS 8009240810
Download: ML19340A992 (12)


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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT

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REGION III

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Report of Operations Inspection IE Inspection Report No. 050-010/76-27 IE Inspection Report No. 050-237/76-28 IE Inspection Report No. 050-249/76-30 Licensee:

Commonwealth Edison Company P. O. Box 767 Chicago, Illinois 60690

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Dresden Nuclear Power Station License No. DPR-2 Units 1, 2 and 3 License No. DPR-19

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Morris, I12inois License No. DPR-25 Category: C Type of Licensee:

BWR (GE) 200 & 810 MWe Type of Inspection:

Routine, Uaannounced

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Dates of Inspection:

December 21-23, 1976, January 17-21, 1977

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Prinicpal Inspector:

W. D. Shafe

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(Date)

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Accompanying Inspectors: None

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Other Accompanying Personnel: None

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Reviewed By:

R.'C. Knop, Chief Reactor Projects Section (Date)

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SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

Inspection Summarv

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Inspection on December 21-23, 1976 and January 17-21, 1977, (Unit 1, 76-27), (Unit 2, 76-28) and (Unit '3, 76-30): Review of. procurement,

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calibrations, records, plant cleanliness and follow-up of noncompliance l

and open items for.all three units. Review of plant operations after refueling for Unit 3 and Licensee Event Reports for Unit 2.

Five items of noncompliance were identified as follows: One infraction

relating to calibrations (Units 1, 2 and 3).

One infraction relating

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to an unlocked high rad door (Unit 2).

One infraction relating to

an open LPCI pump room door (Unit 3).

Two infractions relating to a Licensee Event Report (Unit 2).

Enforcement Items

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Infractions A.

Contrary to 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XII, and the licensee's Quality Assurance Procedure No. 12-52, no program exists to cali-brate those components associated with safety related systems and

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used to verify that system operation is within the Technical Speci-

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fication requirements. This noncompliance applies to Units 1, 2

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and 3.

(Paragraph 4, Report Details)

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B.

Contrary to _10 CFR 20.203, the Unit 2 moisture separator room high rad door was'found unlocked and unattended during a plant cleanliness tour.

(Paragraph 5.c, Report Details)

C.

Contrary to Technical Specifications 3.7.2, the Unit 3 LPCI pump room flood door was found open and unattended, during a plant cleanliness tour. Unit 3 was in operation at the time of the-event.

(Paragraph 5.d, Report Details)

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D.

Contrary to Technical Specifications 3.3.B.1, the licensee failed-to completely insert and disarm an uncoupled control rod on

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December 12, 1976, (CRD F-5) and on December 28, 1976, (CRD J-11).

For CRD F-5 on December 12, 1976, the rod was tested three times before being inserted and disarmed. _ For CRD J-11 on December 28, 1976, the rod was tested three times, declared recoupled and used at which time was co*pletely inserted and until December 30, 1976, m

disarmed.

(Paragraph 9.a, Report Details) /

E.

Contrary to Technical Specifications 6.6.B.1, immediate noti-fication, subsequent telegram and 14-day follow-up' report was

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. not accomplished upon discovery of exceeding a limiting condifion fo'r

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operation relating to a Unit 2 control rod drive uncoupling.

(Paragraph 9.b,. Report Details)

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Licensee Action on Previously Identified Enforcement Items

.In a previous-inspection (IE Inspection Report No. 050-237/76-07),

the licensee received a deficiency relating to retention of work requestswhichidentifiedthetypeofmaince'nanceacg7mplishedonthe refueling grapple. The licensee's corrective action-was reviewed and found adequate.

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Other Significant Items

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A.

Systems and Components None.

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B.

Facility Items (Plans and Procedures)

None.

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C.

Managerial Items The inspector was informed of the following management changes:

G. Abrell, from Nuclear Licensing Administrator to Director of

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Quality Assurance, Operations D. Scott, from Director of Quality Assurance - Operations, to-Assistant Plant Manager, Braidwood.

M. Turbak, from Lead Engineer, Unit 2, to Nuclear Licensing Administrator.

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J. Wuciga to Lead Engineer, Unit 2.

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The inspector was also informed that a managerial meeting will be held on Februery 4, 1977, to determine the course of action to be followed with respect to continued operation of Unit 1.

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Deviations

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E.

Status of Previously Reported Unresolved Items The inspector reviewed one unresolved item relating to cable separation on Units 2 and 3.

The item remains unresolved and

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1/ Ltr, Bolger to Keppler, dtd 6/1/76.

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f will be forwarded to headquarters for resolution.

(Paragraph 8.b, Report Details)

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Management Interview At the conclusion of the inspection on Dc 9mber 23, 1976, a management interview was conducted with Mr. Stenhensan, Station Superintendent and other licensee representatives. The inspector stated the following:

A.

Quality Procedure (QP) 12-52 requires that instructions be pro-vided and responsibilities described to assure the accuracy of station test, measuring and control instrumentation. However, no program exists to calibrate those instruments used to verify that plant systems are operating in compliance with the techni--

cal specification requirements. This is an item of noncompliance.

(Paragraph 4, Report Details)

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B.

In reviewing the procurement program, several weak areas were identified.

(Paragraph 2, Report Details) The inspector stated that while no specific noncompliance was identified the program weaknesses will be reviewed further in office.

At the conclusion of the inspection on January 21, 1976, a

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management inter **=v was conducted with Mr. Stephenson, Station Superintendent,

...d other licensee representatives. The follow-

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ing was discussed:

C.

The weak areas in the procurement program discussed on December 23, 1976, are considered an unresolved item and will be reviewed in s

a future inspection.

D.

Plant cleanliness appears to have greatly improved, however, the licensee was asked to review their housekeeping program with respect to ANSI N45.2.3.

Housekeeping During the Construction Phase of Nuclear Power Plants. This ANSI guide was spproved for operating plants by Regulatory Guide 1.39, Housekeeping Require-ments for Water Cooled Nuclear Power Plants. This area vill be reviewed in a future inspection.

(Paragraph 5.b, Report Details)

E.

The record retention program was discussed.

(Paragraph 6, Report Details)

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F.

Two incidents relating to control rod uncou' ling was discussed.

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G.

Miscellaneous follow-up items were discussed.

(Paragraph 8, Report Details)

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REPORT DETAILS 1.

Persons Contacted

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B. Stephenson, Station Superintendent A. Roberts, Assistant Superintendent

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B. Shelton, Administrative Assistant C. Sargent, Technical Staff Supervisor C. Lawton, Office Supervisor E. Budzichowski, Operating Engineer, Unit 1

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N. Scott, Lead Operating Engineer R. Ragan, Operating Engineer, Unit 3 D. Adam, Radiation Chemistry Supervisor J. Dolter, Leading Nuclear Engineer J. Kolanowski, Operating Engineer, Unit 2 T. Shaw, Quality Assura"ce Operations

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D. Scott, Director, Quality Assurance, Operations

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C. Schiavi, Staff Assistant, Storeroom W. Hildy, Instrument Engineer R. Yungk, Lead Engineer, Unit 1 R. Thomas, Instrument Foreman R. Campbell, Instrument Foreman J. Eenigenburg, Maintenance Engineer T. Schneider, Chemistry L. Scott, General Engineer

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J. Jurecki, Staff Assistant

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T. Lang, Engineer R. Falbo, Assistant Of fice Supervisor 2.

Procurement (Units 1, 2 and 3)

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The following procurement packages were reviewed to verify that each procurement received proper approval, quality control inspections and proper record retention.

P0 180178, IRM Detector PO 189979, Coated Welding Electrode

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PO 190125, Butterfly Valves PO 191168, Valve Disk PO 195497, Type A Bulb Coil Temperature Switch No items of noncompliance were identified during this inspection, however, in an overall review of the licensee's storage and handling program the fol owing weaknesses were identified.

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Procedures developed for.special handling and storage are inadequate in that no provisions exist to identify the type of storage (i.e., indoor heated, humidity requirements, outdoor storage, etc.)

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b.

Procedures do not exist to specify special preventative maintenance for stored items, c.

The licensees procedure DWP-2, relating to handling limited shelf life items, is vague in that the responsibility for reviewing equipment manuals to make a determination of shelf life is not assigned to any group.

d.

Chemicals, (used in water chemistry control or analysis)

0' rings and diaphrams are not considered safety related.

The inspector informed t!.e licensee that the above identified weak-

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nesses is considered an unresolved item and will be reviewed in a subsequent inspection.

3.

Review of Plant Operations-(Unit 3)

a.

A review of the Unit 3 records indicated that the following systems disturbed during the recent refueling outage, were

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returned to service in accordance with approved procedure.

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Reactor Instrumentation DOP 201-M2 Core Spray System DOP 1400-M1 b.

Further investigation indicated that periodic surveillance during refueling was performed as required by Technical Specifications and finally the control rod withdrawa'i sequence and proper authorizatien was available and in offect prior to the reactor startup. No concerns were identified.

4.

Calibration of Instrumentation Associated with Safety Related Systems (Units 1, 2 and 3)

h In reviewing the licensee's records and in discussions with licensee representatives, the inspector determined that no program exists to. calibrate those components associated with safety related system or functions, and used to verify that system operation is within the Technical Specification require-ments. The inspector informed the licensee that the lack of a calibration program in this area is contrary to 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion XII and the licensee's Quality Assurance Procedure No. 12-52, and is an item of noncompliance.

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5.

pleanliness (Units 1, 2 and 3)

Cleanliness at the site has improved considerably within the a..

last six months.

In a tour of the facility the inspector

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fx noted that most of the highly visible areas within the plant

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are free of debris. Some areas such as pipe tunnels, the condensate pump room and the CRD pump floor are still in need of more work. The inspector encouraged the licensee to continue their cleanup efforts in these areas.

b.

The inspector noted that the storage of tools, materials and equipment within the facility do not appear to be as well controlled as specified in ANSI N45.2.3-1973, House-keeping During the Construction Phase of Nuclear Power

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Plants. The inspector requested the licensee to review their present program with the above identified guide to determine the need for more control. This area will be

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reviewed in a subsequent inspection.

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c.

During the plant tour the inspector found the Unit 2 moisture separator high rad door unlocked with no per-sonnel in the area. The inspector informed the licensee that the failure to maintain the door locked, or manned iscontraryto10CFR20.203(c)(2)(iii)andpsanitemof

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Previous to this inspection 2 the licensee noncompliance.

was found in noncompliance for the same reason. The

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licensee was requested to respond to the noncompliance and is presently preparing their response.

Because the response with corrective action has not been received by this office the licensee need not provide additional response to the above described noncompliance.

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d.

During the plant tour the inspector found the Unit 3 LPCI pump room door open and unattended. The inspector informed the licensee that leaving the LPCI pump room door open and un-attended is contrary to Technical Specification 3.7.2 and is an item of noncompliance.

6.

Records (Unit 1, 2 and 3)

The inspector reviewed the licensce's program for the control, storage, recention and retrieval of records and documents.

The review also included the verification thaf as-built drawings are being properly maintained. No concerns pere identified.

2/ IE Inspection Rpts No. 050-010/76-26, No. 050-237/76-27 and No.

050-249/76-29.

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Follow-up on IE Bulletins (Units 1, 2 and 3)

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. The inspector reviewed the licensee's response to IEB 76-06, Diaphram Failures in Air Operated Auxiliary Actuators. The

review consisted of verification that:

(1) onsite management

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was aware of the response; (2) the information discussed in the response was supported by facility records and (3) the lic-ensee's response was within the time period allowed -in the Bulletin. No concerns were identified.

8.

Miscellaneous Follow-up Items (Units 1, 2 and 3)

a.

Corrective Action for Barton Instrument Setpoint Drift (Units 2 and 3)

A previous inspection report / discussed plans by the lic-

ensee g7 replace deficient Barton DP switches. A followup letter-indicated that the work would be completed by

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December, 1976. Through discussions with the licensee and a review of the records the inspcetor determined that all the identified Barton DP switches have been replaced with the exception of the off-gas pressure switches. A licensee representative stated that the off-gas nressure switches were not Barton switches with a setpoint drift problem to begin with, however, the licer.see intetds to replace the

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present switches with Barton switches as soon as Barton switches are available. A review of the records confirmed

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the licensee's statement. No further concerns were identi-fied.

b.

Cable Separation In a previous inspection,5/ the following items were identi-fied as unresolved.

(1) Cables from separate divisions of the reactor protection systems are tied together in common bundles within the control boards, e.g., Panel 903-10.

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(2) Cables from different divisions of the engineered Safeguards Systems come together in panels in the Auxiliary Electric Room; e.g., panels 902-33, 902-38, and 902-47.

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3/ IE Inspection Rpts No. 050-237/76-14 and No. 050-249/76-12.

4/ Ltr, Stephenson to Keppler, dtd 6/11/76.

5/ IE Inspection Rpts No. 050-237/75-14 and No. 050-249/75-12.

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f In reviewing these concerns the inspector determined that no changes have taken place. The inspector informed the i.

licensee that the requirements for cable separation in this

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area are unclear. These concerns will be forwarded to Head >

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(3 quarters for resolution.

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c.

Off-gas Increase on Unit 3

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Reportable Occurrence RO 50-249/75-44, identified a'n off-gas increase which may have represented an abnormal degradation

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i of the fuel cladding. As a part of the corrective action l

the licensee committed to send a follow-up letter upon com-pletion of the investigation. The inspector reviewed a

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draft report of the follow-up letter on site. No further

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concerns were identified.

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d.

IE Bulletin 76-01, Isolation Condenser Tube Failure

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In a previous inspection / the inspector reviewed the status

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of required action for IE Bulletin 76-01.

The final open item relating to this bulletin required the licensee to

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review the setpoints on the shell side vent monitor alarm.

The inspector reviewed a draft report that recommended the

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setpoints be two times background level. Final review of

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this recommendation will be accomplished by the Onsite

Review Committee. This item will be followed during routine

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inspections. No further concerns were identified.

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e.

Diesel Generator Cooling Water Pump (Units 2 and 3)

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In a previous inspection 7/ the licensee informed the inspec-

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tor that a modification would be made on the diesel generator cooling water pumps to allow an alarm to annunciate in the event of a pump failure whenever the pumps are used for the

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LPCI room cooling function. -In reviewing this modification the inspector determined that the computer will now annunci-

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ate whenever the pump shuts off.

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f.

Jumper tog Maintenance (Units 1, 2 and 3)

In a previous inspection the '.censee committed to review all jumper logs to determine tee need to, replace those 1,

jumpers of a permanent nature and ta review the jumper log procedure to determine'the need for improvements.

In reviewing compliance to these commitments, the inspector

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6/ IE Inspection Rpt No. 050-237/76-21.

7f IE Inspection Rpt No. 050-237/76-22.

8/ IE Inspection.Rpts No. 050-010/76-11, No. 050-237/76-14 and

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No. 050-249/76-12.

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a noted that all long term jumpers have been reviewed and are either removed or in the process of being removed by work request or plant modification. The jumper procedure has

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been updated and appears adequate.

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9.

Review of Licensee Event Report (Unit 2)

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a.

RO 76-68, Uncoupled Control Rod The licensee reported that on December 12, 1976, CRD F-5 was found to uncouple and overtravel following withdrawl from a 50% core scram test.

The rod was inserted to

position 44, chen withdrawn to position 48 where the rod a

was confirmed to have recoupled. Following this, a second scram and withdrawal test was conducted and again the rod was found to uncouple at position 48.

CRD F-5 was then inserted to position 00 and disarmed. On December 12, 1976, another control rod (CRD J-11), was found uncoupled at

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position 48 during a reactor startup. This rod was tested for coupling three times. The rod was determined to be

recoupled and was not declared inoperative. On December 30, 1976, an onsite review was conducted to analyze the two control rod uncouplings. At that time the licensee became aware that a Technical Specification limitation had been

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exceeded. Control rod J11 was immediately inserted to

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position 00 and disarmed. A technical review was conducted

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basedonpreviousexperiences.jpanalysisdeterminedthat by the licensee. The licensec

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when inserted because the inner filter will be realigned.'3ple the control rod will rec 9 The recoupling was confirmed and both CRDs F-5 and J-11 were declared operational.

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The inspector informed the licensee that testing of an uncoupled rod is not permitted by Technical Specifications.

In testing these rods the licensee was in noncompliance with Technical Specifications 3.3.B.1.

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b.

In a telephone conversation on January 25, 1977, subse-

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quent to this inspection the inspector informed the licensee that RO 76-68 requires a 14-day report as identi-fied in Technical Specification 6.6.B.1 instead of a 30-day report as submitted. Failing to submit the report within the required time is an item of noncompliance.

  • The licensee stated that during the onsite review meet-ing of December 30, 1976, the Nuclear Licensing Department

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9/ Reportable Event No. 50-237/74-36.

10/ Onsite Review Committee Minutes No. 76-41.

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(NLD) informed site management that a Technical Specif1-cation change allcwing control rod testing for recoupling had been approved, however, that same day NLD again

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contacted sLee management and rented the Technical Speci-fication ch.nge related only to Unit I and did not include Units 2/3. As the subject control rods had already been withdrawn arJ determined recoupled, no action was taken.

Theinspectorremindedthe}{penseeoftheirpreviouscom-mitment made in August 1974-- relating to uncoupling control rods and steted that this commitment remains effective pend-ing a Technical Specification change allowing for testing of uncoupled rods.

The licensee stated that every effort will be made to obtain an emergency Technical Specification change.

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c.

In a telephone conversation on January 26, 1977, the inspec-tor confirmed a directive to be issued by the station superintendent that in the event of any control rod experi-encing uncoupling, including CRDs F-5 and J-11, all control rods identified as having been uncoupled during this fuel cycle will be completely inserted and disarmed. The lic-ensee stated that a directive covering this requirement will be issued.

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10.

In-Office Review of Licensee Event Reports (Units I and 3)

The following licensee event reports (LERs) were reviewed in-office. No concerns were identified.

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Unit 1 Report Number 76-15, Failure of leak rate test on the 16-foot equipment hatch.

76-16, Reactor coolant sample indicated CL greater than

.1 ppm.

76-18, 'Incore neutron flux amplifier tripped at 145%.

Unit 3

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Report Number 76-18, Feedwater check valves exceed technical specification on leak rate.

11/ Ltr, Keppler to Lee, dtd 8/21/74.

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76-20, MSL Drain Lines exceed leak rate limit.

76-21, Inoperative snubbers due to fluid loss.

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76-25, Feedwater check valves failed leak rate test.

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76-29, CRD valve 3-0301-98 failed leak rate test.

I 76-30, TIP purge check valve failed leak rate test.

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- 76-31 Failure of reactor cooling inboard isolation check

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valve to pass leak rate test.

76-33, Failed pipe union on isolation condenser.

j 76-35. Torus /DW vacuum breaker position alarm failed to i

annunciate in control room.

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