IR 05000010/1975022
| ML20037B137 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Dresden  |
| Issue date: | 02/04/1976 |
| From: | Harpster T, Johnson P, Knop R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20037B135 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-010-75-22, 50-10-75-22, 50-237-75-27, 50-249-75-24, NUDOCS 8009040643 | |
| Download: ML20037B137 (13) | |
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGilLATORY CD:"11SS10N
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OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND EMFORCE!!CNT
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REGION III
Report of Operations Innpection IE Inspection Report No. 050-010/75-22 IE Inspection neport No. 050-237/73-27
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lE Inspection Report No. 050-249/75-24
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Licensee:
Commonwealti Jdison Company Post Office Eox 767 Chicago, Illinois 60690 Dresden Nuclear Feuar Statien License No. D'PR-2 Units 1, 2, and 3 License no. DYR-19 Morris, Illinois License No. DPR-25 Category: C
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, Type of Licensee:
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Type of Inspection:
Routine, Unannounced Dates of Inspection:
December 15-17, 19, 22-23, 30, 1975 and January 8 and 13,1976
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6hnson
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Principal Inspector :
.j7 V
(Date)
Accompanying Inspector :
T. L. Harpster Other Accompanying Personnel: None
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Reviewed By:
R. C. Knop, Section Leader Reactors Project No. 1 (Date)
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StittMARY OF l'IMDINGS
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Inspection Summry Inspection on December 15-17,19, 22-23, and 30; January 8 and 13 (Unit. 1, 75-22): Review of p1: int operation, repertabic eccurrences, refueling activitics, and fire prevention and prottetion.
Inspection on December 15-17,19, 22-23, and 30; Januai y S and 13 (Unit 2, 75-27; Unit 3, 75-24): Review of station Procedares, fire prevention and protection, and Dresden 3 fuel inspection results.
Enforcement Items None.
Licensee Action on Previously Identifie l Enforcemeat Tte :s Not reviewed.
Other Significant Items A.
Systems and Compenents
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Work was in progress to repair deficient electrical cabic pencera-
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tions.
(Paragraph 8.b, Report Details)
B.
Facility Items
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None.
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C.
Managerial Items None.
D.
Noncompliance Identified and Corrected by License t None.
E.
Deviations Nonc.
F.
Status of Previously Reported Unresolved Items An unresolved item listed in a previous inspectten report regarding inoperability of a traverning in-core probe bali valve was determined not to -repret.cnt noncompll:ince wit h regulatory requjrements.
(Paragraph 5, Report. Deta iIs)
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Mana;;ctent Intervleu
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The inspectors conducted an interview with Messrs. Stephennon (Station Superintendent)and Abel (Administrative Assictant) and' other mcwhers of the station staf f at the conclusion of the inspection on January 13.
The following matters were discussed:
A.
The incpector stated that a review of work control practices related to fire prevention and protection had been conducted during the incpcetion.
dased upon ob'scrvations during tua facility tours, the inspector noted that additional attention should be given to eciding centractor fire prevention ncasures and surveillance of station fire equipment. The licensec stated that additional foremen vere being added to prov.ide
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improved control of contractor activitics, and that additienal attention could be focused upon surveillance of fire equipment.
(Paragraphs S.a and 8.e, Report Details)
B.
The licensee nas advised that cdequate centrol of the cable penetration repairs in progress was apparent. The inspector-noted, houever, that existing administrative controls might not be adequate to assure proper review of future modificcticns
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to cabic penetrations..The licensee responded that a procc-
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dure was being t:ritten to sssure that cable penetrations uil]
continue to be scaled in accordance with design specifications.
(Paragraph 3.c, Report Details)
C.
The inspector stated ths.t a review of Unit 1 refueling activitics had been c'onducted, with no ncncorapliance items identificd.
Comments rere presented on the follouing aspects of refueling procedures, as described in the report details:
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1.
Alteration of the planned sequence of fuel movements, 2.
The requirement for all control rods to be inserted when fuel is being added to the reactor core, 3.
The requirement for a minimum 100 cpm on two source range channels prior to rod withdraual, and 4.
Precautions related to sphere cvacuation.
The licensee stated that appropriate revisons would be made to the related procedures. The licensee also stated that a Technical Specifications change requent would he submitted to resolve item 2 and any oil er inconciatency which uinht be identificJ through a review of section 3.10.
(Paranraph 9, Report Details)
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D.
The inspector discussed the status of a stuck Unit 1 control rod drive mechanism (G-3).
The licensec stated that, based on previous experience, it was helicved that the drJve mechanism might become free at hot operating cond it f ora.
E.
The inspector stated that be had revieved Unit 1 plant operation and reportable occurrences without comment.
(paragraphs 2 and 3, Report Details)
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F.
The inspector presented ccaments resulting from his review of Unit 2 and 3 precedures, as deceribed in the report details. With regard to temporary procedure changes, the inspecter requested a commitment from the licensec regarding the establishrent of a method to assure that temporary procedure charges, as appropriate, arc subsequently incorporated into pernunent station procedures.
The licensee stated that such a method would be established by April 1,1976, unless changes to of f-station approved procedures were required, in which case reevaluation of the cc,mitment date might be necessary. The inspector also stated that no method existed to identify to operating sud other personnel which temporary procedure changes vere currently in effect. The
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licensee recpended that_rcsolutions to this matter uculd be con,
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sidered.
(Paragraph 4, Rcport Details)
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G.
During a telephone conversation subsequent to the inspection, the licensec was informed that the inoperability of a traversing in-core probe ball valve, listed as an unresolved item in a previous ihspection report, had been dr.termined not to rep,recent noncompliance with regulatory requirencnts. The inspector stated, however, that in the event of recurrence, plant operation should
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not be continued unless the ball valye or the ascociated shear
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valve is p' aced in the closed position. The. licensee responded that this matter vould be brought to the attention of operating personnel.
(Paragraph 5, Report Details)'
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REPORT. DETA11.'i Part I Prepared by P. H. Joluison 1.
Persons contacter1
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B. Stephenson, Statien Superintendent A. Roberts, Assistant Superintendent J. Abel, Administrative Assistant E. Budzichouski, Unit 1 0. cra ting Engineer J. Dodge, Nuclear Station Operator J. Dolter, Leading Uuclear Engineer C. Ibncy, Engineering Assistant E. Montanus, Nuclear Station Operator 2.
Revieu of Plant Operation (Dresden 1)
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The inspection includcd a review of Unit 1 operation during the months of November and December 1975. The revie.: consisted of
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a tour of the reactor enclosure and turbine building, discussions with operating personnel, and revicu of Icgs and other selected
operating records. The uait was noted to have bec-n chat down for refueling during this two month period. No inspector comments resulted from the review.
3.
Review of Repor' table Occurrences (Dresden 1)
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No licensec event reports had been received since the previous review of reportable occurrences. The inspcetor reviewed the circumstances associated with the maintenance of tro saf ety related plant components for compliance with reporting requirements.
No inspector comments resulted frem the review.
4.
Procedures (Units 2 and 3)
The inspector reviewed selected operating, abnormal condition, maintenance, emergenc;, and adninistrative procedures against requirements governing procedure approval and issue, revision, technical content, and conformance with Technical Specifications requirements. No noncompliance items were identified, a] Lhough the f ollowing co: aments resulted from the review:
a.
Annuncia:.or procedurec 902-3 A-2 and 902-4 G-23 contained incorrect procedure ref erence:
The licensee initiated coirectivo
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actions dt. ring the inspection.
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b.
Procedure approval by the onsite review group is docu..icnted
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on a cover sheet which is issued with each new or revised
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procedure. The cover sheet for ene selected procedure could not he located by licenace personnel. This procedure (repair of the stack sampling system) did not fa ll within the require-mento of Technical Speelfication 6.2.A. and censequently did l
not represent noncorT iance.
Cover sheets for >!J ather selected procedures verc reviewed without cons'at.
c.
Surveillance procedure 6600-S-I was revit.cd $n 1975 follouing an abnornal occurrence to specify diesr_1 generator s;)ced droop adjustment prior to engine shutdoun. The incpector noted that operating procedures DCP 6600-1, 3, and 4 had not been revised to be censistent, and that DOP 6600-6 did not discuss speed droop changes. The licensee stated that the identified procedures vould be corrected.
d.
The control forn used for approving and issuing temporary procedure changes provides f or indicating chen a te:nporary procedure chant;e should be issued as a pera nent precedure revision. The inspcctor noted during his review that sena temporary changes so indicated had not becn subsu uently issued as pcrranent procedurc revisions, and that a syrtem for assuring permanent revisions in ruch casas rea not
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evident. Examples noted ucre (1) tenne rcr: chanpe to DOP 1600-6, dated ::cvceber 27,197 5, and (2) te:..porary
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change to DFP 800-2 (l' nit 1), dated Dece-bcr 14, 1975.
This matter was discussed further during the canct;ctent intervieu.
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5.
Inoperab il ity of a Traversine In-Core Probe (TIP) E0!1 Valve (Dresdca 3)
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The inoperability of a TIP hall valve f or a period in excess of 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> during plant operation was id ified as an unresolved item in a previous inspection report.1ynt
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This matter was referred to It licadquarters for resolution, and was determined not to represent noncompliance since the hall valves are not listed in l
Table 3.7.1 of the Technical Specifications. The licensen was informed of the resolut ion of the item.
The inspector stated that plant operatica would nevertheless not be expected to continue in the event such a problem recurred unlesc cither the ball valve or its associated r. hear valve vere placed in the closed position.
The licensee acknow.ledged the inspector's corawnt and stated that the matter would be brought to the attention of operating personnc].
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IE Inspection Report No. 050-249/75-19.
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6.
Vinual Inspect len nT F..;p_ ended Fuel (Dren.len 3)
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The innpection included viewing of videotapes m.nle by the J Jcensee during visual inspection af colected luel bundles.rer:oved f rem the i
roactor core during the 1975 refueling outage. A lii:ensee representa-tive stated that a tott.1 of ten f uel assemblies had been inspected,
of which sin inspections were videott.pd.
Fuel conditions seen by the inspector are summ trized belou.
For further Infort:ation on the core locatien of the idcutified fuel hundles, ref erence trade be taade to the attach = cut to IE Inspection report ::o. 050-249//3-13. That inspection report also discucccd appsrent fuel damage which occurred follouing the uithdra.-a1 of several control rods on 0 etcher 31, 1974 a.
Bundic No. DD450, core position 7-32: this bundle was on the near side of the fuel ec11 adjacent to one of the control reds withdraun en October 31, 1974.
It was ser-n te have a thin longitudinal crack in the narrow-narrce corner fuel red.
b.
Bundle No. DD37S, core position 11-40 : this bundle was located in the fuel ce11 of a rod withdrawn on October 31, 1974. It was seen to have a longitudinal cracb in the narrou-narr oti corner fuel rod. This crack uas seen to run inter-
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mittently frca the bottom spacer te the second spacer from
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the top, and varied fro::: 1/16 to 1/8 inch in widti.
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c.
Bundle ha. DD300, cere position 17-56:
this fuel Fundle was removed frem a periphcral positien and was apparently not associated with thc October 31, 1974 event. A thin longitudinal crack'was'seen in the wide-wide corner fuel rod.
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d.
Bundle No. DD36, core pcsition 13-34: this hundle was in the.
near corner of a fuel cell diagonally adjacent to one of the control rods withdraun on October 31, 1974. A thin longitudinal crack was seen in the narrow-narrou corner rod, and longitudinc1 cracks uere seen in one of the wide-narrow corner rods ranging up to 1/8 or 3/16 inch in width.
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Bundle No. DD132, core position 09-32:
this bundle was located adjacent to a control rod withdrawn on October 31, 1974.
Longitudinal cracks were seen on all four corner fuel rods, covering most of the length of the bundic. One piece of cladding approxim:tely 1/4 inch by 2 inches was also observed to be missing. A gap of approximately 1/2 inch was apparent between pellets at one position in the narrow-narrow corner rod.
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Bundic No. DD688, core position 49-22: this hundle was adjacent
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to cuntrol rod N-6, one of the rods involved in t he Oc tober 31,
'974 cvent. Longitudinal cracks were scen in all f our cornce
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rods, and the wide-uldu corner rod was also seen to have two apparent small blistere,.
A face rod, two rods frem the narrou-narrou corner, appeared to have a piece of missin;; cladding approximately 1/4 by 112 inch.
The licensec representative stated that the fuel inspections were prompted by the increase in, Drcsden 3 air ejector of f -gas
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reported to the Commission.ipate November,1975, and subsequently release rate experienced in, The inspector stated that the
'off-gas release rate increase would be reviewed further ducir.g a future inspection.
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Letter, Stephenson to Keppler, dated 12/11/75 (Reportabic Occurrence 249/75-44).
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REPORT li'~ rATI.S
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PART II I/. $l. 6 ~. '
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Prepared Dy: /.
?[AMN
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.(Nr. L'.dlarpcter
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(Datc)
Revieved By : <, gl'-19
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W. S. Littic
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Persers Contacted B. Stephenson, Station Superintendent J. Abel, Administrative Acsistant W. LarthcInes, Unit Enginecr T. Blackson, Training Specialist E. Budzichouski, Unit 1 Operating Engineer J. Dolter, Leading Nuclear Enginaer J. Doyle, Quality Control Inspector G. Frankovich, :: aster ::cchanic
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W. Joyce, Training Superviser J. Kolancushi, Unit 2 Leading Engineer
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R. Kyrovac, Quclity Control Inspector J. Lanping,!:aintenance Staff Assistant C. Mancy, Staff Assistant R. Nirner, Engineering Assistant W. Pietryga, Nuclear Engineer
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R. Ragan, Unit 3 Operatin' Engineer.
F. Stellung, Rafueling Forenan '
J. Sullivan, Nuclear Station Operator J. Tescas, Nuclear Engineer T. Watts, Technical Staff Supervisor F. Wolfe, Nuclear Engineer M. Wright, Quality Control Engincer 8.
Fire Provention and Protection (Units 1, 2, and 3)
a.
Work Control Procedure.$
(1) The inspector verified that station work control procedures define requirements for operations tiersonnel approval and control of station construction, modif Jcation, and maintenance activitics. The procedures included :
'(a) " Work Requests" DAl' 15-1, Sc;)tember '1975
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(b)
" Design Control for Operations - Plant Maintenance
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Modi ficat Lc,nn" QP 3-51, Septenber 1975 (c)
" Design Cont.rol for Opera t. ions - Pl. int Malntcuince" QF 3-52, September 1975 (2) The inspector verified that a welding and cutting permit was required, per procedure :
" Fire Prevention for Uciding and Cutting"
'36-508, April 1974 This precedure requires the use of a f f rc.tatch, arJ specified his responsibilitico.
(3) The incpector observcd contractor welding activitica in the Unit 3 trackuay area and Unit 1 sphere, emergency condenscr level, he noted that additienal attentien ta fire prevention practicos was needed on the part of contracter persennel. The licencee stated that four additienal aintenance f orev.n trere beit ;- added to the staff to provide irproved control of contracter activitics.
b.
Quality Assurance Sirrvcill ance
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(1) The inspector verified that Station Quality Assurance Procedures require periodic audit of work auti.ortrations for construction, modification, and maintenance activities to ensure that operating personnel are controlling and authorizing all such activities.
(2) As a result of discussions with the licensee, the inspector noted that quality assurance verificatiens had not been performed dur'ng recent years to confirm that seal c.aterial was not flammable for cable penetration seals being installed, replaced, or modified. The inspector observed records and test samples used to demonstrate that the seal materials being used for current cahic penetration repairs satisfy existing requirements for nonflammability.
c.
Design Change Control The inspector determined through rc view of the electrical cable penet ration modification package and jj uussions with
',he licennce that. adninistrative centrols had been i cpoutd which require review of replacement cable penetratio;
.als to assure flam:able materials are not uned. However, it
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did not appear that these controls would ensure the same
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review for l'uture penetra tion modificaticus. This uas discussed further during the canagement i n terv iew.
d.
Emergency Procedures The inspector verified that plant cmcrgency procedures provide alternate methods for accomplishing an orderly plant shutdoun and cooldown in' cases of loss of norual and preferred alternative cooling sys,tems.
e.
Firefighting Trainire and Ecuirmont (1) The inspector revicued station fire fighting prece-dures, fire equipment surveillance records, and records of training / drills without comment.
(2) The inspector noted that fire drillo are not required on an establishcd frequency by precedure; hewever,
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the licensee conducts fire drills bi-monthly. Record s are retained of each, including an evaluation of the response to cach drill.
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(3) The following cc.monts were noted with regard to fire equipment surveillance.
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(a)
Inspection tags on many fire e::tinguishers had not been filled in for some months, however, a revieu of surveillcnce records indicated the required surveillance had been completcd. The licensee stated that all plant extinguishers would be weighed, rescaled, and given new tags in January, 1976.
(b) Many fire hoses were last hyrostatically tested in July, 1973. The hoses are required to be tested annually. The licensee stated that plans were being made to test all fire hoses,
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Facility Inspection (1) The inspector reviewed the results of an inspection on June 17 and 18, 1975, conducted by the licensec's insurance agency. The inspector noted that a recommenda-tion was oude to extend the fire protection and tuin-tenance schedule to the control room smoke detection
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No olljer items ucru noted with regard to NI:C regt,airements.
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(2) The innpcetor toured the fac il ity wi t h a represent a t ive of the liccucce. The following comments were nottd
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regarding the tour:
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(a) Work was in ptogrens to repair deficient c1cetrical cable penetrations.
(b) llouscheeping appeaced to have ir..provel significantly.
(c) Ikny fire hoses bad not been hydrostatically tested since July,1973.
(Reitrunce P :ragraph S u)
(d) Tags were incomplete on many portabic fire extin-guishers.
(Reference Paragraph 8.c)
9.
Refueling Activitics (Unit 1)
a.
The licensec cor.enced a refueling / maintenance outare on September 1, 1973. Sixty-sir neu fuci ascenblies and one previously exposed fuel asser.bly t.ere picc:d in th? core.
The refueled Dresden 1 core consists of 464 fuc1 assenblies, three of uhich are mixed oxide asccablics.
Follo :tr ; the completion of core sipping operations, 2'. leal *ng f uel assemblics hed been identified.
b.
The innpcetor observed activities on the refueling fleer
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and in the centrol rect., to verify that the ref uelin,,
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operations were being conducted in accerdance eith the technical specifications and approved procedures. :o items of noncoupliance were identified.
c.
The following comments were noted by the inspec tor as a result of a review of refueling procedures and subsequent discussions with the licensee.
(1) Two methods are presently used to issue changen to the refueling sequence - - a temporary precedure change or an addendum to the Nuclear !!aterials Transf er Checklist. This 3cd on one occasion to the issue of a scquence change by both methods. The licensee stated that procedures for issuing changes to the refueling sequence would be. reviewed and revised to provide a cansistent method of issue.
(2)
Step two of the itefueling Prerequisiter. Checklist, DFP 800-53, could allow a fuct assembly to be inserted wi th a control red withdrawn. Furthermore, the corre-spending Techn ical Spec i fica tion, 3.10. A, fu written incorrectly. The intent of the specification, ac
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evjdent in the hacen, in to addresn the case where
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fuel 10 added, not removed, in order to. pri vent inadvertent crLLicality. The lic< nae statid t!u.t a
technical spec 11 Jcc. tion chanp.e requent weuld lie submitted.
(3) Revision 2 to the " Unit 1 Master Refuelinr. Procedure" deleted the procedure reference to the teel.nical specification requirciaent to i.uinte te a t-ial:.un 100 cp:-.
on two source range channels prior to contral rea withdrawal during refueling. This could recult in a technical specification being inadeertently violated.
The licensee stated that the 100 cp:. precaution :: auld be reinserted into the procedure.
(4) The procedurca did not uddress any precauticas or actions to be taken by the refuelin; cre.. prier tc, departing if the sphere evacua tion a lcra sh said scund, such that a fuel asset:bly could be left cucper.d d from the crane over the r(actor core.
T.a 3;cc e t-tated that ap; ropriate precautions stoeld b-inst rted into the refueling procedures.
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