IR 05000010/1975013
| ML19338D019 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Dresden  |
| Issue date: | 08/11/1975 |
| From: | Johnson P, Kister H, Knop R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19338D018 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-010-75-13, 50-10-75-13, 50-237-75-19, 50-249-75-15, NUDOCS 8009150632 | |
| Download: ML19338D019 (16) | |
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY CO:t1ISSION
OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
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REGION II-I
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Report of Operations Inspection
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IE Inspection Report No. 050-010/75-13 IE Inspection Report No. 050-237/75-19 IE Inspection Report No. 050-249/75-15
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Licensee:
Commonwealth Edison Company P. O. Box 767 Chicago,. Illinois 60690 Dresden Nuclear Power Station License No. DPR-2 Units 1, 2, and 3 License No. DPR-19
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Morris, Illinois License No. DPR-25 Categories: C Type of Licensee:
GE BWR, 200 cnd 810 MWe Type of Inspection:
Routine, Unannounced
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Dates of Inspection:
June 10-12, 17-18, 20, 23-27, July 1 and 2, 1975
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C-2 LOW
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Principal Inspector:
P. H. J 6nson
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(Date)
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J III D Accompanying Inspectors -. B. Kister
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C. M. Erb
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Other ' Accompanying personnel: None j'gly[
SMOIS W-Reviewed by:
R. C. Knop Senior Reactor Inspector
'(Date)
Reactor Operations 8 009150 h g
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SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
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Inspection Summary
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10-12, 17-18, 20, 23-27 and July 1-2.(Dresden 1, 75^13;
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Inspection on June Dresden 2, 75-18; Dresden 3, 75-15): Review of licensed and non-licensed training, plant operations, abnormal occurrences, and control of plant activities. Four noncompliance items, related to condu.ct and documentation of the operator requalification program, use of plant startup procedures (Unit 2 only), and baseline inspection of re'placed core spray piping (Unit 2 only).
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' Enforcement Items The'following items of noncompliance were identified during the inspection:
A.
Infractions 1.
Contrary to paragraph 6.2.A.1 of the Dresden 2 Technical
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' Specifications, applicable checkoff lists were not completed for the Unit 2 startup which occurred on May 18, 1975.
(Paragraph 5,, Report Details)
This infraction had the potential for contributing'to an
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occurrence with safety significance.
2.
Contrary to 10 CFR 50.54(1-1), and the approved Commonwealth Edison Operator Requalification Program (Paragraph 2.e, Report
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Details):
-Oral examinations for each two year licensed interval a.
were not being conducted.
b.
No policy was established, and there was no evidence to indicate that station management was conducting an annual review of each licensee's performance.
This infraction had the potential for causing or contributing to an occurrence with safety' significance.
3.
Contrary to Criterion XVI of 10 CFR'50, Appendix B, and Section XI of the ASME Boiler end Pressure (Vessel Code, unacceptable ultrasonic baseline examination results ottained for the Unit 2 core spray safe ends and transition pieceu were not reported to management nor reviewed for acceptability or appropriate corrective actions until after resumption of Unit 2 operation on.May 18, 1975.
(Paragraphs 6 and 9, Report Details)
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t This infraction had the potential for causing or contributing
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to an Occurrence'with safety significance.
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Deficiencies 1.
Contrary to 10 CFR 50.54(1-1)',. and the approved Commonwealth
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Edison Operator Requalification Program, the following required records were not being raintained (Paragraph 2.e, Report Details):
a.
Results of operator evaluations.
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b.
Licensed operator review of procedure revisions, facility changes, and license changes.
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c.
Licensed operator review of abnormal and energency
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procedures.
d.
Plant manipulations performed by licensed operators.
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s The starting and ending of each licensed operator's two-e.
year training program.
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2.
Contrary to Criterion V of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, and the.
Commonwealth Edison Quality Assurance Manual, Procedure 2-52:
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a.
The Training Supervisor was not properly preparing and maintaining records of offsite and onsite training for
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'non-licensed personnel.
(Paragraph 2.b, Report Details)
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b.
Training of station personnel on new and revised quality
procedures was not being accomplished within 30 days of the effective dates.
(Paragraph 2.c, Report Details)
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c.
Periodic Reports by the Maintenance Engineer, Operating
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Engineer, and Technical Staff Supervisor regarding the
status'and adequacy of the onsite and.offsite training programs were not being formulated and provided to the Station Superintendent and Training Supervisor. (Paragraph l
2.d, Report Details)
t Licensee Action en Previsouly Identified Enforcement Items
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. Not reviewed.
Oth'er Significant Items A.
Systems.and Components 1.
The licensee discovered cracks-in the collet housings of several control rod drives.
(Paragraph 7.c, Report Details)
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The licensee discovered after resumption of Unit 2
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the baseline ultrasonic examinations operation that performed cn the newly replaced core spray safe ends and
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transition pieces were unacceptable.
(Paragrapns 6 and i
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-9, Report Details)
Facility Items-(Plans and Procedures)
B.
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None.
C.
Managerial Items
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None.
D.
Noncompliance Identified and Cu rrected by Licensee Contrary to paragraph 6.2.F of the Technical Specifications, Senior Reactor Operator approval for five temporary procedure changes per-
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taining to Units 2 and 3 were given by an individual with an expired (Paragraph 7.d. Report Details)
SRO license.
E.
Deviations None.
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Status of Previously Reported Unresolved Items F.
Not reviewed.
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Management Interview
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interview with Mr. Stephenson The inspectors conducted a management (Station Superintendent) and members of his staf f on July 2,1975.
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The following matters yere discussed:
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The inspector stated that he had reviewed selected areas of the Station Training Program to determine conformance with the Code of A.
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Federal Regulations, Connonwealth Edison procedures,and commitments.
The The r.reas reviewed included licensed ano non-licensed training.
inspector summarized the noncompliance items identified during the involvement in the training He also noted that management review.
to evaluations program had been inadequate, particularly with respect of licensed personnel.
(Paragraph 2, Report. Details)
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. The inspector' commented that the Station Training Program requirements He is required point to the Training Supervisor as the central figure.
by QP 2-52 to plan and coordinate the entire prngram,= drawing the necessary input from the Station Scaff. Observations indicate that the essentially existing program is not centralized and each department conducts its own training, Operations excepted.
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s The inspector turther stated that he considered the training staff and facilities to'be inadequate for a three unit station.
Discussions with the training reaff and observations by the inspector indicated
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that the Training Supervisor spewds the major portion of his time
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l conducting licensed operator training and little time planning and coordinating the Station Training Program. The present facilities, although slightly improved, are not conducive to the learning process.
The licensee ocknowledged the inspector's comments and stated that efforts'are being made to increase the staff and work is underway to improve the existing training facility. Also, some icng range plans with regard to a new facility are being formulated.
B.
The inspector stated that review cf procedures associated with the
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initial Unit 2 startup following the refueling outage disclosed that:
(1) a superseded startup checklist was completed prior to the start-up, (2) the correct startup checklist and three dif ferer startup
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procedures, covering activities which occurred over a p iriod cf approximately 26 hours3.009259e-4 days <br />0.00722 hours <br />4.298942e-5 weeks <br />9.893e-6 months <br />, were subsequently signed off by wne indi-vidual, and (3) one startup prerequisite, completion of the master startup checklist, was not accomplished. The inspector stated that these findings represented noncompliance with Section 6.2 of the Technical Specifications and illustrated a need for attention to more formal control and documentation of plant activities. The licensee noted that the deficiencies had also been identified by an onsite audit, and that subsequent to this being identified a program
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was now underway to insist on following procedures, emphasizing the signoff of checklists.
(Paragraph 5, Report Details)
C.
The unacceptable baseline ultrasonic examination of the r.cw core
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spray safe ends was discussed. The inspector noted that licensee management, because of inadequate control of startup prerequisites, did not know about the unacceptable condition until several days af ter plant startup.
The license was informed that this represeated noncompliance with regulatory requirements in that the questionable UT results were not reviewed and evaluated prior to. unit startup. The inspector requested and obtained a commitment from the licensee that a written report describing the resolution of-the baseline ultrasonic examination will~be submitted to the NRC when'this resolution has been cbtained.
(Paragraphs 6 and 9, Report Details)
L D.
The inspector stated that he had concerb with the credibility of ultrasonic examination data reported by the licensee. He stated that part of this concern appeared to be related to UT techniques; for example, core spray safe end ultrasonic examination results obtained in June differed from those results obtained in Iby.
He noted that inaccurate communication.of UT results was also a factor-S-
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Yn his concern, in that core rpray safe end UT r the inspector by station management on Jun esults conveyed to g
licensee expressed an awareness of thefrom thos
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onic examination.
The
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attention was being g.iven to this area. problem and stated that
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(Paragraph 6, Report Details)
E.
The inspector stated that he had observed th l
the Dn' it 2 charcoal filter, which was e initial startup of
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out reference to the operating procedureperformed by an operator with-stated that no noncompliance with the ope
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but that the operator demonstrated uncertainty
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ocedure was noted, his personal knowledge that all, erequisites twhen questioned ab had been s.atisfied.
He stated that o system startup need for attention to operating proceduresthis further illustrated the knowledge of thepersons contacted during the inspection had con id
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licensee teknowledged the inspector's commentsrecombine s
ered operator Report Details)
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(Paragraph 4.a,
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F.
The licensee was informed that the inadverte Operator's license involved concompliancent lapse of a Senf ar the licencee's corrective actionRequirements, althoug o
e required in view of reported, and corrected by the licensee.regarding th
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p ance s,as discovered, Details)
(Paragraph
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G.
The inspector requested and obtained from th
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to shipment of fuel from Unit 2 to MFRPment that IE:II ra notification prior
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2 control board 2 x 2 array were inoperableThe i n
cators on the Unit been noted on Units 2 and 3 for some period a condition which had
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would be returned to service during the nextstated of time.l li The licensee n that the indicators be modified to provide more trouble-free cunit outage and would ification could be arranged (Paragraph 4.b, Report Details)ervice as
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I.
The inspector stated that discussed in the IE III letter dated April 18May e's ll the commitment u
inspection report..
commitment that the additional training w(ould tThe inspec operators no later than September a
15, 1975 e provided to licensed
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1/ RO Inspection Rpts No.
2/ IE Inspection Rpts No. 050-237/74-10 and 050-249/74-12.
050-237/75-07 and 050 249/
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75-07.
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The inspector referred to previous' discussions concerning the decrease in core. spray piping design pressure from 1250 to 1150
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psig. This matter was also discussed during a telephone conversation
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on Jaly 21, and a licensee representative stated that the need for
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a change'to.the bases to Technical Specifications Section 1.2 would be reviewed.
(Paragraph 3.c, Report Details)
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REPORT DETAILS
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Part I
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Prepared by P. H. Johnson and H. B. Kister
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Persons Contacted
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B. Stephenson, Station Superintendent
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A. Roberts, Assistant Superintendent D. Butterfield, Administrative Assistant i
G. Abrell, Unit 2 Operating Engineer
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J. Almer, Senior Radwaste Foreman j
T. Blacknon, Training Specialist
'E. Budzechowski, Unit 1 Operating Engineer J. Dolter, Leading Nuclear Engineer i
l D. Dransfeldt, Nuclear Station Operator P. Dunkel, Shift Engineer G. Heintz. Nuclear Station Operator W..Hildy,. Instrument Engineer i
B. Jaicomo, Nuclear Station Operator
_ R. Janacek, Thermal Engineer W. Joyce, Training Supervisor
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B. Knop,' Engineering Assistent C. Maney Engineering Assistant
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R. Meadows, Engineering Assistant-E. Meintel, Maintenance Engineer-J. T arson, Nuclear Station Operator lj R. Ragan, Unit 3 Operating Engineer
W. Roman. Training Specialist C. Schiavi, Enginering Assistant N. Scott, Shift Engineer
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i J. Uremovic, Nuclear Station T. Watts, Tecnaical Staf f Supervisor
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H. Whitehead, Shift Engineer M. Wright, Quality Control Engineer
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B. Zank,- Training Specialist 2.
Training
The inspector reviewed selected areas of the station training program delineated in the Commonwealth Edison Quality Assurance Manual, QP 2-52 (Revision 1) and the approved Operat6r Requalificaton Program dated April 5, 197'..
Cencral Employee Training was reviewed to determine compliance with a.
ANSI N18.1. Station Training procedures had been issued =for all the l-areas specified in the General Employee Training section of the-Standard. No items of concompliance were noted.
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b.
Selected training records for'non-licensed personnel in the custody of the Training Supervisor were reviewed for completeness
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and adequacy. The records were found to be generally incomplete with some folders completely void of information. A licensee
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representative stated that records of training completed were not always forwarded to the training department for inclusion in the individual training folders,but were retained by the parent department. The inspector noted that QP 2-52 requires the Training Supervisor to maintain records of all offsite and onsite training. The licensee acknowledged the inspector's comments and stated that the departments were required to forward results of training to the training department but were not always prompt.
A lack of manpower to maintain records was also stated as a principal cause. The inspector later examined Maintenance Department training records and found them to be generally adequate.
It is noted, however, that records of training prior to 1972 were generally not recorded.
Record review also revealed that training on 'new and revised c.
Quality Procedures was not being accomplished within 30 days of the effective date as required by QP 2-52.
Records did not indicate training on most QP's to have been conducted. Licensee representati.as acknowledged the deficient records, but stated that the training was in tact being conducted, though not within the required 30 days.
d.
The inspector requested to review cny Periodic Reports that had
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been submitted to tha Station Superintendent and Training Supervisor regarding the status and adequacy of the onsite training program.
The inspector noted that QP 2-52 requires such reports to be sub-mitted as requested by the Station Superintendent. Review sub-sequently established that the surveillance program calls for
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submission of such reports in January and July of each year.
The licensee stated that none had been provided. The ir.;pector noted during the Management Interview that more management attention to the stati'on's training programs was needed.
The inspector reviewed the implementation of the approved Operator e.
Requalification program and concluded that implementation had not yet been achieved in the following areas:
(1) Paragraph IV.C of the program requires that oral examinations be conducted each two-year licensed interval. No orals had been conducted to date.
(2) Paragraph IV.E of the program tequires that Station Manage =ent conduct an annual review of each licensed individuals per-formance. Discussions with the Training Supervisor regarding this review indicated that it was not being conducted as intended. The Training Supervisor stated that he reviewed-9-
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the annual examination'and the simulator evaluation; however, there is no record of that review, nor does
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there appear to be a policy established or specific
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management responsibility assigned for conducting and
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evaluating the review.
(3) Paragraph VII of the requalification program requires that the Training Supervisor maintain certain records for each man in the requalification program. The inspector reviewed selected training folders in'the custody of the Training Supervisor and noted that no records existed for:
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(a) Results of evaluations.
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(b) Licensed operated reviews ot procedure revisions, facility design changes, and' license changes.
Note: Apparent lack of proper - ongoing review in areas (a) and (b) was further substantiated by.the inspector's review of the simulator instructor's evaluation contained in the folders. These noted that
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some operators were not familiar with recent setpoint changes and plant modifications.
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-(c) Licensed operator review of the contests of all abnormal and emergency procedures.
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(d) Records showing the beginning and end of each person's two year retraining program, j
Records of plant manipulations performed by the operators were
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present in some cases where in other folders records were not present or were not up to'date.
The inspector also noted that the Training Supervisor did not have an adequate up-to-date list cf all licensed personnel and license expiration dates.
3.
Miscellaneous Items The inspector conducted r followup on licensee commitments resulting from occurrences et other facilities and results of previous inspections.
The following comments are noted.
i a.
In Units 2 and 3 Inspection Report No. 75-07 the licensee committed to fmproving-the core spray system filling procedure to include
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system venting. A review of the current pr'ocedure indicated that
proper system venting had been included. This item is considered
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i closed.
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b.
In Units 2 and 3 Inspection Report No. 74-02 the licensee committed i
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to preparing the following procedures or revisions:
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(1) Procedure for response to o.ff-gas detonations.
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(2) Procedure revision to include all the station instrument-air compressors.
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I (3) Procedure for handling the malfunction of a safety or Electromatic relief valve.
The inspector reviewed the above procedures.and considers the commitment satisfied.
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c.
A previous inspectice report discussed action taken by the licensee to reduce the pressure of portions of the new core
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spray piping. A represe..tative of the Division of. Reactor Licensing questioned during a subsequent telephone conversation whether the reduced pressure had a bearing upon the reactor pressure safety limits contained in Section 1.2 of the Technical i
Specifications. After discussion with licensee representatives, i
the inspector was informed that possible effect on the safety limit had been considered during the cafety review, but that further review and possible discussion with DRL would La under-
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taken to determine vhether a change. to the bases of the Technical Specifications, Section 1.2, should be submitted.
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Observation of Plant Operation i
Plant operations were observed at various times during the inspection,
principally from the control room with comments as follows:
a.
The Unit 2 charcoal filter was placed into operation for the first time en June 17.
A technical staff engineer (Licensed
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SRO) briefed the Nuclear Station Operator and others concerned j
with the evolution and directed its performance. The inspector i
noted that no reference was made to the approved system startup i
procedure. Although no deviation from the procedure was apparent, the NSO demonstrated uncertainty when questioned about his personal
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knowledge of prerequisites and understanding cf the evolutio~n conducted. 'The shif t engineer was present for. a portion af the evolutien and stated that he would have remained until system startup were completed had the technical staff enginer not been a licensed SRO.
The shif t engineer and cthers contacted during the inspection stateu that operator knowledge,of the off-gas system was considered to be inadequate The inspector further noted that
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the technical staff angineer who had been most closely involved
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with the new of f-gas systems was due to be transferred away from the station during the month of July, and questioned whether adequate technical experience to support the systems would be retained at the station. Licensee representatives ctated that an ef fective turnover of informatibn would be provided to another engineer who had been working with the new off-gas system.
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-IE Inspection Rpt No. 050-237/75-15.
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The inspector 'noted during observation only 5 of the.16 LPRM indicators on the coof Unit 2 operations
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l were operable.
Further review, ntrol board 2 x 2 array f
maintenance personnel, disclosed that including discussions with intrumer for bulb repiccement and th'e consequentma
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e of the frequent need
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the LPRM indicators operable, an opeThe inspector no
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that without the computer printout. rods has no indication of core res er than alarms and interview and a subsequentIn discussions during the management
. ment stated that the indicators would be m dtelephone conver the next outage, and that a modific ti a e operable during nage-at Quad-Cites to extend bulb life would beon pre'viously performed a
to the end of the refueling outage a d made to Unit 3 prior.
modification could be processed.
n to Unit 2 as soon as the c.
Control of rod programs was reviewed on t approved by authorized persons in accordeac e
to have been procedures.
was noted to be approving on-the-spot chOn one of engineer to effect the desired flux shape pri anges to the rod program power.
on a blank key log form by 'the nuclear en iThe the NSO.
ere being written should be given to the use of a separate fThe ins g neer, for a listing of sequence changes alon a
consideration orm which would provide
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approving nuclear engineer.
g with the signature of the
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A high conductivity annunciator was not d the Unit 1 control panel on July 1 to be lighted on e
Upon questioning, conductivity recorder was seen to be readi
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that tha recorder point was not opthe NSO stated that he h by instrument maintenance personnel af terating correctly.
Investigation ormed inspector showed the recorder point to ber questioning by the
that point.4, condensate storage e out of step, such had been determined acceptable for continwas This tank g
conductivity, but 5.
ued use.
Plant Startup Procedures (Dresden 2)
i Review the refueling outage showed several iof documents rela
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1975, although revised startup prccedurchecklist A superseded startup o reactor startup on May 18, during the previous month.
The revised startup procedurees and checkoffs used during the startup, was not signed correct startup checklist and " normal unitoff as it was completed.if actu
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The startup" procedure DCp 1-1 were
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s subsequently signed off on May 20 by one individual, although the activities covered by DGP 1-1 were completed over a period of more than 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />. One prerequisite on DGP 1-1, " Master
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Outage Checklist DGP l-S3 completed",was not signed off, and
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further review with licensee representatives verified that it had not been completed.
Procedures DGP l-2 (" Unit Startup to Hot Standby") and 1-3 (" Unit Hot Standby to Power Operation"),
which together accomplish essentially the same evolutien as DGP l-1, were also signed of f cn May 20 by the same individual. All three of the procedures had also been reviewed and signed by the same shift engineer. During discussion c f the conditions, licensee representatives stated that the sta; tup checklist and procedures had been signed off at cne ti=e after the omissions were identified by an onsite auditor.
The inspector informed licensee representatives that improper use of the startup checklists and procedures represented non-ccmpliance with Section 6.2.A of the Technical Specifications.
Subsequent review by the inspector of startup procedures and checklists related to a June 15 startup of Unit 2 showed the documents to have been completed with the exception of some checklist items.which could not be cccom,lished until af ter reactor startup (e.g., testing of electromatic relief valves).
A licensee representative noted that a format change was needed to accommodate such items.
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During discussions with station management, the inspector asked how cuthorization to start up a unit was normally given. Management representatives stated that authorization was normally given verbally or in written daily orders.
For weekend outages, authority
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is sometimes delegated to a duty Operations Engineer, although management stated that this was not done for startup following an extended outage. The inspector noted that authorization for plant startup should in any case be based upon an assurance that all prerequisites are satisfied.
6.
Core Spray Piping Base Line Examination (Dresden 2)
Licensee representatives informed the inspector during the inspection of an anomaly discovered with respect to baseline inspection of a portion cf the Unit 2 core spray piping.
The piping components were stated by the licensee to have been received with proper certifications and were installed cnd vprified to be acceptable by radiography and hyrdostatic tests.
An ultrasonic examination of the replaced piping was also performed to serve as a base-line for future in-service inspections.
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t The 316 stainless steel safe end and the 304 stainless steel
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transition (" pup") piece to the carbon steel piping were both internally clad with 308 weld material to provide increased
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resistance to intergranular corrosion. Although station man-agement did not become aware of the condition until af ter several days of operation, the internal clad on the safe ends and pup pieces produced a high background signal which~ effectively defeats possible future in-service examination using existing ultrasonic test procedures. Further review by the irspector disclosed the following findings:
Ultrasonic examinations performed on May 4, '1975, showed a.
indications of 100% + 14 dB over the entire length tnd i
circumference of the safe end and pup piece on the A core spray line. Records of the B line examinations showed lesser indications which sere diagnosed as outer or inner diameter geometry. According to the initial verbal report
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to the inspector, only.the pup piece in the B cote spray -
line had such indications. Following reexamination by ultrasonic means,'the licensee informed the inspector that whole-area indications of 100% + 3-6 dB had been observed for all four componants plus a sample of material obtained from General Electric and determined to be similar to that
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used in the-safe ends.
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b.
The indications were not completely evaluated prior to the Unit 2 startup. Undated comments found on the reverse of the UT data pertaining to the A core spray line noted
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i that.the results appeared as "unbonded cladding", but.no
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evidence of further evaluation prior to operation was present.
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Paragraph IS-232 of ASME, Section X1, states that all detailed c.
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examinations "shall be performed completely, once, as a pre-I operational examination requirement prior to initial plant startup...."
Paragraph IS-311 states that " evaluation shall be made to determine disposition and/or need to make repairs".
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, Further review'of the licensee's examination is discussed in Paragraph 9
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of this report. The licensee stated that attempts were being made-l to develop a special ultrasonic test procedure which could give an acceptable in-service examination of the ' pipe components, and
that in the meantime the acceptable radiographs will be used
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as baseline inspection results. The licensee stated that if an acceptable ultrasonic test method were not developed, both safe ends
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and pup pieces would be considered for replacement during the next refueling-outage. The inspector acknowledged the licensee's
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intention, noting that failure to determine the anomalous con-
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dition and provide proper review prior to planc operation repre-sented an item of noncompliance with regulatory requirements.
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Unusual occurrences
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Certain unusual occurrences were reviewed during the inspection,
as follows:
FailuresofUnit2Electromaticreefvalveswerereported a.
, by the licensee on three occasions. Review of these events and discussions with licensee representatives showed the events and corrective actions to have been as described in the referenced reports.* Ccntrol room logs and test records showed each relief. valve to have been operationally tested at reduced pressure and at near rated pressure following repairs.
. E! high chlorides in the Unit i reactor b.
The licensee reported coolant in excess of 0.1 ppm during reactor startups conducted i on April 7~and 9, 1975. Review during the inspection showed the sequence of events to have been as described in the referenced reports.
The inspector questioned licensee representatives concerning the approximately'three hours which elapsed following _ the sample-confirning high chloride concentration on April 7 l before reactor shutdown was commenced. The representatives ' stated that the time had been used in an effort to locate the source of the chlorides, since condenser effluent and other indications did not appear to be the source. The ' inspector reviewed recorder charts showing condensate con-ductivity'and demineralizer effluent conductivity and could , find no conclusive indication of a source-of the chlorides.
l The inspector noted that a significant amount of river water would have to be introduced into the reactor coolant ' system to give 3.0 ppm chloride conc ~entration, but could see no other possible cause for the observed increase. The temporary increase in concentration noted on April 9 appeared to have-been a result of incomplete cicanup of the original chloride condition.
l i c.
The inspector was informed on July 2, 1975, that cracks had l been observed by the licensee in thb collet housing of four control rod drives removed from Unit 3 for maintenance.
' Cracks in additional drives were subsequently discovered.
Further discussion of the conditions is given in an 4/ Ltrc, Stephenson to Keppler, dtd 5/30, 6/3, and 6/23/75.
5/ .Ltrs, Stephenson to Keppler, dtd 4/15 and 4/16/75.
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. l . N ^ s abnormal occurrence report submitted by the licensee.6/ The cracks were noted to be circumferential in nature, at - the location of increased wall thickness of the collet , housing. Discussions with licensee representatives and examination of a control rod drive used for training purposes showed that complete severance of a collet housing at the point of cracking would cause the rod drive to lock and prevent further movement by either scram or normal drive The licensee's initial review noted that such a pressure.
break was extremely unlikely, and that simultaneous failure of more'than one drive would be r.ecessary to affect safety of operation. The licensee accordingly concluded that operation of Unit 3 and Quad-Cities Unit 1 and 2 could continue pending resolution of the cracking phenomenon.
Due to the generic character of this problem, it was referred to the Division of Reactor Licensing for further review, d.
The liceppee discovered on June 5, 1975, and subsequently reported-to the NRC that a Senior Reactor Operator's license uas determined to have expired en December 8,1974.
Thu license'e reported that a license renewal request had been submitted based upon 2 years from the effective date of an amended license, while in fact two years from the initial issuance of the license was allowed.
The licensee noted _ that the minimum shif t canning required by Table 6.1.1 of the Technical Specifications had been provided at all times, since no more than two units have operated simultaneously since the license expired. Ilowever, review of procedure files showed the individual to have given SRO approval to five , temporary procedures for Units 2 and 3 since the-beginning of 1975. The licensee was informed that noncompliance with Technical Specifications was therefore apparent, although a formal response would not be required since the matter had been identified, reported, and corrected by the licensee.
! i l-l 6/. Ltr, Stephenson to Keppler, dtd 7/3/75.
2/ Ler, stephenson to Keppler, dtd 6/12/75.
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< . s REPORT DETAILS .\\ Part II l //
Prepared By: a rb (Date) . Reviewed By: ' 4[ ! M!Y J. C. LeDoux (Date) 8.
Persons Contacted in a Meeting st the Dresden Site on June 20, 1975 Commonwealth Edison Company (CE) " L. D. Butterfield, Administrative Assistant R. Meadows, Engineering Assistant R. Williams, Unit 2 Engineer E. Potter, Nondestructive Examination Supervisor - Quality ^ Assurance Department M. Wright, Quality Control Engineer . 9.
Ultrasonic Baseline. Inspection Problem (Dresden 2) History -
Ultrasonic (UT) indications above 100% of reference level were noticed when performing' the Baseline volumetric inspection-on the replacement ten-inch core spray loops at Dresden Unit No. 2.
- Four pieces of pipe (two safe ends and one short pipe length adjacent to cach safe end) gave indicatic is with shear wave testing above the 100% level, and it was decided that either defects existed near the inner surface of the pipe or some metallurgical condition caused the sound to be reflected.
The safe ends are Type 316 stainless base metal, clad on the inside with 308L weld deposit, and the pipe lengths are Type 304 stainless base metal clad with 308L.
Since the shear wave indicated this unknown condition for the full 360 circumference of the pipe and for the entire length of the pipes excepting the welds, it was considered to be en anomalous condition caused by , the clad layer. The licensee had been unable to secure any leftover j pieces for destructive test from the fabricator, M. W. Kellogg ' . Company (Kellogg) because of a strike. The licensee did obtain ' a safe end piece which had been used for welder qualification and which showed a UT response similar to that in the production pieces. The licensee proposed to section this piece and determine
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. , . . \\ \\ its soundness and the metallurgical structure. This was done, and the inspector sitnessed the result on June 23, 1975. The cladding ~ proved to be 1/8" thick, with a wavy, irregular fusion line between - the weld cladding and base material. The retal was sound, with no evidence of_any defects such as lack of fusion. However,
grain growth had occurred in the heat affected zone of the base metal nearest the weld clad. These crains had grown to as high as 0.020" in (iameter, which was easily ten times the size of other grains removed from this heat affect'd zone.
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All present agreed that this grain growth precluded meaningful shear wave examination, but did not seem to hamper the long-itudinal wave examination.
The licensee stated that special transducers were being purchased from Aerotech Company and efforts would be made to develop a suitable UT technique for this pipe.
In the meantime, the plant will be taken up to power, and methods ' utilizing lower heat input during the cladding operation will be investigated.
It is mandatory that UT be applicable for this inspection because radiation levels during future inspections may preclude satisfactory radiographic examination.
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