IR 05000002/1998203
| ML20196A917 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | University of Michigan |
| Issue date: | 11/23/1998 |
| From: | NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20196A888 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-002-98-203, 50-2-98-203, NUDOCS 9811300188 | |
| Download: ML20196A917 (12) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION t
i Docket No: 50-002 l License No: R-28 ;
.: Report No: 50-002/98203 (DRPM) ,
i Licensee: Univerchy of Michigan Facility Name: Ford Nuclear Reactor -
Location: Ann Arbor, Michigan
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i Dates: October 26-30,1998
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Inspector: T. M. Burdick, Reactor inspector
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Approved by: Seymour H. Weiss, Director Non-Power Reactor and Decommissioning Project Directorate
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Executive Summary Ford Nuclear Reactor l
Report No. 50-002/98203(DRPM)
This routine, announced inspection included aspects of refueling (60745), surveillance (61745), experiments (69005), environmental protection (69004), emergency plan l (82745), health physics (83743), transportation (86740), non-routine event follow-up j (92700), and follow-up on previous findings. (92701).
Refunting (607451 l l
e No concerns were identified in this program. (Section 1.0)
Surveillance (61745)
e Observed Health Physics (HP) surveillance were acceptable, although a weakness in proceduralimplementation was noted. (Section 2.0) l Exoeriments (69005)
e Tracking of experiments was reviewed and looked acceptable. One untagged sample was found in the temporary brick shielding adjacent to the reactor pool and was identified as an experiment tracking weakness. (Section 3.0)
Environmental Protection (69004)
e The University of Michigan campus Radiation Safety Services (RSS) office monitors discharge from all facilities. The Phoenix Memorial Lab HP reports data from the Ford Nuclear Reactor (FNR) to the RSS. No concerns were identified. The total release from FNR is well below the Constraint Rule limit. (Section 4.0)
Emerger,cv Plan 1822151 e The licensee has conducted annual training and drills as required. One emergency portable Geiger Mueller (GM) instrument was found out of service and was identified as a weakness in this area. (Section 5.0)
Health ohvsics (83743)
e The University of Michigan ALARA program was implemented to keep radiation doses at minimum levels. Radioactive materials were controlled acceptably. The annual HP audit was rigorous although corrective action on container labeling was weak. Some j procedure weaknesses were identified. (Section 6.0) j l
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Transoortation (86740)
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j- e Shipping conducted by the reactor licensee was acceptable. A quality assurance l
l documentation error was identifie (Section 7.0)
g Follow-un on Previ6ui Findins 1927011 k
i e The primary cooling pump mounting and electrical connection inspector concerns were corrected and is considered close e The error in procedure OP-103 that permitted reactor coolant pool temperatures up to 116 'F that was above the protection set-point of the rod run-in for inlet temperature has been corrected and is considered close e The reporting violation for failure to notify NRC of the ineffective 50.59 was corrected and is considered closed. (Section 8.0)
Follow-un on non-routine event reoorts 1927001 e The licensee reported an event involving the disabling of an area radiation monitor local
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alarm while at power. The licensee promptly identified, reported, and corrected the j problem.
l e The licensee reported a violation of the calorimetric procedure. Licensee identification and reporting were prompt. Licensee corrective action was weak in the area of procedures. (Section 9.0)
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[*- REPORT DETAILS l
l l Plant Summary The Ford Nuclear Reactor at the University of Michigan has continued to support teaching in the graduate and undergraduate programs and various research and irradiation service The reactor management suspended reactor operation for three weeks in September to refocus on their mission and safety. The Phoenix Memorial Laboratory organization is c l
undergoing some changes including the Laboratory Director position and the Reactor Manager position. No permanent selections have been made as of this inspection. Both positions as well as the Safety Review Committee Chair have been occupied by qualified )
individuals until permanent selections can be mad .0 Refueling a. Insoection Scone (60745)-
To determine whether fuel was inspected, handled and maintained as required, since the last inspection.
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! Records were reviewed. No concerns were identified. The licensee has two l procedures for fuel handling. One is a management procedure with overview l
information and guidance. The licensee doesn't use the procedure since it is not j sufficiently detailed. Based on discussions, the licensee is considering if the
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c. Conclusion )
The licensee has been conducting fuel handling, inspection, and maintenance as require l 2.0 Surveillance (61745)
a. Insoection Scone (61745)
To determine if the licensee conducted its surveillance program as required by the technical specifications (TS) and licensee commitments, since the last inspection.
l b. Observations and Findings No operations surve:llance was conducted during the inspection. Health Physics
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(HP) surveillance wts observed during swipe surveys and pool water sampling and
! counting with no problems observed. Randomly selected surveillance operations
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and HP records were reviewed and found to be complete, accurate, and within prescribed limits and frequency. Some outdated uncontrolled field copies of HP surveillance procedures were found in the records log books. The licensee
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.. 2 immediately removed all old procedures found. Nothing was substantially different between the current and old revision Records of self reading pocket dosimeter (SRPD) surveillance were reviewed. The inspector noted abnormally high readings for the amount of instrument reading drift during the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> tests. Five percent of full scale is the maximum allowed by procedure yet the readings recorded were often 50 percent of scale. The HP stated that he wasn't aware that, according to the procedure, the SRPDs were required to be rezeroed before the drift test was performed. This accounted for the unusual test results. Dosimeter leakage results in conservatively high readings therefore no safety consequence existed. The licensee began retesting the dosimeters during the inspection according to the procedure, HP-109. This was an isolated weakness in procedure implementatio c. Conclusions The license has been conducting surveillance as require .0 Exoeriments !
a. Insoection Scope (69005)
To determine whether the licensee conducted experiments in accordance with j regulatory requirements and licensee commitments, since the last inspectio )
l b. Observations and Findings The licensee's record of experiments was reviewed with no problems note Procedure OP 104 " Experiments" requires that experiment samples be tagged. The inspector noted that one untagged sample was stored in the shield bricks next to the reactor pool. The licensee was capable of using markings on the sample to i retrieve its record. A tag was immediately completed and placed by the licensee to track the sample. This was an isolated experiment tracking weaknes j c. Conclusinn The licensee conducted and tracked experiments in accordance with requirement , .
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To determine if the licensee's environmental monitoring program hat been l effectively maintained to meet regulatory requirements and licensee commitments, since the last inspectio l
b. Observations and Findings '
The licensee discharged one 3000 gallon tank of waste water resulting from storm water intrusion into the reactor building in July 1997. Records of the discharge j and the radioactive contents were reviewed. The inspector verified that the '
licensee ensured all requirements were met to dispose of the water into the sanitary sewe .
l Airborne release records indicated that the total annual activity released was below the 10 CFR 20 constraint limit for public exposur l l
c. Conclusions The licensee's environmental monitoring program has been effectively maintained l to meet regulatory requirements and licensee commitment .0 Emergenev Plan a. Inscection Scone (82745)
To determine if the licensee's emergency preparedness program was maintained in a state of operational readiness, since the last inspectio b. Observatioas and Findings The licensee removed all respiratory protection equipment from the program since the last inspection. A review of the last two drills and meetings indicated that the licensee has been proactive in keeping the outside support groups involved. One portable GM detector in the emergency equipment locker was found to have been out of service since October 21,1998. The HP technician tagged the detector as inoperable but it had not been replaced. The inventory check procedure conducted periodically by operations requires inoperable equipment to be replaced. The licensee replaced it immediately. This was an isolated emergency plan preparedness weakness.
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c. Conclusion )
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The licensee's emergency preparedness program was maintained in a state of l operational readines .0 Health ohvsics a. Insoection Scone (83743)
To determine if the facility radiation protection program has been maintained in accordance with regulatory requirements and licensee commitments, since the last inspectio b. Observations and Findings Access control to beam ports was verified to be effective. J beam Port had been a concern during the last inspection. Dose measurements throughout the various facility areas were taken using an ion chamber and a neutron detector. Indications were within prescribed limits. Accident environmental monitoring dosimetry were verified to be in place at their designated locations. A new reactor HP replaced his predecessor in September 1997, and has been developing his relationship with the FNR staf !
l Flooding and Cleanup The beam port floor and basement flooding due to a July 1997, storm sewer l backup in the FNR was reviewed. The FNR and RSS staff and management cooperated to contain, assess, and clean up the water that was a mixture of storm water and contaminated waste water. A review of swipe surveys indicated that contamination was removed and records showed that only a small amount leaked into the Phoenix Memorial Lab (PML) that was also identified and cleaned. The campus RSO provided constructive feedback to the FNR management regarding the FNR staff's use of protective clothing and contamination control methods that l could be improved. The operators received reenforcement training from the HP during pool activities this past summer, i HP Procedures ;
The RSO had identified HP procedure deficiencies in the 1997 audit and again in the February 1998 audit. in June 1998, the RSO brought the procedure concern to l
the attention of the Reactor Safety Committee that,in turn, directed the FNR staff j to complete the HP procedure upgrades by the end of July 1998. During the l inspection review, the inspector noted that most procedures had been updated and approved for use. Some uncontrolled copies of old revisions were found in calibration records logs and the licensee removed them immediatel .
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ALARA The inspector reviewed the campus ALARA program against the FNR practices and noted that the workers were supposed to receive notification when their extremity exposure exceeded a LevelI threshold of 450 mrem. The inspector noted that there were at least two individuals from the FNR who received no letter when they exceeded the threshold. When questioned by the inspector, the RSO discovered that the letters were being issued based on the previous threshold of 950 mrem due to administrative oversight. The RSS office immediately corrected the oversight and issued notices to the affected individuals. This was an ALARA procedure weaknes Radioactive Materials Labeling The 1998 RSO audit also identified inadequate labeling of radioactive materials in the FNR and PML pursuant to 10 CFR 20.1904. The report stated that they should consider better labeling of radioactive material in the facility. The inspector toured the two isolated storage areas. One area had low level radioactive waste in stacked drums stored behind a roped off barrier and the other had old neutron activated (NAA) samples stored in containers on shelves in a remote pipe tunnel to which the access door is locked. The drums were marked with yellow and magenta tape with the radiation symbol and the waste drum barrier rope had a sign regarding radioactive storage. The shelves were also marked with the same tap Access to both areas were marked as radioactive storage areas. The inspector measured dose rates in both areas and found them to be less than 5 millirem per hour near the drums and less than 2 millirem in the tunnel area. Licensee records were retrievable to identify the contents of each container. During the inspection, the licensee labeled the drums that were accessible and posted a consolidated list of the contents in all the drums. Additional information on waste contents was also placed on the barrier rope. The licensee plans to package the old NAA materials into waste drums as soon as possible. This was a weakness in corrective action to a licensee identified proble c. Conclusion The facility radiation proteation program has been maintained in accordance with regulatory requirements t.nd licensee commitments. Corrective action on licensee identified procedures an'J labeling concerns were slo .0 Transportation (86740)
a. Insoection Scone (867401 To determine whether the licensee has established and is maintaining an effective management-controlled program, to ensure radiological and nuclear safety in the receipt, packaging, delivery to a carrier and, as applicable, the private carriage of
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licensed radioactive materials; and to determine whether transportation activities are in compliance with the applicable Nuclear Regulatory Commission (10 CFR Parts 20 and 71) and Department of Transportation (DOT) (49 CFR Parts 171-178)
transport regulation b. Observations and Findings The licensee transferred most radioactive material over to the campus RSE l shipment or storage. The records for shipments off-campus were reviewed. One i recent waste shipment done by a broker did not have a complete quality assurance I record of package verification on 9 of 16 packages. The licensee is responsible for l brokers completing the quality assurance checklist required by their procedure, HP-111, " Radioactive Shipments." This was an isolated procedure implementation )-
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Training records for employees who perform transportation duties were reviewed and found to be curren c. Conclusion The licensee has established and maintained an effective management-controlled program, to ensure radiological and nuclear safety in the receipt, packaging, delivery to a carrier and, as applicable, the private carriage of licensed radioactive material .0 Follow-un on Previous Findings a. Insoection Scone (92701)
To determine the status of previous NRC findings and evaluate the licensee's corrective action b. Observations and Findings The inspector verified that the primary cooling pump mounting and electrical connection concern had been corrected to restore the pump and motor to their original design This' item is closed (50-002/98202-03)
Correction of the error in procedure OP-103 was verified. The licensee identified and corrected a similar error in one other procedure. The error permitted reactor coolant temperatures up to 116 'F which was above the new protection set-point of the rod run-in for inlet temperature was verified. This item is closed (50-
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l 002/98202-04)
The reporting violation for failure to issue a written notification to the NRC of the ineffective 50.59 discussed in report 50 002/98202 was corrected. The licensee
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has greatly improved communications with the NRC. The reporting requirements were reenforced at the licensee's three week retreat in September. This item is closed. (02014)
c. Conclumian : i
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' The licensee's corrective actions were prompt and thoroug I ( , i l 9.0 Follow-un on Non-routine Events
a. Innoaction Scoon (927001 l
l To determine through onsite follow-up of selected event reports, whether NRC licensees have taken corrective action (s) as stated in written reports of the events and if responses to the events were adequate and met regulatory requirements, ,
license conditions, and commitment I l
b. Observations and Findinan l
l Inoperable Bridge Area Radiation Alarm i
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The licensee identified and reported an event involving the disabling of the bridge area radiation monitor local alarm for a few hours while the reactor was at power.
- The operators misunderstood the technical specification operating requirements of l the local alarm. The operators and management thought that the separate control
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room recorder alarm was functional when the local alarm was bypassed due to
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spurious actuations. During event review the FNR management discovered that the recorder alarm for that channel had been disabled some time in the past. They ;
thought it had been done for trouble shooting but had no record to verify. The l inspector reviewed the TS basis and found that the technical specifications are not !
clear on which alarm is required to be operable but the licensee understood that the !
- local alarm was required from the TS basis statement. When FNR management discovered that both alarms had been out of service for a few hours they immediately returned both alarms to service and revised the instrument procedures ;
for the area monitors to verify alarm operability both locally and at the recorde l The inspector verified the event, cause, and corrective actions as described. Based i on the corrective action, self identification, non-willfulness, and non-repetitive !
nature of this event it is considered a Non-Cited Violation in accordance with'
Enforcement Guidance Vll. ;
Calorimetric Procedure Error h The licensee identified and reported an implementation error of procedure, OP-106,
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for performing thermal power determination. The FNR management discovered
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the linear level controller one percent higher (99 percent vs. 98 percent) than what
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l l it should have been at full power (2 MW). The management immediately restored the adjustment to the value inferred by the calorimetric data from the previous day 1 and provided retraining for the operators. The procedure was revised to clarify the I difference between actual and indicated power. Calculations later determined that I actual power never exceeded the 2 MW license limit. The inspector reviewed the calculation and found no problem By procedure the operators determine the actual power at one MW based initially on the neutron instrumentation and then measured using a one hour averaged heat up rate. In this case the actual power was 1 MW at a 48 percent setting on the linear controller. From that information the operator is expected by FNR management to know that the linear level control setting doubles at full power and increases proportionally at other intermediate power levels. The procedure, OP-106, does not address the linear level control setpoint after the initial I determination. During discussions with the operators they discovered that the two operators didn't appreciate the difference between thermal (actual) power and the indicated power. The misunderstanding prompted the operators to adjust the controller setting up one percent (98 to 99) in an attempt to match actual power to indicated power after reaching 2 MW. After reviewing the procedure for determining thermal power, OP-106, reactor operating procedure, OP-101, and the report, the inspector concluded that the operators had insufficient procedure guidance to direct their actions after performing the calorimeter determination and that the operators had not distinguished true power from indicated power. The licensee disagreed with the insufficient procedure finding and stated that the operators' training was sufficient for them to make the correct inference from the 1 MW calorimeter determination. They are reviewing their procedures to consider
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additional guidance where appropriate. This event was caused by a weakness in
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the procedure and operstor misunderstandin c. Conclusion Corrective action (s) were as stated in the written reports of the events and responses to the events were acceptable and met regulatory requirements, license conditions, and commitment .0 Exit Meeting summarv The inspector presented the inspection results to members of the licensee management at an eKit meeting on October 30,1998. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented. The inspector asked the licensee whether any material l- examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. None were .
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<. 9 Parsons Contacted University of Michinan l
F. Neidhardt Vice President, Research J. King Chair, Safety Review Committee * !
J. Lee Interim Director, Phoenix Memorial Laboratory j M. Driscoll Radiation Safety Officer, University of Michigan H. Downey Health Physicist, Phoenix Memorial Laboratory
- P. Simpson Assistant Manager, Research Support
'B. Ducamp Assistant Manager, Reactor Operations The inspector also contacted other technical and administrative staff personnel during the inspectio * Denotes those attending the exit meeting on October 30,1998.
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Insoection Procedures Used l
60745 Class 1 Non-Power Reactor Fuel Movement 61745 Class i Non-Power Reactor Surveillance 69005 Class i Non Power Reactor Experiments 69004 Class i Non-Power Reactor Effluent and Environmental Monitoring l 82745 Class i Non-Power Reactor Emergency Preparedness i
.83743 Class l Non-Power Reactor Radiation Protection 86740 Inspection of Transportation Activities 92700 Onsite Follow-Up of Written Reports of Non-Routine Events l 92701 Onsite Follow-Up on inspector Identified Problems items Ooened and Closed l
Open j None Clar+A 50-002/98202 03 Pr. mary cooling pump j 50-002/98202-04 Licensee procedure guidance ;
50-002/98202 02014 NRC Notification !
List of Documents Reviewed Safety Analysis Report Safety Review Committee Minutes Surveillance Procedures and Records Technical Specifications Radiation Protection Procedures, au'dits and records Transportation procedures and records Environmental protection procedures and records Fuel handling procedures and records Surveillance procedures and records Emergency Plan, procedures, and records Abnormal event records List of Acronyms Used CFR Code of Federal Regulations DRPM Division of Reactor Project Management NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission PDR Public Document Room RSO Radiation Safety Officer SRC Safety Review Committee TS Technical Specification
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INSPECTION FOLLOWUP SYSTEM (IFS) i SPEED CLOSEOUT / UPDATE FORM . ,
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DOCKET NUMBERS RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL: T. Burdick
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FACILITY: _ University _nLMichigan Ford Reactor AFFECTED UNITS ITEM ITEM REPORT SE CLOSE/ UPDATE INSPECTION ITEM (1/2/3) TYPE' NUMBER E NO. g REPORT N E ISSUE DATE g STATUS *
1 V I O 9 8 2 0 2 0 3 9 8 2 0 3 10/26/98 C 1 V I O 9 8 2 0 2 0 4 9 8 2 0 3 10/26/98 C ,1 I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I i I I I I I (FOR ESCALATED ITEMS ONLY)
AFFECTED UNITS ITEM EA NUMBER NOV ID NUMBER CLOSEOUT REPORT INS ITEM (1/2/3) TYPE N ISSUE STATUS DATE *
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1 VIO 9 8 -
1 5 5 0 2 0 1 4 9 8 2 0 3 C VIO -
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