Text

Partially Withheld Investigation Rept 1-93-047R Re Alleged Harassment,Intimidation & Discrimination
	ML20206S881
Person / Time
Site:	Millstone
Issue date:	04/18/1995
From:	Caputo G, Letts B, Teator J; NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I), NRC OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS (OI)
To:	;
Shared Package
ML20206S841	List: IA-99-143, Partially Withheld Investigation Rept 1-93-047R Re Alleged Harassment,Intimidation & Discrimination; ML20206S836; ML20206S875; ML20206S881;
References
	FOIA-99-143 1-93-047R, 1-93-47R, NUDOCS 9905240026
	Download: ML20206S881 (75)
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.1 MILLSTONE UNIT 1:

ALLEGED HARASSMENT, INTIMIDATION AND DISCRIMINATION -

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Office of Investigations R: ported by 01:

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PDR FOIA SAVAGE 99-143 PDR 1

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Title:

MILLSTONE UNIT 1 NUCLEAR POLER PLANT:

ALLEGED HARASSMENT, INTIMIDATION AND DISCRIMINATION Licensee: Case No.: 1-93-047R Northeast Nuclear Energy company Report Date: April 18, 1995 P.O. Box 270 Hartford, Connecticut 06141-0270 Control Office: OI:RI Status:

Docket No.: 50-245 CLOSED Report d by: Reviewed by:

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p his is __ 74 \ l Jeffrey$iTeapor, investigator Barry R. Cetts, D {

Office \of Investigations Of.fice of Investig\ ations rector '

Field office, Region I Field Office, Region I Participating Personnel:

Donald D. Driskill, Sr. Investigator Office of Investigations Field Office, Region I /)-

Guy' P. Caputo, DirectoV Ernest P. Wilson, Investigator Office of Investigations .

Office of Investigations .?

Field Office, Region I e '?

(:

Kristin L. Monroe, Investigator y Office of Investigations '

t Field Office, Region I WARNING The attached document / report has not been reviewed pursuant to Title 10 CFR Subsection 2.790(a) exemptions nor has any exempt material been deleted. Do not disseminate or discuss its contents outside NRC. Treat as "0FFICIAL USE ONLY."

SYNOPSIS On September 8, 1993, an investigation was initiated to determine whether a Millstone Unit 1 Nuclear Power Plant (MP1) employee was harassed, intimidated and' discriminated against by his management for engaging in NRC 3rotected activity. The employee has filed nuclear safety concerns with t1e NRC.

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On August 22. 1993, the employee filed a 10 CFR 2.206 petition with the NRb.

requesting enforcement action. Specifically, the employee claimed that his suspension for fifteen days without pay in August 1993 for falsification of time keeping records resulted from having previously reported safety concerns.

In addition, his employment was subsequently terminated in June 1994 for being

, away from his work station without supervisory approval. ,

i The 01 investigation did not substantiate that the employee was discriminated

- against for engaging in protected activities, either in relation to his August 1993 suspension or subsequent termination of employment.

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ACCOUNTABILITY The following portions of this Report of Investigation (Case No. 1 93 047R) will not be included in the material placed in the PDR. They consist of pages 3 through 75.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS ,

Pace SYNOPSIS ................................. 1 ACCOUNTABILITY ,............................. 3 APPLICABLE REGULATIONS .......................... 7 l

LIST.0F INTERVIEWEES ........................... 9 l l DETAILS OF INVESTIGATION ........................11 Pur30se of Investigation .....................11 c

Bac(ground . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Interview of Alleger . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 4 Coordination with NRC Staff . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 Allegation No. 1 (Licensee Management Harassed. Intimidated. and Discriminated Against REYNOLDS by Suspending Him for Three Weeks Witnout Pay in August 1993) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 Evidence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 Conclusion .........................41 Allegation No. 2 (Licensee Management Harassed. Intimidated and Discriminated Against REYNOLDSo'y Terminating His Employment on June 27, 1994) . .. ...... . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 Evidence ................... ......42 Conclusion ...................... . . 71 1

-LIST OF EXHIBITS ............ ... ...... .. 73

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f APPLICABLE REGULATIONS Allecation No. 1: Licensee Manacement Harassed. Intimidated. and

)iscriminated Aaainst REYNOLDS by Suspendina Him for Three Weeks Without Pay in Auaust 1993 Alleaation No. 2: Licensee Harassed. Intimidated. and Discriminated Acainst REYN0LOS by Terminatina H1s Emoloyment on June 27. 1994 10 CFR 50.5(a)(1): Deliberate misconduct (1993 and 1994 Editions)

. (a) Any licensee or any employee of a licensee; and any contractor

. (including a supplier or consultant), subcontractor, or any employee of a contractor or subcontractor, of any licensee, who knowingly provides

. to any licensee, contractor, or subcontractor, components, equipment, y materials, or other goods or services, that relate to a . licensee's activities subject to this part; may not:

(1) Engage in deliberate misconduct that causes or, but for detection, would have caused, a licensee to be in violation of any rule, regulation, or order, or any term, condition, or limitation of any license, issued by the Commission.

10 CFR 50.7(a): Employee protection (1993 and 1994 Editions)

(a) Discrimination by a Commission licensee, an applicant for a Commission license, or a contractor or subcontractor of a Commission licensee or applicant against an employee for engaging in certain protected activities is prohibited. Discrimination includes discharge and other actions that relate to compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment. The protected activities are established in section 211 of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, as amended, and in general are related to the administration or enforcement of the requirement imposed under tne Atomic Energy Act or the Energy Reorganization Act.

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LIST OF INTERVIEWEES ,,

EXHIBIT ACQUITANTE. Jr. Joseph A.. Supervisor. Maintenance Department. MPl. . . 59 ALBEE. Bruce D.. former Supervisor. Maintenance Department. MP3 . . . . . 37 ARCARI. Pasquale. Mechanic A. Maintenance Department. MP1. . . . . . . . 18 ARSENAULT. Alan R., Mechanic. Maintenance Department. MP3 . . . . . . . . 34

- BERGH, Neil G., Manager. Maintenance Department. MP1 ........ 15 & 46 BOYER. Roger G., Supervisor. Maintenance Department. MP1 . . . . . . . . 25 BROWN. Michael E. , former Personnel Consultant. Millstone . . . . . . . . 24 CARLING. Douglas L., Mechanic A. Maintenance Department. MP3 ......35 COMEROSKI. Mich'ael J., Mechanic A. Maintenance Department. MP1 ... . 21 COOPER Cliff Mechanic A. Maintenance Department. MP1 . . . . . . . . . ,, 6 0 g

DUNN. Michael. Electrician. Maintenance Department. MP1 . . . ..... 57 EMORY. Ernest H.. Mechanic A. Maintenance Department. MP1 . . . . . . 17 FLEMING Virginia G.. Personnel Manager Nuclear. Millstone ......22 GENTRY. Michael. Operations Manager. MP2 ..... ...... . . 32 FARRIS Drexel. Licensing Engineering, NU Licensing Department .....45 HAYNES. Harry. Director MP1 ......................27 HOMINICK. Kenneth A., Mechanic A. Maintenance Department. MP1 . . . . . . 65

- LORD. Robert Morgan, former Supervisor. Maintenance Department. MP1 . . 19 McNERNEY. Timothy S.. Contractor Procedure Writer, Maintenance Department. MP1 . .... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 MESSINA. Phil, Contractor, Senior HP Technician. MP1 . . . . . . . . . . 44 MILLER. Donald. Senior Vice President, Millstone ............47 MORRELL. Gil C., Contractor. Procedure Coordinator. Maintenance '-

Department. MP1 . . . . . . . . . . .... ...... ... 50 Case No. 1 93 047R 9

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MURPHY, Robert. W., Hechanic A, Maintenance Department. MP1 . . . . . 38 & 61 NEUMAN, Jim, Mechanic A. Maintenance Department, MP1 ..........43 i

PAWLOSKI, Richard E. , Manager. Labor Relations Department, NU . . . . . 40 PETERSON, Richard L., General Supervisor, Maintenance Department, MP1 . . 16 REIDER, Peter J., Contractor, Procedure Writer, Maintenarice !

Department. MP1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 REYNOLDS. Clarence P. former Mechanic A. Maintenance Department. I MP1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78 & 8 l l

ROSS, Anthony, Electrician, Maintenance Department, HP1. . . . . . . . . 58 j ROSS. Michael J. , Manager, Work Planning & Control . MP1. . . . . . . . . 49 4

STEVENSON, Jeffrey A., Engineer Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Plant . 56 VLAUN. Ronald A. Mechanic A. Maintenance Department. MP1. . . . . 36 & 64 WARG0. Charles. Senior Engineer. MP1 .................. 28 WEEKLY. Patricia L., Security Manager. Millstone ............33 WETHERBEE. Mark E. . Mechanic A. Maintenance Department. MP1 . . . . . . 63 i

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s DETAILc 0F INVESTIGATION Puroose of Investication This investigation was initiated to determine whether the employee Clarence "Pete" REYNOLDS, an MP1 Maintenance Department Mechanic "A." was discriminated against by his management for engaging in protected activity. On August 22.

1993, the employee filed a 10 CFR 2.206 petition with the NRC. requesting enforcement action. Specifically the employee claimed that his suspension for fifteen days without pay in August 1993 for falsification of time keeping records resulted from having previously reported safety concerns. In addition, his employment was terminated in June 1994 for being away from his

. work station wit 1out supervisory approval (Exhibit 1).

Backoround On June 18. 1992. REYNOLDS alleged to Millstone NRC Resident Inspector Douglas A. DEMPSEY that he was being harassed and intimidated for bringing up safety concerns and/or objecting to his department's way of doing business.

REYNDLDS alleged that the harassment and intimidation was being committed in the form of poor performance appraisals, which caused him to be placed in a Performance Improvement Program (PIP). prohibiting him from being a member of the Interplant Maintenance Force (IMF), which precluded him from supplementing his income while working at the other Millstone units. DEMPSEY wrote in the allegation report that REYNOLDS made no specific statement bearing on nuclear safety. DEMPSEY provided REYNOLDS with a copy of the United States Department of Labor discrimination information (Exhibit 2).

On August 11. 1992. REYNOLDS made another allegation to DEMPSEY (Exhibit 3.

p. 1). REYNDLDS alleged that since he began working at Northeast Utilities (NU) he has been bringing to light safety matters, decisions on repair work versus replacement, and fair and equal treatment of his peers. REYNOLDS said that, in the past, his supervision listened to his complaints and corrected some. He alleged that in the past year his supervision tried to stop his comments by reflecting their disapproval ' his erformance reviews. He alleged that in I ht of what nappened to E/

this treatment caused a chilling ef ect on what he said.

He alleged that ma agement was trying to build a se a ainst him so th t, hey Q could dismiss him without fear of a repeat of the ey

. affair. REYNOLDS provided DEMPSEY with a written statement outlining h W_

allegations (Exhibit 3. p. 2).

'. On August 22, 1993. REYNOLDS filed a 10 CFR 2.206 petition with the NRC.

requesting enforcement action. As a result of his August 12, 1993, suspension from his job (Exhibit 4. pp. 1 and 2).

On October 25. 1993. NU responded to REYNOLDS' 10 CFR 2.206 petition stating that "no acts of discrimination have been taken against Mr. REYNOLDS. and the management actions he has experienced were prompted by his conduct, which includes a history of anger, communication difficulties, and absenteelsm" (Exhibit 5. pp. I and 2).

The employee has also filed discrimination complaints with the United States Department of Labor (DOL). Wage and Hour Diyision, and Occupational Safety and Case No. 1 93 047R 11

9 Health Administration and the State of Connecticut, Department of Public Utility Control (DPUC) . On September 22, 1994, the DOL, Wage and Hour Division, dismissed REYNOLDS' complaint regarding his termination after determining that a " prima facie" showing had not been made (Exhibit 6).

REYNOLDS appealed that finding and a appeals hearing has been scheduled. The DOL OSHA investigation preliminarily concluded that the actions taken by NU against REYNOLDS were not related to REYNOLDS engaging in licensed activity.

That investigation remains open with additional field work requested by the Boston. MA. DOL, OSHA Regional Headquarters (Exhibit 7A). .

I REYNOLDS' complaint with the DPUC also remains open.

Interview of A11eaer On August 20. 1993. REYNOLDS was interviewed by 01:RI Investigator Ernest Wilson (Exhibit 78). On August 11. 1994, REYNOLDS was interviewed by the reporting investigator (Exhibit 8). Information provided during this ,

interview will be included in the evidence section of this report. l l

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.oordination with the NRC Staff On May 3.1994. Karla SMITH, Regional Attorney Region I. NRC. reviewed the allegation and concurred en the potential regulatory violations.

Allecation No. 1: Licensee Management Harassed. Intimidated, and Discriminated Against REYNOLDS by Suspending Him for Three Weeks Without Pay in Augusf 1993 Summarv I

I The following individuals were interviewed by 01:RI on the dates indicated regarding the allegations.

Name Position Date of Interview (s) l former Supervisor. September 14, 1994 Bruce D._ALBEE. Maintenance Department, MP3 Mcchanic A, Maintenance January 10, 1995 Pasquale.ARCARI Department. MP1 Mechanic. Maintenance April 12, 1994 Alan R. IRSENAULT Department. MP3 Manager, Maintenance August 12, 1994 & ;

Neil G. BERGH January 10, 1995 Department. MP1 Supervisor, Maintenance November 8, 1994 i Roger G. BOYER Department, MP1 l October 25 & 26, 1994 Michael E. BROWN former Personnel Consultant, l

Milistone '

Mechanic A Maintenance September 14, 1994 Douglas L. CARLING l Department, MP3 Mechanic A Maintenance September 15, 1994 ,

Michael J. COMEROSKI Mechanic A. Maintenance January 10. 1995 l Ernest H. EMORY Department, MP1 1 Case No. 1 93 047R 12

4 Virginia G. FLEMING Personnel Mana9er Nuclear, November 9. 1994 !

Millstone l Michael GENTRY Operations Manager MP2 October 26, 1994 Gil MORRELL Contractor Procedure October 6. 1994 Coordinator, Maintenance .

D rtment, MP1

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l Harry HAYNES 1 rector MP1 December 15, 1994 .&

Robert Morgan LORD former Supervisor, January 10, 1995 Maintenance Department, MP1 Robert W. MURPHY Mechanic A, Maintenance May 4 & September 14, Department, MP1 1994 Jim NEUMAN Mechanic A Maintenance September 14. 1994 Department. MP1 Richard E. PAWLOSKI Manager Labor Relatiors December 15, 1994

- Department, NU Richard L. PETERSON General Supervisor. January 10. 1995 i Maintenance Department. MP1 l Clarence P. REYNOLDS former Mechanic A. August 20, 1993 l' Maintenance Department. MP1 Ronald A. VLAUN Mechanic A, Maintenance April 12 & September 15.

Department. MP1 1994 l Patricia L. WEEKLY Security Manager. Millstone November 9. 1994 /

Charles WARGO. Senior Engineer. MP1 March 24. 1994 Evidence

1. In REYNOLDS' December 19, 1983. Employee Developmenc Rcpcrt (EDR), 1t stated, in the " DEPENDABILITY" section, that REYNOLDS' " attendance record better than last report: with room for improvement" (Exhibit 9).

2. In REYNOLDS' January 8, 1985. EDR. it stated, in the "DEPENDASILITY" section, that REYNOLCS had a "very poor attendance record" (Exhibit 10).

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3. InREYriOLDS' February 17. 1987 EDR. it stated, in the " DEPENDABILITY" section; that REYNOLDS was " Dependable, needs to improve attendance" (Exhibit ~11).

4 In REYNOLDS' July 30, 1990. EDR. it stated, in the " DEPENDABILITY"

. section. that "PTO [ personal time off] within guidelines. Have seen some improvement in lateness" (Exhibit 12).

5. In REYNOLDS' July 30. 1990. EDR. it stated, in the " COMMUNICATION" section, that " Capable of communicating effectively. Can easily intimidate peers. Capable of disrupting communication" (Exhibit 12).

6. BERGH added that at that time. REYNOLOS was often an impediment to department work because if REYNOLDS did not agree with something he would become disruptive. BERGH recalls complaints about that from PETERSON, BOYER and other departments. BERGH added that REYNOLDS' rating in the communications area was not based on one particular event '

(Exhibit 15. p. 1).

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7. In REYNOLDS' March 12, 1991. EDR. it stated, in the " DEPENDABILITY" section, that "Pete's absenteeism has to some extent been effected by personal issues". In the " Communication"Verbal section, it ' stated that "Pete altercations with supervisors must focus on his temper in 1991.

and peers are a severe . . . " (Exhibit 5. p. 30).

8. In the attachment to this EDR. BERGH states that, "The department staff continues to express dissatisfaction and concern for Mr. REYNOLDS Mr. REYNOLDS treatment of his peers and ability to control his temper.

supervision, can at times be very abusive, condescending and even border This behavior is most disturbing because it on insubordination.

detracts from the many constructive qualities Mr. REYNOLDS has to offer.

A.s in the past, the department staff encourages Mr. REYNOLOS to reflect on his behavior and assess the need to incorporate change" (Exhibit 5.

p. 31).

9. In the employee reaction section of this EDR, REYNOLDS wrote "very disatified [ sic]" (Exhibit 5, p. 30) .

They had on there a few

10. REYNOLDS said. "So I got a performance in 1990.

things that I didn't particularly care for, which I know that's copy's around. Putting two a d two together with what was haopening with fQ and dealing with these people for the past eight

' g or nine years, started picking up what s really happening because they (Bob LORD) were saying things that weren't true" (Exhibit 8, p. 15).

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In REYNOLDS' March 21, 1992. EDR. he was rated as " Occasionally Falls Short of Expectations" in the " DEPENDABILITY" and " COMMUNICATION" sections (Exhibit 5. p. 33).

21. 1992. EDR. it stated, in the

12. In an attachment to the March

" DEPENDABILITY" section, that REYNOLDS availability continued to be impacted by excessive sick time and that REYNOLDS five year average was in excess of 100 hours0.00116 days 0.0278 hours 1.653439e-4 weeks 3.805e-5 months sick leave per year (Exhibit 5. p. 34).

13. Records provided by NU reveal that at Millstone Station, the average number of total days absent for " Paid For Employee Absences Due to1992 4.51 Sickness & Non-Occupational Injury" for 1991 was 4.8 days, for days. and for 1993. 3.92 days (Exhibit 13 p. 2).

14. Records provided by NU reveal that REYNOLDS took the following sick leave: 148 hours0.00171 days 0.0411 hours 2.44709e-4 weeks 5.6314e-5 months hoursin in1989, 1993, 65 hours7.523148e-4 days 0.0181 hours 1.074735e-4 weeks 2.47325e-5 months in 1990, 100 hours0.00116 days 0.0278 hours 1.653439e-4 weeks 3.805e-5 months in 1991. 148 hours0.00171 days 0.0411 hours 2.44709e-4 weeks 5.6314e-5 months and 32 hours3.703704e-4 days 0.00889 hours 5.291005e-5 weeks 1.2176e-5 months in 1994 (Exhibit 14, pp. 2 9).

in 1992, 62 21, 1992, EDR, it stated, in the

15. In the attachment to the March

" COMMUNICATION" section, that REYNOLDS ". . . openly ridicules ideas and efforts. chooses to be antagonistic to others, challenging the fundamental expectations established in their principles of excellence.

The department staff continues to express frustration and dissatisfaction with Mr. REYNOLDS' behavior and how it negatively l impacts the teamwork culture so vital to the success of the department" l (Exhibit 5, p. 35). \

16. On June 18. 1992. REYNDLDS alleged to NRC Resident Inspector Doug DEMPSEY that he was being harassed and intimidated for bringing up i 14 Case No. 1 93 047R ,

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safety concerns and/or objecting to his department's way of doing business (Exhibit 2).

17. On August 11, 1992. REYNOLDS made an additional similar allegation to

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DEMPSEY (Exhibit 3).

18. REYNOLDS stated that in 1992 he first felt that he was being harassed, intimidated and discriminated against for raising nuclear safety concerns when BERGH, PETERSON, and LORD started on a program of degrading the quality and quantity of work and his performance reviews (Exhibit 8, pp. 12 and 13).

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19. The " Observed Behaviors Supporting 02 Performance in Communication" for l REYNOLDS' 1992 EDR lists seven instances in which REYNOLDS' )

communications were found to be below expectations (Exhibit 15, p. 11). !

20. PETERSON said that he recalls the incident described in the Upgrade on j 108" section of the " Observed Behaviors Supporting 02 Performance in Communication" document. He said that it was not uncommon for REYNOLD5 and Ernie EMORY to get into an argument during a refueling outage. ,

PETERSON.said that he counseled both of them about the need to get along, but that it got to the point where the disruption in the work {

t caused them to not put REYNOLDS on the 108" level disassembly work (Exhibit 16, p. 3). {

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21. EMORY said that it was too many years ago for him to really recall the incident with REYNOLDS. but believed the incident occurred in 1989 (Exhibit 17, p. 1).

22. EMORY recalls that during another outage he had trouble with REYNOLDS.

This trcuble consisted of "maybe" two arguments with REYNOLDS. He felt that the trouble centered en he and REYNOLDS being given equal responsibility and authcrity over certain work and thus neither had the power or authority to cecide on how the work was to be done (Exhibit 17,

p. 1) . _

23. ARCARI was interviewed regarding the incident described in the "LPCI Motor Chance out" section of the " Observed Behaviors Supporting 02 Performance in Communication" document (Exhibit 18).

. 24. ARCARI said that REYNOLDS " blew up" and told him if he didn't want to do what he was telling him to do, then he should go see BERGH. ARCARI stated that he was upset about what had happened and spoke to BERGH the next day. .He told BERGH that from then on he wanted to be told who he was to take orders from (Exhibit 18, p. 1).

25. ARCARI said that, "at this moment" (January 1995), he does not recall if REYNOLDS delivered abrasive comments to him as described in the document (Exhibit 18, p. 1).

26. LORD recalls that the first problem he had with REYNOLDS occurred in the fall of 1990 when REYNOLDS was leading a work crew when he observed REYNOLDS instructing two workers to do something which he helieved was ~

unsafe. LORD ordered that the job be stopped (Exhibit 19. p. 6 .

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27. LORD stated that REYNOLDS responded by throwing his hands up in the air -

and walking away. LORD attempted to discuss with REYNOLDS different ways to accomplish the job but REYNOLDS did not want to hear about it.

LORD said that REYNOLDS does not like anyone to question his authority.

LORD viewed REYNOLDS' actions as insubordination, and thought about sending him home from the job site at that point but, did not (Exhibit 19 p. 1).

28. LORD wrote up REYNOLDS for his. behavior and provided the document to BERGH. BERGH told him that it would be investigated but LORD does not know what if any action was taken (Exhibit 19. p. 1).

29. BERGH said that the day after the incident. LORD told him he was very upset with REYNOLDS' behavior and tone. BERGH said that he did not talk to REYNOLDS about that behavior and REYNOLDS was not given a verbal warning, because NU tries to give employees several chances before resorting to the Constructive Discipline Process (Exhibit 15. p. 1).

30. LORD said that he has known REYNOLDS since 1979 and had no prior major problems with him. LORD said that REYNOLDS had displayed a history of anger and disrespect especially to individuals who had engineering degrees (Exhibit 19. p. 1).

24. 1982. warning REYNOLDS about

31. LORD provided a document dated November abuse of sick time and that REYNOLDS had been observed out in his truck when he had called in sick (Exhibit 20).

32. COMEROSKI worked with REYNOLDS on that job and said that the work was supervised by LORD. COMEROSKI witnessed the argument thatLORD occurred and between REYNOLDS and LURD on how the job should be done.

REYNOLDS both began to yell at each other over this disagreement (Exhibit 21. p. 1).

33. COMEROSKI opined that the other workers that were present felt that REYNOLDS was right. He added that if he were REYNOLDS in that situation. he would have cone the same thing (Exhibit 21, p. 1).

COMEROSKI

. 34 COMEROSKI described REYNCLDS as a very fair and good worker.

said that incident was "probably the closest catastrophe" to a loss of life in his work career (Exhibit 21. p. 1).

35. COMEROSKI said that "as he sees it now. this incident was the start of Peter's problems with his management." COMEROSKI said that he "can't say anything nice at all about LORD." He knew that REYNOLDS did not get along with LORD and he believes that LORD took every opportunity to say something bad about REYNOLOS. but he had no specific information to offer regarding that statement (Exhibit 21. p. 1).

36. REYNOLDS stated that he was upgraded and in charge of the work crew for the screen house event and that LORD was his supervisor (Exhibit 8.

p. 31).

37. REYNOLDS said that, during the work on this job. LORD came out of his office and "He started yelling at me, can't do that, can't do that.

Somebody's going to get' hurt" (Exhibit 8 p. 34).

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REYNOLDS said that LORD was worried that someone would get hurt with the j

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way they were proceeding with the-job and they had a disagreement over l how the job was to proceed (Exhibit 8, p. 34),. l l

39. REYNOLDS said that, "One thing led to another. I said he said just set them straight down. I said it's going to make a mess. It's going to ruin the rest of the_ screens. It's really going to do some damage. I He wouldn't listen. He yelled at me" (Exhibit 8, p. 34).

40. REYNOLDS said that he called LORD an " asshole" and told him that "the {

only reason they made you a supervisor is because you don't know anything?" (Exhibit 8, p. 34). .

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41. REYNOLDS said that as a direct result of the argument. LORD told him j that he was not going to be upgraded anymore, although LORD did not j offer the argument as the reason for that action (Exhibit 8, pp. 35 and 1 36). l

42. REYNOLDS said that he apologized to LORD the next night for what he had said, but LORD didn't accept the apology (Exhibit 8, p. 36). j

43. REYNOLDS said that he met with BERGH LORD, and PETERSON to discuss what happened and nothing was said to him (Exhibit 8, pp. 36 and 37). j

44. REYNOLDS said that, " Things that happen Mr. Bergh and Peterson didn't f '

say exactly at that particular time. They waited down the road, like it reflected on my review. One of the reviews that I went through, the next review I went through, which they downgraded me. I questioned them on every aspect of why it was going down. The answers that they gave me, well, back when you did the screen house you were very verbal with '

your supervisor" (Exhibit 8. p. 37).

45. BERGH informed REYNOLDS, in a letter dated March 17, 1992, that as a 1 result of achieving an unsatisfactory performance rating he was being placed in a PIP (Exhibit 5. p. 37).

l

46. In the 1.etter*, BERGH further informed REYNOLDS that the PIP did not {

constitute disciplinary action, but that his ' failure to achieve the l expectations of the PIP will result in personnel action up to and j including discharge (Exhibit 5, p. 38).

47. BERGH stated it was felt that a PIP was needed to point out to REYNOLDS that his work performance had deficiencies and the PIP was the mechanism for management to help coach and move the employee along in a positive way (Exhibit 15. p. 1).

I

48. BERGH saic that the PIP is designed to allow discussion with employees on areas for improvement and the need for improvement and the objective is to make the employee successful (Exhibit 15, p. 2).

49. FLEMING recalls an April 27, 1992, meeting that she had with REYNOLDS.

She recalls that REYNOLDS talked about-what he believed were behavioral character.istics (being loud, vocal and .confrontational) that he had that caused him to have more supervisory attention faid to him. She recalls Case No. 1 93 047R 17 1

7 that REYNOLDS told her that was the way he was and people had to get used to it (Exhibit 22, p. 1).

50. FLEMING stated that LDS also disc sedwithherthatheusedsickh ave because he had h YNOLDS attributed (Exhibit 22, p. 1). to ] {

51. FLEMING stated that REYNOLDS also raised safety issues which she brought to BERGH's attention. These issues were discussed with REYNOLOS at a May 20, 1992. meeting with him. BERGH and FLEMING. FLEMING had no further involvement in the safety issues (Exhibit 22, p.1).

52. On June 19, 1992. REYNOLDS was removed from participation in the IMF j pending successful achievement in his PIP (Exhibit 5, p. 61).

53. In the dependability area of the PIP, REYNOLDS was required to provide verification from a physician for all absences due to illness until his attendance record was determined to be satisfactory (Exhibit 5, p. 37). ;

l 54 FLEMING stated that NU Procedure 44 (Exhibit 23, p. 1) states that the company reserves the right to require employees to provide medical verification of illness. She is aware of other NU employees being required, as REYNOLDS was, to provide a note from a doctor when sick I leave was used (Exhibit 22, p. 2).

55. In the communications area of the PIP, REYNOLDS was expected to:

1) refrain from derogatory comments about the intellect or capability of other team members: 2) refrain from using vulgar or rude adjectives l

which demean and degrade the qualities and capabilities of other team '

members: 3) openly and cooperatively share your knowledge, ideas. views l and aspirations in a constructive, professional manner (Exhibit 5, pp. 37 and 38).

56. REYNOLDS said that Defore BERGH became the MP1 Maintenance Manager, they had this massive management change at Northeast Utilities. "They got l alF these people in that had an attitude of the worker the non- i educated or non college degree person is dirt. That's exactly the way l it seemed. It's not just my feeling, the feeling of a lot of people there" (Exhibit 8, p. 15).

57. BERGH offered that when he became the MP1 Maintenance Manager, he felt that all employees were being overrated in their EDR's and that the ratings were based on information that was not relevant to that rating period. BERGH said that he began the process of improving the quality and content of his employee's EDRs. This resulted in a significant adjustment for everyone in the shop, especially REYN0LOS, who was not improving his performance to meet the new expectations (Exhib.it 15,

p. 2). --

58. PETERSON said that change was forced on MP1 and the nuclear business in general by NU management. the Institute for Nuclear Power Operations, NRC, and BERGH. when BERGH became the maintenance manager (Exhibit 16.

p. 4).

Case No. 1 93 047R. 18 s

59. ' PETERSON said that before these changes a lot of worker performance deficiencies were overlooked, as long as you performed your job well.

He said that BERGH decided that he was going to e'1 force the work rules that had been ignored for years, and BERGH told the entire department that the EDR rating system was going to be chanosd (Exhibit 16. p. 4).

60. PETERSON said that BERGH " raised the bar" as far as what was going to be expected of the workers, and that forced a culture change in 1990 1991.

The Maintenance Department management caught a lot of flak over this from some of the older workers, who the year before had been rated higher and were now being downgraded on their EDR's (Exhibit 16 p. 4).

(

. 61. PETERSON said that BERGH tried to make this a constructive experience to

. make everyone strive to improve, but that they were also going to be held more accountable for their performance (Exhibit 16. p. 4).

. 62. PETERSON said that BERGH was raising the company's expectations of its workers and that what REYNOLDS had done in the early and mid 1980's was wrong. He continued to state that REYNOLDS' performance did not change after BERGH arrived, but the accountability changed, resulting in the culmination of REYNOLDS poor performance over the years (Exhibit 16.

p. 4). .

63. In DEMPSEY's meeting notes of his August 11. 1992. meeting with REYNOLDS it indicates that REYNOLDS told DEMPSEY that. " Performance ]

appraisal grades for all members of department have dropped over the 1 years standards getting tougher" (Exhibit 3. p. 4). l 64 Regarding REYNOLDS' PIP. BERGH said that he LORD and PETERSON worked very closely in administering the PIP. BERGH said that REYNOLDS' PIP started out well, but towarcs the end of the PIP. REYNOLDS' performance began to slide backwards again. At that point, he was very anxious and concerned about where REYNOLDS' performance was going and what was going ,

to happen as a result of REYNOLDS' continuing poor performance l (Exhibi t 15 p. 2). 1 l

65. BROWN recalls that in early 1992, he was approached by BERGH regarding I REYNOLDS' job performance problems. BROWN said that among REYNOLDS' )

problems were his communication difficulties with his supervisors 1 (Exhibit 24. p. 1). I

66. BROWN said that BERGH developed a PIP for REYNOLDS. and he (BROWN) and BERGH reviewed the plan. BROWN informed BERGH that he wanted BERGH to

', be specific in what was expected of REYNOLDS (Exhibit 24. p.1). )

67. BROWN said that based on what was presented to him, any " reasonable" person would have concluded that there was a aerformance problem with REYNOLDS. BROWN was aware and sensitive to t1e fact that REYNOLDS had said that the disciplinary actions that were taken against him were done so because he had raised safety issues. BROWN stated that he did not see any evidence to support REYNOLDS' belief (Exhibit 24, p. 1).

6B In the August 3. 1992. EDR generated to close out REYNOLDS* first PIP.

REYNOLDS was rated as failing to meet expectations in the

" DEPENDABILITY" and " COMMUNICATION" sections (Exhibit 5. p. 63).

Case No. 1 93 047R ,

19

69. BERGH said that the information described in this EDR was shared with REYNOLDS. who said that "it was all bullshit" and that they were trying to "get" him (Exhibit 15. p. 2).

70. REYNOLDS said that he was called in by his management to discuss his 1991 EDR. "So I took a roll of toilet paper with me and sat it on the desk. Didn't say nothing, just took a roll of toilet paper with me and "Because at least sat it on the desk." REYNOLDS said that he did that something. I'd have something.to. wipe my ass with. This paper I.just is too See what I mean? I can't be I didn't say nothing.

stiff.

had it with me. Now you can indicate what did it mean to you?" '

(Exhibit 8. p. 154).

71. BOYER recalled attending one of REYNOLDS' yearly performance review REYNOLDS brought in a meetings with BERGH, PETERSON LORD and REYNOLDS.

roll of toilet paper and said something to the effect of. you can use the roll of toilet paper or the performance review document to wipe your ass, because that was how much it meant to him (Exhibit 25. p. 1).

72. BERGH said that as the PIP was. coming to a close, he told FLEMING that it was worse now with REYNOLDS than before, and that FLEMING brought up termi. nation and reassignment as options available to him (Exhibit 15.

p . 2) .

73. BERGH said that he could not go along with those options andHe looked agreed for another vehicle to help turn REYNOLDS' performance around.

with FLEMING to close out the first PIP and capture what they had uo to that point. It was decided to place REYNOLDS in a second PIP (Exhibit

15. p. 2).

74. BERGH recalls FLEMING stating that placing an employee in a second PIP had never been done before. BERGH said that the whole thrust of the second PIP was to have REYNOLDS tell them in his own words how he expected himself to behave and oerform in the work place (Exhibit 15.

p. 2).

75. BERGH said that he told REYNOLDS to write down his thoughts on that, and BERGH said that they would use it an a road map through the second PIP.

this resulted in two weeks of fighting and conflict, during which REYNOLDS was obstinate and had a bad attitude, but it was finally completed in August 1992. This PIP was to stay open for one month (Exhibit 15. p. 2).

BERGH recalled that during REYNOLDS' PIP REYNOLDS threatened to use the

76. not as a resource, but as a device NU Employee Assistance Program (EAP) to say that management was to blame for his poor performance and not him (Exhibit IE. p. 2).

77. LORD said that BERGH directed that REYNOLDS be put on a PIP. The plan was mainly developed by PETERSON although LORD BERGH and Virginia FLEMING assisted (Exhibit 19, p. 3).

78. LORD recalls being at a meeting with BERGH. PETERSON, and REYNOLDS whe PETERSON told REYNOLDS that he (REYNOLDS) has a problem in " dealing people." PETERSON strongly suggested to REYNOLDS that he seek help 20 Case No. 1 93 047R

through the NU EAP. LORD recalls that REYNOLDS was initially silent but, then REYNOLDS stated that it would be a good way to build a case against all involved (Exhibit 19 p. 2).

79. PETERSON did not recall REYNOLDS saying during one of his PIP review meetings that he would use NU's employee assistance program (EAP) as a good way to build a case against all involved. PETERSON does recall a time when BERGH discussed the EAP with REYNOLDS and REYNOLDS rejected the idea (Exhibit 16. p. 2).

80. LORD said that it was PETERSON's decision to remove REYNOLDS from being allowed to work on the IMF because PETERSON wanted to be able to observe REYNOLDS' improvement on the performance improvement plan (Exhibit 19.

. p. 3).

81. PETERSON said that BERGH proposed removing REYNOLDS from participation

. in the IMF while REYNOLDS was in the PIP. PETERSON said that he initially disagreed with BERGH (Exhibit 16. p. 2).

82. PETERSON said that BERGH explained to him that the PIP's purpose was to observe REYNOLDS' job performance and they would not be able to do this if REYNGLDS was allowed to work on the IMF at other units. PETERSON said that they did not want to have to bring in other supervisors from other units and tell them that they had to monitor REYNOLDS' job performance while on the IMF (Exhibit 16. pp. 2 and 3). ,

J

83. BERGH was questioned regarding REYNOLDS' statement to a U.S. Department of Labor Wage and Hour Divis' ion Investigator that in August 1992 BERGH threatened to terminate him (Exhibit 15. p. 17). BERGH said that it was absolutely not a. threat, but he wanted REYNOLDS to understand the consequences if he did not improve his performance (Exhibit 15 p. 2). )

84 LORD provided a writter " verbal warning" to REYNOLDS as a result of finding REYNOLDS at a restaurant on the evening of February 25, 1992, after he had calle~d in sick that day (Exhibit.26).

'85. LORD said that BERGH re:;uested that he put this incident in writing.

LORD said that after he caught REYNOLDS in the restaurant, he observed a noticeable change in REYNOLDS' behavior (Exhibit 19. p. 2).

86. PETERSON said that LORD told him about seeing REYNOLDS in a restaurant on the evening of a day that he had called in sick. PETERSON believed that LORD did not want to make an issue of it. LORD did tell him that REYNOLDS had lied to him about being too sick to come to work, and he (LORD) was " pissed off" about that (Exhibit 16. p. 2).

87. BERGH said that LORD ~ informed him of thi s the'next day and asked him what they should do about it. BERGH said he and LORD decided that a verbal warning was appropriate, but that he had no personal discussion

~

with REYNOLDS about this incident (Exhibit 15. p. 3).

88. LORD said that after this he had a few other incidents with REYNOLOS and he (LORD) would inform PETERSON. The incidents usually involved REYNOLDS using profane language to him. PETERSON. BERGH, and LORD would bring in REYNOLDS to discuss the problem and REYNOLOS would always deny Case No. 1 93 047R 21

what he said to LORD (using profanity) and would call him (LORD) a liar (Exhibit 19,' p. 2).

89. LORD said that, after this happened a few times, BERGH directed him to document any incident he had with .REYNOLDS because REYNOLDS would deny the incidents. LORD told BERGH that he did not feel right in doing this just for REYNOLDS because it made him feel that he was singling out REYNOLDS for things that he did. BERGH told him that he wanted it documented (Exhibit 19. p. 2).

90. LORD admitted that it was common practice for MP1 maintenance department workers to use profanity (Exhibit 19, p. 2).

91. LORD said that he would also wri.te.down things for other employees that he supervised whether they be negative or positive. LORD would then use these things as a basis to produce REYNOLDS* and others performance appraisals. LORD said that he never went out of his way to get into conflict with REYNOLDS and he was never directed to do that either (Exhibit 19, p. 2).

92. LORD added that REYNOLDS was treated differently in this regard (being directed by BERGH to document problems with REYNOLDS) because of his behavior and not because he raised safety concerns (Exhibit 19. p. 2).

93. PETERSON said that he. BERGH and LORD managed and directed REYNOLDS' PIP. He would meet with REYNOLDS to discuss the plan and how REYNOLDS was doing in the program (Exhibit 16, p. 2).

94. PETERSON recalls meetings that were held to discuss arguments between REYNOLDS and LORD, where REYNOLDS called LORD a fucking liar" (Exhibit 16 p. 2).

95. PETERSON added that REYNOLDS could be very disruptive at meetings ar.d would get loud with people to get his point across (Exhibit 16. p.1).

j

96. PETERSON recalls a PIP review meeting where REYNOLDS was physically and mentally distraught due to the negative criticism that he (REYNOLDS) was receiving during the PIP because he was not meeting what was expected of him (Exhibit 16, p. 2).

97. PETERSON said that, shortly after that meeting, he had REYNOLDS come to his office to discuss the PIP process as a friend and as his supervisor.

PETERSON said that even though he and REYNOLDS had their problems in the past they still had a friendship (Exhibit 16, p. 2).

98. PETERSON said that he told REYNOLDS that his situation was very serious and used the baseball analogy that REYNOLDS had three strikes already and he had better hope that the catcher dropped the third strike (Exhibit 16, p. 2).

99. PETERSON said that he then assisted REYNOLDS in writing up a plan on how he could improve his performance, and helped him with the spelling and l

grammar. PETERSON said that shortly after doing this with REYNOLDS.

l

'REYNOLDS' performance continued to slide (Exhibit 16, p. 2).

Case No. 1 93 047R 22

/

100. ' At the completion of the second PIP. REYNOLDS was rated as 003/ Fully Meets Expectations. This EDR is dated September 24. 1992 (Exhibit 5.

p. 66).

101. REYNOLDS said that at one of his PIP review meetings he told PETERSON and LORD that the PIP ' sucked". REYNOLDS also told them "the program itself I felt was a good program and it should be applied to people that deserve it and it shouldn't be a] plied to me because what they've been saying about me is not true" (Ex1ibit 8. pp. 110 and 111).

102. REYNOLDS also told them chat he believed they were putting him through the PIP to "get back to me for raising all the safety issues." REYNOLDS said that they told him that was not true (Exhibit 8 p. 111).

~

103. REYNOLDS believes they were mad at him because he said the PIP sucked and because he turned in the safety concerns (Exhibit 8. p. 122).

104. REYNOLDS said that he got a good review at the end of his second PIP "because I'm telling you I didn't raise any safety concerns. I didn't bad mouth them as far as, you know, your paperwork sucks, this -

{

you know.,I didn't say nothing. I made it a point to avoid any !

conversation at all that was unnecessary to continue my job" (Exhibit 8.

pp. 171 and 172).

105. REYNOLDS said that, "I didn't say no more about safety, no more about i the way they screw everything up, right? I just closed my eyes, and this is what happened. I get a good review. So, that gives me the i message as long as I keep quiet,.I'll get a good review" (Exhibit 8. '

pp. 172 and 173).

106. REYNOLDS said that he " deliberately ignored safety issues during this time period, and I've got a list of them at home, the ones I ignored that I didn't turn in all right? - for this six week period or whatever it is, all right?" (Exhibit 8. p. 173) 107. HAYNES stated that he was not personally involved in suggesting or implementing the PIP that REYNOLDS was placed in. At the time, he was satisfied that it was appropriate because REYNOLDS' EDR dated January 1.

1991, rated him as 002/ Falls Short of Expectations. He was not kept .

. apprised as to the administration of the plan but does recall seeing I some of the written weekly reviews of REYNOLDS* performance (Exhibit 27,

p. 1).

108. REYNOLDS said that he filed a grievance because "they were putting me through this program (PIP) and I felt it was unnecessary and I also said at that point I feel that they're putting me through this program because of all the saf ty concerns I brin nd they don't want another situation like (Exhibit 8. pp. 73 and } d 74).

109. NU stated that REYNOLDS appealed his March 21, 1992. EDR. and then filed a grievance seeking to upgrade his overall evaluation. REYNOLDS pursued his grievance through all stages of the NU grievance procedure and was denied the relief he sought at each step in the process (Exhibit 5. -

pp. 12 and 13).

Case No, 1-93 047R 23

110. REYNOLDS' grievance statement is dated August 13, 1992 (Exhibit 5,

p. 44).

111. On November 16, 1992. BERGH gave REYNOLOS a verbal warning about sleeping at a November 13, 1992, Maintenance Department meeting (Exhibit 15, p. 19).

112. LORD recalls that BERGH informed him that he observed REYNOLDS sleeping during an MP1 maintenance department meeting. LORD said that BERGH told him that "Pete was out" (Exhibit 19, p. 3).

113. WARG0 recalls seeing REYNOLDS sleeping at maintenance department meetings, but cannot recall if REYNOLDS fell asleep at a November 13.

1992 meeting (Exhibit 28. p. 2).

114. PETERSON recalls that REYNOLDS had his head back, eyes shut, mouth open.

and appeared to be sleeping at a November 13. 1992, department meeting (Exhibit 16, p. 1).

Ey 115. )statedthathattendstheregularmaintenancedepartment

.eetings, but does Nt recall REYNOLDS falling asleep at a meetinc on November 16, 1992, or at any other meeting (Exhibit 29. p. 2).

116. REYNOLDS said that on November 16. 1992, he was called into Bergh's office. and accused of sleeping at the November 132 meeting. REYNOLDS saidthathewasnotgleepingatthemeeting(Exhibit 8.p.155).

was sleeping at the meeting and that 117. REYNOLDS said that M another employee was captured o tape sleeping at a different presentation and they were not reprimanded (Exhibit 8, pp. 155 and 156).

11B. REYNOLDS felt that he was being treated differently (Exhibit B. p.156).

119. On November 30, 1992, REYNOLDS received a written reprimand from BOYER for leaving work on November 20E without receiving the permission of his supervisor (Exhibit 25, p. 5).

120. BOYER recalls that during the middle of the day on November 20, 1992, REYNOLDS said to him that it was a slow work day and that he would like to get an early jump on vacation (Exhibit 25. p. 2).

121. BOYER said that he informed REYNOLDS that NU's personnel policy said ,

that personal time could not be granted for the day before or the day l i

after vacation. REYNOLDS then told him that he had an appointment that he couid not miss (Exhibit 25, p. 2). l 122. BOYER recalls looking for REYNOLDS later that day and could not find l

him. BOYER assumed that REYNOLDS had gotten permu sion to leave early -

from PETERSON. BOYER saw PETERSON that Monday and asked if REYNOLDS had I asked him if he could leave early. PETERSON told him, "no" (Exhibit 25.

p. 2).

BOYER said that he and BERGH discus:Ed the situation with REYN0'.CS, as 123. j statedintheNovember30Ememorandum. BOYER does not recall MtG0's name being brought up regarding this incident (Exhibit 25. p. 2).

Case No. 1 93 047R 24 1

1 ;

124. REYNOLDS said that he had a medical appointment on November 20E and that he told BOYER about it at lunchtime. BOYER told him that he had to run it by PETERSON (Exhibit 8. pp. 180 and 181).

125. REYNOLDS said that PETERSON and BERGH were not to be found that day (Exhibit 8. p. 181).

126. REYNOLDS said that it was getting late and that for a long time WARGO was left in charge if BERGH and PETERSON were not around. REYN0LOS said he asked WARGO if he were in charge and WARG0 said "yes" (Exhibit 8.

p. 182).

127. REYNOLDS said that he " explained the situation [to WARG0), that I had to

- go to the doctor and everything and BOYER said run it by Peterson. I said Peterson is nowhere to be found. I says is it all right if I leave? And he said yes. He said no problem, and he said have a nice vacation, because the following week I was going on vacation. So, I left" (Exhibit 8. p. 182).

128. REYNOLDS said that he knew he had the approval of somebody to leave early on' November 202 (Exhibit 8 p.182).

129. REYNOLDS' said that when he met with BERGH he argued that point, and BERGH said that he didn't leave WARGO in charge that particular day (Exhibit 8. p. 182).

130. REYNOLDS said that he told BOYER._ "you know, seeing as we're not doing nothing. I'm going to leave'early. I've got an appointment anyway . . ."

(Exhibit 8. pp. 182 and 183).

131. REYNOLDS said that his paycheck reflected two hours of personal time taken for November 20. 1992. REYNOLDS felt that if he left without permission his paycheck should have reflected disciplinary action (Exhibit 8, pp. 183 and 184).

132. REYNOLDS viewed this as a continued act of discrimination and retaliation (Exhibit 8. p. 183). .

133. WARG0 recalls that he was doing office work the day that REYNOLDS left work early. He was not assigned any task related to work by the MP1 maintenance shop (Exhibit 28, p.1).

, 134. WARGO recalls that REYNOLDS came to his office to offer him information

- that he was going to a doctors appointment, even though he (WARGO) was not directing any workers (including REYNOLDS) that day (Exhibit 28,

p. 1).

135. WARGO said that REYNOLDS did not ask him if he could leave, he just told He acknowledged (not verbally) that REYNOLDS was going. WARGO him.

finds it curious that REYNOLDS offered him no instructions as to what he was supoosed to do with this information (Exhibit 28, p. 1).

136. WARGO indicated that it is not within his sphere of responsibility to tell someone who was not in his: chain of command that he or she can leave work early. He added that BOYER and LORD were REYNOLDS' first Case No. 1 93 047R. 25

i l line supervisors. He felt no responsibility to follow up with BOYER.

LORD or the timekeeper regarding REYNOLDS' statement (Exhibit'28.

p. 1).

137. WARG0 does not recall REYNOLDS telling him that he could not get a hold of his supcevisors to tell them he was leaving, and that was why he was telling him. He does not recall if REYNOLDS' management chain was unavailable that day (Exhibit 28, p.1).

138. WARGO recalls that the next day MP1 Maintenance Manager Neil BERGH asked him if he had given REYNOLDS permission to leave the job or the station the day before. He told BERGH that he did not authorize REYNOLDS to leave (Exhibit 28, p. 1).

139. WARGO added that there were occasions when an engineer working in the field with hourly workers might feel comfortable with telling someone that they could leave work early for a doctor's appointment. But, in this instance, that was not the case (Exhibit 28. p.1).

140. BERGH said that after the incident he sat down with REYNOLDS to get his version of the incident and believes that REYNOLDS concurred that he had-appro. ached BOYER twice about his desire to leave work early that day (Exh,ibit 15 p. 3). !

141. BERGH said that he then spoke to WARGO, who told him that he had not given REYNOLDS permission to leave work early that day. BERGH acknowledged there were times in the past, when he was going to be away, that he would announce to the department that WARGO would be in charge.

BERGH stated that he had not left WARGO in charge on November 20. 1992 (Exhibit 15 p. 3).

142. BERGH believed that the incident warranted a written warning to REYNOLDS due to the circumstances of the incident and the fact that REYNCLDS had just gotten out of a second PIP. BERGH viewed this incident as REYN0LCS slipping back into poor performance (Exhibit 15 p. 3).

143. WARGO has known REYNOLDS for approximately eleven years, but they have no real personal relationship. He opined that REYNOLDS is a very difficult person to deal with and chooses not to be around him (Exhibit 28, p. 2).

144. WARGO said that he has observed REYNOLDS using a very inappropriate tone during conversations. He believes that REYNOLDS has the mechanical ability to be productive, but his behavior makes it difficult to work and deal with him (Exhibit 28. p. 2).

145. During an August 20. 1993, interview with 01:RI Investigator Wilson, REYNOLDS stated he was suspended by BERGH, on August 12. 1993. for what BERGH said was a " serious" time charging falsification (Exhibit 7B.

p. 1).

146. REYNOLDS stated that BERGH had been after him for over a year because he

. reported nuclear safety concerns at Millstone and believed that BERGH was using the time charging occurrence as a pretext to suspend, and most likely, fire him (Exhibit 7B. p. 1). ,

l Case No. 1 93 047R 26

147. ' REYNOLOS claimed that the time charging falsification amounted to forty five minutes of overtime pay for Sunday. August 8.1993, that was fully ;

explainable (Exhibit 7B. p.1). I 148. REYNOLDS believed that his suspensi.on, and probable firing, was directly related to his raising of safety issues. REYNOLOS acknowledged that {

some of his concerns were eventually appropriately fixed by NU i (Exhibit 7B. p. 1).

149. REYNOLDS stated that he had fully intended on working until the normal quittingtimeforaSunday(August 8$).whichwas5:30p.m.

(Exhibit 78. p. 2).

150. REYNOLDS stated that due to the need to get the time sheets in promptly to make payroll. the time sheets were picked up hours before 5:30 p.m..

and he wrote on his time sheet the normal quitting time of 5:30 p.m.

(Exhibit 78. p. 2).

151. REYNOLDS stated that the actual job that he was working on was substantially completed at about 3:20 p.m., and he stayed at the job site until 4:40 p.m.. after being told by the Millstone Unit 3 (MP3) job supervisor, who he knew only as "Al." to leave early (Exhibit 75 p. 2).

152. stated tha for time recording purposes a work week begins on Ey.

40LD was on August Bi (Exh101t 29. p.1).

153. REYNOLDS, in a second OI interview, stated that he worked only with ARSENAULT on August 8[ (Exhibit 8. pp. 210 and 211).

154 REYNOLDS stated that at lunch time, he filled out his time chit himself because he tncught of it at tnat time (Exhibit 8. p. 212).

155. REYNDLDS stateo inat he put the hours worked as 7:00 a.m. to 1700 hours0.0197 days 0.472 hours 0.00281 weeks 6.4685e-4 months and that after lunch they went back to work (Exhibit 8. p. 212).

155. REYNOLDS stated that tney worked steady, and completed their work at about three o' clock and went back to the MP3 shop (Exhibit 8 pp. 212 and 213).

157. REYNOLDS said that when he left he ran into' BERGH (Exhibit 8. p. 190).

158. REYNOLDS said that, as he left. he saw BERGH there and spoke to him and Chuck (Exhibit 8 p. 217).

159. REYNOLDS said that BERG 4 looked at his watch but didn't say anything to him about why he was leaving early (Exhibit 8 p. 217).

150. BERGH said that en August 8. 1993, he was the On Site Director of Station Emergency Operations (ODSEO). He said that on his way into the Millstone South Access Point (SAP) he ran into REYNOLDS and described REYNOLDS as being extremely cordial (Exhibit 15 p. 3).

Case No. 1 93 047R 27

161'. BERGH said that when he got to the MP1 maintenance shop area he noticed a lot of the other mechanics were in the shop. At approximately 5:05 p.m. BERGH told these workers that they could go home (Exhibit 15.

p. 3).

162. BER3H said that seeing the other workers in the shop got him curious about REYNOLDS leaving alone earlier. BERGH said this raised his antenna because of earlier problems with REYNOLDS leaving work early, and the next day he called PETERSON to confirm if REYNOLDS was assigned to the MP3 IMF (Exhibit 15. p ~4).

163. A work order shows that on August 8, 1993. REYNOLDS worked with A.

ARSENAULT and K. HOMINICK (Exhibit 30. pp. 2 and 3).

164. REYNOLDS stated that he immediately realized that he needed to amend his time sheet to reflect his early departure from work, but knew that he could not do this until Monday. since the time. sheets had already been picked up for payroll processing (Exhibit 7B. p. 2). g INVESTIGATOR *S NOTE: According to at that time, MP3 had 1 itsworkersrecordtheirworkhourson"ch)lts." After the " chits" were filled out, the workers placed them in a box on a supervisor's desk. Each of the maintenance department supervisors

. had a box on their desks. The " chits" in those boxes were picked up the next morning and the information transferred onto a payroll sheet. A supervisor then verified the information on the time

- sheet and signed tne time sheet (Exhibit 31, p. 1).

165. REYNOLDS said that when he got home that night he told his wife that he left work early and that, when he left, he saw BERGH and she said.

"that son cf a bitch is going to do something. I says I know it. I've got to make sure I change my time sheet and, you know, everything is right, the way it's supposed to be" (Exhibit 8. p. 218).

166. REYNOLDS said that his wife said. "you already made out your time sheet?

I said yes. I made it out at noon. and for me to go back and change it when I decided to leave would have been useless', because by the time I got to Unit 3 and everything and got back again, it would have been 5:30. So, I didn't" (Exhibit 8. p. 218).

167. REYNOLDS said that Monday morning he went to see Rose, the MP3 timekee]er, in her office "to see her to see about getting the time

' sheet clanged, because I had in my mind what the - you know, he's (BERGH) going to say something about it and he's going to give me another warning, you know, or something" (Exhibit 8. p. 218).

168. REYNOLDS said that Tuesday he went up, about the same time, to see CRUEGER. but she was talking to Mike GENTRY. and he didn't want to interrupt, so he left (Exhibit 8. p. 219).

169. REYNOLDS said that on Wednesday he finished up his work and went to see CRUEGER and asked her for the time sheet, so he could change it (Exhibit 8. pp. 219 and 220).

Case No.- 1 93 047R '28

i 170. REYNOLDS said that he told CRUEGER the situation and what was going on. I "that Neil Bergh is going to try and pull something, he's going to give I me a warning, say I left early, and I'm trying to cheat the company out of money and all this shit" (Exhibit 8, p. 220) 4 l

171. REYNOLDS stated that he told CRUEGER that he wanted to change the time, J "you know, make sure it's right." So, CRUEGER "went up under her desk, along the wall, she went and got the box where she has all these tims

{

sheets. She goes through it, looks through. Huh, Said you're sure it was Unit 1. huh? I said yes. She says there's no time sheets here for Unit 1 for Sunday, and she looks there's none here for Saturday either. The time sheets (chits) were gone for both shifts" (Exhibit 8,

. p. 220 and Exhibit 7B, p. 2).

J 172. REYNOLDS stated that he told her that, "I bet you Neil Bergh's got it i and is looking at them to see what time I put on my time sheet, and she i

. says, well, this is unusual, nobody's ever come in here and took these chits from under my desk I don't even know how they knew that they were there, but they were gone" (Exhibit 8, p. 221).

, 1 173. )byi T-

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\ 'lL Case No. 1-93 047R 29

180. VLAUN stated that he Gecompanied REVNOLDS upstairs to CRUEGER's office.

REYNOLOS asked CRUEGER if she had his time sheet because he left work an hour early on Sunday and wanted to change it (Exhibit 36, p.1).

181. VLAUN said that CRUEGER told REYNOLDS that she would take care of it.

She told REYNOLDS that someone had been in her paperwork because all of the MP1 time sheets for Sunday had been taken. REYNOLDS said that he

" figured that would happen" (Exhibit 36, p.1).

182. VLAUN then asked CRUEGER if she had his time sheet for Sunday. She told him "no." that all the MP1 sheets were gone. At this point VLAUN left the office and waited in the hall, and REYNOLDS and CRUEGER continued to talk for approximately one or two minutes. VLAUN does not know'what they discussed (Exhibit 36, pp. 1 and 2).

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184.

k.$rg,,185.

186.

187.

188.

189.

C Case No. 1 93 047R. 30

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W 190. h

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a 191. REYNOLDS said that he told HALEY that the time sheets are missing, and I think BERGH's got them and he's going to try to give me another warning or something (Exhibit 8. p. 223).

192. ) recalls that REYNOLDS probably ' ebeginningtof the middle of the week of A gust 8_" (Sun ay) to tell that he left early on Sunday and had put his time in for having wo ten hours when e only worked nine and one quarter hours (Exhibit 29. p.1).

193.

6Y JL 194 )does'notrecall REf fy added th'at workers to 1 ave their time sheets O changed, a d at the time, did not view REYNOLDS' request as anything out of the crainary (Exhiti: 29. p. 2).

a t k ya 19e. opinec that if REYNDLDS had not run into BERGH as he was eaving The plant, he wouV "

h ve Ey (Exhibit 29, p. 2).

g 197. believes that REYNOLDS was suspended for a nutc5er of thi including other writte warlings and bad performance reviews. has no knowledge of REYNOLCS reputation for leaving work early.

believes that other wor (ers leave before the end of their scheduledis EY workday (Exhibit 29. p. 2). i 1 198. BERGH said that he also called GENTRY to ask if he could check with his supervisors'to see if REYNOLDS had permission to leave early on August 8E (Exhibit 15. p. 4).

199. GENTRY said that BERGH asked him if MP3 had released a lot of people early from work on August 8E. BERGH asked him to talk to the person that REYNOLDS had worked witn that day (Exhibit 32, p. 1).

200. GENTRY said that the supervisor told him that he did not let the crew leave early and that no one had asked if they could' leave early. GENTRY Case No. 1 93 047R 31

provided BERGH with this information sometime early in the week (Exhibit 22 p. 1).

201. GENTRY informed BERGH that, normally. he would not let his lead workers (or upgrades) release workers early (Exhibit 32, p. 2).

( '-

202.

203.

9b .

204 205.

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206. GENTRY said that he informed BERGH of this via the telephone, and BERGH commented. "Oh, that's interesting" (Exhibit 32, p. 2).

207.

208.

209.

'L 210.

I 211. ' WEEKLY said that she was requested by. FLEMING and BERGH to look into a possible falsification of hours by REYNOLDS. while REYNOLDS was on an IMF assignment (Exhibit 33 p. 1). .

Case No. 1 93 047R 32

_. 7

212. WEEKLY stated that from the Security Department's perspective RE'NOLDS did not attempt to falsify his tinne sheet based on a statement @(/

(Exhibit 33. pp. 1 and 4). {

213. WEEKLY.statedthat[

214.;

215./

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a 216. REYNOLDS stated that on Thursday. August 12, 1993, at about 11:50 a.m..

BERGH confronted him in PETERSON's office over the time sheet and asked him why he left work early on Sunday (Exhibit 78, p. 2).

217. REYNOLDS stated that he explained to BERGH why he left early and BERGH asked him if he filled out the time sheet in question. REYNOLDS acknowledged that he had, and the discussion ended. REYNOLDS said that he was not given an opportunity to explain that he attempted first thing Monday mor.ning to straighten out his time sheet (Exhibit 7B. p. 2).

218. REYNOLDS 'said that on August 12E. at approximately 3:45 p.m. , he was summoned to the NU Human Resources Group (HRG) office at Millstone.

Present was PETERSON EERGH. and BROWN of the HRG (Exhibit 78, p. 2).

219. REYNOLDS acknowledged to them that he filled out the original time sheet and BERGH immediately interjected "This is serious." REYNOLDS said that BERGH looked at BROWN. who nodded his head, and BERGH then suspended him indefinitely, pending an investigation (Exhibit 78, p. 2).

220. REYNOLDS stated that his attempts to have his time changed for

. August BE were successful because his pay stub showed that he was paid cnly for the hours that he worked on that day (Exhibit 78 p. 3).

~

221. REYNOLDS said that after his suspension he telephoned the MP1 timekeeper to confirm that his time sheet had been changed and made correct before the meeting with BERGH on August 12$. She replied that "they" told her not to talk to him. REYNOLDS assumed that "they" referred to BERGH, PETERSON, and BROWN (Exhibit 7B. p. 3).

222. REYNOLDS contends that his suspension was inappropriate because he did nothing wrong. He further contends that the suspension was the direct result of the safety concerns he had raised (Exhibit 7B. p. 3).

223. REYNOLDS. in his second 01 interview, stated that when they got back to the shop ARSENAULT filled out the paperwork, and somebody says, well, you two might as well leave now and I said to ARSENAULT. "I don't know if I should or not, because Neil Bergh's here. He's been after my ass" (Exhibit B. pp. 213 and 214).

, .q ,

Case No. 1 93 047R 33

r 224. ARSENAULT recalls being assigned to work at MP3 on Sunday. August 8, 1993. He worked with REYNOLDS and Ken HOMINICK. He was not the " lead man" on this job. REYNOLDS may have thought that he was the lead man because he had the work package for taking apart the brace joint (Exhibit 34, p. 1).

225. ARSENAULT said that Al MURATORE did not work with them that day (Exhibit 34, p. 1).

226. ARSENAULT recalled that they started the job at approximately 7:00 a.m.

and completed the job at approximately 4:00 3.m. He knew that it was late in the day when they completed the job 3ecause there was not enough time for them to begin another job (Exhibit 34, p. 1).

227. ARSENAULT told REYNOLDS that everything was set, the tools were all cleaned up, and all he (ARSENAULT) had to do was complete the paperwork for the work package (Exhibit 34, p. 1).

228. ARSENAULT said that he told REYNOLDS that he could do what he wanted.

REYNOLDS told him that he was going back to MPl. and that if he (ARSENAULT) needed him. give him a call. REYNOLDS did not specify what he was going to do (Exhicit 34. p. 1).

229. ARSENAULT did not tell REYNOLDS that he could go home, and REYNOLDS did I not tell him that he was going home. He had no additional contact with REYNOLDS that day. He and HOMINICK left at approximately 5:30 p.m.

(Exhioit 34, p. 1). ;

t CARLING was the upgraded welder at MP3 during the August 1993 outage. l 230.

He supervistd the welding crew and gave out job assignments. He recalls l

that REYNOLDS was a welders helper in the outage welding crew (Exhibit 35, p. 1).

CARLING found out, af ter the f act, that REYNOLDS had left work early and f 231. He does not l got in trouble (fired or suspended without pay) for it. >

recall REYNOLDS asking him if he could leave work early during the outage. CARLIN3 did not have the authority to let employees leave work early. He said that Al ARSENAULT did not say anything to him about REYNOLDS leaving work early during the outage (Exhibit 35, p.1).

232. CARLIN3 said that he has no firsthand information regarding whether REYNOLDS was harassed, intimidated, or discriminated against because he had raised safety issues (Exhibit 35, p. 1).

233. BERGH stated that his investigation revealed that on August 8,1993, REYNOLDS did not have the permission of his supervisor to leave work early (Exhibit 15.,pp. 3 and 4).

234. During the second 01 interview. REYNOLDS said that he then wentHe to then take a shower in the MP1 shower room, probably about four o' clock.

e cleaned out his locker, straightened thin out, waiting ti 1 5:30. ,

ty that then. it hit him, that were down f 1pv REYN LDS sai

'for the day and they were a he house. It as a nice day from ana erytm (Exhibit 8, pp. 214 216).

34 Case No. 1-93 047R.

235. REYNOLDS said that he told VLAUN that. "I think I'm going to leaveh kl are visiting me. you know. He said, well, you've got to g e careful, t eil Bergh's there. and I says don't worry. I'll change my time sheet tomorrow" (Exhibit 8. p. 216).

-236. VLAUN recalls that he saw REYNOLDS on August BE. but did not work with him. He recalls leaving MP3 that day at approximately 4:45 p.m. to go back to MP1 to take a shower. When he got Dack to MPl. he did not see REYNOLDS. He does not recall REYNOLDS telling him that he was leaving work early (Exhibit 36. p.1).

237. REYNOLDS said that he left work early because "they had nothing more for me to do. So, at 20 minutes till after cleaning out my locker and putting everything back and stuff, the other guys were through, and I went they went towards the shop, and I went out the gate" (Exhibit 8.

e pp. 216 and 217).

238. ALBEE said that interplant maintenance force workers are not allowed to

. leave work early. If they do leave early, they are only paid for the hours they work. ALSEE said that if he leaves work early on a Sunday, he only gets paid for the hours that he works (Exnioit 37. p. 2).

239. MURPHY recalls that he worked on the IMF at Millstone Unit 3 (MP3) on Sunday. A.ugust 8, 1993. REYNOLDS also worked that day but was not assigned to work with tnem in the welding shop. Because it was a sicw work day, he and VLAUN went back to the MP1 maintenance shop at approximately 4:30 p.m. He did not see REYNOLDS when he got back tc the shop (Exhibit 38. p. 1).

240. REYNOLDS said that he did not attempt'to cheat the company by originally claiming that he worked ten hours on August 82 (Exhibit 8. p. 225).

241. REYNOLDS said that every " tire that I've left early from that place.

I've told somebody. if I've nac a doctor appointment, or sometimes.

before all this shit started with me, you know. if I just you know.

you're not doing nothing. you want to leave early, you tell them you want to leave early. and usually there's no problem" ,(Exhibit 8.

p. 225).

242. REYNOLDS said that on Thursday, right before lunch. BERGH asked him if he left early Sunday. and he said yes. BERGH then asked him which supervisor authorize:: him to leave early and REYNOLDS said "Al" because at that time he could not remember "Al's" last name (Exhibit 8. p. 229).

243. REYNOLDS said that he told BERGH what he was doing on August 8E. that "we'd finished up our work, and he (A1) said you might as well leave, and I left, and I saw you spoke to you, and you never said nothing" (Exhibit 8. pp. 229 anc 230).

244. REYNOLDS said that later that day (Thursday) he was told that BERGH.

wanted to see him in FLEMING's office. He met with BERGH and BROWN and BERGH told him that he was being suspended indefinitely (Exhibit 8,

p. 232).

I Case No. 1 93 047R 35

l l

245. REYNOLDS said that he then met with Anthony ROSS. Don DELCORE, and Tim HALELANCK and put together his 10 CFR 2.206 petition (Exhibit 8.

p. 235).

246. BERGH said that by Wednesday of that week, GENTRY informed him that REYNOLDS did not have permission to leave work early. As a result of !

this, he and PETERSON met with REYNOLDS to ask him why. he left work early (Exhibit 15. p. 4). l 247. BERGH said that REYNOLDS' first explanation was that C m

were visiting at his house and he wanted to see them, and saw no proo with showering and leaving work early (Exhibit 15, p. 4). l l

I 248. BERGH said that they asked REYNOLDS two or three times who gave hia l permission to leave work early. BERGH said that REYNOLDS was very evasive in answering that question. REYNOLDS. finally said that a guy who had been upgraded had given him permission. They continued to press )

J REYNOLDS for the name of the individual and REYNOLDS said that the guy was named "Al something" (Exhibit 15. p. 4) .

249. PETERSON said that BERGH asked him to check with MP3 tc see if REYNOLDS was given permission en August EE to leave work early. PETERSON fcund that no one was given permission to leave early (Exhib7t 16, p. 3).

250. PETERSON then performed a gate log check for that day, whicn reveale:

tnat REYNOLDS was the cnly one who left early. PETERSON said that the more investigation tna; was performec, tne more it did not look gooc fcr REYNOLDS (Exhibit 16 p. 3).

251. A gate log check revealed that on August 8,1993, REYNOLDS exited the plant at 4: 36 p.m. (Exhicit 39) 252. BERGH added that durin; the Ncvember 1993 State of Connecticut j Employment Security Appeals Divisien hearing. REYNOLDS backtrackec en his statement to them by saying that "Al" was a "]co lead." BERGH stated that a " job lead" also has no authority to let employees leave work early (Exhib t IE. p. 4).

253. BERGH said that the pcint was that all of the other mechanics who worked that day left their werk areas early, but they came back to the MP1 maintenance shop anc waite0 until tney were released, while REYNOLDS chose to leave the site (Exhibit 15, p. 4) .

254 BERGH said that the workers waiting to be released before leaving is characteristic of the changes that have taken place at Millstone. He i added that eight years agc. i' he did a gate log check, it would shcw that many of n1s workers would be arriving for work after the start time, while now everyone is in by the 7:30 a.m. start tirre (Exhibit 15.

p. 4).

l 255. BERGH maintains that REYNOLDS was disciplined for this incident because he left work without permission. The discipline amounted to a tnree week suspension withcut pay (Exhibit 15, p. 4,. l f

l i

Case No. 1 93 047R 36 i

b

256. BERGH acknowledges that HALEY told him before his August 12. 1993, meeting with REYNO.LDS (regarding REYNOLDS leaving work early on '

August 8E) that REYNOLDS had corrected his time sheet with her, (Exhibit 15, p. 3). -

.257. BERGH pointed out that during the meeting REYNOLDS did not mention this tohimandpointedoutthatthiswasanotherexampleofREYNOLDSnot being up front with what happened in the August 82 incident ;

(Exhibit 15, p. 3). ,

258. BROWN said that in a pre meeting with BERGH, he discussed the J

disciplinary action options that were available to BERGH. He added that, at that point, termination was not discussed as a disciplinary option. BROWN said that BERGH was going to ask REYNOLDS questions !

regardirio August 8E, and how REYNOLDS answered those questions would

- determi 4 whether REYNOLDS was going to be put on a Discretionary Interim nanagement Action (DIMA) or not (Ex1ibit 24, p. 1).

. 259. BROWN said that based on REYNOLDS' statements to BERGH at the meeting, i and due to the continuing nature of the investigation, BERGH informed 1 REYNDLDS tnat he was being placed on a DIMA. He and BERGH decided to !

place REYNOLDS in a DIMA because if REYNOLDS was found not culpable, the j ccmpany could make REYNDLDS "whole" by paying him for the time that he j was suspe,nded (Exhibit 24, pp. I and 2).

260. BROWN said that BERGH discussed with him the possibility of discipline for REYNOLDS. He added tnat a four week suspension and terminaticn were other disciplinary options discussed, but termination was deemed to be too severe. When the three week suspension was decided, NU knew that REYNOLDS' pay stub showed that he was only paid for the hours that he j workedonAugust8[. He adaed that NU still felt that the suspension ]

was justified (Exhibit 24. p. 2).

261. BROWN said that he forwarded BERGH's proposed discipline to the NU l corporate 3ersonnel. legal, anc labor relations departments for tneir t review (Ex1ibit 24. p. 2). f 262. FLEMING said that she was acorised of the proposed disciplinary action and it was reviewed by REYNDLDS' supervision, NU Human Relations, and i Labor Relations Departments. She also believes that the NU Legal !

Department reviewed it (Exhibit 22, p. 2).

i 263. FLEMING stated that a consensus was reached that the three week l suspension without pay was warranted, and that NU wanted to send a l signal. " loud and clear" to REYNOLDS, regarding his behavior ]

(Exhibit 22, p. 2). (

264 FLEMING stated that REYNDLDS' actions "once again" called into question ;

his dependability which had been previously addressed (on more than one occasion) by his management. She stated tnat on August 8, 1993.

REYNOLDS: had not been authorized to leave the work place early and that I the number of hours worked, that he put on his time sheet, was a repeat {

l of a dependability issue that he was reprimanded for in November 1992 I (Exhibit 22, p. 2).

i Case No. 1 93 047R 37 j

265. VLAUN believes that REYNOLDS' discipline was harsh. He believes that REYNOLOS is on BERGH *s " bad side" because he has filed grievances (Exhibit 36, p. 2).

PAWLOSKI said that he is responsible for union contract negotiations and 266. He is also responsible for reviewing administration of those contracts.

proposed discipline for union and non union employees to insure fairness and consistency (Exhibit 40. p. 1).

267.

PAWLOSKI stated that he reviews approximately one hundred and fifty He proposed actions per year, and he tries to treat everyone the same.

explained that he looks at the employees: 1) yearsand of service: 2)

4) the specific employment record; 3) prior disciplinary history: facts of an incide He uses NU's Constructive Disciplinary Policy to help determine what level of discipline is warranted (Exhibit 40, p. 1).

268.

PAWLOSKI added that, over the years, NU has been very successful in arbitration hearings regarding discipline administered to NU employees (Exh1Dit 30, p. 1).

269.

PAWLOSKI said that NU dces cet use discipline to punish its em icyees, PALLOSC state:

but ratner it is used to cnance an employee's behavior.

tna either he er the employee's supervisor decides upcn the level cf discipline, but he usually asks the supervisor what he wants to prcpcse. C.

He then reviews that prcposal to see if it is appropriate (Exhib1:

p. 1).

270. Regarding REYNOLDS leaving work early on August 8,1993 PAWLOSKI on or about AugJs 16. 1993. Chuck GREGORY (one of his recalls tna informed employees) him of :ne particulars of tne incicent and tna:

Millstone management was locking at terminating REYNOLDS for the efferse

1) REYNOLDS' November 1992 written warning: 2) apparent e because of-~ n of a time sheet in the August 8, 1993 in nt: and3)Cy fais1 fica Q REYNCLDS' e (Exhicit D. p. 1).

271.

PAWLOSKI stated that he looked at REYNOLDS' fifteen years of service at NU and his most recent Derformance rating of 003 dated October 4, 1992 He also lockec (Exhibit 5, pp. 67 and 68), or Fully Meets Expectations.

at the Ccns:ructive Progressive Discipline Policy and noted that :ne l termination would not be consistent with the guidelines, in that it would have skipped over the suspension option (Exhibit 40, p. 2). l PAWLOSKI added that he also asked himself, "If this were a union f 272. PAWLOSKI saic l employee would an arbitrator uphold the termination?"

time, that an arbitrator would have given that he opined, at tna:

REYNOLDS his job- back.

Because of these things. PAWLOSKI recommended that REYNOLDS be given a severe suspension from work without pay (Exhibit 40. p. 2).

273.

PAWLOSKI believes that REYNOLDS' three week suspension was justified and also believes that the suspension would have been upneld by an ::

a-c;;rator. He recommended the severe suspensicn ir an atte :: .

p. 2).

correct REYNOLDS' werk behavior (Exhibit 40 !

3E Case No. 1 93 047R.

J

274. PAWLOSKI stated that REYNOLDS' getting paid only for the hours that he worked on August 8, 1993, did not cause him to change his decision that

[ discipline was justified because: 1) REYNOLDS left work without hisn supervisor's proval: 2) REYNOLDS submitted a false time sheet (the

[y PAWLOSKI stated that in August 1993, he was not aware that REY OLDS had raised safety issues Q (Exhibit 40, p. 2).

275. REYNOLDS said he also filed for unemployment insurance with the State of Connecticut because he felt that they " maliciously set up to suspend me" (Exhibit 8, p. 238).

276. The State of Connecticut. Employment Appeals Division, stated that the issue in this case was whe.cher REYNOLDS was suspended for repeated

- willful misconduct. They found in REYNOLDS' favor and awarded him three weeks unemployment insurance because "the employer did not sustain its burden to show that the claimant's act that triggered the suspension was an act of willful misconduct, it is unnecessary to determine whether or not the claimant committed any other acts of wilful misconduct. The referee concluces that the claimant was suspended for reasons other tnan repeated willful misconcuct" (Exhibit 41, pp. 2 and 3). .

277. NU informed the State of Connecticut that. "we cisagree with the decision bnd firmly believe that tne evicence established unecuivocally that the Claimant was suspended for repeated wilful misconduct The Appeal Referee's " findings" contained a number of factuel inaccuracles and failed to take into account undisputed evidence that was introduced by the company .. NU also stated that, "the interests of administrative and cost' efficiency would be best served by permitting a closure of the claim process without further appeal" Exhibit 42).

278. The reporting investiga cr mentioned to PAWLOSKI that tne State of Connecticut. Emoloyment Security Appeals Division. uoheld REYNOLDS' claim fct unemployment be-en ts for the three week suspension and his eventual termination. PAWLOSKI responded that his office does not even bother to 90 to these hearings, because the state almost always finds in the employee's favor (Exnic1: 40, p. 2).

279. PAWLOSKI also commented that on the way to work today (December 15, 1994), he heard on the radio a report that the State of Connecticut pays seventy seven percent of all unemployment claims that are filed versus the national average of forty four percent (Exhibit 40. p. 2).

INVESTIGATOR *S NOTE: PAWLOSKI provided the reporting investigator with the front page of the December 15, 1994 "The Hartford Courant" newspaper. The lead article is titled, " State is easiest place in U.S. to get jobless benefits, study finds." A report prepared by State of Connecticut legislative staffers found that

" employees who quit or were fired won jobless benefits at preliminary hearings 73.2 percent of tne time in 1993 significantly higher than the national average of 44 percent."

The report also found that, " Workers fired for misconduct had an even higher rate of success than those who cuit. In 1993. fired Case No. 1 93 047R 39 .

I employees won jobless benefits 92.5 percent of the time" i (Exhibit 40. pp. 22 and 23).

280. BERGH said that he and LORD met with REYNOLDS on September 3. 1993, to discuss the sus)ension. BERGH said that he was surprised when REYNOLOS showed up for t1e meeting not ready to begin working. He said that sarcastic and very testy, which was REYNOLDS was confrontational totally opposite of the behavior he would have expected from an employee coming off of a suspension (Exhibit 15 pp. 4 and 5).

281. REYNOLDS said that on September 2.1993. PETERSON called him at home and said BERGH wanted to see him in his office tomorrow at 7 a.m.

(Exhibit 8. pp. 238 and 239).

At the September 32 meeting REYNOLDS was given a letter by BERGH that outlined the reasons for his three week suspension. The letter stated 282.

that on August Bf he was not authorized to leave the work site early, despite telling BERGH that he was authorized. The letter also indicated that the time sheet he submitted for that day reflected ten hours of work when he had worked cnly nine hours (Exhibit 5. p. 75).

2E3.

The letter also mentioned three other acts of misconduct, and advised REYNDE.DS Inat this was a final and all inclusive warning against further The letter concluded with, "Should other performance problems.

incidents occur. no matter how cissimilar, you will be subject to discharge" (Exhibit 5. pc. 75 and 76).

1) he was given 284 REYNOLDS wrote a rebuttal letter which stated that:

permission by his lead man to leave early on August BE: 2) he d and 3) made a he was sicnificant number of attempts to have his time chan He added tnat if paid only for tne hcurs tnat he worked on August BE.ge :

BERGH had properly lcded into this or asked him for an explanation they would have found the situation as he described it, instead of

" continuing your " witch nunt" to retaliate against me for raising

p. 82).

legitimate Safety and Nuclear Concerns" (Exhibit 5 285.

In his letter. REYNCLDS stated that he " offered clear. recognizable, and indisputable facts" regaroing the other acts of misconduct mentioned in BERGH's Septe :ber 3rd letter. and stated that the reason for those earlier actions is " retaliation" (Exhibit 5, p. 82).

286. In closing his letter REYNOLDS stated that he believed that "all the actions and proposed future actions indicated in your September 3.1993 letter towards me are a direct result of my protected activities" !

(Exhibit 5. p. 83).

287. NEUHAN said that he and REYNOLDS had a discussion (either before after REYNOLDS was suspended) about REYNOLDS getting into trouble for leaving work early on August 8,1993. REYNOLDS told him that he left work early that day and got caught. REYNOLDS told him that REYNOLOS BERGH saw did him leave work early, ano that was why he was suspended.

not tell him that he was really suspended because he had raised safety issues to his management (Exhibit 43. p. 1).

40 Case No. 1-93 047R

Conclusion Regarding REYNOLDS' 2.206 petition issue, it is concluded that the evidence developed during this investigation did not substantiate that he was harassed, intimidated, or discriminated against for having raised safety concerns.

Alleaation No, 2: Licensee Management Harassed. Intimidated, and Discriminated Against REYNOLDS by Terminating His Employment on June 27, 1994 Summary The following individuals were interviewed by OI:RI on the dates indicated regarding the allegations, Name Position Date of Interview (s)

Bruce D. ALBEE, former Supervisor, September 14, 1994 Maintenance Department MP3 Pasquale ARCARI Mechanic A Maintenance January 10, 1995 Department, MP1 Alan R. ARSENAULT Mechanic, Maintenance April 12, 1994 Department, MP3 Joseph ACQUITANTE. Supervisor, Maintenance November 9, 1994 Department, MP1 Neil G. BERGH Manager, Maintenance August 12, 1994 &

Department. MP1 January 10, 1995 Roger G. BOYER Supervisor, Maintenance November 8, 1994 Department, MP1 Michael E. BROWN former Personnel Consultant, October 25 & 26, 1994 Millstene Douglas L. CARLING Mechanic A Maintenance September 14, 1994 Department, MP3 Cliff COOPER Mechanic A,, Maintenance September 14, 1994 Department, MP1 Michael DUNN Electrician, Maintenance October 26, 1994 Virginia G. FLESING Personnel Manager . Nuclear, November 9, 1994 Millstone chael GENTRY Operation nacer, MP2 Octob r 26,199)4 hl November 30, 1994 (L

Drexel HARRIS Licensing Engineering NU Licensing Department Harry HAYNES Director, MP1 December 15, 1994 Kenneth A. HOMINICK Mechanic A, Maintenance May 4, 1994

. Department, MP1 Robert Morgan LORD former Supervisor, January 10. 1995 Maintenance Department, MP1-Timothy S. McNERREY Contractor, Procedure January 10, 1995 Writer, Maintenance Department, MP1 Phil MESSINA Contractor, Senior HP November 30, 1994 Technician Donald MILLER Senior Vice President, December 15, 1994 Millstone ;.

Case No. 1 93 047R 41 1 4

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Contractor, Procedure October 6, 1994 Gil MORRELL Coordinator, Maintenance '

Department, MP1 Mechanic A. Maintenance May 4 & September 14 Robert W. MURPHY 1994 Department, MP1 Mechanic A, Maintenance September 14, 1994 Jim NEUMAN ,

Department. MP1 Manager, Labor Relations December'15, 1994 Richard E. PAWLOSKI Department. NU General Supervisor. January 10, 1995 Richard L. PETERSON Maintenance Department.

MP1 Contractor, Procedure January 9, 1995 Peter J. REIDER Writer, Maintenance Department, MP1 former Mechanic A. August 20, 1993 Clarence P. REYNOLDS Maintenance Department.

MP1 Electrician Maintenance October 26, 1994 l Anthony ROSS Department. MP1 Manager, Work. Planning & November 9, 1994 Michael ROSS Control Group, MP1 Jeffrey STE.VENSON Engineer Connecticut October 25. 194 Yankee Atomic Power Plant tember 15, Mechanic A. Maintenance April 12 & .

Ronald A. VLAUN 1994 Department. MP1 Mechanic A, Maintenance October 26, 994 Mark E. WHETHERSEE Department. MP1 Senior Engineer, MP1 March 24, 1994 Charles WARGO Evidencg

1. BOYER was questioned regarding a February 2, 1994, altercation that REYNOLDS had at a Healtn Physics (HP) control point. BOYER said that he ,

heard loud voices and looked u3 through the window in his office- and saw REYNOLDS.

He walked over to tie control point and found REYNOLDS giving a very personal verbal attack to a HP technician (Exhibit 25, pp. 2 and i 3). e j 1

2. BOYER said that the technician would not let REYNOLDS through the check point to go to the bathroom because the radiation monitor indicated that REYNOLDS was calling the technician an l REYNOLDS was contaminated. l idiot, and may have also used profanity (Exhibit 25, p. 3),

3. BOYER said that he interjected himself into the argument to defuse the l situation. BOYER told the technician to contact his supervisor because REYNOLDS needed to go to the bathroom and he (the technician) needed to decide whether to let REYNOLDS through to go to the bathroom. He also i

told REYNOLDS that the technician was only trying to do his job as he {

could not let REYNOLDS through because he was contaminated (Exhibit 25,

p. 3).

1

4. S0YER said that the HP technician BOYERcommented to him said thet that he and he agreed, didn't toldhave {

to take that type of verbal abuse.

l l

1 42 Case No. 1 93 047R.

1

1 i

the technician that, if he felt it necessary, he should tell the HP

' supervisor about it (Exhibit 25, p. 3).

5. BOYER believed that REYNOLDS was loud and abusive to the technicians.

BOYER said that, at some point BERGH asked him what had happened during this incident (Exhibit 25, p. 3).

6. MESSINA stated that a man, who he later learned to be REYNOLDS, set off a radiation detection alarm at a HP checkpoint where he was working.

REYNOLDS started giving Craig MADOR (a junior HP technician) a problem about the alarm and began yelling at the junior technician (Exhibit 44 -

p. 1).

7. MESSINA said that he went nver to assist MADOR, and REYNOLDS also started yelling at him. MESSINA then explained to REYNOLDS the i procedures that they must follow when someone sets off an alarm.

REYN0LOS continued to yell at them (Exhibit 44, p. 1). ;

i

8. MESSINA believes that REYNOLDS felt that if he yelled loud enough they I would back down from their responsibility and let him go through the checkpoint. At this point. REYNOLDS told him that he had to go to the bathroom. He told REYNOLDS that he would call his office and ask his l supervisor .if they could let REYNOLDS through to go to the bathrocm and ]

tnen return to the checkpoint (Exhibit 44, p. 1).

l

9. MESSINA stated that his supervisor instructed him to frisk REYNOLDS' hands and feet, and if no contamination was detected, then he could allow REYNOLDS to go through to the bathroom. REYNOLDS had no {

1 contamination on his hands or feet anc was allowed to go to the bathroom (Exhibit 44, p. 1). j

{

10. MESSINA believes that REYNOLDS was not in the bathroom long enough to I

" pull his zipper down." estimating that REYNOLDS was in the bathroom no j longer than ten seconds. REYNOLDS returned and they finished frisking i him, and discovered tnat REYNOLDS had five hundred counts of contamination (Exhibit 44, p. 1).

11. MESSINA stated that REYNOLDS was then sent to the supervisor's office for decontamination. MESSINA recalls that a few hours later a

~

supervisor told him that REYNOLDS had to shower four times to wash off the contamination (Exhibit 44, p. 1).

12. MESSINA stated that BOYER overheard the incident. He asked BOYER, "who is that guy?" BOYER told him it was REYNOLDS. BOYER also told him that he didn't have to take that type of abuse (Exhibit 44, p.1).

13. MESSINA stated that his supervisor asked him to document what had happened (Exhibit 44, pp. 2 4).

14. MESSINA stated that a few days later, he was called by BERGH about the incident. BERGH called him in to tell him that he had seen him working at MPl. and going out of his (MESSINA's) way to help his people, and after hearing about the incident, wanted to tell him that he didn't want him taking that type of abuse from any of his pecole. BERGH then apologized for what had happened (Exhibit 44. p. 2).

Case No. 1 93 047R 43 l

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i

15. MESSINA stated that two to five days later, he and MADOR were working at an HP checkooint when REYNOLDS came over to them and asked "what's your name?", graabing his identification badge. REYNOLDS did the same thing to MADOR (Exhibit 44, p. 2).

16. MESSINA stated that REYNOLDS started to walk away from them, when he (HESSINA) asked REYNOLDS why he wanted their names. REYNOLOS told them that they didn't know what was happening here. that "they" (management)

MESSINA told are out to get him and are looking for reasons to get him.

REYNOLDS that had nothing to do with the incident and that it was his (REYNOLDS') conduct that caused this (Exhibit 44, p. 2). I MESSINA stated that REYNOLDS then asked him something to the effect. /

17. !

"Did you go to BERGH or did he come to you?" MESSINA explained to J REYNOLDS how supervision became involved. REYNOLDS : hen told him that. !

"they are trying to get rid of me." MESSINA told REYNOLD5 that had I nothing to do with what had occurred and also' told REYNOLDS that what he l said the other day about "Eddie" (another senior HP technician who l

assisted them during the incident) was wrong (Exhibit 44, p. 2). 1

18. MESSINA related that REYNGLDS had said that he didn't want "Eddie" MES$1NA taking care of him at the checkpoint because he talked funny. -

stated that REYNOLDS also added something to the effect that he (REYNOLDS) thought "Eddle" was retarded. MESSINA told REYNOLDS that t there was nothing wrong with "Eddie.* REYNOLDS told them that. "This is REYNOLDS then not the end of this. I am going to take this further."

walked away (Exhibit 44, p. 2).

s 19.

MESSINA stated that REYNOLDS was "one hundred percent wrong in what he did." He added that people sometimes get mad when they come through checkpoints and need to De frisked, but in his eight to nine years of 44 being a HP, he had experienced nothing like this incident (Exhibit

p. 2).

20. HAYNES cited the following two examples of incidents where he felt BERGH could have taken action against REYNOLDS: 1) BERGH found REYNOLDS sleeping in the MP1 maintenance area during work hours: 2) On another occasion. REYNOLDS was very aggressive with Millstone Health Physics techhicians. HAYNES feels that from what he knew of these incidents, In both'of these cases disciplinary action would have been justified.

SERGH took no action against REYNOLDS, and this inaction was not directed by HAYNES. HAYNES described BERGH's inaction on these two incidents as, "almost acts of good faith" (Exhibit 27, p. 3).

12. 1994,

21. HARRIS said that during a conversation with REYNOLDS on April he felt that REYNOLDS may have believed that he was deliberately given an assignment by his management that could have caused him physical harm (Exhibit 45, p. 2).

22. HARRIS said that REYNOLDS related to him a possible similarity to that situation and what happened to " Karen SILKWOOD" (Exhibit 45, p. 2).

23. HARRIS said that on the next morning (April 13, 1994) he informed BERGH about what REYNOLDS had said, and BERGH commented that if REYNOLDS BERGH felt that someone was trying to harm him. it was a serious concern.

44 Case No. 1 93 047R

also commented that he would get thatever resources were necessary to investigate REYNOLDS' claim (Exhibit 45, pp. 2 and 3).

24 HARRIS.said that, from his knowledge of REYNOLDS' concern he s'aw no ,

evidence that there was any intent to harm REYNOLDS (Exhibit 45, p. 3).

25. BERGH said that REYNOLDS expressed concerns for his personal safety to HARRIS about unsafe or hazardous working conditions regarding a job assignment that he was given. REYNOLDS referred to similarities between this and the Karen SILKWOOD incident (Exhibit 46, p.1). ,

26. BERGH said that he consulted with Millstone Station Vice President Donald MILLER and BERGH suggested to MILLER that: 1) REYNOLDS should be removed from the ]lant working environment (to satisfy REYNOLDS' concern for his 'own well 3eing): and 2) have someone independent of MP1 Maintenance come in to independently assess REYNOLDS' concerns. MILLER agreed to BERGH *s proposals and MILLER asked him to inform REYNOLDS of the planned actions (Exhibit 46 p. 1).

BERGH said that he met with the NU Legal. Human Resources, and Labor 27.

Relations Departments and turned over everything he had on REYNOLDS' c6ncern and told them that the issue needed a quick "look at" to see if there was any foul play involved (Exhibit 46, p.1).

28. EERGH informed REYNCLOS that he was aware of the concerns that were expressed to HARRIS and that he (BERGH) took them very seriously. He also informed REYNOLDS that he would be reporting to the Procedure Upgrade Group (PUG). effective immediately, and remain there until an investigation was completed. BERGH also told REYNOLDS that he believed this was a " good idea" because REYNOLDS would not have to be working on MP1 equipment (Exhibit 46, pp. 1 and 2).

29. BERGH said that he told BOYER and PETERSON that REYNOLDS may have been intentionally put 'in harms way by one of the "us" and the incident was going to get an independent review (Exhibit 46, p. 2).

30. RegardincJ REYNOLDS' concern. MILLER stated that he was called by an NRC o Resident Inspector at Millstone and informed that REYNOLDS felt that there was an intent to harm him in a work assignment that he was given (Exhibit 37, p. 1).

MILLER stated that he then telephoned HAYNES or BERGH to discuss I 31.

I REYNOLDS' concern. MILLER then directed that REYNOLDS be pulled out of the MP1 work place (Exhibit 47, p.1).

i 32 MILLER said that he then called NU headquarters to have an independent

I safety review of REYNOLDS' concern. It was also decided that REYNOLDS

'would be temporarily placed in the MP1 procedure re write group until the review was completed (Exhibit 47, p. 1),

33. MILLER stated that NU employee Robert BEVERIDGE performed the safety l review. MILLER stated that he knew BEVERIDGE and respected his i

expertise. MILLER stated that, after reading BEVERIDGE*s report (Exhibit 48). he was satisfied that there was no intent to harm REYNOLDS (Exhibit 47, p. 1). .

. t Case No. 1-93 047R~ 45 -

34. MILLER stated that BEVERIDGE told him that he spoke to REYNOLDS about his concern, and REYNOLDS told BEVERIDGE that he really didn't think that anyone was trying to harm him. MILLER stated that after being told that, he was sort of upset with REYNOLDS, because after taking quick action, which involved a lot of work to have the concern looked at, in the end, REYNOLDS didn't feel that there was an intent to harm him (Exhibit 47, pp. I and 2).

35. BOYER explained that the job may have placed REYNOLDS in an unsafe working environment, but it was not a deliberate intention on his part to do that (Exhibit 25, p. 3).

36. HAYNES said that he was aware of REYNOLDS' concern and that REYNOLDS was placed in the PUG until the issue could be investigated by the company (Exhibit 27, p. 3).

37. HAYNES said that the company's investigation satisfied him that there was no deliberate intent to harm REYNOLDS. In discussions he had with REYNOLDS, he (REYNOLDS) did not express any dissatisfaction with being moved to the PUG or the company's investigation of the incident (Exhibit 27, p. 3).

38. BERGH.said that he informed BOYER and PETERSON that REYNOLDS would be reporting to Gil MORRELL of the PUG (Exhibit 46, p. 2).

39. BERGH explained that MORRELL is a self employed contract employee at REYNOLDS was the only Millstone and is the PUG Procedure Coordinator.

BERGH explained that MORRELL NU employee that would be working for.

reports to him on a weekly and as needed basis (Exhibit 46, p. 2).

40. BERGH said that he met with MORRELL (the same day that HARRIS reported REYNOLDS' concerns to him) to tell him that REYNOLDS would be comina to work with him on the PUG (Exhibit 46, p. 2)..

41. SERGH said that he asked MORRELL to assess what procedures that he had in the upgrade process to see which ones related to REYNOLDS' mechanical abilities and that he should use REYNOLDS as a resource to research anc pull together information for those procedures (Exhibit 46, p. 2).

42. BERGH also told MORRELL that it was important that the procedures that REYNOLDS was given would not cause him to be inside MP1 (until the independent review was completed). BERGH stated that he did not direct MORRELL to monitor or watchdog (Exhibit 46, p. 2).

43. BERGH said that REYNOLDS did not complain to him about the assignment to MORRELL's PUG or that he was being

bird dogced by PETERSON (Exhibit 46, p. 3).

44 BERGH said that during the meeting where he informed REYNOLDS of his transfer to the PUG or at a subsequent meeting. he expressed to REYNOLDS the benefit of his assignment to the PUG and his concern for REYNOLDS well being. BERGH also expressed to REYNOLDS that the transfer continued to give him the opportunity to use his talents to help HP1 anc

t. hat the assignment would not cause him to be penalized in the amount of BERGH said that during the .

overtime that would be offered to him.

46 Case No. 1-93 047R.

e assignment to the PUG REYNOLDS was offered overtime and sometimes REYNOLDS accepted it (Exhibit 46. p. 3).

45. BERGH did not get s>ecific with REYNOLDS as to where he could or could not physically be. ]ut essentially directed REYNOLDS that he was to assist MORRELL on procedure development (Exhibit 46, p. 3).

46. BERGH recalls that at one of their regular meetings he asked MORRELL how REYNOLDS' assignment was going. MORRELL told him that REYNOLDS was doing good and it was BERGH's impression that it was a " peaceful existence". BERGH said that given REYNOLDS' work history and his

" interpersonal skills or lack thereof." he (BERGH) had his nose to the wind to see if there were any problems with REYNOLDS' performance (Exhibit 46. p. 3). .

s 47. BERGH said that BEVERIDGE of the NU Safety Department performed the independent review of REYNOLDS' concerns. BERGH said that BEVERIDGE*s conclusion was that there was no foul play, and that the hazard identified by REYNOLDS was well within the capability of a mechanic to recognize and or correct using their training (Exhibit 46. p. 3).

48. BERGH related that no one, including REYNOLDS. communicated disagreement with BEVERIDGE's conclusion. BERGH met with REYNOLDS to inform him of BEVERIDGEls review and conclusion and to tell REYNOLDS that he would be returning to his normal job in the MP1 Maintenance Department. BERGH said that REYNOLDS did not verbally object to this (Exhibit 46. po. 3 and 4).

49. BERGH said that MILLER called him the next morning and told him that he was called at home by REYNOLDS the night before. MILLER said that REYNOLDS told him that he did not want to work for BOYER (Exhibit 46.

p. 4).

50. BERGH said that MILLER directed him to continue REYNOLDS' assignment in the PUG. BERGH saic tnat he cic not object to this to MILLER. although he did not personally agree with MILLER's decision. BERGH offered that he did appreciate MILLER trying to improve relations with REYNOLDS (Exhibit 46, p. 4) .

51. BERGH said that he met with REYNOLDS and told him that he had been instructed by MILLER to allow him to remain in the PUG and REYNOLDS nodded his head but offered no verbal response (Exhibit 46, p. 4).

52. BERGH said that he began discussing with HAYNES and FLEMING what they should do with REYNOLDS because he had previously clashed with his supervisor and now he had clashed with BOYER (Exhibit 46 p. 4).

53. BERGH said they began exploring other job opportunities to bring REYNOLDS "back to the fold." BERGH had to identify three of his employees for assignment to the Work Planning and Scheduling Team (I-Team) by mid June 1994 BERGH informed REYNOLDS that he was interested in having REYNOLDS work in that group as one of the three people. REYNOLDS nodded his head and said " fine" and offered no objection to BERGH (Exhibit 46. p. 3).

Case No. 1 93-047R 47

1 l

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54. BERGH said that, at that time, the time frame and the specifics regardirg the assignment were not discussed. BERGH added that an l assignment to the I Team is generally looked upon as important and as a I means to improve oneself. BERGH added that it also could help in an employees career advancement in the company (Exhibit 46, p. 4).

55. Michael ROSS, the MP1 Work Planning and Control Manager, was questioned regarding REYNOLDS* voluntary rotational assignment to the Work Planning and Control Group (WPCG). ROSS stated that, as the 1994 MP1 refueling ~

outage was approaching completion, he BERGH, and HAYNES began l j

discussing the three MP1 Maintenance Department employees who would be l

selected to replace the workers already assigned to the WPCG (Exhibit 49, p. 1).

56. Michael ROSS stated that BERGH informed him that REYNOLDS had mentioned to him and HAYNES in the past that he would be interested in taking a rotational assignment to the WPCG. ROSS said that REYNOLDS' name was f I

put forward along with three or four others who might be selected (Exhibit 49. p. 1).

57. Michael ROSS said that evontually REYNOLDS, Walter LISS, and Michael'DUNN were selected for the assignment (Exhibit 49, p. 1).

58. HAYNES recalls a meeting he had with REYNOLDS in his office where they discussed a number of issues. During this meeting, he asked REYNOLDS if he had his choice of work assignments which would he select. HAYNES said that REYNOLDS pondered this question and stated that he thought he would be good in the I-Team (Exhibit 27, p. 2).

59. HAYNES said that he told REYNOLDS that he doesn't assign employees to functicns, but that he would let REYNOLDS' management know that he (HAYNES) felt it would be a good experience for REYNOLDS (Exhibit 27,

p. 2).

60. HAYNES added that he conveyed this to BERGH, and BERGH thought it was an opportunity for REYNOLDS to be useful that he (BERGH) would pursue (Exhibit 27, p. 2).

61. MORRfLL said that, in his current contract with NU, he is the Procedure Coordinator for the MP1 Maintenance Department Procedure Upgrade Project (PUP)/ PUG (Exhibit 53. p. 1).

~

62. MORRELL recalls that BERGH told him in late May 1994 that he (BERGH) was going to put REYNOLDS in MORRELL's PUP group, and that MORRELL should utilize REYNOLDS for research and input (Exhibit 50. p. 1).

63. MORRELL said that BERGH told him that he should avoid giving REYNOLDS work that would cause REYNOLDS to go out into the field or plant (MP1).

MORRELL said that BERGH did not ask him to monitor or watchdog REYNOLDS' whereabouts. As far as MORRELL was concerned. REYNOLDS' time (hours worked) reporting mechanism to MP1 did not change. MORRELL was not told by anyone in MP1 maintenance department supervision that REYNOLDS needed his (MORRELL's) approval to go to lunch or anywhere else (Exhibit 50,

p. 1).

Case No. 1 93 047R 48

64. B0VER' felt that when REYNOLDS tsas assigned to MORRELL, REVNOLDS t3as supervised by BERGH and not him (BOYER) (Exhibit 25, p. 3).

BERGH stated that he did not direct MORRELL to monitor or watch'ogd '

65.

REYNOLDS' whereabouts, but that approximately seven to ten days into REYNOLDS assignment, MORRELL approached BERGH -about REYNOLDS wandering and what he (MORRELL) should do about it. MORRELL told him that he had observed REYNOLDS out on the MP1 intake structure when the procedure that REYNOLDS was working on did not require him to be there (Exhibit 46, p. 2). .

66. BERGH stated that he told MORRELL that he would have PETERSON monitor REYNOLDS and that if PETERSON observed REYNOLDS in a place that his work did not require him to be, then PETERSON would intervene at that time.

BERGH does not recall MORRELL coming to him again with this concern (Exhibit 46, p. 2).

67. BERGH added that it was inappropriate for MORRELL to be involved in any performance issues regarding NU MORRELL was not an NUexhibit employee

46. p. (personnel, 2). including REYNOLD

68. MORRELL said he is positive that he did not tell BERGH that REYNOLDS was wandering around during work or that he observed REYNOLDS out on the MP1 intake' structure when tne procedure that REYNOLDS was working en did not require him to be there (Exhibit 50, p. 2).

INVESTIGATOR'S NOTE: This contradicts BERGK's testimony tnat MORRELL had complained to him about REYNOLDS' wandering.

69. MORRELL also stated that BERGH did not tell him that he would have ~

PETERSON or any other MP1 maintenance department supervisor monitor REYNOLDS' whereabouts. MORRELL said that PETERSON did not come to him at any time to check up on REYNOLDS' job assignments or whereabouts (Exhibit 50, p. 2).

q

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INJESTIGATOR'S NOTE: This contradicts BERGH's testimony.

. 70. MORRELL also said that BERGH did not ask him during one of their regular meetings how REYNOLDS' jcb assignment was going (Exhibit 50, p. 2).

71. MORRELL$ddedthatnoneoftheMP1maintenancedepartmentsupervisors asked him how REYNOLDS' assignment was going or about the quality of work REYNOLDS was coing for the PUP. MORRELL had no contact, positive or negative, with the MP1 maintenance department management about REYNOLDS and his assignment (Exhibit 50, p. 2).

72. BERGH recalls that on one occasion MORRELL expressed concern to him that REYNOLDS had taken an authoritarian attitude with some of the procedure writers, where REYNOLDS expressed a firm opinion on how things should be done. MORRELL told BERGH tnat he had to intervene to keep things on track (E,xhibit 46, p. 3)..

I

73. MORRELL said that he did not witness REYNOLDS take an authoritarian attitude with some of the procedure writers, where REYNOLDS expressed a firm opir, ion on how things should be done or that he (MORRELL) had to Case No. 1 93 047R 49 -

)

I 1

l intervene to keep things on track. MORRELL said that he did not witness such an exchange, nor did he tell BERGH of such an exchange (Exhibit 50,

p. 2).

INVESTIGATOR'S NOTE: This contradicts BERGH's testimony.

74. During the January 10, 1995, interview by the' reporting investigator, BERGH was informed that some of his previous testimony conflicted with information provided by MORRELL. BERGH stated that he stands by his previous statement to the reporting investigator and was not going to ,

retract any of it. BERGH stated that he does not know why MORRELL did not recall those things (Exhibit 15, p. 5).

75. MOR4 ELL said that while REYNOLDS was working in his group, he did not observe REYNOLDS in any areas where his job clearly did not require him to be, although he did not see REYNOLDS that often (Exhibit 50, p. 2).

76. MORRELL recalled that, at some point. REYNOLDS told him that he may not want to go back to work in the MP1 maintenance shop. MORRELL believes that BOYER told him that REYNOLDS was no longer going to be working in the PUP group and that REYNOLDS was going back to the maintenance shop.

At some point. MORRELL was told that REYNOLDS would not return to the maintenance shop and that he would continue to work in the PUP group.

MORRELL does not recall who told him that (Exhibit 50, p. 3).

77. MORRELL said that, for REYNOLDS to perform his job, he believed that REYNOLDS did not have to go to the technical library (which is outside of the protected area), because all of the information in that library was also in the PUP work area. MORRELL agreed that there could be

' additional information in the technical library that was not available in the PUP work area (Exhibit 50, p. 3).

78. MORRELL stated that his first knowledge that REYNOLDS was in trouble came when he saw REYNOLDS outside of the Millstone NRC Residen:

Inspector's Office. REYNOLDS told him that he had just been terminated.

REYNOLDS also told him that "he wasn't finished with them yet" (Exhibit 50, p. 3).

79. PETERSON thinks that sometime after REYNOLDS went to work for MORRELL he asked MORRELL how REYNOLDS was doing in his group. PETERSON recalls that MORRELL replied that it would be "OK" if he stayed on the job (Exhibit 16, p. 3). ,

BO. PETERSON said that, at that time, he assumed that MORRELL was referring to REYNOLDS having to leave his work area to smoke. He added that MORRELL did not tell him that he had seen REYNOLDS out on the MP1 intake structure (Exhibit 16, p. 3).

i

81. PETERSON recalls that BERGH told him that REYNOLDS was seen out at the j intake structure, and that he had also seen REYNOLDS in the sea vans at j

Millstone. PETERSON saio that he told BERGH that there was nothing wrong with REYNOLDS being near the sea vans, but added that, in his

.(REYNOLDS*) job function, there was no work related reason for REYNOLDS ,

l to be there. PETERSON said that after this conversation he and BERGH Case No. 1 93 047R 50 i

agreed to monitor REVNOLOS' whereabouts while he was assigned to the PUG

.(Exhibit 16, p. 3).

82. - BERGH said that he instructed PETERSON that, as part of his daily responsibility, he was to keep tabs on REYNOLDS' " whereabouts" to insure that REYNOLDS was in a location that.was consistent with his job assignments. BERGH does not think that PETERSON asked MORRELL on a daily basis what REYNOLDS' job assignments were (Exhibit 46, p. 3).

83. BERGH said that due to PETERSON's position as the MP1 Maintenance Department General Foreman, it was his responsibility to know that REYNOLDS was not to be in the power block, aump house (due to the independent review). BERGH was confident t,at PETERSON had more than enough information to make an appropriate judgement if REYNOLDS was in a location that he was not tapposed to be in (Exhibit 46, p. 3). ,

84. BERGH said that PETERSON reported to him on one or two occasions that REYNOLDS was doing what he was supposed to be doing and that PETERSON knew that REYNOLDS was wandering around "a little bit." BERGH recalled that PETERSON, BOYER, or ACQUITANTE observed REYNOLDS and Anthony ROSS talking at length during the work day and had to be separated (Exhibit 46, p. 3). .

85. BOYER said that MORRELL commented to him that REYNOLDS disappeared during work. BOYER believed that all of the information that REYNOLDS needed to perform the temporary assignment was contained in the MP1 Maintenance Department library crea. BOYER recalled that, at some point. he was told by BERGH that REYNOLDS would be returning to his (BOYER's) crew in the maintenance department.(Exhibit 25, p. 3).

86. REYNOLDS said that he was given an assignment by BOYER that caused him to be in an unsafe work environment (Exhibit 8, pp. 308 311).

REYNOLDS said that after this incident he was placed in MORRELL's j 87, upgrade group until the issue was investigated. REYNOLDS felt it was a i good idea (Exhibit 8, pp. 316 and 317). I

88. REYNOLDS said that on May 11, 1994, he reported a concern to BERGH regarding the storage of CA pipe. REYNOLDS said that BERGH took care of the problem and felt that BERGH responded well to the concern (Exhibit 8, pp. 321 and 322).

.- 89. REYNOLDS said that in late May 1994 BOYER told him that he was coming back to work for him at MP1 (Exhibit 8. p. 322).

90. REYNOLDS sa.id that he told his wife that night that he was quitting because he was not going back to work for BOYER (Exhibit 8, pp. 323 and 324).

91. REYNOLDS said that his wife suggested that he call MILLER, which he did.

MILLER told him to continue working for MORRELL and he would straighten it out (Exhibit 8. p. 324).

l Case No. 1 93 047R 51 i

.M.

information center: 2) technical library in the Hillstone Unit 1 Maintenance Department shop: and 3) the nuclear records department

. (Exhibit 53).

104. REIDER recalls that REYNOLDS worked for MORRELL in the PUG. He said

- that REYNOLDS was not treated any differently-than the other workers in the PUG (Exhibit 54).

105. REIDER understood that REYNOLDS was strictly tasked with information.

retrieval for use in the procedure upgrade process. He believed that REYNOLDS Wo to go to various parts of the plant to gather the required informa'lon, but that a lot of the work was done by telephone with off site vendors to obtain information (Exhibit 54).

- 106. REIDE.R said that in some cases REYNOLDS probably had to walk inside of s the plant to gather information.'such as valve name 31 ate data. He added that REYNOLDS would also have to go to the tec1nical information center which, at that time period, was outside of the protected area

'- (Exhibit 54).

107. REIDER said that he is nct sure of the date when REYNOLDS was found outside of the protected area. He added that he (REIDER) did not have

~

to tell anyone if he had to go off site, but he had to document on his time sheet any time that he spent off site (Exhibit 54).

108. REIDER said that REYNOLDS very rarely told him where he was going and adced that he had no supervisory responsibility over REYNOLDS (E Mbit 54).

109. REYNOLDS said that he did not tell BERGH (on June 20, 1994) that he was outside of the protected area on personal business and that Michael ROSS witnessed the meeting where BERGH alleged that he (REYNOLDS) admitted to this (Exhibit p. 1).

110. REYNOLDS also stated that when he was DIMA*ed in June 1994 He ran into MORRELL in the Millstone Ncrth Access Point (NAP) Building and asked him if BERGH or anycne else had been asking him Questions about him (REYNOLbS), and MORRELL toic nim "no." REYNOLDS said that he called MORRELL after he was fired to ask him if anyone had asked him any questions about June 17. 1994, and MORRELL told him "no" (Exhibit 51.

p. 2).

111. On June 17,1994, REYNOLDS was found to be outside of the protected area. This incident was the eventual cause for his termination

. (Exhibit 55). i 112. BERGH said that he met with Michael ROSS on Friday morning June 17, I 1994, and discussed among other items that they would meet later in the morning with the three individuals identified to participate in the I Team. BERGH told ROSS that he would get back with him as to when the meetingfwould take place (Exhibit 46, p. 4).

113. BERGH said that he found Mike DUNN and Walt LISS (the other two ir.div dduals identified for the I Team) in the MP1 maintenance shop and ,

told them.to be available for the meeting later. At approximately 9:30 l

Case No. 1 93 047R 53 I l l

4

r i

to 10:00 a.m. BERGH went to inform REYNOLDS about the meeting but REYNOLDS was not at his desk. H0RRELL was also not at.his desk (Exhibit 46, p. 4).

114. BERGH said that he made no further' attempts to locate and inform REYNOLDS that morning of the meeting planned for later that morning.

BERGH also said that he did not get back with' Michael ROSS because more pressing matters came up (Exhibit 46, p. 4).

INVESTIGATOR *S NOTE: L3ter in the interview BERGH said that the Friday morning meeting with the selected I Team members was not held solely because he cas not able to get a hold of REYNOLDS.

BERGH said that after noc finding REYNOLDS at his desk he dropped the thought of having the h:eetino because hc did not want to take thirty to sixty minutes to try r.nd locate REYNOLDS. BERGH said that when he did not find REYNOLOS at his desk he assumed that he was performing his job function (Exhibit 46, p. 4).

115. STEVE.4?? sitted that he observed REYNOLDS and Anthony ROSS talking in the Minnene North Access Point (NAP) parking ict on June 17. 1994 (Exhibit 56, p. 1).

116. STEVENSON said that he informed BERGH that he had seen REYNOLDS an in the NAP parking lot. BERGH acknowledged this, but did not make any comment, and they continued their conversation (Exhibit 56, p. 2).

117. STEVENSON stated that he was not on any mission and was not acting on any previous directive from BERGH when he informed BERGH about observing REYNOLDS and ROSS being outside of the protected area (Exhibit 56.

p. 2).

118. BERGH said that later in the afternoon of June 17E. during the course of other business, he had a conversation with STEVENSON who told him that he had seen Anthony ROSS and REYNOLDS in a van in the NAP parkinc lot that morning (Exhibit 46. pp. 4 and 5) .

119. BERGH said that after he got off of the phone with STEVENSON he called Hillstone Security Supervisor Pat WEEKLY and requested that a gate log check be run on REYNOLDS for that morning (Exhibit 46. p. 5).

120. BERGH said that WEEKLY called him back and said that REYNOLDS h the NAP (protected area) and had remained outside of the NAP for over an hour (Exhibit 46. p. 5).

121. BERGH said that he gave HAYNES a call to give him a " heads up" that this may be another instance of REYNOLDS not being where he was sup' posed to be (Exhibit 46. p.,5).

122. BERGH said that either later on Friday afternoon or Monday morning he asked BOYER PETERSON and KISOUNES if they had been approached by REYNOLDS for a need for personal time on Friday, and all three said, "no" (Exhibit 46, p. 5).

123. SERGH said he also asked MORRELL if REYNOLDS had requested any personal -

time or if he knew that REYNOLDS was away from his work area in the NAP 54 Case No. 1 93-047R-

parking lot on Friday morning, and MORRELL said, "no" (Exhibit 46.

p. 5).

124. MORRELL said that BERGH asked him if he gave REYNOLDS permission to go outside of the protected area. MORRELL said that he told BERGH that he never gave REYNOLDS permission to go anywhere, because as a contractor, it was not hi.s responsibility: he did not have control of REYNOLDS' work hours (Exhibit 50, p. 3).

125. BERGH saio that he asked these questions because of the " running track record" of, problems with REYNOLDS leaving his work station without the proper supervisory authorization (Exhibit 46, p. 5).

126. BERGHsaidthathebroughtthistotheattentionofHAYNESandiOormed HAYNES that he would questien REYNOLDS about where he was Friday morning,.

s and HAYNES thought it was appropriate (Exhibit 46, p. 5).

127. Michael ROSS recalls that on June 17E, BERGH-told him that they needed to discuss with REYNOLDS, LISS, and DUNN the expectations and job duties for the assignment, because the outage was almost over and it was time to rotate the new members to the WPCG. ROSS stated that BERGH told him that they would meet that day at either 11:00 a.m. or 1:00 p.m.

(Exhibit 49, p. 1).

128. DUNN rec' alls that on the morning of June 17, 1994, he was told by BERGH that he and Mike ROSS (Manager. WPCG) wanted to meet that afternoon with the workers rotating to the WPCG Inat afternoon to discuss tneir .

participation in it (Exhibit 57. p. 1).

129. HAYNES said that he was probably info'rmed by BERGH on June 17. 1994, that REYNOLDS had been found outside of the protected area during work hours, engaging in non work activity. Specifically. REYNOLDS was found talking to Anthony ROSS in ROSS' vehicle (Exhibit 27, p. 2).

130. HAYNES stated that he instrxted BERGH to gather and review the facts regarding this incident. HAYNES stated that BERGH also informed him that REYNOLDS had admitted te being outside of the protected area on personal business and, specifically, that he had been talking to ROSS (Exhibit 27, p. 2).

e 131. BERGH said that he. M. ROSS. REYNOLDS. DUNN and LISS met on Monday June 20, 1994, at 2 p.m. to discuss the I Team. At that point BERGH l still believed that REYNOLDS would be a member of the I Team (Exhibit 46, p. 5).

~

- 132. BERGH said that as the meeting ended he asked REYNOLDS and M. ROSS to stay, at which time BERGH told REYNOLDS that he had tried to schedule the meeting for Friday (June 17) but had been unable to make contact with REYNOLDS (Exhibit 46. p. 5).

133. BERGH said that he then asked REYNOLDS where he had been on Friday morning. REYNOLDS told him that he had a physical. BERGH asked REYNOLDS if the physical was given inside the protected area and REYNOLDS said "yes." BERGH then asked REYNOLDS if the health facility was in the protected area and REYNOLDS said "yes" (Exhibit 46, p. 5). ._

Case No. 1 93 047R 55

134. BERGH said that he then asked REYNOLDS if he had been any place else Friday morning and REYNOLDS said "no." BERGH then asked REYNOLDS if he had left the protected area and REYNOLDS aid "no." and then REYNOLDS said that he wiss trying to think, and that he had gone to the credit union on Friday morning (Exhibit 46, p. 5).

135. BERGH said that he then asked REYNOLDS what his business was at the credit union and REYNOLDS said that he cashed a check. REYNOLDS then said that he had also met with Anthony ROSS and that he might haye.gone to the personnel office to get a copy of the " blue book." but was not sure if he stopped at the personnel office on Thursday of Friday (Exhibit 46, pp. 5 and 6).

136. BERGH said that REYNOLDS then said that he may have gone to the technical library to get a manual (Exhibit 46, p. 6).

137. BERGH said that he then asked REYNOLDS how long he met with ROSS, and REYNOLDS said thirty to forty minutes. BERGH asked REYNOLDS if his meeting with ROSS was for personal business and REYNOLDS said that it was. BERGH asked REYNOLDS if he had the permission of his supervisor to meet.with ROSS to discuss personal business and REYNOLDS agreed that he did,not have permission (Exhibit 46. p. 6).

138. BERGH said that REYNOLDS commented that he usually "lets Gil [MORRELL) know of his whereabouts." BERGH let REYNOLDS know that he was disappointed in REYNOLDS' decision to leave his work area without permission and reminded REYNOLDS that this was a repeat event and that he (REYNOLDS) was not meeting management's expectations. BERGH then excused REYNOLDS from the meeting (Exhibit 46. p. 6).

139. REYNOLDS said that he had a meeting with BERGH on June 20" where BERGH asked him where he was on June 17E. REYNOLDS said that he explained to BERGH @ ere he had been (Exhibit 8. pp. 335 AND 336).

1 140. REYNOLDS said that BERGH told him during the June 20E meeting tnat he tried to page him (Exhibit 8. p. 331).

141. REYNOLDS said that BERGH took some notes and excused him (Exhibit 8. !

p. 336).

142. REYNOLDS said that on June 17E MORRELL did not question him about his whereabouts (Exhibit 8. p. 332).

BERGH 142. REYNOLDS said that he met with BERGH and ACQUITANTE on June told him that he was being sent home for being off site on June 17

, without authorization. BERGH also told him that the matter was beinc ~

l investigated (Exhibit 8. p. 337).

143. REYNOLDS said that BERGH also called him the next day to tell him that !

the matter was still being investigated (Exhibit 8. p. 338).

BROWN 144 REYNOLDS said that he called BROWN to ask him what was going on.

told him that he had to talk to~ BERGH (Exhibit 8. pp. 338 and 339).

56 Case No. 1 93 047R

)

145. REYNOLDS said that on June 27, 1994, he. met with BERGH and ACQUITANTE.

BERGH told him he was fired and gave him the termination letter (Exhibit 8. p. 342) ..

146. REYNOLDS said that he filed a claim for unemployment benefits with the l State of Connecticut (Exhibit 8, p. 345).

]

147. In an 01 interview, Anthony ROSS acknowledged meeting REYNOLDS in the i Millstone NAP parking lot on a Friday in June of 1994. He was not sure of the exact date of that meeting (Exhibit 58, p. 1).

148. Anthony ROSS said that he telephoned REYNOLDS at work to ask him to get

-him the NU book titled. "You and Your Job." REYNOLDS told him that he would do. what he could to get the book. ROSS said that he told REYNOLDS

. that he had to go to the credit union and would be at Millstone at

,. approximately 10:30 a.m. to 11:00 a.m. (Exhibit 58. p. 1).

149. Anthony ROSS said that REYNOLDS came out of the NAP building and gave

. him the book. They discussed some concerns that they had made to the NRC (Exhibit 58, p. 1).

150. Anthony ROSS recalls that at some point during this time he saw STEVENSON park his car next to his van. He and REYNOLDS then walked to the NRC re.sident inspectors office and walked in. ROSS does not believe that anynne was in the office to discuss a concern that they had raised.

They then left the office and REYNOLDS went back into the plant. ROSS proceeded to the credit union (Exhibit 58, p. 1).

151. Anthony ROSS opined that NU could fire a hundred people for going 9 outside of the protected area or to the credit union. He opined that if anyone went to the credit union on a Thursday (pay day), close to ninety five percent of the employees there would not have their supervisor's permission (Exhibit 58. p. 1).

152. Anthcny ROSS added that no one from NU ques'.ioned him about his meet g with REYtGLDS (Exhibit 58. p.1). *

- 153. Michael' ROSS recalls that en June 17E. BERGH left a message with him or his secretary that the meeting would not be held that day because he could not get all of the new members together. At that time. BERGH was not specific as to who he could not get a hold of (Exhibit 49, p.1).

)

154. Michael ROSS recalls that sometime during the morning of June 20, 1994 BERGH caught up with him and told him they didn't have the meeting on Friday because he was unable to get a hold of REYNOLDS. BERGH then briefed him in general terms that REYNOLDS was unavailable and that his supervision was not able to get in touch with him (REYNOLDS)

(Exhibit 49, p. 1).

155. Michael ROSS said that BERGH asked him to sit in on a fact finding meeting with REYNOLDS regardina his unavailability on June 17. 1994 BERGH also informed him generafly of REYNOLDS' past performance problems (Exhibit 49, p. 1).

Case No. 1 93 047R 57

156. Michael ROSS said that the June 20E meeting with LISS. DUNN and REYNOLDS was held in BERGH's office. ROSS said that going into that meeting nothing had changed to make him believe that REYNOLDS would not be rotating to the WPCG (Exhibit 49. p. 2).

l j

157. Michael ROSS said that during the meeting he and BERGH told them what t

their expectations would be as far as the work scope during the l M. ROSS and assignment. The need for training was also discussed j BERGH informed them that, by accepting the assignment, they would not be j penalized as far as the amount of overtime that would be made available J to them. BERGH told them that ROSS would have input to their yearly performance appraisals, although the appraisals would be completed by ]

their first line supervisors (Exhibit 49. p. 2).

158. Michael ROSS said that when the meeting ended. BERGH asked REYNOLDS to stay. BERGH had previously asked M. ROSS to stay. M. ROSS stated that BERGH then informed REYNOLDS of his attempts to have a meeting on Friday. BERGH told REYNOLDS that he was trying to understand where 1 REYNOLDS was and why the maintenance department management was unaware of his whereabouts (Exhibit 49, p. 2).

159. Michael ROSS believes that BERGH also told REYNOLDS that said M. ROSS he knew that that REYNDLDS was outside of the protected area on Friday.

REYNOLDS told them that he had gone to the credit union on Friday.

BERGH asked REYNOLDS what type of business he had there and the duration of the business. BERGH asked REYNOLDS if he had any reason for spending an extensive amountREYNOLDS of time atprovided the credit union such as a need to a response to BERGH, and BERGH re finance a loan.

commented that the time he was unavailable or outside of the protected area seemed to be longer than what he needed for his business at the credit union (Exhibit t.9. p. 2).

160. Michael ROSS said tha: REYNOLDS then said that he believed that he ran into Anthony ROSS in tne NAP parking lot, and that they had a conversation. REYNOLDS also told BERGH that he had stopped at tne "old M. ROSS schoolhouse" to gather research from some technical manuals.

added that the "old schoci house" is located outsice of the protected area, but that there are also technical manuals in the MP1 maintenance shop that REYNDLDS cculd have used (Exhibit 49, p. 2).

l 161. Michael ROSS recalls that SER3H got a commitment from REYNOLDS that this was another example of similar instances where REYNOLDS was unavailable ROSS added that, the and his management was unaware of whers he was.

fact was that people had been looking for REYNOLDS on Friday to set up a meeting, and REYNOLDS was unavailable. BERGH informed REYNOLDS that he was going to look at this incident and that he would get back to him (Exhibit 49. p. 2). ;

i 162. Michael ROSS stated that after this meeting he still believed that REYNOLDS was going to come work for him in the WPCG. but that some type of disciplinary action was going to be taken against REYNOLOS.

Subsequently, the day before, or on the day of REYNOLDS' termination he was informed by BERGH of the action (Exhibit 49, p. 2).

58 Case No. 1 93 047R-

~

163. Michael ROSS stated that he had no information or knowledge that the disciplinary actions that were taken against REYNOLDS, were taken because he had raised safety issues to his management. H. ROSS was generally aware that REYNOLDS had raised safety issues to the NRC because his group usually handled the issues brought to MP1 by the NRC .

(Exhibit 49, p. 2). 1 164. BERGH said that he then notified FLEMING of his meeting with REYNOLDS and that REYNOLDS had been off site for personal business without permission. BERGH recommended to FLEMING that REYNOLDS' employment be terminated (Exhibit 46, p. 6).

1 BERGH indicated that FLEMING said that she would work with the necessary I 165.

elements within the organization to review BERGH *s recommendation. l

. BERGH then notified HAYNES of his meeting with REYNOLDS and recommended )

, to HAYNES that REYNOLOS be terminated. HAYNES told BERGH to talk to the J Human Resources and Legal Departments to "make sure our ducks are in 1 order" and to make sure that the termination was legitimate and

. necessary (Exhibit 46, p. 6).

166. BERGH said that FLEMING verified that REYNOLDS did not have a physical i on Friday morning, but he did have a physical on Thursday. FLEMING l could not ' confirm that REYNOLDS had requested any of her employees for a I copy cf a " blue book" on Fricay mornirg (Exhibit 46. p. 6).

167. BERGH said that no attempt was made to confirm if REYNOLDS had cone to the technical library, because there was no way to confirm that" (Exhibit 46, p. 6). .

168. FLEMING said that, on or about June 17, 1994, she was apprised that REYNOLDS was found away from his work assignment and outside of the protected area without his supervisor's permission (Exhibit 22, p. 2).

169. FLEMING'said that they realized that termination was a possible I disciplinary option. She stated that the proposed termination was reviewed by MP1 management, and the NU Human Relations Department. Labor l Relations Department, and Legal Department. A consensus was reached that REYNOLDS' termination was justified (Exhibit 22, pp. 2 and 3).

170. HAYNES fsels that REYNOLDS' termination is justified based on: 1) the August 8, 1993, incident: 2) the counseling that REYNOLDS was given the last few years: 3) the warnings of the consequences for continued misconduct which were very clear: 4) REYNOLDS' history of poor performance: and 5) REYNCLDS ignoring his management's directives (Exhibit 27. p. 2).

171. HAYNES added that PAWLOSKI, of the NU Labor Relations Department, met with him and BERGH to go over the facts of the incident to determine if the termination was justified. HAYNES said that NU felt that termination was an appropriate action and that the appropriate reviews had been conducted regarding the termination (Exhibit 27. p. 2).

172. HAYNES said that, in his view, the company had invested a lot of time, management twa and effort, to assist REYNOLDS in changing his work i performance. He feels that the company went above and beyond what would _

Case No. 1 93 047R 59 .

O

\

I be considered reasonable in their attempts to achieve this, but that In it I

was clear that REYNOLDS was not going to change his performance.

addition HAYNES said that he saw no indication or evidence that BERGH was out to get REYNOLDS for raising safety issues (Exhibit 27, p. 2).

I 173. BROWN stated that he was peripherally involved in the decision to He believes that REYNOLDS' termination hinged on terminate REYNOLDS.

the fact that it was similar to the August 1993 occurrence and it occurred a short time after that' (Exhibit 24, p. 2).

174 MILLER stated that a few days after June 17, 1994, he learned that there was a potential disciplinary problem regarding REYNOLOS' work on that I day. HAYNES informed him that REYNOLDS was found outside of the protected area, in the credit union and the parking lot, without his MILLER specifically recalls telling HAYNES to supervisor's approval.

contact the NU Human Resources Group (HRG) regarding this incident 4 (Exhibit 47, p. 2). k

{

175. MILLER said that when the recommendation came that REYNOLDS s terminated, he asked HAYNES if this was really an offense that warranted termination. At tnat time. HAYNES informed him of the other disciplinary actions that had been taken against REYNCLOS (Exhibit 47. I

p. 2). !

176.

MILLER said that he told HAYNES that REYNOLDS was a protected employee wno had raised safety issues and that they should be absolutely sure that this action was not taken because REYNOLDS had raised safety issues. MILLER said that HAYNES told him that he understood the sensitivity of the issue, but that REYNOLDS was not being terminated l because he had raised safety issues. HAYNES told him that REYNOLDS was being terminated for poor performance, insubordination, and his pa performance problems.

proceed and that it 'was HAYNES' call (Exhibit 47. p. 2).

177.

MILLER stated that he met in person with HAYNES, PAWLOSKI, FLEMIN3.

Mary RILEY of the NU Legal Department, andMILLER Ed RICHTERS of the NU HRG b1 stated that he telephone, to discuss REYNOLDS' termination. asked PAWLO l that if this were a termination of a member of union local 457, the union would not grieve the termination. MILLER stated that PAWLOSKI l added that they were "very sure of this action" (Exhibit 47, pp. 2 and 3). l 178.

MILLER stated that there is no evidence to show that any of the actions taken against REYNOLDS were done because he engaged in evidence

1) no a protected activity. MILLER stated that he based his belief on: 2) no evidence that REYNOLDS was isolated in the MP1 maintenance shop: l that REYNOLDS was singled out for anything: 3) his reliance on his l interactions with Millstone employees and, if they sensed that REYNOLDS was terminated because he raised safety issues, he believes that an employee would have told him that; and 4) no other employees ever told him that REYNOLDS was mistreated at MP1 (Exhibit 47, p. 3).

179. MILLER reJated that Anthony CASTAGNO of the NU Public Relations Department received a telephone call from Bob HAMILTON of the "New 60 Case No. 1 93 047R

-London (CT) Day" newspaper asking about REYNOLDS termination. MILLER I

said that HAMILTCN informed CASTAGNO that REYNOLDS came into his office and said that he was fired for raising safety issues. HAMILTON also l said that REYNOLDS had given him his paperwork regarding his safety 1 concerns and the disciplinary actions that NU.had taken against him.

MILLER said that HAMILTON told CASTAGNO that he agreed with NU. that REYNOLDS had been terminated for good cause. MILLER said that HAMILTON couldn't believe that REYNOLDS had given him all of the documentation regarding the disciplinary actions that were taken against him. MILLER added that the "New London Day" has never written an article regardin'g REYNOLDS* termination (Exhibit 47. p. 3).

180. BERGH said that on June 22, 1994, he and Joe ACQUITANTE informed REYNOLDSthathewasbeingputonaDIMAandsenthome,pendingfurther

- investigation of his being off site on Friday June 171. without the

- permission of his supervisor (Exhibit 46. p. 6).

181. BERGH said that, at that point. he was " pretty much out of the loop" and

- that PAWLOSKI. FLEMING, and Mary RILEY of the corporate legal department were the principals investigating how REYNOLDS' actions fit into the NU i Constructive Discipline Procedure (Exhibit 46, p. 6).

182. BERGH believes that on Friday, June 24E he was interviewed by PAWLOSKI. RILEY and FLEMING for th.rty minutes in FLEMING's office.

BERGH said that basically PAWLOSKI wanted to hear the specifics of the incident from BERGH's own mouth and BERGH answered PAWLOSKI's questions (Exhibit 46. p. 6).

183. BERGH said that late in the afternoon of June 24E he was informed by HAYNES or FLEMING that his recommendation for REYNOLDS' termination from employment had been approved. BERGH added that no one objected to this decision (Exhibit 46. p. 7).

184. BERGH siid that he agonized over the weekend about the decision to terminate REYNOLDS. BERGH stated that REYNOLDS' meeting with ROSS for personal ~ business for tnirty to forty minutes without supervisory authorization was the act that caused REYNOLDS' employment to be terminated. BERGH added that the gate log (Exhibit 39) revealed that REYNOLDS;had been out of the protected area on Friday morning for one hour and' fifteen minutes (Exhibit 46, p. 7).

185. BERGH said that on June 27, 1994, he and ACQUITANTE met with REYNOLDS in FLEMING's office and REYNOLDS placed a tape recorder on the desk and i asked BERGH if he minded if he taped the meeting. BERGH said that he l

. didn't mind. BERGH assumes that REYNOLDS recorded the meeting (Exhibit 46. p. 7). 4 l

186, BERGH said that he then read REYNOLDS the termination letter (Exhibit 56) and informed REYNOLDS of his right to go to the NU Nuclear Safety Concerns Program (NCSP) and gave him some blank forms to record any other safety issues that he wanted to report. BERGH offered REYNOLDS the option of entering the protected area (then or after hours) to gather up his personal effects. REYNOLDS said that there was nothing there that .he needed to remove. BERGH offered REYNOLDS to have his whole body count recorded and REYNOLDS refused. BERGH said that Case No. 1 93 047R 61

]

REYNOLDS ofte, m no verbal response when informed of the termination (Exhibit 46 p. 7).

I 187. Concerning the reason for REYNOLDS' termination. BERGH was asked if the other employees of the MP1 Maintenance Department needed supervisory permission to go to the credit union. BERGH said that employees can go to the credit union for five to ten minutes to cash checks etc., and '

that did not require supervisory permission, but added that, as a courtesy it is expected that the employee notify the supervisor of this (Exhibit 46, p. 7).

188. ACQUITANTE said that he was asked by BERGH to sit in as a witness on meetings where REYNOLDS was told by BERGH that he was being put on a DIMA, and in where BERGH informed REYNOLDS that he was being terminated (Exhibit 59, p. 1).

189. PAWLOSKI recalls that a few days after June 17, 1994 he was informed that REYNOLDS was found away from his work area. PAWLOSKI said that FLEMING informed GREGORY of the incident and that GREGORY then related the incident to him (Exhibit 40. p. 2).

190. PAWLOSKI m d that GREGORY reminded him of REYNOLDS' August 1993 three week suspension and told him that REYNOLDS had been found outsice of the GREGORY also mentioned that REYNOLDS had raised protected area again. GREGORY also told him that MP1 management recommended safety concerns.

that REYNOLDS be terminated for this recent action (Exhibit 40. pp. 2 and 3).

191. PAWLOSKI stated that to insure that the proposed termination was

" legitimate." he set up a meeting at Millstone with FLEMING. BERGH, HAYNES, anc Mary RILEY of tne NU Legal Department (Exhibit 40 p. 3).

192. PAWLOSKI stated that he wanted to review the particulars of the incident and "look each of them in the eye" and to observe their demeanor to insure that the incident occurred and that termination was warranted.

PAWLOSKI stated that he did this because he "had to protect the company" (Exhibit 40 p. 3).

193. PAWLOSKI stated.that BERGH's and HAYNES' explanations satisfied the questions that he asked. PAWLOSKI said that he asked BERGH and HAYNES what they would do if they found someone else outside of the protected area. They told him that if they were aware of it, they would take the appropriate action against that individual. PAWLOSKI stated that he was At the end of the meeting.

very comfortable with their responses.

PAWLOSKI said that he told them that they had cause to terminate REYNOLDS (Exhibit 40, p. 3).

194 PAWLOSKI stated ~that he again compared REYNOLDS' situation to a union employee and felt that the termination would be upheld for cause by an arbitrator based on: 1) REYNOLDS' prior discipline problems: 2)

REYNOLDS' recent employee development reports showing poorer performance ratings: 3) the specifics of this incident: 4) an all andinclusive warning

5) an admittance by given to REYNOLDS in the August 1993 discipline:

rtEYNOLDS that he was outside of the protected area in this incicent '

(Exhibit 40 p. 3).

62 Case No. 1 93-047R.

195. PAWLOSKI stated that he saw no evidence and felt "no vibes" or feelings

.that BERGH was using this incident to Junish REYNOLDS because' he had raised safety issues. PAWLOSKI felt t1at REYNOLDS was pushing the system and that REYNOLDS felt that he was " untouchable" because he had raised safety issues (Exhibit 40, p. 3).

196. HAYNES offered that, in his mind, Nij never gave up hoae that REYNOLDS would be able to improve his work performance up to t1e day that he was found to be outside of the protected area (June 1994). He added that NU actively searched for opportunities to resolve REYNOLDS' performance problems. He believes t1at REYNOLDS did not meet them one quarter of the way in their attempts to do this (Exhibit 27, p. 1).

197. PETERSON said that REYNOLDS was a good performer when he first came to NU. He said that REYNOLDS was smart, had a good attitude, and solved ,

problems well, but at the same time, REYNOLDS had a very bad attendance record, using a lot of sick leave and an exorbitant amount of personal i time off. He added that REYNOLDS probably had the worst record in those categories in the whole shop (Exhibit 16. p. 3).

198. BERGH said that w n he became the M aintenance Department Manager he became aware that and the PTO continued to be extended to REYNOL S. This PTO was con inually extended to REYWOLDS. 6 even though REYNCLDS' dependability became an issue in REYNOLDS' [

employee development reports (EDRs). BERGH said that he made it clear to REYNOLDS that R NOLDS needed to improve hi dependability, but if he needed time off to he could have it and it would not be count d against him (Exhibit 46, p. 1).

199. PETERSON said that he coached, talked, and worked with REYNOLDS to improve his dependabihty. and that for awhile, it would get better, but then it would get worse (Exhibit 16, p. 3). ,

200. PETERSGN said that in trying to work with REYNOLDS. he made concessions that later came back to haunt him, when others in the department woulc say. "You did this for Pete REYNOLDS." and wondered why he couldn't do it for them (Exhioit 16 pp. 3 and 4).

201. PETERSON. Said that he could trace the beginnings of REYNOLDS' communicetion problems with fellow workers to when NU changed how overtime would be counted for older (the grandfathers) and newer workers (Exhibit 16, p. 4).

202. PETERSON said that REYNOLDS grieved this with the company, and the !

company upheld his grievance. PETERSON said that caused conflict between REYNOLDS and the grandfathers and between REYNOLDS and the then Maintenance Manager, ODLAND (Exhibit 16, p. 4). ,

i 203. PETERSON said that when BERGH became the Maintenance Manager other things were changing within the company and BERGH was doing his best to implement the changes as directed by the company (Exhibit 16. p. 4).

204. PETERSON said that one of the changes was to go back to the old way of I counting overtime. PETERSON said that this did not' sit well with REYNOLDS, and this happened about the same time that REYNOLDS received l Case No. 1 93 047R 63

]

his 002/ Occasionally Falls Short of Expectations rating in his 1990 EDR (Exhibit 16, p. 4).

205.

PETERSON believes that REYNOLDS should have received an 002 rating in 1987 or 1988 based on his dependability and communications deficiencies.

PETERSON said that, if it were his decision, he would have fired REYNOLDS a long time ago.

He added that, throughout his career, REYNOLDS walked a fine edge with his compliance to work procedures and rules. PETERSON stated that REYNOLDS was " absolutely not" terminated PETERSON added that other emplo'yees because he raised safety issues. ,

brought up safety issues on a daily basis and there was no problem with that (Exhibit 16 p. 4).

206.

MILLER said that he had four or five one hour meetings in his office During these conversations, REYNOLDS told him about how with REYNOLDS.

people in the maintenance department treated him. and that there wereMILL I

problems with how work orders were processed.REYNOLDS p. 2).

207.

MILLER said that when REYNOLDS told him about his safetyREYNOLDS concerns, he wrote down the concerns and made sure they were addressed.

also told him that he was being picked on because he raised safety" issu s (Exhibit 47 p. 2).

208. MILLER stated that he told REYNOLDS that if his management was doingMILLER he would take care of it.

illecal thincs to him (REYNOLDS)

~ ~

"I am here to protect you" (Exhibit 47, that he also told REYNOLDS

p. 2).

209.

MILLER stated that he checked out REYNOLDS' MILLER concern stated that himself he learned thatby talking tney

.to HAYNES. BERGH, and PETERSON.

were doing their best to address REYNOLDS safety issues. but REYNOLDS was just finding ways to not do his job (Exhibit 47, p. 2).

210.

MIO.ER stated that he told REYNOLDS to make sure that he "dic things correctly, bosses."

watch what you are doing, do your-job, and listen ;

work with his supervisors (Exhibit 47, p. 2).

f 211.

HARRIS stated that, during his reviews of REYNOLDS' various concerns, hl saw no evidence that REYNOLDS was harassed, intimidated or discriminatedl HARRIS added that he l

against because he had raised safety issues.really saw the!

concerns raised by REYNOLDS (Exhibit 45, p. 3).

212.

LORD believes that REYNOLDS' nuclear safety concerns were properly addressed by NU. He added, however, that it was definitely not true that BERGH and other MP1 maintenance department supervisors were out t get'REYNOLDS because he raised safety issues (Exhibit 19, p. 3).

213.

LORD said that REYNOLDS "was always safety conscious", and had rais safety concerns to management before the travelling screen incident.

LORD believes that the record w'ill show that REYNOLDS' safety LORD concerns became more prevalent after the traveling screen incident.

64 Case No. 1 93 047R

described REYNOLOS as a very conscientious worker who had pride in his plant (Exhibit 19 p. 4).

214. MURPHY said that the general consensus in the MP1 maintenance department was that LORD, PETERSON, BOYER, and BERGH want to fire REYNOLDS -

(Exhibit 38, p. 2). {

215. HURPHY said that he and others in the MP1 maintenance department asked ACQUITANTE what was going on with REYNOLDS. ACQUITANTE told them that he wanted no part of what was going on, and that he didn't want to get involved in trying to browbeat or fire REYNOLDS as the other foreman had attemated. ACQUITANTE brushed them off and then walked away (Exhiait 38. p. 2). l

. 216. MURPHY o]ined that ACQUITANTE did not discuss specifics with them.

3 because le was part of the management team (Exhibit 38, p. 2). )

> 217. ACQUITANTE said that he has never supervised REYNOLDS. He added that he f

. also has not supervised some other workers in the MP1 Maintenance Department (Exhibit 59. p. 1).

218. ACQUITANTE said that he got along well with REYNOLDS and REYNOLDS was never insubordinate to him. He added that he was the only supervisor l that seemed to not have a prcblem with REYNOLDS. He never witnessed {

REYNOLDS being insubordinate to any of the other MP1 Maintenance j Department supervisors (Exhibit 59, p. 1). i 219. ACQUITANTE said tnat REYNOLDS never told him that he was being harassed, intimidated, or discriminated against by his management because he had raised safety issues. REYNOLDS never told him that the disciplinary l action that was taken against him was really taken because he had raised i safety issues. REYNOLDS never discussed with him the lowering of his l yearly performance appraisals (Exhibit 59. p. 1). i I

220. ACQUITANTE denied that he told MP1 maintenance department workers: 1) that he wanted no part of wnat was going on with REYNOLDS: and 2) that he didn't want to get involved in trying to browbeat or fire REYNOLDS as e the other foreman had attempted (Exhibit 59 p. 1).

INVESTIGATOR'S NOTE: This contradicts MURPHY's testimony.

221. ACQUITANTE does not believe that REYNOLDS was terminated because he had 1

~

raised safety issues. ACQUITANTE never heard any comments from BERGH. f PETERSON. Roger BOYER. or LORD that they wanted to fire REYNOLDS because 1 he had raised safety issues (Exhibit 59, pp. I and 2).

222. ARSENAULT said that he was told by MP1 maintenance department workers ,

MURPHY and VLAUN that REYNOLDS was harassed a lot because he pushes issues very ha d. ARSENAULT also heard that NU had 'ven REYNOLDS a lot 7 h ,

of time off t and workers /] g I wondered.why R YNOLDS was doing this to the company Exhibit 34. p. 2). !

223. COOPER is not aware of REYNOLDS bringing up a specific safety issue to

-his management. He believes that REYNOLDS was fired because he had disagreements with his management. COOPER did not provide any specific Case No. 1 93 047R 65 :

1 1

information regarding these disagreements, and does not recall any of them taking place in his presence (Exhibit 60).

224. MURPHY opined that REYNOLDS was not terminated because he raised safety issues, because they all turned in safety issues which were properly addressed (Exhibit 61).

225. MURPHY opined that REYNOLDS' termination stemmed from the disagreement that REYNOLDS had with LORD on the screen house job, and that was when REYNOLDS' problems with his management started (Exhibit 61).

226. MURPHY recalled that in January or February of 1994. REYNOLDS told him that, "he couldn't take it anymore, he would not last the year, he will either quit or get fired by the end of the year" (Exhibit 61).

227. MURPHY believed that REYNOLDS turned in safety issues as "a natural reflex because of his conflict with his management." He recalls i REYNOLDS saying. "if they want a fight, they are going to get one." l MURPHY inferred that this meant that "if they (management) are going to '

nit pick him, he was going to nit pick" them (Exhibit 61).

228. MURPHY' believed that REYNOLDS' problems were caused by a personality conflict that he had with his management that should not have gone tnat far, referring to REYNDLDS' termination (Exhibit 61).

229. MURPHY said that he is REYNOLDS' good friend (Exhibit 38. p. 3).

230, ALSEE said that in the last fifteen years he has worked with REYNOLDS t twice for two week periods. He said that REYNOLDSREYNOLDSworked very well for~

always did him, and maintained a good safety and work ethic.REYNOLDS would point o whatever he told him to do. He has no information could be done in a better and/or safer way.

regarding whether REYNOLDS was harassed. intimidated, or discriminated agajnst by his management for raising nuclear safety issues (Exhibit 3/.

p. 2).

231. NEUMAN viewed it as arrogance that REYNOLDS left work early on August S.

1993: walked right past BERGH: got into his truck: and left the site (Exhibit 43, p. 1).

232. NEUMAN opined that REYNOLDS has a bad attitude and that REYNOLDS At was very insubordinate, almost on a daily basis to his supervisors.

times, he heard REYNOLDS use profanity to his supervisors (Exhibit 43,

p. 1).

NEUMAN said that REYNOLDS told him that during one of his (REYNOLDS')

233. !

yearly performance reviews with the MP1 maintenance de the meeting. They asked REYNOLDS what the toilet paper was for, and REYNOLDS told them that you can use the roll of paper or the performance review to wipe your " ass" because that was how much the review meant to l him (Exhibit 43, pp. 1 and 2).

234 NEUMAN cpined that REYNOLDS did not like to take orders from anyone, anc -

believes that REYNOLDS felt that everyone was " dumber" than him.

66 Case No. 1-93 047R l

. r J

REYNOLDS was also very difficult to talk to. although he personally got

'along with REYNOLDS "as good as anyone" (Exhibit 43. p. 2). j i

235. NEUMAN believes that REYNOLDS is a very good mechanic, but that "90% of the people you will talk to will say that Pete had a bad attitude." and that he did not get along real well with other people (Exhibit 43.

p. 2).

236. NEUMAN believes that REYNOLDS was suspended and eventually terminated because the MP1 maintenance department management was looking for a i reason to fire him. REYNOLDS' attitude in his everyday job got to be I

where no matter what job he was given by his supervisor, he would find a reason to not do it (Exhibit 43, p. 2). l '

i NEUMAN believes that REYNOLDS got into a vendetta with his management ,

j

. 237.

, over this. He said that REYNOLDS' attitude day in and day out made it

', very difficult to work with REYNOLDS. REYNOLDS' attitude caused so much

" havoc" in the shop, that no matter what any worker did. REYNOLDS felt l

. that the work was not done right. No one wanted to work with REYNOLDS because of this. He added that as far back as ten years ago people did {

j not want _to work with REYNOLDS (Exhibit 43, p. 2).

238. NEUMAN does. not believe that REYNOLDS' raising safety concerns had anything to do with REYNOLDS' termination. He firmly believes that if -

he (NEUMAN) has safety issues, he would raise them, and that they would be promptly addressed. He added that if he didn't think Millstone was I '

safe, he wouldn't work there. and he wouldn't have his son work there either (Exhibit 43 p. 2).

239.kkhasknownREYNCLDSforapproximately It is i

5elief that REYNOLDS is verbally intimidating and haraer to deal witn Q than the other workers in his section (Exhibit 29, p. 2).

240. Said that REYNOLDS dces scream yell and show disrespect to his [

manag. ment (Exhibit 29, p. 2). L 241. DUNN said that REYNOLDS never told him that he was being harassed or discriminated against because he was raising safety issues. REYNOLDS did tell him that LORD was harassing him because of a conflict that REYNOLDS'end LORD had on a job, and that it turned into a " pissing contest" right after the MP1 screen house event (1990) (Exhibit 57

p. 1).

i DUNN said that, approximately three years ago, he and Rich MILLER signed 242.

and filed a nuclear safety concern. BERGH called them into his office

~,

and asked them to explain the issue. DUNN felt that their concern was i handled very well and he was very satisfied with the resolution (Exhibit 57, p. 2).

243. WARG0 said that neither BERGH. nor any other MP1 maintenance department supervisors, ever said to him that REYNOLDS was suspended or terminated for raising safety issues. WARG0 said that he knows of no evidence that exists that would suggest that REYNOLDS was terminated for raising j

safety issues. WARGO does not believe that REYNOLDS was terminated for raising safety issues (Exhibit 62).

Case No. 1 93 047R 67 I

I I

J

244. WARG0 feels that REYNOLOS was disrespectful of other people's opinions, including his supervisors. WARGO said that the MP1 maintenance ,

department management wanted the maintenance department workers to work l better together and communicate better. WARGO opined that concept did not work well with REYNOLDS and eventually contributed to his termination (Exhibit 62).

245. WETHERBEE said that REYNOLDS never told him that he was raising issues.

but he was aware, through talk in the shop, that REYNOLDS had raised issues. REYNOLDS never told him that he was harassed and discriniin'ated against because he raised safety issues (Exhibit 63).

246. WETHERBEE believes that REYNOLDS and LORD had problems with each other and they kept " clashing." He believes that REYNOLDS' raising of safety issues " aided" in him being terminated, but could offer no information to support his belief (Exhibit 63). ]

247. WETHERBEE opined that there is a " click" in the MP1 Maintenance Department where employees who perform work at their foreman's houses are treated better. He could offer no specific information regarding that belief and attributed the belief to hearsay in the shop. He added that he and REYNOLDS were not part of that click (Exhibit 63).

248. VLAUN opined that it was "possible" that REYNOLDS was terminated because he had raised safety issues. The basis for VLAUN's opinion was that

" things kept escalating where it got to a point where management did nct l want to put up with it anymore" (Exhibit 64). ]

249. VLAUN described REYNOLnS and the MP1 maintenance department managers' relationship as " tit for tat." VLAUN added that, when you start agitating someone, they are going to get irritated and eventually tney are, going to do something abcut it (Exhibit 36 p. 2).

250. HOMINICK does not know what has caused the problems that exist between REYNOLDS and his manage er.t. REYNOLDS never mentioned anything to him !

about being harassed, intimidated, or discriminated against. He offered '

{

that most of the time the company is " pretty slack" about time recording (Exhibit 65, p. 1).

251. HOMINICK heard that, when REYNOLDS' )BERGHtoldREYNOLDS l that he could leave work when he neeced to, and dhat he would not be charged any leave time. HOMINICK believes that REYNOLDS has been treated as fairly as anyone at MP1 (Exhibit 65. pp. I and 2), 1 252. HOMINICK has never been told by any NU supervisor or manager that they would ignore a safety issue or problem. When he has raised safety issues he has always gotten an answer (Exhibit 65, p. 2). l l

I 253. CARLING said that he was told by other MP1 employees (nfi) that everyone on site knows that BERGH and the MP1 Maintenance Department foremen

" don't like REYNOLDS because he follows the work rules to the letter" (Exhibit 35, p. 1).

CARLING discussed his willingness to bring safety issues to his f 254.

management's attention. He said t. hat he has worked a lot of places. to l l

Case No. 1 93 047R 68 1

include General Dynamics. Electric Boat Division. and has performed underwater construction. CARLING believes that NU is the " safest place that he has ever worked" (Exhibit 35. p. 1). t 255. ARCARI offered that during his employment at MP1 he has raised a lot of safety issues and that all of them have been handled by the company. He added that some of the concerns that he raised were handled rig 1t away and some took longer. He stated that he has never been threatened in any way because of the safety concerns that he raised, and added that,he is very outspoken about safety issues (Exhibit 18).

256. MURPHY said that it is an unwritten rule that Millstone workers on the IMF, during an outage., can leave work early. Leaving early usually means leaving forty to sixty minutes before the end of the scheduled shift and the workers are not docked any pay for this. Workers have 3

been doing this for fifteen years (Exhibit 38, p. 2).

e 257. It is MURPHY's best guess that all of the Millstone Unit's managers know that IMF workers leave work early, but they will never openly condone it. During outages the supervisors don't enforce the normal rules.

because of the general confusion that comes with the outages. Tne workers take early lunches and breaks, and these breaks are. longer than during normal work (Exhibit 38 p. 2).

258. LORD said that there is no unwritten rule that IMF. workers were allowed to leave work forty to sixty minutes before the end of their scheduled shift during outages and not be docked pay (Exhibit 19, p. 2).

259. ALBEE said that interplant maintenance force workers are not allowed to leave work early. If they do leave early, they are only paid for the hours they work. ALBEE said that if he leaves work early on a Sunday, he only gets paid for the hours that he works (Exhibit 37, p. 2).

250. GENTRY was asked hcw he would handle an allegation that one of his workers had left work early. GENTRY offered that an MP3 Instrumentation and Controls (I&C) Technician was seen leaving work early during the MP3 August 1993 outage. GENTRY was requested by MP3 Director Fred DACIMO to review the time sheets and chits. The review was conducted and no improper absences were fcund (Exhibit 32, p. 2).

261. MURPHY said that he and Bill SCACCIAFERR0 have had their " ass chewed" numerous times over the years by PETERSON, for leaving work early

(Exhibit 38 pp.1 and 2).

262. MURPHY said that in late 1992 or early 1993. PETERSON confronted him

)

with leaving work early. MURPHY denied that he left work early.

PETERSON then took him into his office and showed him a large security printout which indicated that he had left early on a number of occasions. MURPHY apologized to PETERSON for leaving work early.

PETERSON accepted his apology but told him " don't force me to do something about this." MURPHY stopped leaving work early. MURPHY has never received a written reprimand for leaving work early (Exhibit 38,

p. 2).

Case No. 1-93 047R 69

263. 1.ORD was aware that MURPHY and SCACCIAFERR0 were talked to by PETERSON {

for leaving work early on numerou's occasions over the years. LORD is {

aware that PETERSON brought them in to talk about the problem but the issue was kept " quiet." LORD did not know if any disciplinary action was taken against MURPHY or SCACCIAFERR0 (Exhibit 19. pp. 2 and 3).

2 64. The OSHA investigator conducted a mail survey of thirty nine non- {

I management employees of MP1 in an attempt to ascertain the existence of i a " chilling effect" due to retaliation against individuals for engaging in OSHA protected activity. The survey resulted in only nine of the (

thirty nine surveys being returned. The survey revealed that five employees had no knowledge of retaliation, two had heard rumors of )

retaliation, and two made no ind.1 cation either way (Exhibit 66, p. 1). j 265. Respondent number 2 stated that he was aware of co workers being treated I unfairly by management because they had complained to management about safety or health concerns or were suspected of contacting an outside l agency (Exhibit 66, p. 2).

266. Respondent number 2 stated that he would provide no specifics because l

. . ..when management finds out despite what management says you are i l

labled [ sic] a trouble maker and delt [ sic] with accordently (sic]"

(Exhibit 66. p. 2).

267. In response to question number 3. "What is the company policy regarding absence from the work station without a supervisor's permission. Wnat disciplinary action. if any, has been taken against any employees who have been away from the work site allegedly without a supervisor's permission?" respondent number 2 advised. "if you are a trouble maker you are disciplined if you are not a trouble maker nothing" (Exhibit 66, p. 2).

268. In response to question number 3. respondent number 9 stated that.

" Employee is required to ask for personal time off from Supervisor. I don't know of anybody being disciplined for unexcused absence until recently when a fellow employee was terminated due to being off site" (Exhibit 66. p. 6).

269. Respondent number 22 stated that he was told by REYNOLDS that he was 1 treated unfairly by management because he had complained to management about safety of health concerns or was suspected of contacting an }

j outside agency (Exhibit 66. p. 12).

270. Respondent number 31 stated that employees. "Do not leave the work station w/o supervisor's permission" (Exhibit 66, p. 14).

271. Respondent numbe,r 18 stated that. "I and other employees have left work early. I have been spoken to about this many times but nothing more.

Pete was just like the rest of us, he did not leave work anymore than we

'did" (Exhibit 66 p. 21).

272. Respondent number 18 also stated that, "Most of us in the shop who have

' talked among ourselves about Pete's situation, think the trou]1e started with the screen incident . . ." (Exhibit 66. p. 21). ,

70 Case No. 1 93 047R-

. . I 273. Resoondent number 18, further stated that, "There was animosity between 1 Pet'e and management, and they had him under a microscope but I don't /

I know why." Respondent number 18 also stated that REYNOLDS was treated unfairly but didn't know why (Exhibit 66, p. 24).

i 274. Respondent number 19 stated that REYNOLDS' problems started with the l screen event (Exhibit 66, p. 27). .

I 275. Respondent number 19 also stated that LORD and BOYER treated REYNOLDS {

unfairly. "They either gave him difficult jobs and no help or nothing jobs like in the last outage which was in April of 1994" (Exhibit 66,

p. 27).

Respondent number 19 further stated that, "I think it was a vendetta f

276. '

against Pete because he was outspoken and he wanted to do things right" (Exhibit 66 p. 28).

> Conclusion Regarding REYNOLDS' termination of employment, it is concluded that the evidence developed during this investigation did not substantiate that he was harassed, intimidated. or discriminated against by the licensee for raising safety concerns.

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71 Case No. 1 93 047R

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l 72 Case'No. 1 93 047R

LIST OF EXHlBITS Exhibit No. Descriction 1 Notification of Investigation, dated May 6,1994, 2 Allegation Receipt Report, dated June 18, 1992, 3 Allegation Receipt Report, dated August 11, 1992,

- 4 REYNOLOS 10 CFR 2,206 Petition, dated August 22, 1993, 5 NU's Response to REYNOLDS Petition, dated October 25, 1993.

C 6 DOL Wage and Hour Division Letter to REYNOLDS, dated September 22.

j 1994, 7A Memorandum to File, dated January 26, 1995.

78 Report of Interview with REYNOLDS, dated August 20, 1993.

8 Transcript of Interview of REYNOLDS, dated August 11, 1994 9 RE NOLDS' EDR, dated December 19, 1983.

10 REYNOLDS' EDR, dated January 8, 1986.

11 REYNOLDS' EDR, dated February 17, 1987.

12 REYNOLDS' EDR, dated July 30, 1990.

13 Memorandum from MILLER to NNECo Supervisors, dated August 22, 1994, 14 KACICH Letter to Reporting Investigator, dated December 6 ~1994, i

~

Report of Interviea' with BERGH, dated January 10, 1995. l 15 16 ReportofInterviewwithPETERSON,datedJanuary 10, 1995.

17 Report of Interview with EMORY, dated January 10, 1995.

- 18 Report of Interview with ARCARI dated January 10, 1995.

O 19 Report of Interview with LORD, dated June 17, 1994, 20 Document Provided by LORD, dated November 24, 1982.

21 Report of Interview with COMEROSKI dated September 15, 1994.

22 Report of Interview with FLEMING, dated November 9, 1994, 23 MUP 44, dated January 1, 1994.

Case No. 1 93 047R 73 - ,

]

i i

LIST OF EXHIBITS Exhibit No. DescriDtion 1 Notification of Investigation, dated May 6,1994.

2 Allegation Receipt Report, dated June 18, 1992.

3 Allegation Receipt Report, dated August 11, 1992.

. 4 REYNOLDS 10 CFR 2.206 Petition, dated August 22, 1993.

5 NU's Response to REYNOLDS Petition, dated October 25. 1993.

6 DOL Wage and Hour Division Letter to REYNOLDS. dated September 22,

~

. 1994. 1 7A Memorandum to File, dated January 26, 1995.

78 Report of Interview with REYNOLDS, dated August 20, 1993. l 8 Transcript of Interview of REYNOLDS. dated August 11, 1994.

9 RE NOLDS' EDR dated December 19, 1983.

REYNOLDS' EDR, dated January 8. 1986. l 10 l 11 REYNOLDS' EDR, dated February 17, 1987.

12 REYNOLDS' EDR, dated July 30, 1990, 13 Memorandum from MILLER to NNECo Supervisors, dated August 22, 1994 14 KACICH Letter to Reporting Investigator, dated December 6. 1994 15 Report of Interview with BERGH, dated January 10, 1995.

16 ReportofInterviewwithPETERSON,datedJanuary 10, 1995.

. 17 Report of Interview with EMORY, dated January 10, 1995, N

. 18 Report of Interview with ARCARI, dated January 10, 1995.

~

19 Report of Interview w..S LORD, dated June 17, 1994 20 Document Provided by LORD, dated November 24, 1982.

21 Report of Interview with COMEROSKI, dated September 15, 1994, 22 Report of Interview with FLEMING, dated November 9, 1994 23 NLfP 44, dated January 1, 1994 73 .'

Case No. 1 93 047R -

LIST OF EXHIBITS

-Exhibit No. Descriot.i.20 1- Notification of Investigation, dated May 6,1994.

2 Allegation Receipt Report, dated June 18, 1992.

3 Allegation Receipt Report, dated August 11, 1992.

. 4 REYNOLDS 10 CFR 2.206 Petition, dated August 22, 1993.

5 NU's Response to REYNOLDS Petition, dated October 25, 1993, 6 DOL Wage and Hour Division Letter to REYNOLDS, dated September 22, a 1994.

7A Memorandum to File, dated January 26, 1995.

78 Report of Interview with REYNOLDS, dated August 20, 1993.

8 Transcript of Interview of REYNOLDS, dated August 11, 1994, 9 REYNOLDS' EDR, dated December 19, 1983.

10 REYNOLDS' EDR, dated January 8, 1986.

11 REYNOLDS' EDR, dated February 17, 1987.

12 REYNOLDS' EDR, dated July 30, 1990.

13 Memorandum from MILi.ER to NNECo Supervisors, dated August 22, 1994 14 KACICH Letter to Reporting Investigator, dated December 6 ~1994.

15 Report of Interview with BERGH, dated January 10, 1995.

16 Report of Interview with PETERSDN, dated January 10, 1995, 17 Report of Interview with EMORY, dated January 10, 1995.

,- 18 Report of Interview with ARCARI,. dated January 10, 1995.

19 Report of Interview with LORD, dated June 17, 1994.

20 Document Provided by LORD, dated November 24, 1982, 21 Report of Interview with COMEROSKI, dated September 15, 1994.

22 Report of Interview with FLEMING, dated November 9, 1994.

23 ff@ 44 dated January 1,1994.

Case No,-1 93 047R 73 - ,

24 Report of Interview with BROWN, dated October 25 and 26, 1994 25 Report of Interview with BOYER. dated November'8, 1994.

26 Memorandum from LORD to REYNOLDS, dated March 16, 1992.

27 Report of Interview with HAYNES, dated December 15, 1994.

28 ReportofInterviewwithWARGO,d[tedMarch 24, 1994.

29 h )b[L Work Order 83 92 18638, dated August 8, 1993. -_

30 31 /){

32 Report of Interview with GENTRY, dated October 26, 1994.

33 Report of Interview with WEEKLY, dated November 9, 1994.

34 Report of Interview with ARSENAULT, dated April 12, 1994.

35 Report of Interview with CARLING. dated September 14. 1994 36 Report of Interview with VLAUN, dated April 12. 1994.

37 Report of Interview with ALSEE, dated September 14, 1994.

38 Report of Interview with MURPHY, dated May 4. 1994 39 August 8. 1993. Millstone Gate Log Check for REYNOLDS.

40 Report of Interview with PAWLOSKI. dated December 15. 1994 41 State of Connecticut. Employment Security Appeals Divisicn.

Decision for Case Number 1526 BB 93, dated November 24 1993.

42 NU Letter to State of Connecticut Employment Security Appeals Division, dated December 21, 1993.

43 Report of Interview with NEUMAN, dated September 14, 1994 44 Report of Interview with MESSINA, dated November 30, 1994.

45 Report of Interview with HARRIS, dated November 30. 1994.

46 Report of Interview with BERGH, dated August 12. 1994.

47 ReportofinterviewwithMILLER,datedDecember 15, 1994 48 EEVERIDGE Safety Analysis, dated May 2,1994 l

49 Report of Interview with Michael ROSS, dated November 9, 1994.

f 50 Report of Interview with MORRELL, dated October 6, 1994.

Case No. 1 93 04.7R 74 f i

1 1

. e

{

51 Memorandum for File, dated January 3, 1995.

52 53 Report of Interview with McNERNEY, dated January 10, 1995.

. I l

54 Report of Interview with REIDER, dated January 9. 1995. I 55 REYNOLDS' Termination Letter, dated June 27, 1994.

56 Report of Interview with STEVENSON, dated October 25. 1994 j 57 Report of Interview with DUNN, dated October 26, 1994. f l

. 58 Report of Interview with Anthony ROSS, dated October 26, 1994.

59 Report of Interview with ACQUITANTE, dated November 9, 1994,

.f.

1 60 Report of Interview with COOPER, dated September 14, 1994 61 Report of Interview with MURPHY, dated September 14, 1994. 1 62 Report of Interview with WARGO, dated September 15, 1994 63 Report of Interview with WETHERBEE. dated October 26, 1994 64 Report of Interview with VLAUN, dated September 15, 1994.

t' 65 Report of Interview with HOMINICK. dated May 4. 1994.

66 00L; OSHA Cover Letter dated January 27. 1995, and Survey Responses.

J i'.~ I Case No. 1 93 047R 75- ,

__

IA-99-143, Partially Withheld Investigation Rept 1-93-047R Re Alleged Harassment,Intimidation & Discrimination

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