Text

Fundamentals of Insp Course
	ML20207H582
Person / Time
Issue date:	05/31/1988
From:	; NRC
To:	;
Shared Package
ML20207H580	List: IA-88-390, Fundamentals of Insp Course; ML20207H575; ML20207H582;
References
	FOIA-88-390 PROC-880531, NUDOCS 8808290122
	Download: ML20207H582 (382)
	v • d • e

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~ r FUNDAMENTALS OF INSPECTION COURSE MAY 1988

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1 k l 8800290122 000005 PDR FOIA PDR RIEHMB8-390 i

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i TABLE OF CONTENTS

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P111 DEFINITIONS.......................................................... 0-1 ACR0NYMS..............................................................A-I

1. THE INSPECTION PROGRAM i 1.1 Purpose.................................................... 1-1 1.2 Implementation Philosophy.................................. 1-3 t

1.2.1 S a f e ty O ri e n ta t i o n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-3 :

! 1.2.2 Re s i dent In s pectors. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-3 l

! 1.2.3 Inspector Qualification and Authorities.......... 1-4 !

1.2.4 Evaluations by the Institute of Nuclear

-Power Operations........................... ... 1-5 1.2.5 Reactive In spection s. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-6 1.2.6 The S A LP P r o g ram . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-6 l l 1.3 Inspection Program Content................................. 1-9 i <

l 1.3.1 Precon struction Pe rmi t Pha se. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-10 ,

!( 1.3.2 1.3.3 ConstructionPhase.........l....'.................1-10 '

Preocerational Testing and Operational P reparedne s s P h4 se . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-11 1.3.4 Startup Testing.................................. 1-12 1.3.5 Operations Phase................................. 1-13 3 1.3.6 Decommissioning Phase........................ ... 1-13 I I

1.4 P ro g r a m De v e l o pme n t . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 - 13 l 2. PERSONAL CONOUCT OF INSPECTORS 2.1 Preservation of Credibility and Integrity.............. ... 2-1 2.2 Guiding Principles......................................... 2-2 1

2.3 S p e c i f i c Gui d a n c e . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-5 2.3.1 Gifts, Entertainment and Favors................... 2-5 2.3.2 Outside Earleyment and other Outside Activities. . 2-7 '

2.3.3 Fi n a ae i a l Int e re s t. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-9 2.1.3.1 Prohibited Secut'ities.................. 2-9 t 2,3.3.2 Other Financial Interests.............. 2-11 l

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05C4 TABLE OF CONTENTS (Centinued) l E111 2.3.4 Future Employment Restrictions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-13 2.3.5 Postemployment Re striction s. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-13 2.3.6 Use of Government Property....................... 2-15 2.3.7 Mi s u st o f I n f o rma t i o n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-16 2.3.8 Indebtedness..................................... 2-16 2.3.9 Gambling, Betting and Lotteries. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-17 2.4 Other Restrictions Imposed by Federal Law on Employee Conduct...................................... 2-17 2.5 Employees Participation in Political Activities............ 2-18 2.6 Examples of Confi t et o f Interest si tuat ion s. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-21 2.7 Employee Counseling........................................ 2-23

3. LEGAL ASPECTS OF INSPECTION 3.1 Legal Authority of Inspectors as Agents of the Federal Government................................... 3-1 3.2 S t a t u t o ry F ramewo r k o f NRC .', . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 - 1 3.3 Inspection Authority and Legal Impi t eations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-3 3.4 NRC Interactions with Other Federal Governme-t Agencies and 5tates...................................... 3-5 3.4.1 F.nvironmental Protection Agency.................. 3-5 3.4.2 Department of Transportation.................... 3-6 3.4.3 Federal Emergency Management Agency. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-6 3.4.4 State Authorities................................ 3-7

3. 5 Organization of Legal Of fices within NRC. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-7

4. PREPARATION COR AN INSPECTION i

1 4.1 Objective of preparation for an Inspection............ .... 4-1 4.2 Types of Inspections......... .... ................. ...... 4-1 4.2.1 Announced or Unannounced.... ......,.... ...... 4-1 !

4.2.2 Routine and Nonroutine Inspections. ... ......... 4-1 4.2.3 Individual and Tear Inspections.................. 4-2 i j

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i lt 4.3 Scope of Inspection........................................ 4-2 4.4 Duration of Inspection..................................... 43 4.5 Preparation................................................4-3 4.5.1 Timirg........................................... 4-4 4.5.2 Reference Materials.............................. 4-4 4.5.2.1 Inspection Manual...................... 4-4 4.5.2.2 Inspection Refe- ~ e Material....... .. 4-5 ;

4.5.3 Inspection Check List ara m ptance Criteria. . . . 4-9 l 4.5.4

Inspection Performance.. .................... 4-11 !

4.5.4.1 Inoffice Effers.................... ... 4-11 4.5.4.2 Independent Effort..................... 4-11 4.5.4.3 Tracking Techniques.................... 4-12 t

5. EFFECTIVE COMMUNICATION CURING INSPECTIONS !

( 5.1 Need for Unders tanding o f Is sue s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-1 5.2 Techni que s o f Communi ca ti on. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-1 5.3 Se l f E v a l u a t i o n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-2 5.4 Credibt11ty................................................5-4 F

5.5 Cautions................., ................................ 5-5 5.6 practi c e , S tudy, a nd Ob serva ti on. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-7

6. PERFCRMING AN INSPECf!CN 6.1 Inspection Assignments.......... ........................ 6-1 6.2 Inspection Requirements................................

... 6-2 6.3 Legal Basis for Inspections.................... ........... 6-3 I

6.4 Guideltnes for Relations with Licensee's Emplocyees...... . 6-5 '

6.5 Assistance Ouring an Inspection.......... ................. 6-6 '

l 6.5.1 Assistace to the Inspector...... ................ 6-6 6.5.2 Inspection Plan Changes.... .. .... ........... 6-7

6.5.3 Inspector's Cegree of Flexib(11ty................ 6-8 6.5.4 Means for Handling Odd Situations................ 6-9 !

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0588 TAEiE OF CONTENTS (Continued)

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6.3 Inspection Procedures.. . .......... ...................... 5-12 6.6.1 Plan Confi rmation at Site. . . . . . . . . .. . . ... .... 6-1?

6.6.2 Observation of-Activities..... ................. 6-13 6.6.3 Intervtewine. .................................. 6-17

6. 6. 4 - Review of Licensee ' r ' Records, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-20 6.6.4.1 -Prcp vation............................ 6-20 6.6.4.2 Types of Reviews....................... 6-21 6.6.4.3 Techniques for Reviewing Records....... 6-22 6.6.4.4 Mi s si ng Reco rd s. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-24 6.6.4.5 Validity of Records.................... 6-25 6.7 Inspection Findings......................................

. 6-26 7.

CONGUCTING ENTRANCE AND EXIT MEETINGS WITH LICENSEE MANAGEMENT 7.1 P repa ra tion fo r Mee ti ng s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7* 1 7.1.1 Planning............. ...................... ... 7-1 7.1.2 Attendance................... ................... 7-2 7.1.3 Recording 0evices...........................s.... 7-3 -

7.1.4 Discussion and Summary........................... 7-3 7.2 Entrance Meetings....................................... . 7-4

7. 3 Exit Meetings...... .... ............... .................. 7-5 7.4 Confrontation with Licenste Personnel. ...... ...... .. .. 7-7 7.5 Thi rd-Party Attendance at Meetings. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-9

8. DOCUMENTATING INSPECTION RESULTS 8.1 Inspection Reports........................

............... 8-1 8.1.1 Content...................... ......... ....... 8-2 8.1.2 Ba sic Report Guidelines. . . . . . . . . . . ....... .. . 8-4 8.1.2.1 Cover Page.... . ... .. . .... ... 8-5 8.1.2.2 Inspection Details. . ..... ... 8-6 i

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0588 TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)

Pace 8.1.2.3 Timeliness of Reports................. ..... 8-9 8.1.2.4 .._terial s Inspection Reports. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-10 8.1.2.5 Transmittal and Acknowledgement Letters....... ....................... ... 8-10 8.-2 Evaluation and Documentation for Enforcement Matters... ... 8-11 8.2.1 Regional-Inspector Evaluation........... .... .. 8-11 8.2.2 Violation Documentation................. .... . 0-11 8.2.3 Occumentation for Violation of Materials Licenses...... .................. ............. 8-13 8.3 Processing Enforcement Actions............................. 8-13 8.3.1 Notice of Violations......................... ... 8-13 8.3.2 Notices of Deviation............................. 8-14 8.3.3 Order Imposing a Civil Penalty................... 8-14 8.3.4 Acknowledgement of R ,ponses. ............ ...... 8-15 8.3.4.1 Actions W1.hout Civil Penalty........ . 8-15 8.3.4.2 Actions With Civil Penalty............. 8-15 8.3.5 S t a n da rd Fo rma t s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8- 15 8.4 Categories of Exempt In formation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .... 8-16 8.5 Control fo Inspection and Enforcement Documents........ .8-18 8.5.1 Control Prior to Official Issuance.............. 8-18 8.5.2 Release of Safety or Safeguards Information. . . . . . 8-18 8.5.3 Release of Briefing Documents........ ... ... .. 8-18 8.5.4 Release of Administrative Inspection Documents... 8-19 8.5.5 Release of Licensee or Vendor Documents. . . . . . . . . . 8-19 8.5.6 Exclusions From Released Information. . . . . . . . ... 8-19 8.6 Review and Distribution of Inspection Reports. . . . . . . . . . 8-20 8.7 Investigations.. ........ .... .. . . . . . . . . . . . . ... .... 8-22

9. EVALUATION OF LICENSEE MANAGEMENT EFFECTIVENESS 9.1 Basic Principles and Functions of Management......... ..... 9-1 9.1.1 Planning.... .... .......... . .......... . .. .. 9-1 9.1.2 Organizing........ .... .... .......... .... ... 9-2

0538 TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)

Pace 9 .1.' 3 Staff.ing......................................... 9-3 9.1.4 Directing........................................ 9-3 9.1.5 Co n t r o 1 1 1 n g . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-4 9.2 Regulatory Requirements for Management of Nuclear Power P1 ants............................................. 9-4 -

9.3 Licensee Organizational Structure..................... ... 9-5 9.3.1 Utility and Corporate Organization............. .9-5 9.3.2, Operatirg Plant Organization..................... 9-6 9.3.3 Organization of a Plant Under Construction..... . 9-8 9.4 Management Information and control Systems. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-8 9.4.1 The QA/QC Organization....... ................. . 9-8 9.4.2 Safety Review Committees..... ................... 9-10 9.4.3 Cor ective Action Systems.......... ..... ....... 9-13 9.4.4 Commi tment Tracking Systems. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-13 9.5 Evaluation and Improvement of btili ty Management. . . . . . . . . . . 9-13 9.5.1 Reactor Inspectien Program..................... . 9-13 9.5.2 Performance Apprai sal Team. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .... 9-14 9.5.3 The Program for Systematic Assessment of Licen see Performa nce. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-16 9.5.4 Licensee Improvement Programs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-18 9.6 Mea sures of Management Ef fectiveness. . . . . . . . . . . . . ..... 9-19 9.6.1 Policies, Goals, and Objectives.. ..... ..... . 9-19 9.6.2 Responsibilities........................... ..... 9-19 9.6.3 Management Attitude and Commitment..... .. ... . 9-20 9.6.4 Employee Attitude............

................ .. 9-22 9.6.5 Awareness-Communications and Coordination. . . . . . . 9-22 9.6.6 Selection and Training of Personnel......... .... 9-23 9.6.7 Collection and Analysis of Information. . . . . .. .9-23 9.6.8 Overall Management Performance.. .. ... . .. 9-24 l 9.7 Trend Analysis.... . .. ... ...... . ... . . .. ... 9-25 )

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TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued) l l Pace

10. HANDLING ALLEGATIONS 10.1 Contact with A11egers.................................... 10-1 10.2 Initial Contact.......................................... 10-2 10.3 Gathering the Facts....... ................... .......... 10-3 10.4 Reporting the Facts............................ ....... .10-7 10.5 Allegations of Harrassment and Intimidation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-7 10.6 Handling Requests for Confidentiality. .. .. .. ....... . 10-8 10.7 Protecting the Identi ty of Allegers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-14 10.8 Wrongdoing............................ .................. 10-14 10.9 Followup of Allegations in the Inspection Reports........ 10-15 10.10 Signed Statements........................................ 10-18 10.11 Di scussions of Followup with Licensee. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-21 10.12 Occumentation of Allegations in Inspection Reports.. .... 10-23

, 10.13 Public Relations Respcnsib111 ties... .................... 10-24

11. ENFORCEMENT OF NRC REGULATIONS AND LICENSE CONDITIONS 11.1 Purpose of Enforcement Provisions.. ....................... 11-1 11.1.1 En f o rc eme n t To o 1 s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11- 1 11.1.2 Types of Orders.............. ................... 11-2 11.1.3 Issuing Orders.............. ............. .... 11-4 11.2 Determining Appropirate Enforcement Actions.. ............. 11-4 11.3 Issuance of Enforcement Documents... ... ................. 11-7 11.3.1 Notice of Violation.................. . . ....... 11-7 11.3.2 Notice of Deviation............. .............. 11-7 11.4 Civil penalty Assessment.......... . ........ ........ .. 11-8 11.4.1 Base Monetary Amount..... ... ............... .. 11-8 11.4.2 Adjustment Factors. . . . . . . .... ... . .. 11-9 11.4.2.1 Licensee Identification and I

Reporting Prior to NRC Action.... ... 11-9

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TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)

Pa g e.

11. 4. 2. 2 Co rrecti ve Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-10 11.4.2.3 P a s t P e r f o rma n c e . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 - 11 11.4.2.4 Prior Notice of Sim11ar -

Events.............. 11-11

, 11.4.2.5 Multiple Occurrences........................ 11 11.4.2.6 Continuing Violations....................... 11-11 11.5 P r e s s R e l e a s e s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 - 12 11.6 Coamission Consultation................................ . 11-12 11.7 Violations of Reporting Requirements......... ........... 11-12 11.8 Violations of Record-Keeping Requi rments. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i1-13 11.9 Material False Statements................................ 11-13 11.10 Empl oye e P rotect i on Ca s e s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11- 14

12. BACKFITTING 12.1 NRC Processes for Managing Backfitting of Nuclear Power P1 ants..................................... ...... ..... 12-1 12.2 NRC Regulatory Staff Positions Applicable Prior to 8 a c k f i t t i n g . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 - 2 12.3 Regulatory Staff Po'sitions that Constitute Backfitting. . . . .12-3

12. 4 Ty p e s o f 8 a c k f i t s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 -3

12. 5 Ge n e r i c Ba c k f i t s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12- 4 ,

12.5.1 The C6mmittee to Review Generic Requirements..... 12-4 12.6 Licensee-Specific Backfitting......... ........ ..... .... 12-8 1 12.6.1 Determining the Need for Plant-Specific ;

Backfits......................... ............. 12-8 I 12.6.2 Regulatory Analysis............................. 12-9 1

l 12.6.3 Licensee Claims of Nonidenti fied Backfits. . . . . . .12-11 )

12.6.4 Licensee Appeal s o f Propcsed Backfits. . . . . . . . . . . 12-12 12,7 Examples of Analyses of Sta f f Posi tion s. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-12 12.7.1 Applicability of Licensing Conditions. . . . . . 12-13 12.7.1.1 Use of Standard Review Plan.... .. ... 12-13 12.7.1.2 Use of Regulatory Guides. ......... .. 12-14

12.7.1.3 Use of Plar;t-Specific Orders. ......... 12-15 i

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0588 TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)

Pace 12.7.2 Applicability of Inspection and Enforcement Process........................................ 12-15 .

12.7.2.1 Inspections............................ 12-15 12.7.2.2 Notices o f Violation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-16 12.7.2.3 NRC Bulletins...........,.............. 12-17 12.7.2.1 Reanalysis of Issues.......... ..... .. 12-17 12.8 Handling of Possible Backf 4 Si tuations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-18 12.,8.1 Determining the Effect on Safety................. 12-19 12.8.2 Categorization by Signi ficance. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-19

13. l.ICENSEE CCRRECTIVE ACTION SYSTEMS 13.1 Regulatory Basis for a Corrective Action System. . . . . . . . . . . .13-1 13.2 Elements of an Ef fective Corrective Action System. . . . . . . . . . 13-4

13. 3 Ident i fica tion o f the Problems. . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-4

( 13.3.1 Sel f Identi fication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-5 13.3.2 Monitoring....................................... 13-8 13.3.3 Inspection and Audit Activities...... ........... 13-10 13.3.4 Re v i ew Ac t i v i t i e s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13- 13 ,

13.3.4.1 Specific Reviews...................

.. 13-13 13.3.4.2 General Reviews...... ................. 13-17 13.4 Tracking Problems and Corrective Action.. .............. .. 13-21 13.5 Evaluation of the Problems.. ................. ............ 13-24 13.5.1 Safety Impact............................ ....... 13-25 1 13.5.2 Reporting Needs and Requirements................. 13-27 13.5.3 Generic Implications........ ................. .. 13-28 13.5.4 Corrective Action Needed......................... 13-30 13.5.5 Root Cause and Action Needed to Prevent Recurrence................... ...... .......... 13-31 13.5.5.1 Root Cause Determination. ... . . ..... 13-31 13.5.5.2 Fixing the Root Cause....... ... .. . . 13-35 13.6 Corrective Action............................. . ... ... . 13-36 13.7 The Inspector's Outies and Responsibilities.......... .

. 13-39 i

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0588 TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)

P._ag!t

14. EMERGENCY RESPONSE AND FOLLOWUP OF A MAJOR ACCIDENT 14.1 NRC Response Objectives and Ro1es.......................... 14-1 14.2 NRC Response Modes......................................... 14-3 14.2.1 Standby Mode..................................... 14-3 14.2.2 Initial Activation Mode................. ........ 14-3 14.2.3 Expanded Activation Mode......................... 14-4 14.3 Activities of the Emergency Organi zation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-4 14.3.1 Response Management by Executive Team and Director of Site Operations.... .......... .... 14-7 14.3.2 Protective Measures Assessment by Protective Measures Team and Coordinator. .......... .... 14-9 14.3.3 Reactor Safety Assessments by Reactor Safety Team and Coordinator......................... . 14-10 14.3.4 Safeguards and Security Assessment by Safeguards Team and Safeguards and Security Coordinator.. .14-12 14.3.5 Government liaison by government Liaison Officer and Coordinator................................ 14-12 14.3.6 Congres siona l L1 a i son. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .' t 14-14 14.3.7 Public Affairs Team and Coordinator.... ......... 14-14 14.3.8 Response Coordination Functions and Objectives... 14-15

14. 4 The Role of the Resident Inspector. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 14-15

14. 5 Rol es o f Other Federal Agenci es. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-16 14.5.1 Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan. .. 14-16 14.5.2 Location of Federal Agency Decisionmakers and Coordinator................................. . .14-18 14.6 Summary of Major Assignments and Responsibilities. . . . . . . . .14-18

14. 7 Followup of a Major Incident. . . . . . . .. ....... . ........ .14-19 14.7.1 Functions of NRC Offices in Establishing and l Implementing the Followup Program. . .. .14-21 i

14.7.2 Functions of an Incident Investigation Team.... . 14-26 '

14.7.2.1 Objective and Scope of an Investigation........ ... ........ . 14-26 i 1

0588 TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)

Pace 14.7.2.2 S c h ed u l e . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 -2 7 14.7.2.3 Team Composition and Qualifications.... 14-27 14.7.3 Functicns of an Augmented Inspection Team........ 14-28 14.7.3.1 Objectives and Scope of an Augmented Inspection........................... 14-28 14.7.3.2 Schedule.................. ...... .... 14-29 14.7.3.3 Team Composition and Qualification. ... 14-29

15. PARTICIPATION IN PUBLIC HEARINGS 15.1 The Public Hearing Process..................... ........... 15-1 15.2 The Relationsh'ip of Staff Witnesses and NRC Lawyers Involved in the Hearing....................... . ..., .. 15-3 15.3 Preparation of Direct Testimony............ .... ....... .. 15-7 15.4 Advice for a Witness Giving Oral Testimony............... . 15-12

'( 15.5 References.. ........... ....... ...................... ... 15-16

16. FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT .

16.1 Requirements of the Act.................................. . 16-1 14.2 Records Subject to FOIA Request s. . . . . . . . .................. 16-1 16.3 FOIA Exemotions.......... .... ........ ... ...... ... . 16-3 16.4 Special privacy Act Issues. ........ ................... .. 16-13

17. INFORMING THE FUBLIC 17.1 The Resident Inspector as the Interface with the News Media.17-1 17.2 Public Af fairs Policy. . . . . . . . . . ..... ....... .. ... .. 17-1 17.3 Information Role of the Resident Inspector.... . ...... 17-3 17.4 News Sources. ................. .... . ........ .. .... .. 17-5

17. 5 A News Vacuum Creates Mi sinformation. . . . . . . . . . . . ... .... 17-6 17.6 Working with the Public Af fairs Of ficer. . . . .. ...... . ... 17-6 17.7 Guidance for Discussion with Reporters. .. . . ......... 17-7

( 17.8 Questions Most likely to be Asked... .

. ............... . 17-10

0588 TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)

Pace APPENDIX A. Charter, Comi ttee tc Review Generic Requirements. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

B. Li st of Type s of In spection Reperts. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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DEFINITIONS Administrative Inspection Material. Inspection documents that include only the following items: (1) interview schedules, (2) lists of personnel to be interviewed, (3) lists of licensee / vendor documents to be reviewed, (4) lists of licensee / vendor activities to be witnessed.

Deviation. A licensee's failure to satisfy a written commitment; for example, a commitment made in a final safety analysis report (FSAR) to conform to the provisions of applicable codes, standards, guides, or accepted industry practices, when the code, standard, guide, or practice involved has not been made a legally binding requirement by NRC.

Oraft Insoection Report. Any version of the inspection report prior to its official issuance. It is to be considered a draft inspection report from its initial development throughout the period of supervi sory and management review until finci publication and distribution.

Enforcement. The documentation and characteri::ation of potential licensee / vendor violations and deviations, as defined in the NRC inspection manual * "Enforcement Program," IMC 0400, including the issuance of notices, orders, and civil penalties.

Enforcement Document. Any material considered to be an NRC record C that is related to planned or proposed enforcement actions to be instituted for potential licensee / vendor violations and deviations.

Exemot Information. Information n N releasable to the public or, potentially, to the licensee. Such lyformation is not normally in an inspection report.

Insoection. The examination, investigation, review, or evaluation of any record or activity of a licensee or vendor to determine the safety or safeguards significance of that record or activity and/or to assure compliance with any applicable rule, order, regulation, or ifcense condition pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, 42 U.S.C 2011 et seq. An inspection is considered to be:

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1. One or more visits made to the licensee's or vendor's site and/or corporate headquarters to satisfy an established inspection requirement. Normally, only visits made within a 30-day period may be considered to be a single inspection. Return visits to )

complete the exit interview with management or to conduct an i enforcement conference prior to issuance of the inspection report is included in that same inspection.

'Formerly designated the Inspection and Enforcement Manual. Chapters in this manual that were formerly called Manual Chapters (MC) are now designated IMC.

2. A series of activities conducted by resident inspectors during a ,

period of up to 6 weeks.

3. An in-office review of licensee documents or reports; for example, a followup inspection conducted to review 10 CFR 21 reports, 10 CFR 73.71(c) licensee event reports, or licensee operating procedures. (See 10 CFR 21, "Reporting of Defects and Noncompliance," and 10 CFR 73, "Physical Protection of Plant and Materials.")

Insoection Document. Any material obtained or developed during or resulting from an inspection of a licensee or vendor that is considered to be an NRC record.

Insoection Module.- Instructions for conducting an inspection.

Licensee. The applicant for or the holder of an NRC license or a construction permit.

NRC Record. Any book, paper, map, photograph, brochure, punch card, magnetic tape, paper tape, sound recording, pamphlet, slide, motion picture, or other documentary material rega rdless of form or characteristics, made by, in the possession of, or under the control of the NRC pursuant to Federal law or in connection with the transaction of public business as evidence of NRC organization, functions, policies, decisions, procedures, operations, programs or other activities.

Observations. Observations are neither evidence of violations nor unresolved items. Observa'tions are offered as program improvement items, but they have no sp(cific regulatory '-aquirements.

Official Issuance. The final publication and distribution of documents that have received the concurrence and signature of all appropriate levels of management in accordance with NRC inspection manual IMC 0611, "Review and Distribution of Inspection Reports'" for inspection documentation and NRC inspection manual IMC 0400, "Enforcement Program," for enforcement documentation.

Open Item. Matters that reoutred further review and evaluation by the inspector. Open items are used to document, track, and ensure adequate followup on matters of concern to the inspector, procrietary I n fo rma tion . In forma tion consisting of trade secrets, commercial or financial information or other information exempt from mandatory public disclosure.

Recuirement. A legally binding obligation such as a statute, regulation, license condition, technical specification, or order.

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Unresolved Item.~ An unresolved item is a matter about which more information is requireo to ascertain whether it is an acceptable matter, a deviation, or a violation.

Vendor. Any nonlicensee or organization inspected as part of the Vender Inspection Program.

Violation. The failure of a licensee or vendor to comply with a requirement.

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ACRONYMS ACRS Advisory Committen on Reactor Safeguards AE00 Office for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data ANSI American National Standards Institute BWR Boiling Water Reactor CFR

,- Code of Federal Regulations CRGR Committee to Review Gerneric Requirements EDO Executive Ofrector for Operations EPA Environmental Protection Agency Fed. Reg. Federal Regulations FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency FES Final Environmental Statement FOIA Freedom of Information Act

( GET INPO General Empicyee Training Institute of Nuclear Power Operations LER Licensee Event Report LWR Light Water Reactor NC'A National Environmental Policy Act NPROS Nuclear Plant Reliability Data System fLMSS Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission NRR Office of Nuclear Redctor Regulation NSI National Security Information NUREG The designation of a formal NRC report OGC Office of General Counsel OI Office of Investigation PSAR Preliminary Safety Analysis Report PWR Pressurized Water Reactor QA Quality Assurance i A-1

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QC Quality Control RES Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research SALP Systematic Assessment of~ Licensee Performance SAR Safety Analysis Report SER Safety Evaluation Repor.

SRP 'tandard Review Plan U.S.C United States Code- ,

USI Unresolved Safety Issue i

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CHAPTER 1 -l 1

l THE INSPECTION PROGRAM 1.1 PURPOSE The mission of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is to protect the health and safety of the public and the environment in the uses of nuclear facilities and materials. The inspection program is one of the principal methods NRC uses to accomplish this mission. Objective evidence is gathered through personnel interviews, direct observation of activities, and the review of records to assure that the policies, programs and equipment at a licensee facility are effective at assuring the public health ard safety.

( A permit to build and a license to operate a nuclear facility are issued when an applicant has demonstrated to NRC that it is trustworthy and technically and financially capable. NRC ,

regulations and work actions are based on the understanding that the nuclear industry is ultimately responsible for the proper ccnstruction and safe operation of its facilities. The inspection program is designed and carried out to independently verify that the licensee is building and operating its nuclear. facility in accordance with its permit, license, and regulatory requirements and that its work activities are being performed in a high-quality, proper manner to assure operation with adequate protection. The effort to accomplish this does not make NRC a natural adversary of the industry. Rather, NRC and the industry {

seek the same ultimate goal--OPERATION WITH ADEQUATE PROTECTION. l l

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Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 50.70 (10 CFR 50.70 "Inspections") gives NRC authority to conduct insp2ctions at a licensee's f acility. In addition to authorizing the inspection of the licensee's records, premises, activities, and licensed materials.

4 NRC inspections are performed on a outine basis (routine inspection program) in accordance with a written program. In addition to the routine program, there is a reactive inspection effort. In the reactive program, investigations are made of problems, issues, incidents, accidents, allegations, and other unusual circumstances.

Conducting inspections at a licensee's factitty involves more than a determination of whether a licensee is in compliance with NRC requirements. The performance of the licensee in implementing its programs is also evaluated. The ultimate goal of the inspection program is to ensure that a licensees programs and equipment will adequately perform their intented functions.

Inspection effort in this area also identifies changes in the performance of a licensee that would indicate the need for increased inspection effort by NRC and possible corrective actioc(s) by the licensee. Significant inspection findings are communicated to the Commission, other NRC offices, government agencies, licensees and the public.

During an inspection, the inspector may identify areas where the licensee is not in compliance with its license or regulatory requirements.

When this occurs, the noncompliance finding is documented along with other findings of the inspection, and the documentation provides the basis for appropriate NRC enforcement action. The NRC inspection manual discusses enforcement (IMC 0400, "Enforcement Program") and this topic is considered later in Chapter 11.

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1 1.E IMPLEMENTATION PHILOSOPHY 1.2.1 Safety Orientation The inspection program is safety oriented and performance oriented. The focus of the inspection effort is in those areas that are involved with the greatest risk to plant sa fe ty. The inspection program only audits a relatively small portion of the individual activities done each day at a plant. It is important to note, however, that implementation of the program does not make the facility safe. Safety cannot be inspected into a facility.

Implementation of the inspection program provides an appropriate indicat' ion to NRC and the public that the licensee is meeting its comnlitment to build and operate its plant safely by complying with its license and regulatory requirements. Tne inspection

( program does not supplant the licensee's programs or responsibi-lities; rather, it is an independent verification. that the licensee s programs are being effectively 8

implemented in accordance with applicable NRC requirements.

1.2.2 Resident Inspectors The inspection program is a sampling program that reviews a cross section of the licensee's activities, rather than a 100% review.

When a potential problem is identified by the inspector, inspection effort may be increased untii a determination is made that the problem does not exist or that corrective action is required by the licensee. By using resident inspectors, it has been possible to place primary empnasis on direct observation of activities of the licensee; however, it is recognized that a mixture of inspection efforts applied along with direct observation of licensee activities, prcgram ' veri fication, and review of records appears to be optimum for a +1mpling type of inspection program.

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I The program emphasizes the assignment at a plant site of a generalist inspector (resident inspector) with a broad engineering background. Inspections requiring a specialist, on the other hand, are performed by inspectors based at a regional office. The resident inspector is the primary onsite evaluator for NRC.

1.2.3 Inspector Qualification and Authorities It is assumed that implementation of the program is accomplished by inspectors who meet the minicum NRC qualificatien requirements for the areas being inspected. Minimum NRC qualifications for inspectors for the variou> areas are given in the NRC inspection manual in INC 1245, "Inspector Qualification." It is the use of qualified inspectors and their feedback of field observation to the rest of the NRC staff and the licensee that makes the program successful.

The program identifies areas to be inspected but does not limit the inspector to just completing the inspection procedure requirements. Inspectors frequently identi fy areas of interest to pursue beyond those called for by the program that they feel require additional inspection effort in order to make a safety finding. For an inspectnr to pursue these independent areas, the Inspection program provides for a 20% independent inspection effort. This e f fort is exclusive of the prescribed routine inspection and reactive effort but is included in the total inspection manpower effort calculated for each inspector.

Inspection procedures identi fy those steps and actions that shou!d be considered by an inspector in the evaluation of the functional area inspected before a determination can be made that the f acility is being operated in a safe manner. The inspection l requirements imposed on the inspector are not necessarily the i

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( same requirements NRC places on a licensee and it is not implied nor intended that the inspection program requirements be levied on the ifcensee. Any atterhpt to en force inspection program requirements on the licensee that are not regulatory r:quirements constitutes misf aterpretation of NRC inspection philosophy and misuse of inspection procedures. ,

1.2.4 Evaluations by the Institute of Nuclear Power Goerations The licensee's facility and operations are also evaluated by personnel of the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO).

INPO teams periodically conduct formal evaluations of utility corporate involvement a.nd plant operations. Several months after INPO personnel have an exit meeting, an evaluation report is completed and is available onsite for NRC review. The evaluation report includes the licensee's planned corrective actions in response to INPO findings. The INPO evaluation report normally requests that the licensee submit a letter to INPO within six months to report on the status of actions taken in response to the evaluation report. When each of there documents become available onsite, they are reviewed by the Senior Resident Inspector. In addition, they are reviewed by the Regional Project Section Chief and/or Branch Chief during routine visits to the site.

Since INPO has its own system for obtaining member corrective actions, NRC's role in pursuing correction of the INPO evaluation findings primarily involves those potentially significant safety problems for which NRC has responsibility. This means that NRC does not systematically followup on the timeliness and adequacy of licensee actions taken in response to specific INPO findings.

If, however, NRC review of the documents reveals specific '

information that could substantially affect nuclear safety in the l

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short term, the matter is pursued by the NRC. Given the general nature of most INPO findings and INPO's review and acceptance of .

corrective actions as described in evaluation reports, NRC specific followup activities are rarely needed. I f, however, NRC review of the INPO dccumentation raises questions,. the resident inspector or regional supervisor, with agreement of the Regional Administrator, requests the licensee to describe what followup has been performed. All specific followup actions and the results of any information requests are documented.

1.2.5 Reactive Inspections The inspection program has a reactive element in addition to the routine element. The reactive element of the inspection program is that which the name implies--it is the response or reaction to some influence outside the defined and described routine inspection program. Sometimes, the reactive element is 2videnced by an indepth evaluation in response to an event, alienation, or a problem identified at the plant. <

Experience has shown that when the reactive effort is added to the routine effort, the available manpower resources are often exceeded. For that reason, a priority system for pe rforming inspections was developed that places the highest emphasis on those matters most closely linked to operational sa fety. The priority system is based on the resu?ts of the systematic assessment of liceasee performance (SALP) program.

1 1.2.6 The SALP proaram l

The SALP program is an integrated NRC staff effort that collects l available observations and data on an annual basis and evaluates I licensee performance by utilizing these data and observations. ,

The integrated systematic assessment is intended to be i

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( sufficiently diagnostic as to provide a rational basis for allocating NRC resources and to provide meaningful guidance to licensee management.

In the SALP program, functional areas of the licensee's program are reviewed and the licensee's performance in these areas is rated by three categories, as follows:

Category 1 - A combination of attributes which demonstrates achievement of superior safety performance.

Category 2 - A combination of attributes which demonstrates achievement of satisfactory safety performance.

Category 3 - A combination of attributes which demonstrates achievement of only minimally satisfactory performance.

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The priority system established to allocate inspectinn progr6m resources in various functional areas is based on dividing the inspection program into three parts: minimum, basic, and supple-mental. The results of the SALP assessment provide the basis for ,

determining which part to use.

l In a SALP functional area rated Category 1 the minimum program is I conducted. Performance of the basic or supplemental program is not required; however, areas where a negative trend is identified are eldgible for enhanced inspections selected from the basic program. If a licensee's facility, overall or per functional area, is rated as Category 1 for two consecutive SALP program periods, the basic program is conducted at the site in addition to the minimum progran during the third SALP program period.

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In SALP functional areas rated Category 2 the basic program is conducted in addition to the minimun, program. Inspection effort is modified according,1y (increased or decreased) for areas where either positive or negative trends in the licensee's performance are identified.

In SALP functional areas rated Category 3, all, or part, of the supplemental program is conducted in addition to the basic and minimum programs. Supplemental procedures aro based on deficiencies identi fied in the SALP process and/or performance indicators. Areas where significant improvements are under way and a positive trend is indicated may be considered for performance of just the minimum and basic programs.

For facilities that have rece!ved new operating licenses, at least the minimum and basic programs are conducted until two postlicensing SALP evaluations have been completed. .

These program requirements establish a baseline routine inspection program that concentrates attention on poor performance areas while maintaining a minimum level of inspection coverage in all areas. It is not intended that the baseline progran preclude enhanced inspections in any functional area where weaknesses have been identified, nor is it intended to preclude reduced inspection ef forts for areas where significant improvements are under way and a positive trend has been identified. For example, while a facility may have been rated as a Cat gory 2 in Operations, declining performance overall or in a particular area of operations may require increased inspection attention during the current SALP evaluation period. Similarly, a facility could have been rated as a Category 3 in an area where significant improvements are under way to such an extent that l inspection effort may be reduced to the basic program.

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The determination of the total inspection e f fort required to complete each inspection phase is difficult to predict. The reactive inspection effort is applicable to all inspection programs, but, as expected, appears most often in the operations phase. The amount of inspection effort that will be required for each reactive event is not known in advance. In addition to this, inspection effort for the operations phase can vary depending on the mixture of minimum, basic, and supplemental programs being used.

Since tHe effort can have a large variance between sites within a given region, the region and NRC headquarters must work closely with each other to ensure adequate inspection effort for all facilities within the total inspection resources available.

1.3 INSPECTION PROGRAM CONTENT

( The light water reactor (LWR) inspection program applies to all classes of LWRs regardless of the nuclear steam system supplier or Architect / Engineer. The program is divided into six discrete phases of inspection activity. The six phases of inspection activity are described in NRC inspection manual IMC 2511 through IMC 2516, which are titled as follows:

IMC 2511 - LWR Inspection Program - Preconstruction Permit Phase IMC 2512 - LWR Inspection Program - Construction Phase IMC 2513 - LWR Inspection Program - Preoperational Testing and Operational Preparedness Phase IMC 2514 - LWR Inspection Program - Startup Testing Phase IMC 2515 - LWR Inspection Program - Operations Phase IMC 2516 - LWR Inspection Program - Decommissioning and Dismantling Phase

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y 1.3.1 Preconstruction Permit Phase The preconstruction permit phase would be applicable to a nuclear power plant and would start from the time NRC receives formal notification of the utility's intentions to butid a nuclear power plant and would continue up to the time a construction permit is issued. The preconstruction permit inspection program would be applicable to the utility (applicant), the service consultant to the applicant, and the constructor organization and includes those activities that relate to the health and safety of the public. These activities are described by the quality assurance program (QA) required in the application for a construction pe rmi t. Principal areas covered by the inspection program ins:lude the establishment, execution and administration of the QA program relating to the activities associated with the development of the .,

safet.* analysis report (SAR), design, procurement, and const- tion. Where the performance and/or surveillance of nuclea. swer pit.nt site construction a'ctivities are contracted to the architect / engineer, vendor, or nuclear steam system supplier organizations, the QA program i s applicable to the site-related activities conoucted by the construction divisions of these organizations.

The principal objective of the program i s to ensure that the technical quality and &dministrative requirements and the activities important to health and safety are effectively imclemer,ted during the design, procurement and preliminary construction activities at the nuclear power plant.

1.3.2 Construction phase Imolementation of the construction phase program includes evaluation of the adequacy of licensee performance during construction, portions of this phase of the program are also

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used during major plant modifications. The construction phase program is accomplished by determining licensee effectiveness in '

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identi fying conditions that may adversely affect operational safety and in achieving ' compliance with NRC requirements and licensee commi tment s'. This determination provides sufficient information to establish a basis fot - making recommendations

, relative to the issuance of an operating license.

1.3.3 Precoerational Testing and Operational preparedness Phase The preoperational testing and operational preparedness phase program becomes effective approximately 24 months before the issuance of the operating Itcense. It includes those activities directed toward operational rehdiness of the plant and coincides with the final portions of the construction phase inspection program. Initial phases of the startup testing program also overlap the latter phases of this program. The general J

requirements identified are applicable to both boiling water reactor (BWR) and pressurized water reactor (PWR) facilities; however, the detailed inspection procedures in some cases differ depending on the type of facility. The requirements identified in this inspection program are normally completed before issuance of an operating license.

The purpose of this program is to verify through direct observation, personnel interviews, and review of facility records that (1) systems and components important to the safety of the plant are fully t0sted to demonstrate that they sati s fy their design requirements, (2) management controls and procedures, including quality assurance programs, necessary for operation of the facility have been documented and -implemented, and (3) the plant staff has transitioned from a construction activity to an operational activity, and is ready 'to operate the plant safely.

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i 1.3.4 Startuo Testina l

..The startup testing phase of the inspection program becomes-effe.tive approximately six months before issuance of the

operating license.and continues approximately two years after the facility completes the full-power testing program and: all test results have been reviewed and accepted. This inspection effort overlaps inspection activities associated with plant operating activities and with preoperational testing and operational preparedness activities.

The basis for the licensee's startup testing program is contained ,

in NRC Regu*.a to ry Guide 1.68, "Initial Test Programs for Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants." Chapter 14 of the licensee's Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) and the NRC Safety Evaluation Report (SER) contain the specifics of the licensee's program for testing in four areas. Thesa are:

(1) initial fuel loading and precritical tests, -

(2) initial criticality, (3) low power tests (tests generally conducted at power levels of less than 5%), and (4) power ascension tests (tests conducted at power levels greater than 5%).

The startup testing inspection program examines the results of tests in each of these areas. !

The startup testing program verifies througn .,pection that all 4 l required tests have been successfully performed and that the f desired test results have been achieved.

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4 t 1.3.5 Ocarations phase The operations phase program is implement *d when an operating license or fuel-loading authorization is issued for the facility.

Portions of the LWR inspection program for the startup phase are also conducted during the initial operation af a facility. The inspection program for preoperational testing and operational preparedness is completed or close to completion by the time this procedure is in effect.

Thi's inspection program remains in effect until the facility license is significantly modified to reflect a deactivated status or the facility is decommissioned. In either case, the licensee, must submit infermation to the Office of Nuclear Reactor Reculation (NRR) describing its plans for achieving the desired status. Following approval by NkR, the licensee's application ,

provides the basis for the development of specif t: NRC inspection

[ activides for the work. required to achieve a deactivated status or a decommissioned status.

1.3.6 Decommissionine phase The inspection program for the decommissioning phase is being developed. The requirements for this program will implement the policy and decisions made by NRC regarding the methodology to be used for decommissioning a plant to estabiish a final plant j decommissioned status.

i 1.4 PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT Ouring the early years of the inspection program, minimal l inspection detail was provided for the inspector. T'it inspection l program was basically predicated on hiring inspectors with five years or more experience in reactor operation or in the construction field and allowing them to perform inspections based 1-13

on their experience. During that period, the inspection program .

identified general areas of safety concerns to be inspected with a minimum amount of wr'itten instructions.

As experience and the number of plants and inspectors increased, it became apparent that the program, as it was being implemented, was not providing consistent inspection among the inspectors implementing the program or among the regions. In the middle 1970s a decision was made to rewrite the inspection program to provice more inspection detail to ensure uniformity of inspection effort for each nuclear facility regardless of the region in which it was located The inspection program that is used today has undergone many revisions from that first effort, such as the addition of the resident inspector and the three levels of inspection effort in the operations program. However, the basic concernoftheprogram$sstillthe same.

When the inspection program received its first major revision to incorporate more inspection details, the reaction from the i

'nspectors tended to be negative because l't appeared to them that their ability to inspect areas within their expertiso was limited by a program th:t appeared to be prescriptive and detailed. This gave the impression that inspecting was now being done by a "cook book" method that did not consider the experience and background of the inspector. This was not and is not the case. The rregram developers acknowledged that the inspection program needs to provide latitude for the inspector. For this reason, as noted previously, the inspection procedures should be viewed only as guidance to be considered by the inspector while conducting the inspection. In addition the inspection program provides for 20%

of an insoectors time to be used for independent inspection effort, including time to inspect in areas where it is felt inspection time is needed to determine whether or not a problem I exists.

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CHAPTER 2 PERSONAL CONOUCT OF INSPECTORS I

2.1 PRESERVATION OF CREDIBILITY AND INTEGRITY Preservation of personal credibility and integrit. . as well as that of NRC as an organizatior., requires objective, professional conduct. Improper conduct and situations that create the appearance of impropriety must be avoided.

The personnel policies of NRC require that the character, associations, and loyalty of employees be of high order.

Employee conduct and self-discipline, both on and off the job, must measure up to the highest standards.

( The justification for this policy was best stated on April 27, 1962, by President Kennedy in a message to Congress on ethical conduct in the Government, wherein he said: "No responsibility of Government is more important than the responsibility of maintaining the highest standards of ethical behavior by those who conduct the public business. There can be no dissent from the principle that all officials must act with unswerving integrity, absolute impartiality, and complete devotion to the public interest. This principle must be followed not only in reality but in appearance. For the basis of effective Government is public confidence, and that confidence is endangered when ethical standards falter or appear to falter. . ,"

"The ultimate answer to ethical problems in Government is her.est people in a good ethical environment. No web of statutes or regulation, however intricately cor.ceived, can hope to deal with 2-1

the myriad of possible challenges to a man's integrity or his devotion to the public interest. Nevertheless, formal regulation is required - regulation which can lay down clear guidelines of policy, punish venality and double dealing, and set a general ethical tone for the conduct of public business."

In reading the regulations and policies set forth here inspectors must remain mindful that it is their responsibility to know;and comply with these rules. Therefore, if an inspector has any doubt whether a contemplated action may be a violation, there is responsibilfty to consult the applicable statutes or seek guidance from an immediate supervisor or a counselor. It is the position of NRC management that, in addition to the legal requirements established in 10 CFR 0, "Conduct of Employees,"

employees must be attentive to the high standards of integrity expected in all their activities, personal or official, and conduct themselves in a manner to create and maintain respect for the NRC and the U. S. Government.

2.2 GUIDING PRIhCIPLES On May 8, 1965, Executive Order 11222 was issued, in which general standards for the ethical conduct of government employees are stated. The Executive Order provides for the reporting of employment and financial interests of employees in certain government positions and authorizes the heads of agencies to issue appropriate agency regulations. In issuing regulations the agency heads are further directed to provide exceptions, as may be appropriate, to individual employees dependent on the duties and responsibilities of their work. The Executive Order also authorizes agencies to further restrict certain employee transactions as viewed in relation to the special circumstances of the agency's mission; for example, stock ownership restrictions, i

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(- Congress has also expressed its views ' en the general guidelines. ,

go,*cnment employees should follow in ths conduct of their business in a "Code of Ethics for Government Services." The key provisions of this Code state:

"Any person in Government service should:

1. Put loyalty to the highest moral principles and to country above loyalty to persons, party, or Government department.

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2. Uphold the Constitution, laws, and legal Regulations of the United States and of all governments therein and never be a party .to their evasion.

3. Give a full day's labor for a full day's pay; giving to the performance of his duties his earnest effort and best thought.

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4. Seek to find and employ more efficient and economical ways of getting tasks accomplished.

5. Never discriminate unfairly by the dispensing of special favors or privileges to anyone, whether for remuneration er ,

not; and never accept, for himself or his family, favors or benefits under circumstances which might be construed by ,

reasonable persons as influencing the performance of his '

i governmental duties.

6. Make no private promises of any kind binding upon the duties of office, since a Gwerment employee has no private word which can be binding on public duty, i

7. Engage in no business with the Government, either directly

or indirectly, which is inconsistent with the conscientious pe rfo rmanc. of his government duties.

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8. Never use any faformation coming to him confidentially in ,

, the performance of government duties as a means of making a o

private profit.

9. Expose corruption inherever discovered.

10. Uphold these prfnciples, ever conscious that.public office is a pubite trust."

In addition to Executive Order 11222 and the Code of Ethics, the Ethics in Government Act sets forth both civil and criminal sanctions for violating specified standards of employee conduct.

NRC has also set forth general principles to guide inspector conduct. An inspector shall avoid any action, whether or not specifically prohibited by 10 CFF Part 0, which might result in, or create the apoearance of:

1. using a public office for private gain; 1

2. giving preferential treatment to any person;

3. impeding government efficiency or economy; l

j 4 losing independence or impartiality;

5. making a government decision outside officia1' channels; or !

6. affecting adversely the confidence of the public and the '

integrity of the government. (Ref. 10 CFR 0.735-49(a)) i J

j General standards of conduct are further outlined in the NRC j l inspection manual in IMC 0235, "Conduct of Employees", and IMC 0237, "Supplemental Statement on Conduct of Employees for ]

Resident inspectoPs", Further guidance and rules have been established at the regional level and the inspector must consult i

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( the applicable regional instructions.

The authorization for '

these additional rules and policy restrictions are established by Executive Order 11222, which, as stated above, allows ag;ncies to issue more restrictive regulations if required under the circumstances to accomplish the mission of the agency.

2.3 SPECIFIC GUIDANCE NRC regulations set forth specific standards for the receipt of gifts and favors, outside employment, financial interests, the use of government property, future employment, postemployment, the misuse of information, indebtedness, gambling, and other matters related to both conflict of interest and employee conduct. Many of the NRC regulations are based on government wide standards that can be found in 18 U.S.C. 201-209 and 5 CFR 735. It is important to realize that the intentional violation of many of these standards carries criminal sanctions.

( Inspectors a t, therefore, advised to consult freely with supervisors or counselors.

2.3.1 , Gifts. Entertainment and Favors t

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Employtes are prohibited from soliciting or accepting, directly i or indirectly, any gift, gratuity, favor, entertainment, loan, or .

any other thing of monetary value, from a person who (1) has, or is seeking to obtain, contractual or other businass or financial relations with NRC; (2) conducts opera:1ons or activities that are regulated by NRC or i, an applicant for a license from NRC; or (3) has an interest that may be substar.tially affected by the performance or nonperformance of the employees' of ficial duties. >

i (See 10 CFR 0.735-42, "Gifts, Entertainment and Favors ").

There are exceptions to this general prohibition of ac:epting gifts. For example, accepting a gift is permitted when the

' circumstances surrounding the giving of a gift make it clear that i

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it is a family or personal relationship, rather than a business ,

relationship, which is the motivating factor for a gif t. The fact a friend of long standing works at the plant where you are the resident inspector would not preclude you from accepting a gift from 'him if it was clearly motivated by your social relationship rather than your position as an inspector.

Management policy instructions are not intanded to prohibit the continuation of friendships and other normal social activities.

To avoid embarrassment or false allegations to either the

, individuals involved or NRC, the immediate supervisor should 'be informed in writing, of any unusual social relationship that constitutes a real or apparent conflict of interest for. an employee.

The regulations provide that acceptance of food and refreshments of nominal value on infrequent occasions in -the ordinary course of a luncheon or dinner meeting, or other meeting or an inspection where an employee is p'roperly in attendance is not prohibited. (See 10 CFR 0.735-42 (b)(2)) This, however, is an area in which management policy is more strict for inspectors. ,

Since inspectors, bt.cause of their uni be positiens, have day-to-day contact with those NRC regulatePs, inspectors must avoid situations that may appear to influence NRC decisions. As

, a matter of policy, therefore, inspectors should avoid the ,

acceptance of anything.

The acceptance of free transportation from a licensee or other 4

person doing business with NRC is prohibited by the regulations to the extent it might reasonably be interpreted as seeking to influence the impartiality of the emplof te or the agency. (See 10 CFR 0.735-42(c)) Kare again, the policy with respect to inspectors is more strict; inspectors shall not join car pools l with either licensee or contractor employees.

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,,,,n, , , , ,,e. ,-, , , . . . -, . - - , - . , . , - . - . . -.+w- . , . - ,

( Within NRC, an employee shall not solicit another employee for a gif t to an official superior, make a donation to a gif t for an official superior, or ' accept a gift from an employee receiving less pay than himself. .(See 10 CFR 0.735(d) and 5 U.S.C. 7351) A ,

voluntary gift of nominal value or a donation in a nominal amount 4 made on a special occasion, such as a marriage, illness, or ;

retirement, is, however, permitted. An employee shall not r

directly or indirectly solicit from, e.ccept from, offer. to, or grant to an official superior or subcrdinate employee a loan of more than a nominal amount. Here igain, however, a loan of more ;

than a nominal amount that is based on a special personal or business relationship is not prohibited with prior approval of [

the higher ranking employee's supervisor. In these situations the inspector should consult with the appropriate counselor.

Finally, an empicyee shall net accept a gift, present, decoration or other thing valued at greater, than $165.00 from a foreign government or international organization.

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2.3.2 Outside Emoloyment and Other Outside Activities 'i There is no general prohibition against an inspector engaging in outside employment or other outside activity. The employee should know, however, that when employed oy NRC the emoloyee cannot:

1. accept outside employment that impairs mental or physical capacity to perform the NRC job; ,

4 2. accept fees for public lectures, appearances, or publication of books and articles if the activity is performed as part ;

of official duties and/or the information was prepared or presented during official working hours; 1-L I

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,_ ______y. .y _,,r, - _ _, ._.,.,_., ,,. ., ., - - - , -

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3. accept any fee, compensation, gift payment or expense, or anything of monetary value in circumstances in which acceptance may result in, or create the appearance of, a conflict of interest; and 4 accept employment with or do consulting services for any company or organization that is closely related to any activity licensed or regulated by NRC.

NRC empicyees are, however, permitted and encouraged to teach, lecture and write within the provisions of the law. (See. 10 CFR 0.735-40)

In any case where there is a question as to the propriety of outside employment in which an inspector proposes to engage, or where prior written authorization is required by the rules, the Regional Administrator .must submit a memorandum to the Executive Director for Operations seeking his concurrence in permitting the outside activity. (See 10 CFR 0.735-40(b)) The memorandum should cover such information as the inspector's current job title, a ;

brief st,mma ry of the inspector's official duties, a brief description of the proposed employment or outside activity, and the Regional Administrator's view of whethar the outside employment or activity should be authorized.

On a related matter, employees are prohibited from receiving any salary or anything of monetary value from an outside source as compensation for services to the government. In essence, an inspector cannot be paid from any source but the U. S. Treasury for performing his normal duties. Inspectors should be aware 1

that there are criminal provisions which prohibit receiving any salary as compensation for services performed as a government I employeo from any source other than the United States. (See 18 U.S.C. 209) l l

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i Criminal law also prohibits a government employ 6e from acting as ,

a representative for any person or organization presenting c141ms, contracts or' other particular matters 'in which the

-Government has any interest. (See 18 U.S.C. 203 and.205)

Exceptions are provided whereby a government employee may act as an attorney or agent for a person who is subject to disciplinary, loyalty or other administrative proceedings, provided the action is not in conflict with the performance of normal duties and is provided without compensation. This prohibition also does not prohibit representing parents, spouse or child, or anyone - else served as legal guardian. It also does not prohibit providing testimony in proceedings in which the government has an interest, so long as that testimony is limited to facts learned on opinions held while an NRC employee, t

2.3.3 ' Financial Interest 2.3.3.1 Prohibited Securities Generally speaking, a government employee may not participate personal l'yandsubstantiallyasagovernmentemployeeinamatter

) in which the employee has a financial interest. Forbidding '

certain employees from having a financial interest in listed prohibited companies is the principal means whereby NRC assures that its employees do not have a financial interest in those they '

regulate. Commissioners, and certain employees who occupy 4

positions at or above salary grade GG-13' or its equivalent, and l the spouse, minor children or other members of the immediate household of Commissicners or covered employees, are not i permitted to own any stocks, bonds or other security interests t issued by: '

4 2-9

1. Publicly or privately owned utilities that have (a) filed an application with the Commission requesting an early site

review, (b) sought authorization to construct or operate a facility for the generation of electric energy by means of a nuclear reactor or (c) received a construction permit or an i operating license from the Commission that currently is ineffectivo.

2. State or local governments, if the primary purpose of thw security is to finance the construction or operation of a nuclear reactor.

3. Companies manufacturing or selling nucIvar power or test reactors.

4. Architectural engineering companies that have (a) been engaged by an applicant for a construction permit or for en operating license to provide services relating to a nuclear ;

facility or (b) filed a standard reference design that is under Commission review or has been approved by the

.- Commission and currently is ineffective.

f, 5. r s Companies licensed by the Commission to mill, convert, enrich, fabricate, store oc dispose of source or special nuclear material, or applicants for such licenses, i

This stock ownership prohibition also applies to individuals below the salary grade GG-13 level who provide input into the NRC ,

decisionmaking process, such as NRC inspectors. If there are questions as to whether employees are covered by this '

prohibition, they should consult a counselor. .

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Each spring the Office of the General Counsel (OGC) provides to ,

all employees a Itsting of those specific companies in which employees are prohibited from having a fintncial interest. An inspector covered by this- prohibition and members of the immediate family must divest themselves of any stocks, bonds and j

securities in any of the prohibited companies within 30 days of employment, with NRC. Also, if the inspector or a member of the immediate family acquires any interest in any of these companies

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through gif ts, inheritance or other similar involuntary manMr that interest must be disposed of as soon as possible. If it is l not possible to immadiately dispose of the interest, a counseler should be contacted.

Employees and family members covered by the stock ownership restrictions may not purchase prohibited securities for their Individual Retireu nt Accounts. Employees may, however, own shares in diversified mutual funds that contain such stocks in their portfolio. ,

l 2.3.3.2 Other Financial Interests

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A procedure exists for the granting of exemptions to the restrictions on ownership of securities. An employee should not, however, expect to be granted an exemption unless very unusual I

circumstances are involved and it can be determined that the divestiture of the stocks, bonds, or securities is definitely ,

inequitable. Financial loss is not considered an acceptable '

reason for granting an exemption. For example, exemptions are 1

typically granted if an employee has a vested pension in a ,

prohibited company. The Office of the General Counsel has i

reviewed numerous pension funds and if OGC determines that the amount the employee is entitled to under the pension cannot be affected by the performance of the company an exemption will be !

, granted tnd the inspot. tor will not be pro.1bited from advising 1

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the Commission on matters af fecting the prohibited company. A list of the pension funds that have been reviewed is available to counselors. They should be contacted if there are questions in this area.

A further example in which an inspector may be eligible for an exemption is where there is an interest in an ESOP (Employee Stock Option Plan) or TRAE50P (Tax Reduction Act Employee Stock Option Plan) account; these are accounts where the inspector, as a former employee of a prohibited company, is eligible to obtain ownership of restricted stocks, bonds or securities to be issued at some future date. The inspector is eligible to acquire such securities, but upon receipt of the securities must dispose of them in a rettonable time.

The prohibition against owning certain prohibited stocks is set forth in 10 CFR 0.735-29. This provision should not be confuser with the prohibition of 10 CFR 0.735-21, whien brohibits en employee from participating personally and substantially as a government of ficer through any decision in any manner concerning

company in which he has a financial interest. The point is that an employee may own an unlimited amount of . stocks, bonds, b

and other security interests in companies not falling within the classification of prohibited securities set; forth above, but may not participate as an NRO employee in matters affecting any such entity if the employee's current holdings in that company exceed

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$1,000 or constitute more than one percent of the dollar value of the outstanding shares of the company. A lesser interu t is considered remote or inconsequential and would not precltde an employee from advising the Commission concerning that entity.

An employee also may not participate in matters affecting the financial interest of any organization in which he or she serves as an officer, director, trustee, pa rtne.r or employee, or in matters in which the employee's spouse, minor child or partner has a financial interest.

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2.3.4 future Employment Restrictions Inspectors are prohibited from representing NRC to a prospective employe= or on any natter in which the prospective employer has a financial interest. This restriction applies beginning with the

. Initial solicitat!cn and continues until negotiations break off.

This restriction does not prevent an employee frool seeking employment with organizations that have dealings with NRC.

Employees cannot, however, perform their job functions as ,

repre*,entatives of NRC with the prospective employer during employment discussions. In either case, if the employeo solicits, negotiates, or is approached by the licensee, the employee must stek relief from inspection responsibility for the

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potential emol oyer. Manager.ient policy regarding future employment rcquires the supervisor to relieve the employee of conflicting assignments as eariy as practicable. Inspectors mst

remain tensitive to the need to inform management at the earliest possible t'me concerning solicitation or negotiation with

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licensnes or other entities involved in the nuclear industry so P

that s :y assi.;nment relative to that prospective employer can be avoided. Inspectors do not have the luxury to wait to see hw negotiattors are progressing before they advise management. This ,

policy is designe( to assure the credibility of both the inspector and the regulatory process.

2.3.5 postemoloyrfnt Restrictions ,

A question frequently arises regteding restrictions on contacts with NRC by former NRC employees. The rule essentially precludes j a former employee from switching sides and then appearing again before the federal governinent. (See 18 U.S.C. 207) The restrictions imposed by the Ethics in Government Act fall into three categories:

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1. There is a permanent ban on acting as another person's representative (basically making any written or cral .

communication with intent to influence the Federal Government) to the' Government on any case, contract, application or other particular matter involving a specific party if the former employee participated personally or substantially with regard to the matter while employed by NRC.

2. There is a two year ban en such representation involving particular matters and specific parties oc matters tnat actuall'y were pending under the former employee's official responsibility within one year prior to termination of that responsibility.

3. "Mt employees classified as salary grades SES or GG-17 or above are subaect to more restrictive conditions, including (a) a two year prohibition on giving assistance in the representation of anyone other than the United States if that assistance involves personal presence at any formal or -

informal appearance and is in connectics with any particular matter involving a specific party in which he or she participated personally and substantially while a government employee, as well as (b) a one year ban on contacting NRC with intent to influence agency action on any mattoes pending before, or of substantial interest to, the agency.

The Executive Director for Operations (EDO) may exempt a former employee from these restrictions to permit the individual to communicate scientific or technological information to NRC. !

i Detailed regulations on how to secure the ELO's approval were premulgatec recently by the Commission. (See 10 CFR 0.735-26(e)) !

1 The postemployment restrictions are explained in greater detail in the regulations promulgated by the Office of Personnel Management in 5 CFR 737. {

NRC also has promulgated administrative j 2-14 1

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( pror'dures to enforce these postempicyment restrictions. They have been published as NRC Manual Chapter 4124, "Conduct of Employees," Appendix Part VI.

The regulations do not address 'the reverse of this problem; that is, when a current NRC emploieg is called upon to advise the Commission on matters affecting a former employer. As a attter of policy, however. inspectors are precluded from advising the Commission on matters they were personally and substantially involved in while employed by a company regulated by NRC.

2.3.6 Use of Government property

, An inspector shall not directly or indirectly use, or allow the use of, government property of any kind, indluding property leased to the government, for other than officially approved activities. An employee has a positive duty to protect and

[ conserve government property, _ including equipment, supplies, and other property entrusted or issued to him. (See 10 CFR 0.735-43)

Perhaps the best example of this . prohibition is the use of government automobiles while on travel status. The U. S. Code (31 U.S.C 638k'c)T and NRC Manual Chapter 1501, Part III require that governmers vehicles not be used for other than the intended purpose; that is to provide transportation for the offit:ial use of government amployaes only. For an inspector this prohibition means that government vehicles will be used only for travel to and from a site for the purpose of attending an inspection, investigation, meeting or other official dealing with a licensee.

An example of how misuse of a government vehicle may easily occur is when an efaployee has permission to keep a government vehicle at home snd drives a child to schsol in the morning, even though the school is on the norm 41 route. Conversely, while in travel status, use of a government vehicle is permitted to attend ,

church.

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Other common example of the improper use of government property for personal reasons include using government envelopes for personal letters, photocopy- equipment for personal matters, telephones for personal long-distance calls, and computers or

~ord n processors for personal matters.

2.3.7 Misuse of Information For purposes of furthering a private interest, an employee may not directly or indirectly use, or allow the use of, official information obtained through or in connection with government employment which has not been made available to the general public. (See 10 CFR 0.735-41) For example, an inspector is prohibited from advicing a licensee of the internal NRC deliberations relative to an enforcement matter concerning that lkensee to the extent it has not been otherwise made pubite or providing internal documents to the public without management j approval.

2.3.8 Inriebtedne s s '

NRC, considers the credit affairs of its employees essentially their own concern. Employees are expected, bewever, to conduct their credit affairs in a manner that does not reflect adversely on the government as their employer. NRC will not be placed in a ;

position of acting as a collection agency for private debts or of determining the validity or amount of contested debts to private concerns. An employee is expected to pay each just financial !

I obligation in a proper and timely manner, especially one imposed by law. Failure on the part of an enioloyee without good reason l

to honor a just financial obligation or to make or adhere to l satisfactory arrangements for settlement may be cause for i i

disciplinary actions. (See 10 CFR 0.735-45 for a definition of l

what constitutes a Just financial obligation) l 2-16

C. 2.3.9 Gamblino Bettino and lotteries While on government owned or leased property, or while on duty for the government, an employee is prohibited from participating -

in any gambling activity, thcluding the operation of a gambling device, conducting a lottery or pool, participating in a game for money or property, or in sel'.ing or purchasing numbers slips or tickets.

2.4 OTHER, RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED BY FEDERAL LAW ON EMPLOYEE CONOUCT In the previous sections certain statutes and NRC requirements regarding employee conduct are discussed. Other rules and statutory laws pertinent to conduct and ethical behavior are li;ted below, and additional guidelines may be found in 10 CFR 0.735-30:

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1. Prohibitions against disclosure of confidential information. '

i (Ref. 18 U.S.C. 1905)

2. Prohibitions against prescribed political activities. (Ref.

NRC Manual Chapter 4122, "Political Activity")

3. Prohibitions against bribery of public officials. (Ref.18

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U.S.C. 201)

4. Prohibitions against misuse of a Government vehicle. (Ref. '

31 U.S.C. 638a(c))

5. Prohibitions against fraud or false statements in Government 4

matters. (Ref. 8 U.S.C.1001) i j l

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6. Prohibitions against mutilating or destroying public records. (Ref.18 U.S.C. ' 2071) -

7. Prohibitions against making false entries in official records. (Ref.18 U.S.C. 2073)

Enployees of NRC are obligated to acquaint thecselves with these additional statutory provisions as a condition of poployment.

2.5 EMPLOYEE PARTICIPATION IN POLIf! CAL ACTIVITIES All employees of NRC should acquaint themselves with NRC Manual Chapter 4122, "Political Activity," in which detailed exp1& nations are provided regarding those political activities permitted in the exercise of the individual's. rights as a citizen and those that are prohibited under applicable law and ,

regulations.'

The following information provides a general understanding of the political "do's" and "don'ts" of a federal employee.

An employee of NRC may not:

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1. Use official authority or influence for the purpose of .

interfering with or affecting the results of sn election, i

2. Take an ective p&rt in political management or in a t

i political campaign, except as permitted by law or regulation,

3. .

Serve as an officer of a political party, a member of a national, state or local committee of a political party, an officer or a member of a committee of c partisan political club, or be a cancidat' f;r any of these positions. !

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4, Become involved in organizing or reorganizing a political' party organization or political club.

5. Get involved directly or indirectly with soliciting, receiving, collecting, handling, disbursing, or accounting for assessments, contributions, or other funds for a partisan political purpose or in connection with a partisan election. e

6. Organize, sell tickets.to, seek support for, or actively participate in a fund-raising activity of a political party or political club.

7. Take an active part in managing the political campaign of a candidate for public office or political party office.

8. Be a candidate for, or campaign for, an elective pubite office in a partisan election.

9. Take an active part in an organized solicitation of votes in support of or in oppositten to a candidate for public office or political party office.

10. Act as recorder, watcher, r:ballenger, or similar officer at i the polls on behalf of a political party or candidate in a ;

partisan election.

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11. Drive voters to the polls on behalf of a political party or a candidate in a partisan election.

12. Endorse or oppose a candidate in a partisan election in a political advertisement, a broadcast, campaign literature, or similar material.

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13. Serve as a delegate, alternate, or proxy to a political -

party convention.

14. Address a State or national conventton or caucus, or a rally or similar gathering of a political party in support of or '

in opposition to a candidate for public or political party office or on a partisan political question,

16. Initiate or circulate a nominating petition for a candidate in a partisan election.

An employee of 'RC N may:

1. Vote and express opinions on political subjects and candidates.

2. Otsplay political pictures, stickers, badges, or buttons.

3. Participate in the nonpartisan activities of a civic, community, social, lab'or, or profession >;l organization, or of a similar organization.

4 Attend political conventions, rallies, fund-rai:ing functions, or other political gatherings,

5. Sign a political petition as an individual citizen.

6. Make a financial contribution to a political party organization.

7. Take an active part as an independent candidate in a -

partisan election.

8. Take an active part as a candidate or in support of a candidate in a nonpartisan election. '

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9. Be politically active in connection with a question that is not specifically identified with a political party, such as a constitutional amendment, referendum, approval of a municipal ordinance or any other question or issue of a similar character.

10. Serve as an election judge or clerk or in a similar position to perform nonpartisan duties as prescribed by state or local law.

2.6 EXAMPLES OF CONFLICT OF INTEREST SITUATIONS Examples of recent decisions by the Office of- General Counsel on conflict of interest cases are given balo'.. The facts have been changed slightly for illustrative purposes.

An NRC employee was named co-trustee of a trust established for the benefit of his parents. The employee inquired

( whether, as co-trustee, he could manage prohibited securitiss. He was advised that he could not. Either the prehibited securities should be sold or the other co-trustee (who was not an NRC employee) should be given total responsibility for the management of the prohibited stock.

2. An employee inherited prohibited stock. OGC advised the employev to divest herself of the stock within six months.

(Determinations regarding the appropriate divestiture time are made on a case-by-case basis.) Until divestiture took place, the employee was advised she could not participate in matters affecting that company.

3, An NRC employee was invited to an awards dinner hosted by a reactor vendor. The erricyee was told that he could attend if he reimbursed the vendor for the reasonable price of the dinner.

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4 An NRC employee stated that he wished to negotiate for employment with an NRC licensee. OGC edvised the employee that once he submits a resume to ',he utility he is precluded i from working on matters for the NRC affecting that ifcensee.

If negotiations ended, he could resume working on matters affecting that company. If the ecpioyee's WRC job did not require him to worv, on matters affecting the utility, he was under no obligation to infone his supervisor that he was negotiating for employment.

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5. A university licensed by NRC asked an NiC employee to give a lecture at the university. The university offered the 1 employee an honorarium. OGC advised the employee that the '

speech could be treated as one of his NRC duties, in which i case he could not accept the honorarium from the university.

Alternatively, he could accept the honorarium if he took annual leave, and received prior written authorization from the E00 to accept the honorarium.

6. A nonsupervisory NRC employee accept 6d employment with 4 i utility he Bad inspected. OGC told him that his prior NRC emplo.Wnt dW nos restrict his activities for the utility, except thtt ?,e could le t represent the utility before NRC on !

cn> enforcesert action in 'which he participated while an NRC empicyee or en e# inspection report he had helped to I

1 prepare ditring his NRC tenure.

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7. An ilRC special government employee (consultant) advised the :

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] NRC staff on seismic aspects of a particular operating j license application. Thereafter, he was hired by the l

l applicant as a consultant on quality issurance issues !

arising from the same application. In that capacity, he met l

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with representatives of the NRC staff to present the applicant's position. OGC advised the NRC consultant that he could not make further representations to NRC on behalf of !

the applicant because he previously had advised NRC on the l same application. !

8. An NRC employee is responsible for monitoring a work order >

iss'Jed by NRC to a national laboratory. The NRC employee questioned his contact at the national laboratory about

whether the laboratory had any summer employment opening for '

which the NRC employee's child might be qualified. The NRC employee was advised that since he is responsible for i monitoring the work performed by the laboratory the employment inquiry was improper because it created the .

appearance that ha was using his government position for private gain.

2.7 EMPLOYEE COUNSELING jk Nany rules that could affect an inspectors career both in and outside government are presented above. Inspectors are j encouraged to consult their supervisors at the earliest time !

concerning any questions they have concerning 10 CFR 0 or related !

l conduct matters. Inspectors should feel free to contact either their supervisors or the regional counsel directly on any matter.

Where appropriate, the Office of the General Counsel will be consulted. The rules envision that inspectors will ask questions

! early to avoid problems rather than waiting to react to a suspected problem.

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l CHAPTER 3 l l LEGAL ASPECTS OF INSPECTION 3.1 LEGAL AUTHORITY OF INSPECTORS AS AGENTS OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT Inspectors are agents of the Federal government and must understand the scope of their legal authority, confona their activities to their particular authority, and not go beyond the limits of that authority. The Federal government, in contrast to state governments, is one of express, limited powers granted by the Constitution and limited by the Bill of Rights. In framing a Federal government, the founding fathers were concerned that <

individuals and the states be free from an abusive centrally

( located Fedet al government. The balance of rights and duties -

l under Federal law is governed by statutes and not the whim of individual persons.

3.2 STATUTORY FRAMEWORK OF NRC r

NRC was created pursuant to the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, 42 U. S.C. 5801 et, seq. That Act abolished the Atomic ,

Energy Commission, whten had, among other responsibilities, both '

promotional and regulatory responsibilities, and transferred to ,

the new NRC all licensing, inspection and related regulatory functions of the Atomic Energy Commission. l t

NRC is an independent regulatory agency. As such it is not a '

part of the Executive Branch of government. As a matter of '

l~ policy, however, the agency generally abides by laws, regulations ,

l and directives that affect other executive agencies. NRC derives -

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i its authority solely from statutes enacted by Corgress. It answers to Congress, which has numerous subcommittees with .

oversight jurisdiction over NRC activities. In addition to Congressional oversight, final decisions of NRC are subject to judicial review by Federal courts.

The Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, 42 U.S.C. 2011 et.

seq., is the statute which sets forth the nuclear materials and -

fact 11 ties that must be licensed and regulated by NRC. It also requires that operators who manipulate controls of power reactors be separately licensed. The Act sets forth the basic statutory charter for licensing, inspecting and regulating nuclear material, f acilities and operators. It provi:les both civil and criminal sanctions for violations of the Act, as well as violations of the rules, regulations, license conditions, and orders issued under authority off the Act.

The Act dcas not give NRC jyrisdiction over all uses of nuclear material. For example, unle:s otherwi se provided by law,

, Department of Energy activities are not Itcensed and regulated by NRC. Also, nuclear power reactors used for defense purposes, l such as for navy ship propulsion, are not licensed and regulated by NRC. NRC is, however, responsible for the ifcensing of 00E High Level Vaste Repositories. NRC can also delegate certain of its functions to the states. The Act authorize, NRC to enter into agreements with states that meet and maintain certain j standards to permit tnese statet to regulate aspects of the use j of byproduct materials, source matarials and specisi nuclear !

materials in quantities not sufficient to form a critical mass. l I

In order for NRC to properly implement its statutory responsibil-ities, the Atomic Energy Act also authorizes NRC to exercise

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rulemaking powers. Generally speaking, wh;n NRC identifies a l reoutrement that is l generic, rul making is appropriate.

Conversely, if a requirement is unique to one or 'a limited number of licensees, an Order or Itcense cor.dition is the preferred sporoach. (See Chapter 11 for dotat15) .

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( 3.3 INSPECTION AUTHORITY AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS i

The authority of NRC inspectors to inspect facilities and :

I documents is contained in the Atomic Energy Act and the- _

a' implementing regulations. Typically, a licensee consents to NRC inspection by a condition in the license. If this consent is revoked oy the licensee, inspectors may have to acquire a search warrant prior to inspection. The question of an inspector's authority to inspect in the face of a licensee's refusal to allow ,

such inspection has many legal impilcations. Any inspector who is confronted with this situation must imediately notify the supervisor and advise the Regional Counsel. Although the

, authority to inspect is seldom questioned, licensees do attempt at times to place conditions or restrictions on inspector access .,

or freedoms once within a facility. NRC regulations require power reactor licensees to provide inspectors immediate ur. fettered access, equivalent to access provided regular plant ,

( employees, following proper identification and compliance with 4

applicable access control measures for security, radiological protection and personal safety. '

The type of inspection and investigation that NRC is authorized by the Atemic Energy Act to conduct is a civil inspection or investigation. The Act directs that criminal investigations be j referred to the Federal Bureau of Investigation for criminal 3

prosecution by the Department of Justice. If criminal wrongdoing is suspected, the inspector m:;st noti fy the supervisor i imediately.

I I

inspections take on added legal significance when an inspector i

, has to make a judgment as to whether a legally supportable I

violation has occurred. The inspector must assure that the facts ;

4 gathered establish by a preponderance of thW evidence (evidence :

showing that it is more lik$ly than not) that a violaston of a legally enforceable requirement has occurred.

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Regulations, license conditions, or conditions contained in

Orders must be applied by inspectors to a specific set of facts.

l To apply these requir'ements correctly, the language of these requirements must be carefully noted and applied exactly.

Particular attention must be given to the use of such words as "and," "or," "shall," and "may" in determining whether a

requirement exists or a noncompliance has occurred. Also, special note must be taken to det6rmine whether any words in a requirement are specifically defined in either the regulations or l l

the license. Requirements must be applied correctly in order to l support enforcement action. Should the inspector decide to recommend enforcement action, it is staff responsibility (burden of p>'cof) to have sufficient evidence to establish that it is ,

morn likely than not that a violation has occurred. This ares is more fully explored in Chapter 11, i

It should be noted that NRC Regulatory Guides do not have the force and effect of law. Therefore, an inspector cannot cite a Itcensee for his failure to follow a Regulatory Guide, unless the licensee has specifically incorporated that Regulatory Guide into the license or the Commission has incorporated that Regulatory Guide into the regulations.

NRC is aethorized tb issue civil penalties for violations of t regulations promulgated pursuant to specified licensing sections of the Act or for violations of any requirement for which a license may be revoked. The Act specifies certain situations for

l. which licenses may be revoked, but because of the limitations of the Acninistrative procedures Act, no license may be suspended or reycked without notice to the licensee and an opportunity for the licensee to correct the problem. Exceptions may oc':ur if the violation is willful or the public health, safety or interests require immediate suspension of activities.

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-( At times inspectors are contacted by lawyers or other persons L

involved in legal proceedings concerning inspection findings.

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All such contacts must be reported to the Regional Counsel. In addition, 10 CFR 9.200-204 sets forth the procedcres to be followed .when a subpoena or other demand for NRC documents >r information is issued in a proceeding in which NRC is not' s !

party. (See 10 CFR 9, "Public Records") -

4 3.4 NRC INTERACT!CN WITH OTHER FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AGENCIES AND STATES

) 1 The Federal government, as noted previously has express powers.

Similarly, the power and authority of the agencie within the Federal government are precisely defined by enabling statutes. -

I Agencies have no authority to act unless such action is expressly l provided for in a statute. As a result, a number of NRC functions ove' lap or compliment those of other agencies. Typically, f cooperdtive arrangements are made in the form of Memoranda of

] t i Understanding between agencies with overlapping jurisdiction. l r

3 cme of the more important arrangements NRC has with other i federal agancies are described below, I

j 3.4.1 Environmental Protection Acency s

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The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) establishes generally applicable environmental standards for the protection of the environment from radioactive material. NRC, on the other hand, !

retains retponsibility for the implementation and enforcement of those envicenmental standards with respect to radioactive l material. (See Memorandum of Understanding with Respect to AEC 4

(Atomic Energy Commission) Licensed Facilities, 38 Fed. Reg.

l 24936, September 11, 1973) In addition,

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NRC and EPA have '

executed a Memorandum of Understanding and Policy Statement 1

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regarding thair respective re;ponsibilities under .both the' National Environmental . Policy ' Act and the Clean Water Act for plants and activities regarding an NRC license or permit. (See 40 Fed. Reg. 60115, December 31,1975) 3.4.2 Department of Transportation The Hazardous Materials Transportation Act, 49 U. S.C. 1801 et.

seq., authorizes the- Secretary ' of < Transportation to. designate material as hazardous material and to promulgate regulations for '

the safe transportation of such material. NRC and the Department of Transportation have entered into a Memorandum of Understanding regarding their respective responsibilities in this area relative to nuclear material. The Departmens H Transportation is required to regulate safety. in tht. trans portation . of hazardous l mcterials, including nuclear material, while N'IC is authorized to I license and regulate the receipt, possession, use and tr.nsfer of nuclear material. NRC is also responsible for approving shipping casks for used (irradiatec) fuel. (See Memorandum of Understanding with the Department of Transportation on Transportation of Radioactive Material, 44 Fed. Reg. 38690, l July 2, 1979) !

l 3.4.3 Federal Emercency Manacement Acency The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) has the lead responsibility to work with state and local ~ governments on offsite emergency planning for nuclear reactors. (See Memorandum of Understanding Between FEMA and NRC Relating to Radiological-Emergency Planning and Preparedness, 45 Fed. Reg. 82713, December 16, 1980. See also 10 CFR 50.47, "Emergency Plans," for applicable standards and procedures) NRC has responsibility to make a finding on the overall adequacy of em6rgency planning (both onsite and offsite) after receiving input from FEMA.

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( 3.4.4 State Authorities The states have responsibilities that compliment, and at times conflict with, those of NRC in the area of nuclear regulation.

Such conflict has been recognized in several court decisions, most notably Pacific Gas and Electric Company v. The State Energy Resources Conservation and Development Commission of California, wherein the United States Supreme Court stated that Congress intended that the Federal government should regulate the radiological safety aspects involved in the construction and operation of nuclear power plants, but the states retain their traditional responsibility in the field of regulating electrical utilities for determinhg questions of need, reliability, costs and other related state concerns. As noted earlier, Section 274 of the Atomic Energy Act also provides . basis for NRC's Agreement State Program, which enables the states to assume the licensing and regulatory authority over source, byproduct and limited quantities of special nuclear material. Even for those C materials and facilities which under the Atomic Energy Act must be licensed and regulated exclusively by NRC, the states retain their traditional role with respect to electric generation.

In addition, the Low level Radioactive Waste Policy Act of 1980, as amended, 42 U.S.C. 2021 et. seq. , es.ablished the policy that each state is responsible for the disposal of commercial low- '

level waste generated within its borders and that such wastr san be most safely and efficiently managed on a regional basis.

3.5 ORGANIZATION OF THE LEGAL OFFICES WITHIN NRC The General Counsel directs matters of law and legal policy, and provides opinions, advice and assistance to the Commission and Staff with respect to all activities. Reporting to the General Counsel are two Deputy General Counsels and six Assistant 3-7

General Counsels responsible for specific functional areas: (1)

Adjudications and Opinions, (2) Legislation- and Governmental Relations, (3) Rulemaking and Fuel Cycle, (4) Hearings, (5)

Enforcement and, (6) Administration. For separation of functions issues, internal office communications and deci s i on.*, are coordinated at the Deputy General Cot.asel byel . That official does not pa ^1cipate in providing adjudicatory advice to the Commissioners. Otherwise the office functions as an integrated unit.

The Regional Counsel is the liaison between the regional office and the Office of the General Counsel. Should an issue arise in the course of the inspection program which requires legal consultation, the inspector must firs ^ contact the immediate supervisor and, if the supervisor agrees that legal consultation is appropriate, Regionti Counsel is consulted. The Regional Counsel assures that the appropriate lawyers within OGC are

. consulted when necessary, i

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C CHAPTER 4 PREPARATION FOR AN INSPECTION

'4.1 OBJECTIVE OF PREPARATION FOR AN INSPECTION Evaluation of the licensee's activities with regard to regulations and the terms and conditions of the license are the responsibility of the inspectors assigned to the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation or the Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards. The quality of an evaluatton is a direct function of preparation. The inspector's job is to identi fy safety problems and start the licensee toward action to correct identified problems. The objective of preparation is to provide the necessary elements that lead to effective inspec'tions.

4.2 TYPES OF INSPECTIONS 4.2.1 Announced or Jnannounced As a matter of general policy inspections are conducted on an unannounced basis to help determine that licensees are providing adequate protection of the health and safety of the public.

Regional managers may, however, authorize the performance of announced inspections for individual cases in the interest of efficiency.

4.2.2 Routine and Nonroutine Inspections The principal difference between routine and nonroutine inspections is the amount of preparation time. The inspector has opportunity to prepare in a normal manner for routine inspections

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whereas preparation time may be limited or nonexistent in the case of a nonroutine inspection. Normally, nonroutino '

inspections are made in response to an event.

l A nonroutine inspection in the materials program, for example, !

could result from a variety of causes, such as allegations or thefts or losses of significant quantities of byproduct materials.

4.2.3 Individual and Team Insoections Inspections are usually conducted by a single inspector. For large reactor programs (construction assessment, performance assessment, operational readiness), however, a team approach fs used.

4.3 SCOPE OF INSPECTION The basic scope of any type of inspection is provided in one or more inspection procedures contained in the appropriate Chapters of the NRC inspections manual. The pertinent chapters are:

IMC 2500 - Reactor Inspec* ion Program IMC 26C0 - Fuel Cycle Facility Inspection Program IMC 2700 - Licensee Contractor and Vendor Inspection Program INC 2800 - Materials Inspection Program For material license inspections, a single procedure for each type of license is sufficient to provide adequate guidance for inspections of radiography, medical, and indus^. rial or academic uses. In the case of power reactors, there are multiple inspection procedures. No single inspection incorporates all 4-2 l

possible procedures, but a schedule is developed that covers the inspections required for an entire year. A schedule window is provided for each inspection to provide the flexibility needed to adjust to various situations.

4.4 DURATION OF INSPECTION Estimating the time required for a routine inspection !s the ,

responsibility of the individual inspector or the leader of a team inspection. The inspector is responsiblq for utili;fnq time efficiently and being flexible in approaching an inspect.cr Many factors are involved in estimating the time req'.f red for an inspection, such as skill and experience of the inspector, organizational structure of the licensee, the record-keeping methods of the- licensee, and the licensee's attitude. In some cases the most cooperative licensees tend to cause the longest inspections. On the other hand, an uncooperative licensee provides minimum information, and the inspector consumes time

, searching for the required information.

For new inspectors, data is available for determining the average inspection time used for completion of routine inspections.

Observation of experienced inspectors is also beneficial because experience guides t.iem in estimating.

4.5 PREPARATION Once the type, scope and duration of the inspection have been determ'ned, it is time to prunte for an effective inspection.

Preparations begin with arranging transportation, lodging, obtaining a funds advance and gathering the materials essential for the inspectien.

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4.5.1 T,i_mi n o The inspector must determine the optimal time to conduct the inspection. Proper int'erface with licensee personnel should be considered when planning to ensure minimum impact on the licensee's activities, efficier.t use of time, and sufficient time to conduct a thorough inspection.

Prior to power reactor inspections, the inspector should contact the Resident Inspector to obtain information concerning the availability of specific licensee personnel and the status of plant conditions that may affect the planned inspection. At academic institutions the inspector should realize that during traditional vacation periods licensee personnel may not be available. In the case of industrial radiographers, it may be necessary to arrive at night to observe field activities. The important factor is to be alert to these types of problems.

4 5.2 Reference Material s 4.5.2.1 Inspection Manual In preparing for an inspection it is necessary to identify the appropriate chapter in the NRC inspection manual and prepare an inspection plan based on the procedures contained in that chapter. Each procedure is divided into three sections.Section I provides the inspection objective,Section II specifies the inspection requirements, and Section III expands on the information in Section II. The inspections specified in Section II are to be accomplished to the inspector's satisfaction and to the satisfaction of the supervisor. In most cases the responsibility for evaluating the depth of detail to be included in establishing compliance rests with the inspector.

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Section III provides tachnical guidance and administrative instructions for dealing with situations that may possibly be experienced by the inspector. The goal is to accomplish Section I, using -Section II, a: si sted by the guidance contained in Section III.

4.5.2.2 Inspection Reference Material The sup]orting materials necessary for an inspection 'are the following:

1. Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR)

The selected inspection procedures should be examined for references to 10 CFR, and the inspector should review the appropriate sections prior to the inspection. It is suggested that a copy of the pertinent regulations be carried to the inspection site so that it is not necessa-y to rely on the

( licensee to have current copies of the regulations available.

This may be more pertinent with material licensees ,than with power facilities licensees.

t Certain regulations contain detailed require.nents. An exampla is 10 CFR 20, "Standards for Protection Against Radiation," which speci fy numerical exposure limits. In contrast, 10 CFR 50, "Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities," does not provide such. numerical limits or specific instructions relative to operation of a reactor.

This section (10 CFR 50) of the regulations instructs prospective licensees on requirements for Itcensing and the content and procedure for submitting applications. The application and other documents submitted become the basis for a construction permit / license and the technical specifications.

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2. NRC License /.oermits and Technical. Specifications l l I Much of the data base licensee's are inspected by is contained in l

l NRC licenses / permits, associated documentation and technical specifications. Since there are differences among the types of licenses issued by the Commission, each type is described separately below.

a. Material Licenses Material licenses are numerically the largest group of licenses issued and have a direct impact en the largest number of individuals. These licenses include conditions that specify the nuclide form and quantity that may be possessed, the authorized use, and the location of use.

Other conditions provide specific limitations cr requirements on the licensee. These conditions may include items such as sealed source leak test requirements, temperature. limits on gas chromatographs, the number of patients on which a specific medical procedure may be performed, and reports the licensee may be required to submit. One condition that appears in most .

materials licenses states that "except as specifically provided otherwise by this license, the licensee shall possess and use licensed meterial ... in acco-dance with statements, representations, and procedures contained in the licensee's application ...." The inclusion of such a condition in a license incorporates the identified dccuments in the body of the license.

b. Fuel-Cycle Facility License A fuel-cycle facility license is substantially the same as a materials license; however, the volume and detail of referenced documentation is much greater. Where the simpler material programs have a single insoection procedure for a specific activity, multiple inspection procedures are applicable to fuel-cycle f acilities. '

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c. Reactor License and Construction Permits The organization nf the ticense/ permit is considerably different from that of the materials license. The license document' contains, essentially, no specific data relating.to the plant or its operation. The portion of the license document analogous to the conditions of a materials license are contained in the Technical Specifications.

The license contains opera!1ns requitecents, safety standards, limiting conditions for operation, surveillance standards, design features, and administrative standards. These topics encompass all the license-imposed conditions related to plant operation.

Construction permits contain some specific conditions that impose requirements on applicants for licenses, usually in areas dealing with environmental monitoring programs. The major portion of the requirements imposed on the applicant are in the. form of commitments contained in the application and the Preliminary Safety Analysis Report (PSAR) which is identified in and incerporated in the construction permit. Construction permits also frequently reference the Final Environmentd Statement (FES) and. impose specific NRC staff recommendations contained in the FES on the applicant in the areas of environmental matters.

3. Other References

a. Preliminary and Final Safety Analysis Reports The Preliminary and Final Safety Analysis Reports (PSAR/FSAR) are portions of the application for the construction permit and operating license. They contain the basic description of the site and facility and licensee commitments in areas of administration, construction, operation, radiation protection, waste management, emergency planning, and physical security on

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which the Commission bases its action in the issuance of a construction permit (based on PSAR) or operating license (based

en FSAR). The content of PSARs and FSARs is prescribed in 10 CFR 50.34. Af ter issuance of a construction permit, the PSAR remains substantially unchanged. The- FSAR is developed during construction from the PSAR and incorporates ' changes necessitated by changes in design, eqaipment, and regulatory requirements.

prior to licensing a facility the Regional staff is responsible for determining that the facility was constructed in substantial compliance with the FSAR.

b. NRC Regulatory Guides Regulatory Guides have been develepsd to augment the guidance given to applicants and licensees in the regulations. They describe acceptabit methods of implementing specific parts of the regulations, identify and describe NRC staff techniques used t.o evaluate specific problems ur postulated accidents, and provide guidance to applicants concerning information needed by the staff in its review of applications for permits and licenses.

Regulatory Guides are not intendedfosupplant the regulations, and compliance with the guides is not required, unless committed to by the licensee. Alternatives are acceptacle if the licensee provides an ' adequate ba si s for the issuance of a permit or license.

c. Codes and Standards Codes and Standards that a licensee must meet are specified in 10 CFR 50.55(a), Codes and Standards. Alsc, in various Regulatory Guides and in pSAR/FSAR commitments, references are made to numerous codes and standarde. These may include references such as:

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American Society of Testing and Materials American National Standards Institute The Institute of Electrical and Electronics.Enginters

d. Previous inspection reports covering the area of interest.

e. Bulletins, licensee bulletin responses, and Infornation Notices in the area of interest.

f. Most recent SALP report excerpts covering the area of 1 interest.

g. Outstanding Items List.

4.5.3 Inspection Checklist and Acceptance Criteria To ensure that a thorough and efficient inspection is conducted, it is recommended that a checklist be developed'for each element of the planned inspection. The baseline for development of this

, checklist should be the inspection procedure (module) to be utilized for the inspection. Specific inspection i te.ns are

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provided in the inspection elements of Section II of the inspection procedure. The checklist aids in accomplishiag the following: i

1. Review of each inspection element, i

2. Development of requirements for the particular element, !

3. Documentation of completion, !

4. Provision of data for the inspection report.

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The complexity of the checklist varies with the particular module being inspected. It should includa, as a ,*inimurs:.

1. The inspection requiremenc,

2. The itcense requirements (Technical Speci m .itions, license, FSAR, Codes, Standards, etc.),

3. Space for appropriate notation.

Forms for preparation of the checxitst are shown as Attachments I, II, III of this chapter.

Inspection preparation must also include development- of acceptance criteria for comparison with the inspection findings.

There must be a legal basis for accenting or rejecting the inspection findings anc providing a basis for taking enforcement action. The legal acceptance criteria may come from any onc of the documents discussed in Section 4.5.2.2 or any other references specified in a requirement document. If a particular licensee does not have a requirement to comply with a particular inspection element, that element should be noted and reviewed with the supervisor. Each inspection element must be reviewed and compared with the appropriate acceptance criteria, and a record of the review and comparisen must be made.

The inspaction plan must. be discussed with the resident inspector (via telephone) and with more experienced inspectors and the supervisor.

These discussions may indicate items to be added, areas of special interest, or areas where more preparation or -

review of additional reference material is warranted.

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( 4.5.4 Inspection performance.

4.5,4.1 Inoffice' Effort Some inspection modules require application of significant amounts of time for review of licensee procedures, and such review can be done in 'the NRC office. This provides for efficient use of time at the site for interviewing personnel, direct observation of activities, and independent inspection effort.

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The decision regarding what can be done in the office varies and must be made by the inspector as he reviews the inspection elements. As a minimum, however, inoffice effort should include review of all available licensee procedures, completion of all module elements possible, and formulation of questions requiring clarification upon arriving at the site.

( 4.5.4.2 Independent Effort In the development of the inspection prgram, the inspector is not restricted to the defined inspection program and nothing else. Consideration of opportunities for' independent inspection is considered part of preparing for an inspection. Such independent inspection time (20%) is for the purpose of expanding the effort to include areas not speci fically defined la the regular program, or to provide for an expansion of the regular pregram if desired; for example, instead of reviewing two surwillance tests the inspector may elect to review several additional tests.

1 The inspector may preselect areas of interest, such as special

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walt-throughs of the plant during regular or nonregular hours, I observing certain operations tests or maintenance, exploring l potential problems, or merely looking at areas of specific interest. In thi,s regard, preinspection preparation in the form 4-11 1

_ _ _ _ _ . , _ _- _ v . - -

l of gathering information, reviewirrg requirements, and formulating '

questions can be beneficial. Such pretaspection preparation alsc '

tends to include independent inspection effort in the regular rehedule; whereas, if considered only on an impromptu basis, independent effort could be overlooked or forgotten in the effort to compivte the ragular inspection program.

ll In summary, the inspector should make -4 conscious effort to inciude plans for independent inspection effort as part of his regular program schedule. The NRC inspection manual, in IMC 2515, "LWR Inspection Program -

Operations Phase," addresses independent inspections and backshift laspections for resident inspectors. 1 4.5.4.3 Tracking Techniques i

A variety cf techniques are used by inspectors to keep track of '

outstanding inspection items. In general, a list should be J maintained for each facility as an aid to the inspector concerning items that requi re inspection followup. The list i

should have provisions for a description of each item and a reference to the item's origjp. Further provis'ons should be made for resolution, with reference to the appropriate I documentation.

l Typical items that may be included are: unresolved inspection items, licensee commitments, questions ra i sed by the inspector 1 that require some inspector followup, or any other inspector identified problems.

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l Attachment I !

1 Inspection Report Number Radiography AREAS INSPECTED AND FINDINGS Licansee: License No: Amendment No:

INSPECTION ITEM CRITERIA FINDING

1. Management Cortrol Systems Lic Cond Structurs of Organization as described in requirements?

NOTES & REMARKS:

2. Training and Qualification of Personnel Lic Cond Training and retraining conducted as required? -

Written and oral exams conducted?

Examination results reviewed by management?

( Instructions to workers per 19.127 19.12 NOTES & REMARKS:

3. Licensee Internal Audits Lic Cond Scope and frequency of audits as r? quired?

Conducted by appropriate persons?

Records maintainsd? Review by manage 5ent? Deficiencies identified and corrected?

NOTES & REMARKS:

4 Inspection and Maintenance Lic Cond ,.

Pro; ram implemented? Cover devices and storage container;? 34.28 Precedures Implemented? 34.3a(j)

Records maintained? Review by management?

I NOTES & REMARKS:

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Licensee: __.

Inspection Procedure Date:

Radiation Protection - Operation

1. Qualifications Persons Contacted: __ __

Identify changes or additions to radiation protection staffs since inspection, dated .

Information source

[ Qualification requirements specified in:

Technical Specification Section FSAR Section Review records to verify that individuals meet qualifications.

Records Reviewed for: Meet qualifications Yes No I

Specify inadequate qualifications:

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CHAPTER 5 EFFECTIVE CCMMUNICATION OURING INSPECTIONS 5.1 NEED FOR UNDERSTANDING OF ISSUES Clear and concise comaunication is necessary to accomplish inspection objectives. Finding prnblems is only part of the objective. The attainment of corrective action for a safer condition is the goal, and this can be effected only if NRC is able to assure that the licensee and other affected parties clearly understand the issues and their significance.

5.2 TECHNIQUES OF COMMUNICATION It is not feasible to estimate the number of times people have used the word communicate as though it were an order to a subordinate, a supervisor, a licensee, or others. Many times it has failed to produce the desired result, and many times the speaking (or shouting) of this simple word has done little more than to frustrate people. This occurs because the word communicate is overused and misused. The dictionary defines it in a literal sense: to transmit or convey something intangible, as information or feelings, so that it is satisfactorily received or understood. Thus communication is a process by which there is an exchange of information through a common system of symbols and signs. This comon system is not limited to words but includes i facial expressions, gestures, emotions, and hand signals, and it l' requires listening and observation-

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The most ef fective communicators practice, whether by intuition or intent, the following behavioral traits:

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1. They exercise the appropriste amount of authority based on '

rank and rarely, if ever, become dictatorial.

2. They are credible. People trust the things they say and have respect for their opinions and comments.

3. They back up their decisions.

4. They know how to listen.

5. They are always willing to discuss problems and usually show how to solve them.

6. They elicit listener feedback to assure themselves of understanding.

Each individual may not be able to emulate all these traits, since personality, heritage and environmental experiences give individuals special traits and characteristics. The effective behavioral traits listed above should, however, be considered.

5.3 SELF EVALUATION ,

It is important to know ones strengths _and weaknesses. Strengths can be an aid, but if improperly directed, 'they can be a detriment. Some individuals may not be immune from an unconscious tendency to irritate licensees, peers, and supervisors. The following questions should be considered seriously and introspectively, as a means'of self evaluation:

1. Are you quick-on-the-trigger or short-on-the-fuse in discussions with others?

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( 2. Do you feel an irrepressible urge to debate many cf the statements others make? Do many of your discussions become arguments, and yo6 wonder why?

3. When you talk about your activities, do you constantly use the word "I"?

4 Do you use such expressions as "whip them into shape" and "straighten them out" in conversations that are critical of others?

5. Do you consider yourself to be more competent than the licensee? Peers? Your boss? Do you let them know you feel this way, by word or deed?

6. You want to be liked, but do you wonder why you don't seem to be accepted by the others? Do all your efforts at friendship lead nowhere?

7. Do you manage to avoid responsibilities?

8. Are you giving a lot of emphasis to acquiring status and power symbols?

9. Are you reluctant to share or to allow others to have the same perquisites as you?

10. In meetings do your comments take a lot of time? Do you try to stand out in meetings as being especially clever and perceptive?

The conclusions to be drawn from such self evaluation are self-evident.

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5.4 CREDIBILITY r The establishment of levels of confidence in contacts is essential. it is important to know who to believe and who will say anything that comes to mind. Most individuals are basically honest, but most will avoid the communication of details that may cast a negative light on themselves, since all are self-conscious to some degree and are desircus of protecting an image. These characteristics must be considered when evaluating in formation received and in responding.

When asked questions, one must be prepared with answers, or should respond "I do not know but I will get the answer." The answers must be backed with reasons, rationale, and conviction and must be followed to a conclusion.

The needs of others must be respected. An inspector has all day to inspect and knows what to do; however, the pressures, responsibilities, requirements and goals of the licensee's personnel must be considered.

1 An inspector must be a responsive listener. Talk is cheap. The failure to listen is expensive. Responsive listening encourages the person who is doing the talking to continue to be communicative, passive listening, attentive but. silent without reaction, i s a "turn-of f. " It is important to express what is perceived and heard in terms of "I perceive from what you are saying that...." Two-way communication is assured. The dialogue may be intended only as an information-sharing or gathering event. If a decisfor is necessary, determine the urgency. If the decision is ne needed immediately, continue to be a responsive listener while asking for time to consider all viewpoints. Make a statement such as "I do appreciate the time you took to bring these facts to my attention. .I would like to look into it more deeply. I will get back to you by (specific time) and wo can go on from that point."

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No attempt should be made to entrap the licensee. 'A licensee should not be surprised by facts, agendas or indications of problems identified during the course of the inspection.

Communications should be kept flowing throughout the course of the inspection to provide the licensee the maximum opportunity to respond and provide correct information. A hide-and-seek game would destroy credibility. i Inspections involve a wide range of diverse requirements, and it is necess,try to communicate with many people. In specific details of system operation, it may be necessary to talk with an operator concerning a high-level management decision, or, it may be necessary to deal with the president of a company. On the surface this may not seem like much of a challenge; however, credibility will be negated quickly when talking over the head of an individual or wasting a company president's sime with trivia.

The licensee may challenge the inspectors views, and therefore views must be backed with reasons and rationale. The inspector should hear the licensee out and attempt to come to an agreement.

If a disagreement persists, however, the inspector should cease discussion and obtain an NRC position before further pursuit. A lasting argument should be avoided.

5.5 CAUTIONS In communicating with a licensee "do not": l

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1. prosecute by interrogation. Avoid questions that take the 4

form of implied accusatic'is and put the licensee on the l defensive. i l

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2. Pass judaement. Be careful not to be accusative or 7

judgmental.

3. Respond inconsistently. Inconsistent response destroys two-way communication. *

4. Lose your "cool." Wait to discuss problems cntil both parties are relatively free of emotional p essures.

5. Raise veur voice in anaer. The inspector must maintain exemolary behavior and self-control.

6. Threaten

7. Preach

8. Order and command i

9. Givo false craise, The tendency to give a pat on the back ,

with one hand rapidly becomes a slap in the face when a brief statement of praise is shortly followed by 'the potentially formidable word "but."

10. Aeolv labels. Exercise caution in the selection of adjectives that might be interpreted as ridicule. j 1

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11. Scout oreverbs and banalities. Attempts at reassurance l

usually fall quite short of the intended mark when they take the form of overworked maxims.

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12. Minimize matters or overstate them.

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( 5.6 PRACTICE, STUDY, AND OBSERVATION Communications is an ' area in which everyone . can continue to improve through practice, study and observation. Make full use of experiences, analyze the results, and learn by the observation ;

of approaches practiced by others.

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CHAPTER 6 PERFORMING AN INSPECTION 6.1 INSPECTION ASSIGNMENTS Inspection assignments are normally made on the basis of a general ar,ea of qualification and expertise (such as for resident inspector's) or by specialty (such as, welding, instrumentation, end radiation protection). Responsibility for an inspection procedure is usually given to the group with the technical expertise to best accomplish the inspection.

The minimum training program to be completed by each inspector in a particular classifications is specified in the NRC inspection

/ manual (IMC 1245, "Inspection Qualification"), which states that

\ only those inspectors who have successfully completed the required training will be allowed to perform inspections. The Regional Administrator may, however, based on previous experience and the needs of the organization, authorize persons to conduct inspections who have not completed all the training.

There may be circumstances in whict individuals may be required to participate in inspections (especially in reactive situations) outside their area of expertise or specialty. These circumstances will be the exceptions. No rmally, inspcetors conduct inspections only in the areas for which they are trained and qualified. When inspectors encounter situation in which their knowledge or experience is insufficient to properly conduct or complete an inspection. they must contact their supervisor for 4

guidance or for obtaining assistance.

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l 6.2 INSPECTION REQUIREMENTS Upon arrival at a site for an inspection the inspector should already be prepared (See Chapter 4) and knowledgeable of:

(1) inspection requirements, (2) regulatory recuirements, such as regulations, license conditions, technical specifications, (3) licensee commitments, and (4) acceptance criteria for the areas to be inspected. preparation should not start after arrival onsite, although under reactive situations, this may be somewhat necessary.

The review of procedures is invariably if nked to inspections, regardless of the area or function inspected. The inspection may require review of the licensee's administrative, security, quality assurance / quality control, radiation protection, or other types of procedures for compliance with requirements, or may require verification that operations are being conducted in accordance with approyed procedures. Since procedures are not normal', retained in the Regional Offices (and many are not retained in the resident inspectors' offices), the procedure review (and the use of procedures in preparing for other inspection activities) can only be done at the site. 'n'h il e the inspector may not know the exact procedures to be reviewed or utilized until he arrives at the site, preparation for the inspection should 1.1c l ude the identification of the types or groups of procedures to oe inspected so that the specific procedures involved may be readily identified and obtained.

At the entrance interview (sae Chapter 7), the inspector will inform licensee management of the scope of the inspection and provide information on individuals (positions), activities, records and facilities that will be involved in the inspection. ;

The licensee will then be able to participate in the most i efficient 'anner. The licensee pays for the inspection, and the I

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l 6-2 l l

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key to an effective inspection for the licensee and NRC is knowing the regulatory requirements and how they should be applied, and then m'aking observations of the licensee's implementation of the requirements.

6.3 LEGAL BASIS FOR INSPECTI ONS In conducting an inspection, the inspector, as an NRC representative, has certain legal rights, as well as legal l responsibilities. These rights and responsibilities should be kept in mind throughout the inspection process.

l The right (authority) for NRC to conduct inspections is contained in Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR). An NRC license contains requirements to comply with the appropriate regulations in 10 CFR. The regulations in lCFR O 30.52, l "By-product Material," 10 CFR 40.62, "Source Materials," 10 CFR l 50.70, "Product and Utilization Facilities" (such as reactors), 1 C and 10 CFR 70.55, "Special Nuclear Material," all require a )

licensee to afford to NRC the opportunity to inspect materials. -

l premises, f acilities, and records. Additionally, 10 CFR 19.15, l "Consultation with Workers During Inspections," authorizes l inspectors to "consult privately with workers" on "matters l related to applicable provisions of Commission regulations and I licenses."

The regulations for an inspection may contain the clause "at all i reasonable times," as in 10 CFR 30.52. Obviously, if a by-product material licensee has the r.aterial in a shop that is open from 9 am to 5 pm on Monday through Friday, the inspector should not expect (or plan) to conduct an inspection at 7:30 am or on Saturday unless special arrangements had been made. A 8

"reasonable time" should be considered any time when "authorized l

6-3

i activities" are being performed. It should be noted that 10 CFR 50.70 does not contain the "reasonable times" clause. '

since power reactors conduct "authorized activities" 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months a day, seven dcys a week.

At any time when on the licensee's premises, an inspector has the responsibility to comply with the same requirements as 3 licensee employee in such areas as physical security, radiation safety, or occupational safety, as well as applicable special conditions of the license. Any postings, such as "No' Smoking

or "No eating or drinking," shall be adhered to by everyone. If an area is identified as a, "hard-hat area," wear a nard hat when entering, If an area is postad "No Entry - Test in progress," do not enter unless you have clesrance from the appropriate test supervisor or shift supervisor. The authority to inspec*, does not extend to overriding or violating If censes recuirement '.

An inspector does not have the right or authority to knowingly and willingly violtte licensee requirements. If this cccurs and the licensee catches him, a response of "I did it to see if your system would catch me" is not only inadequate and inexcusable, but dumb! The Itcensee would be oc firm ground to request the F

inspector 'o leave the premises immediately and to report the case to regional management, t

An inspector does not have the right or authority to operate any installed equipment. If there is a question about the status or operability of a piece cf equipment, the licensee should be requested to test or otherwise demonstrate that it is functional.

The inspector has no authority to push buttons or turn switches or operate valves. Such actions may damage the plant and Create severe legal problems.

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6.4 GUIDELINES FOR RELATIONS WITH LICENSEE'S ENpLOYEES -

Regardless of the type' of facility being inspected and the form of the inspection being conducted, there are certain guidelines that should be applied (See also Chapter 5):

1. Perform in a professional manner at all times.

2. Be prepared.

3. Connunicate clearly. Ask the necessary questions and listen to the answer. Questions that require only "yes" or "no" for an answer may be lacking in specificity: questions that require a 30-minute soliloquy may better be asked as several shorter questions.

4. Keep licensee management informed, especially when apparent

!g violations are identified. The Exit Interview is not the

\ time to bring new matters to the fore and expect an adequate response from management.

5. Be prepared (again!).

6. Look for the root cause of a problem, not the fluff. Follow through.

f 1

7. Maintain objectivity. ,

8. Recognize that management has certain prerogatives and respect them, t

9. Be prepared (again!).

10. Be observant, i

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These guidelt.1es also contain cautions for the inspector.

1. Do not threaten. ,

2. Do not raise issues for which specific details cannot be provided. Do not make statements such as "You have big problems in your_ surveillance testing program - ! Just have not found them yet."

3. Do not make a big issue of something which lacks substance-or safety significance.

4. Do not criticize other licensees or NRC.

5. Do not be a party to rumors.

6. Do not interfere with work in progress. It is obviously not the appropriate time to ask questions while a radiog*apher ,

is trying to get a source back into a pig or a reactor operator is trying to get feedwater flow under control after tripping a feed pump.

^

7. Do not be the licensee's consultant. When a problem is '

identified and the licensee asks, "What should we do to fix '

it?,"aresponsefromtheinspectorwillquicklyp'Itthe inspector in the position of a consultant. The inspector shculd expidin that he is not in a position to answer that

! question.

6.5 ASSISTANCi OURING AN IN5pECTION 4 ,

6.5.1 Assistance to the Inspector A common mistake (or misconception) on the part of new

' {

inspectors, and some not-so-new inspectors, is that once they start on an inspection away from the office, they are on their

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4 w - .- -

_e. .,

4 own. This could not be further from the truth. Regardless of the situaticn which may arise, help is only a telephone call away.

If the . inspector encounters a problem beyond the scope of his experience or knowledge, or needs assistance in interpreting a situation or requirement, assistance can be obtained by the telephone call to the supervisor or a senior inspector. The resources of the region can be used, as can those of the program offices, 0ffice of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR), Office for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data (AE00), and Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards (NMSS) if a request is '

made. The key consideration should always be the prompt resolution of the si.tuation.

6. 5. 2 " Inseection Plan Chances When preparing for an inspection, a plan that lists the

(

procedures, followup items, violations, and other areas and items

to be inspected is prepared and approved. This plan forms the basis for the inspection. Once the inspection is started, however, the inspector may be requested by the residtr,t inspector

, or another inspector (or even the licensee) to look at other matters or to help with a different inspection. '

Since the inspection plan was approved by the inspector's supervisor, any major change in the inspection should be made only with supervisory approval. This can be accomplished with a telephone call. If the supervisor disapproves the change, however, the original plan should be followed. If the request requires only a minor change that would not interfere with the

)

original scope of the inspection, or complements the original plan, the decision may be made by the inspector without prior ;

approval.

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6-7

Another situation might be oncountered in which the inspector e arrives with the inspection plan in hand and is informed that an event has occurrod which falls into the inspector's area of expertise or responsibility. This situation may also occur during an inspection; for example, (1) an engineering inspector is inspecting the surveillance testing program when informed of an electrical mal f anction that made two safety systems inoperable, and (2) a radiation specialist is inspecting the radioactive materials transportation program when informed of an apparent evere<posure. In buth these examples, the inspector would have the necessary knowledge to handle the situation' by gathering information, reviewing logs, and taking appropriate action. The supervisor should, however, be notified that the inspector is shifting from the routine to the reactive mode.

This will help to inform the region of the situation. It is important to keep the supervisor informed.

6.5.3 Insoector's Decree af Flexibility The amount of flexibility allowed by a supervisor in revising the scope of an inspection will vary among supe rvi sors. One supervisor may not permit an inspector to taake changes, while another may allow some flexibility within the scope of the inspection, The amount of flexibility may <$panc on the supervisor's assessment of the inspector's capability to handle unusual or changing situations, it is this judgement f. hat will cause the i

supervisor to tell one inspector to "go ahead and handle it" and to tell a different insoector in the same circumstance to "stand fast we will have someone there tonight to handle it."

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5 e

\ -The inspector should discuss with the supervisor how much latitude there is in altering the inspection. Some inspectors i may have carte blanch'e, while others have none. Only direct ,

discussions will determine this; "assume" is not a good practice

~

for an inspector.

6.5.4 Means for Handlino Odd Situations Every inspector will come up against odd situations. A few such

. situations are discussed below. It is better to recognize such situations and to handle them than to go through' critical self-evaluation of the event af ter the fact. Discussions with '

more-experienced inspectors are also hilpful.

2. What if the inspec. tor arrives at the area of the activity to Be inspected and finds nothing going on? Do not go away.

Look at the general conditi.ons. Is the procedura up-to-date? Does the "as left" condition fit the procedure?

(' Are there any safety hazards? Are equipment, system, and material properly protected or stored? .

. t i.

2. What if work stops when the inspector shows up? Many times workers are hesitant to do things in the presence of an .

inspector. Informing them of the purpose of the inspector's presence and stating that they should go on with their work should be sufficient. If that does not work, leave the area

' ~

and contact the resident inspector and licensee management.

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3. What if something appears to be wrong? If you are alone <

obtain a licenste's representative to which to explain the

{

problem and to have as a witness, if available. If action

?- is needed, contact an appropriate level of licensee management. If immediate corrective action is needed. ;

1 judgement is required based on the inspector's capabilities i and limitations. For example, if the inspector comes t.pon a

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fire, it should always 69 reported to the licensee. Now, ,

should he fight the firi or wait and watch the licensee's response? Picking'up a fire extinguisher and putting out a small waste-material tire may better protect public health and safety than watening the licensee fight the larger fire that would develop. On the other hand, an inept inspector trying to fight a large fire and hindering the licensee's well-trained fire crew could have Just the opposite effect.

Remember to follow licensee requirements in these situations. The inspector should give scae thought to handling odd situations before going into the field. i

4. What if something appears to 69 leading to noncompliance?

Stop it from happening if possible. A case can be made that a facility is safe as long as it operates within the regulations. As an NRC representative, an inspector cannot allow a licensee,to proceed down a path that would lead to noncompliance and an implied unsafe condition. The ,

inspector must be extremely careful, however, about '

directing activities and issuing orders. This is best handled by identifying poten,tial problems to licensee management.

5. What if an activity needs to be stopped for safety? The only official method for stopping an activity is the issuance of a Confirmation of Action Letter, which requires regional office action. It is quicker and more ef ficient to explain the problem to licensee management and suggest that they consider stopping until the safety question can be resolved. If this does not work, contact the regional office. If sometaing appears to be of immediate safety concern, it should be corrected (immediate corrective action) by the licensee prior to the inspector leaving the site, g s 6-10

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What if operatr.,rs question the inspector? The inspector G.

should try to answer the questions to the best of his ability, if the questions relate to the regulatory aspects of the job, or inform the individual where the answer might be obtained. The inspector should not interpret licensee policy or get caught in licensee's internal politics.

7 What if the inspector is accused of disturbing work or interfering with p 'e tperation? It is possible for an inspector to be overly aggressive, and therefore the inspector should make an honest evaluation of the situation.

Maybe the inspection can be done another way or at another time. It might be that the ifcensee is trying to hide something. In this situation the inspector should remain in l the area and make what adjustments he c.an to remove the licensee's claim of interference. The inspector has a legal

] basis for being there, for having access, and/J.' conducting the inspection, but not for interfering with ope?ations.

8. What if an overly helpful or interfering licensee .

representative is encountered? The inspector can request

[

that no one accompany him during that portion of the inspection or he might try to inform the individual that '

there is interference. If the inspector cannot resolve the situation with the individual, the inspector should meet with licensee management to work out a compromise.

9. What if the inspector feels he carnot walk away from an activity? This is a sure sign that there is a problem. If '

the inspector's presence is required for safe operation, the licensee is not doing his job. Sometimes, the feeling is generated by the inspector's intuition. it may be something seen but not yet evaluated. If the inspector remains in the

, area and continues his observations, the problem can usually be identified.

t 6-11

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6.6 INSPECTION PROCEDURES r

6.6.1 Alan Confirmation at Site An inspection generally consists of several parts: interviews, observation, and records review, although specialized inspection functions may involve performing independent measurements or

, examinations. Regardless of the type of inspection conducted and the relative emphasis on different techniques, preparation cannot be stressed enough. (See'also Chapter 4).

Inspection plans should be reconfirmed when the inspector first arrives at the site. The amount of time required for this l depends on the inspector's knowledge of the site and Its operations. The inspector should obtain the information needed j to be efficient with inspection time and the licensee's time. .

The following (aformation should be obtained:

1.

The names and telephone numbert, of the licensee's contacts. >

for the activities to be inspected. If the inspector is j

lookingatmorethanonefacetoftheactivity,theremaybh more than one contact. It is helpful also to identify the depth of knowledge required from the contact, t

2. Information regarding the records associated with the activity, including the developaint procedures used, ,

I location, and quantity. If records are needed from storage, identify those to the licensee so that they can be retrieved and be available when required.

3. The locations of the activities to be inspected and the access requirements. If unescorted access is needed, find out what badges and training will be required, and if there are other requirements. l I

6-12

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\ 4 The status of the activities to be inspected. This could

-include availability of records and the status of the licensee's review of records of results or data. This information can be used to establish the order of the inspection.

6.6.2 Observation of Activities 1

During the preliminary review period, the inspector should consider whether specific areas of inspection are going to be ;

announced or unannounced. For example, if the inspector wishes to observe maintenance activities, those activities can be identified to the licensco or the inspector can observe unannounced. Observing an activity without prior knowledge by the Itcensee gives greater confidence that what is seen is the l way the licensee normally conducts that type of' activity.

. Informing a Itcensee of specific areas to be-observed can be more efficient, however, for both '.he inspector and the ifcensee. I

{ can also preclude the activity being completed prior to the It inspector seeing it.

i, As part of the preparation for abservation of an activity, the '

inspector may choose to attend shift briefings, job briefings, or i

, mock-up training, especially for maintenance or test activities.

Such briefings, in addition to increasing the inspector's

understanding of the work, permit assessment and evaluation of l

the quality of the training and the attitude of the supervisor. '

Two points concerning interplay with the licensee must be considered. First, an insmector should normally be :ccompanied by a licensee representative. Most of the time, the inspector i will find it useful to have a knowledgeable representative along to explain practices and activities, and to help find equipment, .

instrumentation and records. The ifcensee representative can also provide a second set of eyes for observation of problems.

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l This is especially important if the problem is transient. If the ,

representative interferes with the inspection or appears to be assigned for training, however, the inspector should request a different representative or decide to work alone.

The second point concerns -commitments. If an inspector identifies an unsatisfactory situation and wants a commitment to

. get it resolved, the person making the commitment should be of the management level that can implement a resolution or stop work. If the inspector observes a maintenance activity that is in an area that is unsatisfactory from a cleanliness standpoint, and af ter raising the issue, "someone" says they will clean up the area before resuming work, that "someone" should be at the management level to make the commitment. A foreman or maintenance engineer might be appropriate; a helper or laborer would not. Since the person making the "commitment" might only be doing so to get the inspector to go away, the inspector should follow up with a discussion with licensee management to make them aware of the concern and to assure that corrective actions are taken.

b If an inspector sees an activity that does not fit the preconception and understanding of the regulatory requirements, it does not necessarily mean that there is a violation. At this point the inspectcr must start asking . questions and investigating, since there are a number of ways of meeting many regulatory requirements. It is probably best to get to the answers at this time. For example, if a procedure is to be used and is not observed, an the licensee how the technical specification requirement to have a procedure is being fulfilled.

The licensee representative might say to the workers, "Do a step, then call Joe Blow on the phone," and Joe checks the step off and reads them the next step. The inspector must make sure that it is that way by questions and observation before accepting it, If, however, the administrative procedures say that the procedure must be at the jobsite, ghere is a problem. The inspector should 6-14

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( look for everything he has expertise in; that is, the inspector should not be a slave to the checklist or inspection plan. If properly prepared and there is a good plan or checklist, the inspr. tor will be able to get the things needed without constant referral to the list.

When inconsistancies or oddities are observed, it is time to question. Many times, there t 'll be logical reasons for the odd things. Just because the licensee can provide a logical reason, however, does not make the situation right. Some regulatory requirements for review or approval might have been bypassed or there might be a weakness in the way the licensee was attempting to control the activity.

If a procadure is to be used, look for evidence of use or disuse.

Dirty procedures could indicate use, but procedures can get dirty if they are left lying around unused. The inspector should determine whether' the procedure is up to date and fits the job.

(, An example might be a repair procedure for control rod drives.

In the office, the procedure might look good; that is, the '

disassembly, inspection ahd reassembly of the drive can be followed. On the job, 40 bives are being worked on in parallel and reassembled in assembly line fashion with parts going every ,

which way. The procedure which reads well in the office probably is not controlling the job as it is being performed, and :

necessary inspections and sign-offs are not being accomplished.

The inspector should always look at safety in and around the activity. In addition to the specific items the inspector is looking for, attention should be given to fire hazards, radiological hazards, and industrial safety hazards. Industrial l safety hazards are particularly important because it is the inspector's safety that is at risk, and industrial accidents in contaminated areas can mean radiological problems. If someone '

+

6-15

is seriously injured or killed in a nuclear-related activity, t even though it is a typical industrial accident, it not only '

affects the individual but could also have far-reaching implications for NRC and the industry.

The inspector should look for the posting required in the area of the work: for example, radiological permits and fire / hot work pemits. The job should then be compared with the posting and the posting with the job.

If a fire watch is posted, does the fire watch know what it is he is "watching"? , Does he know where a fire extinguisher is and how to use it? Is the fire extinguisher within the check period?

Does he know how to call the fire b'rigade? In other words, is the fire wat@ just fulfilling a requirement or performing a useful jrb7 The inspector must develop the ability to always "see" the important aspects of the activity, even though those aspects may not be part of the specific item being inspected at the time.

For example, if' calibration is important, the inspector should when observing 4 meter face for a reading value, also read the calibrition sticker. This type of check becomes automatic ,

through experience. One way to develop this habit is to write the routine items on a 3 x 5-inch card. Periodically, while observing an activity, the card should be used to determine whether those items listed are being "seen."

Attention should be given to the possible degrading effect of the activity being inspected on other activities in the area.

Problems might be observed that would require attention by the I licensee, such as workmen standing on instruments and tubing, ;

safety-related piping being used to support rigging, material being stacked around a radiation monitor, or nearby equipment being damaged by the activity. i i

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6-16 l

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Observations should sometimes be made on back shifts to look for negative actions on the part of the licensee, For example, if the licensee is only staffed te provide QA. coverage on the day shift for welding activities, the -inspector's observation on a back shift should verify the absence of welding activities. .

6.6.3 jnLerviewino A g' cod interviewing technique is probably the strongest tool of an inspector. Interviews @Jring an inspection can range from a simple question or two to detailed questioning covering many hours. The techniques covered here are applicable to both. A basic premise is that if the inspector does all the talking, I information is not being obtained. It is necessary to let the i interviewee talk. Impressing the interviewee with the -

inspector's knowledge does not accomplish the objective and may intimidate the individual. Asking general questions at the beginning about subject areas requires the interviewee to verbalize detail to try to communicate with the inspector. The questions can then become more detailed as the interview progresses. .

t.

The inspector must also remeinber that "off the record" in formation that relates to safety or violations of the i

regulations cannot be accepted. The only thing the inspector can do is protect the source. The inspector does not have authority to grant conficentially to a source. HRC policy on confidentiality was published in the Federal Register at 50 FR j 48508 on November 25, 1985, and corrected at 50 FR 50864 on

December 12. 1985.

6-17 l O

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The following guidelines should help the inspestor in developing ,

interviewing techniques.

1. Get the interviewee relaxed.

2. Se as private as possible in the interviewee's own environment.

3. Use terms the interviewee can relate to.

4. Stay away from questions that can be answered bv "yes" or "no."

5. Watch for mood changes or changes in resposse to questions.

These can be clues to problem areas that need to be developed or about the openness of the response.

6. Ask the right questions. Most people do not lie. They stretch things and do not volunteer information that they are afraid of, but they will altswer a specific or direct question, te

7. Try a different approach if the interview is not developing ;

the required information. Sometimes appearing to drop a particular line of questioning and turning to other related topics may elicit the desired information,

8. In general, do not take copious notes during the interview.

Write the notes after the interview while they are fresh in !

mind. Never use a tape recorder to record other's conversations. If notes are taken and are going to be part l of the report or record, read them back to the interviewee

, to see 'if he agrees with what is written.

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6-18

9. Do not make accusatiens. Rather, try to remove inconsistencies in answers in order to get the facts. *

10. Go not ieterrupt the interviewee, but do steer the discussion at pauses.

11. Do not put pressure on thw interviewee by use of harsh tones or inflecticas, if pressured, the interviewee will probably t: ease to provide information, answer only "yes" or "no," or even lead the inspector toward wrong conclusions.

12. Do not give the impression that you are superior to the interviewee.

13. Do not try to get the interviewee to disagree with company '

policy.

, 14. Do not accept general allegations. Ask for specific ,

( details. If possible, do not listen to allegations that are !

, not NRC's concern. Rather, refer the interviewee to the

} responsible agency.

I, u

15. Do not let an interview interfere with the safe performance !

of the job the interviewee is doing if the interviiw is L being conducted on the job.

1

16. As a general rule, do not try to interview people during job i breaks or after normal working hours.

i

17. If you do not like what the interviewee is telling you or doing and will be discussing it with his boss or other !

management, let him know. Most individuals will let you do it only once and the "word" will get around quickly. I l

C.

l 6-19

. J

6.6.4 Review of licensee's Records r

6.6.4.1 Preparation It is important in preparing to review the licensee's records that the inspector know what form the record of implementation of regulatory requirements is likely to take. Observation of the recording process will make it possible for the inspector to visualize the activity during the review of the record.

The inspector may or may not review all records. Guidance for determining what records to review is available in the NRC inspection manual. Another approach would be to do a 100% scan in order to select records pertinent to the specific inspection for more detailed review. The inspector should know and understand the basis and purpose of the records prior to initiating a review. ;

The inspector should select a location for the review.

Consideration should be given to where the records are stored and the ability to retrieve them. It is sometimes beneficial to review the records near a licensee representative who can aniser questions when they come up. It should be recognized that if records are being reviewed as they are being generated (test data, for example), the licensee's review process may not have had an opportunity to function; and if the review process is to be verified as part of the inspection, other records will have to be reviewed. For many inspection efforts, the fact that the licensee's review identified an omission or odd data is just as important or more important than the fact that the omission occurred or that the data are odd. The Itcensee must be capable of functioning and identifying problems when the inspector is not present.

6-20

6.6.4.2 Types of Reviews There are five types of reviews: (1) directed, (2) exploratory, (3) specific, (4) Informational, and (5) reconstructive.

Inspection procedures from the inspection manual usually indicate i that specific records are reviewed to establish that the licensee is doing certain things. In many cases, this is only a starting point. Reviews and approvals do not always establish that the licensee is doing the job properly or that a record is valid.

(See 6.6.4.5 for "Validity of Records.")

An exploratory review consists of looking for the results of a suspected or alleged weakness. This type of review requires prior knowledge by the inspector of weaknesses in the licensee's administrative controls, precedure review, experience, or ;

allegations. The inspector postulates what and where the error will be and reviews the records to confirm the hypothesis.

(-

A specific review is a 100% scan to select records pertinent to the requirements of the inspection procedure. This approach should not be used to fulfill 100% of the inspection procedure requirements, since it is also important to establish that the ifcenset functions prcperly in more routine tasks.

An in?ormational review is conducted to obtain knowledge and ,

1 trends or to identify problems for followup. The key to this type of review is to know what information is desired. For many inspectors, the more and faster the records are covered the better the review. When it is done right, it is like speed reading. For reactor operations inspectors, the ability to follcw plant operating modes and a knowledge of the related techr.ical specifications requirements ara essential to be

) efficient.

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A reconstructive review is conducted to reconstruct a specific event. Many times this will require the review of more than one r .

log and/or record, as well as, supplemental interviews. After information from all sources is gathered, it must be reconciled, and the following should be considered: (1) detailed notes should be taken from each source so that the information can be reconciled later; (2) unrelated items can be important since some things can be mutually exclusive; (3) times arv always a problem. Some people use only a guess or an approximate time in logs. If logs are in different locations, there can be clock errors. People's estimates of how long something takes are usually podr. Walk-throughs help give better estimates.

6.6.4.3 Techniques for Reviewino Records When reviewing records, the inspector should be aware of patterns in the records. Many people can tell from a person's actions 4

when there is a lie or something is being covered up. T'Is can '

also be true in logs and records. For example, understatement'or

overstatement can be the key to identifying something for further review or followup; an odd entry can be meaningful either in itself or the reason it was made; changes in neatness, or the lack thereof, can indicate either that a lot of word engineering !

1' went into the log or that maybe the log was or was not generated ;

at the time of the event. ;

The inspector should know what is the best way to have the i information presented to him and laid out for his review. Many find the more and faster the information is presented the better. l The records should always be reviewed in sequence. 1 I

i Generally, it is most efficient to have a relatively quiet spot 1

(without the licensee looking over the inspector's shoulder), but where the inspector can ask key questions of someone who is l

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\ knowledgeable in the area. For example, the back of a control room is good for reviewing logs, since.when the inspector comes explained the desired

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across an entry- that needs to be information can be obtained immediately.

P The specific regulatory items required to be in logs are few, but I they should be presented in readily understandable wording. The l

' purpose of the log is ' to comunicate within the Itcensee's organization, and it should be understandable to those who use it. In other words, the inspector may have to learn the licensee's system, but should make sure the licensee understands it. The inspector should ask .what an acronym or abbreviation .

means. If the Itcensee has to think about it, or look it up, then the entry is not communicative, and the inspector has a basis for having it changed.

The inspector should conduct the review efficiently and use good judgement on how close to examine. When reviewing data, the I

(- limiting case should be found and reviewed critically. Then the i remaining data can be compared with the limiting data.

The inspector should return the records when the review is s complete and make sure the licensee knows the records have been ,

returned. If semething is missing or misplaced after an .

inspector leaves, the inspector will be blamed. It is all right i to remove records from the file after obtaining permission, but

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the licensee should refile the material. !

The inspector will need to take notes during the records review I to substantiate the inspection report to be written later. The minimum notes taken should at least establish the records reviewed, but enough notes should be taken to assist in writing

the report upon return to the office. This implies that areas to !

be covered in the report will be backed up by more notes than those that need not be covered. The inspector should be critical !

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of the notes taken. Too many might be a waste of time, too few r make it difficult to write the report and to justify the

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findings. If the inspector takes a large amount of notes and finds that they are not useful, time was probably wasted during the inspection. .

Many inspectors note the records reviewed and the dates of the reviews. Then, as questions arise, followup notes are taken. ,

Questions should be highlighted so that answers can be obtained before leaving the facility. ,

4 Making copies of logs or records, including recorder charts, can save time; however, many licensees are hesitant to allow this.

I Usually, if the inspector explains that the copy will not go to "

the NRC Public Document Room unless someone requests the notes

! under the Freedom of Informatton Act, the licensee will permit '

copying. The inspector can also point to the efficiency of not l

! having to hand-copy all the information.

Detailed notes are required if there is a potential violation. '

The notes should establish plant conditions and specific details of the violation.

If available, electrnnic recording devices may be used to take notes. It should be remembered, however, that such notes cannot be reviewed readily during the inspection. Therefore significant items should be written so that they can be referred to during l

) the inspection and at the exit interview. Licensee procedures may restrict the use of electronic recording devices in certain :

areas of the facility.

6.6.4.4 Missing Records If gaps occur in a series of records being reviewed, the first conclusion often drawn is that there is a problem. This may or I

may not be the case. Suppcse, for example, the records show - i l

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that a surveillance test was done six days in a row, not done on the seventh day, done another six days, not done on the seventh, and then done another six days. Old the Itcensee make three mistakes? Not necessarily. If the technical specifications require the test to be done every three days but the licensee chooses to do it daily except on Sunday when the crew that does the test is not routinely on duty, there is no problem. If, ,

however, the technical specifications require the test to be done daily, there is a problem.

A missing record should be the starti;.J point for further inspection. I record documents that a requirement was met.

Therefore when a record is missing, the inspector must determine whether the requirement was met or not. The fact that the record is missing may mean that a requirement (test, survey, operation) was not met or'that the licensec's records system has problems.

l 6.6.4.5 Validity of Records l

There are a number of approaches ,to establishing the validity of the records. The best is to observe the record being generated,

but this is not practical in many cases. The inspector may choose to establish the validity by conducting interviews. To establish that the records were generated in accordance with l approved procedures and by qualified personnel. The interview should also establish that the individual who generated the record understood what he was doing and was not just filling in blanks. '

The inspector may review the procedures to de+. ermine that they were technically correct and could produce the required results.

The raw data may be reviewed to establish the basis for the record, and then the inspector can reduce the data or perform the calculations as a check on the record.

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Cross checks with other records can also be used to establish ,

validity. Though not as accurate as most test recorders, control room recorders should be used for comparison.

Sometimes tests, etc., will apcear to have been "dry labed." They may have been, but there can also be logical explanations which can be verified, such as the original was contaminated or the '

data were collected at more than one location and then recopied.

Probably the best method to establish validity is a combination of methods in which the inspector compares the administrative and regulatory requirements with the procedures review and interview results, as well as observations of a portion of the activity.

Computer results are hard to verify, and computers are typically <

usea' for the most complex applications. The inspector can gain some assurance of validity by using one or more of the following techniques: (1) reviewing the program. (2) establishing the validity of the computer input by review of calibration records or comparison with plant parameters, (3) reviewing the licensee's OA program as it relates to program control, (4) conducting hand calculations, (5) requiring test calculations '

based upon known input and output data, (6) requiring re-input of data. (7) requiring input of inspector generated data.

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} 6.7 INSPECTION FINDINGS Ouring an inspection, violations of NRC regulations may be found. l The information needed to support a written citation must then be l accumulated. This is normally done before the inspector leaves the inspection site.

To stand the test of a critical second evaluation by Regional management, and ultimately by the licensee, the specific details of the finding are required. In i

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f general, the information needed will include a citation of the Mic regulation or licensee condition violated, the licensee's proteaures for complying with the regulation or licensee ,

condition, details of the specific observation of the taspector which indicates a violation, including exact quotations of pertinent comments and complete reference document identification.

I Cbservations by the inspector should describe the scope of the

examinations, as wel1 as the details of the observation of c noncompliance. Obtaining this information concurrent with - the l inspection activity permits quotation of pertinent data during the exit interview and facilitates preparation of the Notice of 4

Violation.

. The inspecte.c aust continually evaluate discoveries against the acceptance criteria established for the inspection and, as [

i variances from these criteria (regulations and license l(

3 conditions) are discovered, they must be recordec and evaluated.

No violation, however insignificant it appears to the inspector, should go unrecorded; however, action taken should be based on the Severity Level, as defined in the NRC -inspection manual (IMC (

0400, "Enforcement Program"). In cases of obvious omission or !

oversight, the inspector should attempt to determine the adequacy '

and sa fety of the activity by using whatever other objective '

I evicence is available. In those cases where it can ba confirmed

! that there is no violation, that the activity complies with the l

] requirements of 10 CFR 2 (dRules of Practice for Domestic Licensing Procedures") and that a violation citation should not be issued, the finding and the justification for not issuing the :

citation should be included in the details section of the 4

inspection report and discussed in the exit interview. As discussed previously (in Chapter 5) any activity which is a violation (or even of concern) should be discussed with the

, f 6-27

If consee during the course of the inspection. This will permit ,

a further' action by the Itcensee that afght develop additional !

knowledge which would 'af fect the significance of thi finding '

prior to the exit interview, d

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CHAPTER 7 d

CONOUCTING ENTRANCE AND EXIT MEETINGS WITH t.ICENSEE MANAGEMENT 1.1 PREPARATION FOR MEETINGS Effective communication with the licensee during entrance and exit meetings is as important as the actual inspection. A meeting that is filled with arguments and interpersonal conflicts is destructive, and one that does not have -an identified objective is not likely to accomplish anything. Participants should have a feeling of time well spent. There should be a formal beginning and productive conclusions that result from a meeting of the minds.

Preparation for management meetings is essential, since failure to properly prepare for entrance and exit meetings may make the ,

inspector appear to be professionally incompetent. As a result, inspection findings would not be respected and the licensee might be hesitant to initiate corrective action. The inspector must clearly define the basis and requirements that support his findings. If findings are not clearly understood by the licensee. corrective acticns are likely to be inappropriate, i i

7.1.1 Plannino Meetings should be scheduled far enough in advance to assure that all parties have adequate time to prepare. An agenda should be f prepared with which to guide the meeting step by step that should outline the topics to be covered and pertinent related information. This will clearly define and ensure understanding of the meeting objectives. 4 d

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l The entrance meeting is held so that the inspector (s) can discuss the plan for the intpection with the licensee; similarly, the exit meeting is held .to discuss the findings. The inspector ,

should control these meetings to best suit the objectives of the inspection, and the scope and nature of comments to be presented should be well thought out in advance. When more than one inspector is involved, the lead inspector or tien leader should control the meeting, with other inspectors participating as l appropriate. The meeting should be conducted in a place that l

will optimize the attentiveness of meeting participants.

7.1.2 Attendance Entrance and exit meetings should be attended by the senior licensee representative having direct responsibility for the areas involved in the inspection. Plant supervisors with responsibility for areas to be discussed should also be requested !

to attend. Generally, it is cesirable to conduct meetings with a small group of key plant personnel that have direct responsibility. 1 Some licensees desire that large numbers of plant eeployees attend exit meetings where the inspaction results are discussed.

l Attendees in large numbers may, however, present some discussion I control problems that might not be encountered with a smaller group. In addition, the large group may limit the scope or freedom of discussion. Large exit meetings also create an impression of the inspector talking to the staff instead of to l

management, and may tend to diminish management initiative. If large numbers of licensee representatives do attend the meetings, the inspector should request that active participation in the discussion by those other than site or corporate management. be held to a minimum. If appropriate, the inspector may encourage the liceisee to control the size of the exit meeting.

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( 7.1.3 Recordine Devices Tape recorders are _not to be used by NRC representatives during the conduct of entrance and exit meetings. If the licensee expresses a desire to tape meetings, the inspector should explain the disadvantage of taping, emphasizing that it could inhibit the free flow of communications.

If such tapes are made, the inspector must request.a copy of the tape or a verbatim transcript, and this request must be made prior to the recording. The inspection report should state clearly that a recording was .made and that a copy was requested.

7.1.4 Ofscussion and Summary The licensee's image of NRC and receptiveness to NRC findings

will be determined by the manner in which the inspector conducts entrance and exit meetings. At these meetings the inspector is ,

the NRC. Personal preferences and opinions that differ Dom NRC policy or positions should not be stated. If the inspector is not prepared or does not take the leadership role at meetines, communications between NRC and licensee will suffer and resolution of concerns will be hampered.

The lead inspector should speak in specific terms and avoid generklities. Points should be presented concisely and supported with facts.

The information desired fron; the licensee should be known before the meeting and should be part of the agenda. Specific comments or commitments should be requested. For exit meetings the licensee should alresdy have knowledge of the inspection findings and be prepared to provide the information requested. The licensee should be allowed adequate time to prepare to respond to the requests.

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Major points of the meeting should be summarized by the lead r icsper. tor at the meeting conclusion. In particular, those items t9 quire further action and the commitments mada during the

, should be reiterated. For example, enforcement items and solved issues should be restated.

.dTRANCE MEETINGS An entrance meeting will normally be conducted by the inspector with licensee management as soon as possible .after arrival at the site so as to assure that the licensee is aware of the scope, plan, and schedule of the inspection. This meeting will also serve to introduce key personnel.

Specific items that require followup from a previous inspection should be on the cgenda. Such items may include unresolved issues, open items (see Definitions), and licensee commitments.

The inspector should be prepared to discuss the history.of each item. During the meeting the licensee's position relative to each item should bo determined to ascertain where inspection effort will or will not be productive. The following items should be discussed:

1. Licensee Event Reports (LERs). The inspector should review the circumstances relative to each LER, identify pertinent questions and concerns, and then discuss them during the entrance meeting.

2. Plant Status. Information relative to current plant conditions and problems is important-to the inspector for ;

coordinating inspection ef forts and identifying areas of potential interest. The inspector should question the l

licenses relative to present plant status, recent problems l and plant modifications planned during the time of the inspection.

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3. General Interest Items. There should be discussion of events that have occurred at other facilities, industry developments, or changes in HRC, as appropriate.

4 Licensee Questions. The licensee should be given an opportunity to raise questions.

5. Licensee Interfaces. The senior 1fcensee representative at the meeting should provide a licensee interface for each area the inspection will cover. The inspector should meet with interface personnel promptly to determine tneir organizational responsibilities and authorities and show how they can be contacted. To the extent known records needed for examination during the inspection should be located.

6. Schedule for Exit :4eeting. The time should be set for the exit meeting. The meeting location and attendance may also be discussed. -

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Negative Findings. Plant managers should be asked how they prefer to be informed about negative findings during the course of the inspection.

7.3 EXIT MEETINGS Exit meetings are conducted to communicate preliminary inspection '

findings and give the licensee an opportunity to provide additional information that could change the findings. The exit meeting is just as important as the inspection, and adequate preparation is a must. The licensee should be in formed of preliminary negative findings in a timely manner before the exit ,

meeting -

no surprises, At times the licensee can provide additional information or otherwise cla ri fy issues th?t the i

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inspector has initially identified as a potential problem.- It is unreasonable to expect a meaningful exchange of ideas at the exit meeting, unless the licensee is aware of the issues before the meeting begins.

The inspector should debrief the residert inspector periodically during the inspection. This will sinrve to provide an opportunity to draw on the resident's knowledge of the plant and its programs and will allow the resident inspector to provide insight.

At the exit meeting the inspector should first present the status of the items that required followup from a previous inspection and then state the findings for each new area inspected, including the scope of the inspection and the conclusions. The conclusions may be of three types: (1) there are no problems, (2) there are unresolved issues, and (3) violations or deviations were detected. In the case of a violation, the specific requirement violated should be identified and the supporting facts should be presented; however, the security level of the violation should not be assigned. The inspector s'hould explain what the licensee is or is not dcing and why the activity does not meet the identified requirement.

All safety problems should be discussed and plans made for their prompt resolution before the inspector leaves the site. All commitments made by licensee personnel during the inspection should be confirmed and the inspector should obtain assurance that individuals at the meetings have the authority needed to cause the commitments to be fulfilled. At the same time the licensee representatives should be requested to specifically identify any inspection areas that involve proprietary or o* ne

sensitive information.

The inspector should be sensitive to issues the licensee believes constitute "backfits." Such issues should be handled a:;

discussed in Chapter 12.

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( If the licensee's program does not meet or cloes not contain a commitment to an accepted industry standard or Regulatory Guide, the inspector should biing' this to the licensee's attention and point out that this item is not a legal requirement on the licensee but is consistent with accepted industry practice.

Corrective actions planned by the licensee relative to the accepted practice should be identified by the inspector. If the licensee plans no corrective action, the item should be brought to the attention of the NP.C supervisor for evaluation, and consideration should be given to bac'kfitting.

Inspector preferences, opinions and recommendations that are not supported by legitimate requirements or substantiataa by fact should not be discussed with the licensee. Many licensees will automatically respond t'o suggestions or comme'1ts made by the inspector. The inspector should avoid inadvertently imposing his preferences or opinions on the licensee.

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In general, no draft written material should be provided to the licensee.

7.4 CONFRONTATION WITH LICENSEE PERSONNEL There are a number of negative expressions that may be used by l participants in meetings, such as l "We trieri that before."

"It can't be done that way." !

"It just won't work in this company."

"Management would never go for it."

"Why change it? We've always done it this way before "

"That's against company policy."

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' j "We don't have that mucn authority." e "That's impossible!"

"That's ridiculcus!"

"Now you're going too far!"

"We don't have the space (or, the people, equipment)."

"That would cost too much to do."

"Who has time for that?"

These expressions are counterproductive and must be prudently suppressed by the inspector. Such comments are invariably based on assumptions rather than knowledge. The inspector may have heard them before and allowed them to become discussions, but there is no place for them during an exit meeting. The only valid assumptions are that new solutions must be found for new problems or fo'r those older problems that have resisted solution.

The inspector should be aware that people who make such comments may be avoiding making a ecmmitment. If recognition of this reinforces the observation of ne:gativi sm as an individual's trait, it may provide an important clue that can lead to a beneficial course of action on the part of the inspector.

If the licensee disagrees with the findings and/or becomes hostile, it is !mportant that the inspector not engage in an argument. The inspector must maintain control over the meeting.

When this situation arises, the inspector should present findings and then allow the licensee to state a position. If it is obvious that agreement over the findi.,gs cannut be reached, the inspector should simply restate the position and request a senior licensee representative to state the licensee's position.

Resolution of the difference of opinion will then be worked out in direct communication between NRC regional and licensee management.

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The licensee may attempt to justify not meeting a requirement by stating that another facility with equivalent systems / components is not required to do this or that the NRC Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (Nr.R) agrees with the licensee. The inspector may respond by stating, "I am not familiar with NRR requirements; however, the- FSAR or Technical Specifications state)..." or "we have not received corre spor dence from NRR relieving you of that requirement. Have you requested relief from the requirement / commitment in writing?"

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1 Occasionally, a member of the licensee's staff may take a ridiculous position on a finding or make light of a violation or deviation. One suggested method of handling this s?tuation is to ask the senior licensee representative present if the position expressed by the individual represents the position of the company. If the answer is in the affirmative, request the raanagement representative to repeat the Company's position, since you do not want to misst. ate the position in the inspection' report and the letter requesting confirmation of that position.

7.5 THIRD PARTY ATTENDANCE AT MEETINGS l

The occasion may come up where a third party, such as a state regulatory group or a concerned-citizen group wants to attend ifcensee/NRC meetings, such as the e. tit meeting. When this '

occurs, the insoector should contact the NRC supervisor for guidance. Generally speaking, before a third party is granted 1 permission to attend licensee /NRC meetings, an understanding of the ground rules is reached and in some instances, a formal agreement is documented establishing meeting rules. The meeting rules would, in general, establish that NRC would be in control of the meeting and that third party participation would be limited.

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CHAPTER 8 00CUMENTING INSPECTION RESULTS 8.1 INSPECTION REPORTS In most cases, the inspection report represents the final product of the inspector's work. The effort devoted to preparation and onsi te inspection may be diminished unless the inspector's findings

are properly documented. An inspection involves numerous discussions and interviews between the inspector and licensee: however, the inspection report is the official NRC position and permanent record concerning the inspection findings.

The inspector may conduct inspection activities in an excellent manner, but unless a high quality report is the final product, much of the effort is lost. .

Information appearing in inspection reports is used to support and substantiate enforcement matters or provide documentation on questions that might arise several years after the inspection.

Therefore, it is impcrtant that inspectors put forth their best 1

effort to produce high quality inspection reports.

Some inspectors seem to have a talent for report writing; for others it is a frustrating, laborious experience involving many revisions. It is recognized that each inspector and reviewer has an individual writing style. It is also recognized that English composition is not an exact science and different opinions exist concerning certain grammatical and punctuation practices. As such, it is not practical to expect that all reports will reflect '

a single writing style. For consistency, however, inspection l

reports should follow some basic rules. References to be used as basic guidance concerning style and documentation are (1)

NUREG-0650, "Technical Writing Style Guide," and (2) The Greco Reference Manual, 5th Edition.

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F i 8.1.1 Content r-An inspection report is the written record of the inspection.

This document includes the inspection resi'ts obtained during the site inspection, as well as the results of inspection activities conducted in the office before and after actual travel to the site. The principal purposes of an inspection report are to:

1. provide a basis for enforcement action and cvnvey t..e results of the inspection to the licensee or vendor.

2. Ensure that inspection findings accurately represent the facts collected and the conclusions drawn by the NRC staff

'without improper influences by licensees or vendors.

3. Provide general conclusions about the effectiveness of the program or activity inspected and, if appropriate, the effectiveness of the licensee's management systems and quality control programs.

4 Provide information to NRC regional and headquarters management on the implementation of the inspection program and on the identification of significant health, safety, and safeguards findings.

5. Provide information to the general public.

The inspection report contains facts, observations, and conclusions. All inspection findings must be reported in an unbiased, objective manner. Enough informition must be ir.cluded to establish what items in a particular inspection prc;edure were l completed. To the extent possible, established formats should be i used to ensure uni fo rmi ty and make effective use of the time required to complete a r? port. !

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The NRC inspection program covers a wide variety of inspection activities. In most cases, . therefore, an inspection report is somewhat unique, depending on the particular inspection activity.

The following list includes some of the functional areas in the NRC inspection program:

1. power reactors - regional inspections

a. reactor safety and projects

b. radiological controls

c. emergency preparedness

d. physical security

e. operator licensing

f. safeguards

g. systematic assessment of ifcensee performance

2. Power reactors - headquarters inspections C a. Safety System Functional Inspections

b. Safety Systems Outage Modificatior)s Inspections c.

OtherSpecializedTeamInspectionf9

3. Nonpower reactors

4. Fuel facilities

5. Materials

a. medical

b. industrial

e. research

6. Uranium mills 8-3

These inspection programs are described in the following inspection manual chapters: '

IMC 2500 Reactor' Inspection program IMC 2600 Fuel Cycle Facility Inspection Program IMC 2700 Licensee Contractor and Vendor Inspection Program IMC 2800 Materials Inspection Program IMC 2900 Performance Appraisals A list of these types of inspection reports is given in Appendix:

B items 1 through 14 The majority of the information provided in this chapter covers routine inspection reports; however, there are other documents, such as enforcement materials, allegation records, transmittal letters and acknowledgement letters, that are also important ,

parts of the documentation process. All inspection results must be documented in an inspection report unless otherwise specified I

in the NRC inspection program. See Inspection Manual Chapter 0610.

8.1.2 Basic Report Guidelines-l Al.1 inspection reports, except materials field notes, consist of:

(1) a cover page that identifies the licensee, date of inspection, and other summa ry de ta i l s, and (2)' subsequent pages ;

' which provide inspection details and the information necessary to support and substantiate significant safety or safeguards

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( 8.1.2.1 Cover Page The cover page provides identi fying . Information about the licensee inspected and a brief summary of the scope and findings

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of the inspection. It contains the dates of inspection, the !

report number, names of inspectors, signature of the approving NRC manager, and a summary of the subjects or areas examined, and I the results of the inspecticn.

i The summary should be brief, but it should be f actual. Since the l cover pages of all inspection reports are intended for release to l i

the public, no classified information, safeguards information, or other information exempt from disclosure should be included. The emphasis in the summa ry should be on licensee strengths and weaknesses, and any significant safety matters that w

. ere disclosed. Whe violations or deviations are being reported, the summary should inclyde a sentence that describes each item briefly in general . terms but does not discuss enforcerrent concerns (for example, severity levels or civil penalties).

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When no violations or deviations were found, this should be stated.

If the report contains information that is exempt from disclosure to the publ ie. , the summary should exclude all such exempt information. All exempt information should be in a separate enclosure to the inspec' tion report, if possible. The distribution of inspection reports containing exempt information is controlled in accordance with NRC Manual Chapter 2101, "NRC Security program." Before placing inspection reports in the NRC public Document Room or making general distribution, all exempt information must be deleted. Violations and deviations must be described in general terms to preclude disclosure of exemot information.

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8.1.2.2 Inspection Details C Following the cover pa'ge, the inspection report includes a brief description of the inspection activities carried out during the inspection and a detailed discussion of inspection findings to substantiate any identified health, safety and safeguards concerns, violations, or deviations. The report must be factual.

Findings must be clearly stated and must include a discussion of how the findings and conclusions were determined.

Emphasis should be on significant findings that may have an impact on safety or safeguards and/or represent noncompliance with NRC regulations or license conditions. The report is not intended to be a lengthy discourse of activities carried out to justify the time spent or to demonstrate the inspector's knowledge of a particular technical area. If no safety or management , problems, violations or deviations were identi fi ed, succinctly state the activities carried out during the inspection and the conciusions drawn relative to the licensee's, contractor's, or vendor's performance.

e The inspection details should include section., as appropriate, for each of the following topics:

1. Persons Contacted. List the licensee / vendor-maragement and senior technical representatives and any other individuals who furnished'significant information. Include the name and title of each individual, unless there is a need to protect the identity of an individual. Indicate by an asterisk or other suitable note those individuals who participated in the exit interview. Include other NRC personnel involved, such as the resident inspector, when appropriate.

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.( 2. Functional or Program Areas Inspected. This is the main body of the report which briefly describes the fur.ctional or program area, in'spected and provides the necessary description of inspection findings. This portion of the report is divided into paragraphs which generally should be l titled with the subjects or titles of the inspection f procedures under which the inspection was performed.

l For each program or functional area examined, the inspector should report: (1) what was inspected, (2) the time period j covered,by the examination or review, if pertinent to the inspection results, (3) a brief description of specific inspection activities carried out during the inspection, and (4) the significant findings and conclusions of the inspectcr relative to the licensee's performance, excluding enforcement concerns. With respect to conclusions for each subject area covered, the inspector should include a statement similar to one of the following:

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, a. The findings in this program area appear to indicate an

{' improving (declining) cerformance since the previous

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evaluation. l

b. The program or activity inspected is effective with respect l

l to meeting ti.e safety objectives ofthe program,

c. No violations or deviations were identified.

d. This program area requires further review and evaluation and I is considered to be an open or unresolved item. (A reason j should be stated).

e. The following violations and/or deviations were identified during the inspection of this program area. l

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These statements are illustrative and are not intended to be r used exactly as written. In addition, other statements may be appropriate in certain situations.

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Open items and unresolved items are included in the written description of the program area to which they apply. Each open and unresolved item should be identified by a unique number to facilitate tracking and subsequent followup.

Open items are matters which have been discussed with the licensee, which will be reviewed further by the NRC inspector, and which require some action on the part of the NRC inspector or licensee, or both.

Unresolved items are matters about which more in forma tion is required in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, violations, or deviation.

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3. Action on Previous Inspection Findings. Describe any significant licensee or vendor action on previously 1". , identified inspection findings. Provide a description of the findings and a statement as to whether each item included remains open or is closed Inspection reports are not used to track all matters considered open; therefore, it is not necessary to list all outstanding items and all violations that the regional office still considers open. Rather, this part of the report should contain information related only to those items examined during the inspection.

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4 Exit Interview. List the naiaes and positions or titles of persons present at the exit interview with Itcensee or vendor management. If the list of persons contacted is the same as the list of persons participating in the exit interview, a referencing note is adequate and the list need not be repeated.

This section should briefly describe each subject discussed at the exit interview, and whether any of the information discussed was proprietary. Specific items discussed elsewhere in the report should not be described in this section in detail. To the extent that management expresses a position (agrees, disagrees) with the inspection findings, this position should be factually reported. It is not necessary, however, to report the licensee's or vendor's planned corrective action for violations and devi.ation, since the licensee or vendor will be given an opportunity to provide the information in writing.

Any contact af ter the exit interview regarding changes in either the licensee's or inspector's posittog on an item also should be reported.

5. Enforcement Conference / Management Meeting. If an enforcement conference or management meeting is held before the inspection report is issued, a brief summary of the meeting should be included in the report and referenced in the transmittal letter.

8.1.2.3 Timeliness of Reports Reports should be issued in a timely manner while the inspection findings are fresh in the licensee's mind. The effectiveness of an inspection diminisnes as the length of time between the exit interview and report issuance increases. The goal is to issue I

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inspection reports 30 calendar days after completion of the r

inspection (45 calendar days for major team inspections). For a resident inspector, the goal is 21 calendar days after the last day covered by the inspection report. It is recognized that the goal may not be met in all cases; however, the report shoudl be dispatched within 30 days after completion of the inspection (45 calendar days for major team inspections).

8.1.2.4 Materials Inspection Reports A complete formal report must be prepared for any materials inspection that involves (1) an inspection of a Priority 1 licensee (see IMC-2800, "Materials Inspection Program"), except a radiographer, (2) a special inspection conducted in response to an allegatiin or licensee incident or event, or misadministration, or (3) an inspection that may result in escalated enforcement. Other materials inspections may be documented with a formal cover page plus inspection notes or a completed NRO Form 591, "Sa fe ty Inspection," plus inspection notes, i

Inspection notes should be legible and' contain sufficient detail to define the scope of the inspection, the status of compliance formed during the inspection, the status of followup items involving prior enforcement or ieported licensee events, and sufficient information to support any fir 'ings of violations or deviations. i' 8.1.2.5 Transmittal and Acknowledgement Letters l

Appendix 8, in items 15 through 35, lists examples of standard l

formats for the inspection report cover page and transmittal and i acknowledgement letters i ssed by ,tt regions. The transmittai letter should highlight or otherwise. discuss th.e results of the inspection, as contained in the fummary of the report, with emphasis on safety significant matters. Certain paragraphs are 1

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in standard format and should not be changed; however, the writer can add supplemental parag aphs .in the transmittal and acknowledgement letter for. matters that need specific attention.

8.2 EVALUATION AND DOCUMENTATION OF ENFORCEMENT MATTERS.

Documentation of enforcement' matters is an important p&rt o' the inspection process. Enforcement matters must be documented in accordance with established NRC procedures.

8.2.1 Reofonal-Inspector Evaluation Regional inspectors identi fy apparent violations of regulato ry requirements during inspections and recommend enforcement action based on appropriate documentation of findings. They suggest a severity level to appropriate regional management and

provide reasons for mitigation or escalation of a civil penalty, if any.

The regional inspectors also review responses to Notices of Violation submitted by If censees to determine whether correctf ve actions are adequate and prepare, er provide input to, evaluations of licensees responses to prop ' sed civil penalties and Orders.

8.2.2 Violation Documentation Once a violation has been identified, the facts surrounding the violation must be assembled. The information documented should address the following points, if applicable:

1. What requirement was violated?

2. How was the requirement violated? ,

3. When was it first violated and for how long?

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4. By whom was it violated? r

5. Who discovered the violation?

6. Ho's was it reported and by whom?

7. Are there previous violations of a similar nature?

8. Are there multiple examples of a particular violation?

9. What was the cause of the violation?

10. What is the safety significance of the violation?

11. Was there careless disregard of NRC requirements or.

indications that a requirement was willfully or knowingly violated?

12. Was management aware, or should it have been aware, of the violation?

13. Is there evidence that management was involved directly or indirectly in the violation and to what extent?

14 Are there circumstances surrounding the violation which increase or decrease its significance?

15. How many opportunities did the licensee have to discover that there was a violation? Were there opportunities to discover the violation sooner; and, if so, what were they and who should have recognized them?

The documentation should include specific information regarding times, dates, names and titles of persons, and types of equipment involved in the violation. This documentation is usually 4

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____________________--_---___--_-i.__----______________---- _ _ _ _ - - - - -

( presented in an inspection report. The severity level of a violation should not be described in tha inspection report but should be dealt with 'iq the enforcement package.

The inspector should attempt to determine the root causes of problems and document them. Violations should be evaluated to establish whether the problem is only a minor, isolated event, or whether the violation is an indication of more serious problems, such as lack of management controls, inadeouate procedures, or lack of training.

Results of such evaluations snould be documented.

8.2.3 Documentation for Violation of Materials Ucenses NRC Form 591, "Safety Inspection," is used for inspections of materials licensees, Inspection Priority Il through VII. When properly acknowledged by licensee management, indicating that

( corrective action .will be taken for any violations noted, this form serves as the official notification of enforcement action.

Its use as a notification of enforcement action is limited to inspections which result in severity level IV or V violations.

Some severity level IV or V violations are preprinted on the form, and others may be written in by the inspector.

8.3 PROCESSING ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS 8.3.1 Notice of Violations When an appropriata enforcement action is selected, the licensee is notified of the decision by means of a letter transmitting the Notice of Violation. The Notice informs the licensee that an inspection was conducted, as well as when and by whom it was conducted. The areas in which the violation was found are described in detail; any sanctions being proposed are stated; the 8-13 I

reason for the sanctions are presented; the response that is e necessary from the licensee is described; it is stated that the action is not subject 'to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980; and it indicates that the transmittal letter, the Notice of Violation and the licensee's response will be placed in the NRC Public document Room, r

Notices of Violation are signed and dated by the person who signs the transmittal letter. The notice should contain a very brief description of the event (no more than one paragraph), the legal citation of the requirement er requirements that were violated, ,

the date of the violation, the way in which the requirement was violated (the facts necessary to show that one or more elements l

of the requirement were not met', the severi ty level, and the proposed civil penalty amount, if appropriate. The notice also informs the licensee of the response required to be made to NRC and, if applicabic, of the option to request mitigation for any or all the penalties being proposed.

l 8.3.2 Notices of Deviation

i. I Notices of Deviation are written in the same format as Notices of l Violation. The transmittal letter arks the licensee to respond by describing any corrective action taken to prevent recurrence and stating the date when the corrective action will be complete.

Each notice should reference and quote or paraphrase the pertinent commi tment, and should describe the manner in which the commitment was not met. Notices of deviation should be sigaed and dated by the person who signs the transmittal letter.

8.3.3 Order Imoosino a Civil penalty An Order Imposing a civil penalty is attached to a transmittal letter that references previous correspc.1dence between the licensee and NRC relative to the action being considered, takes '

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into account any licensee rebuttal or reasons for mitigation or remission, imposes the civil penalty, notes that the action is not subject to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980, and states that the letter and its enclosures will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room.

An Order imposing a civil penalty is accompanied by an evaluation of the licensee's response as an Appendix to the Order. The evaluation should include a restatement of each violation (if the licensee dentes t.'e violation or if it is in error), a sumary of the licensee's response, an NRC evaluation of the licensee's response, and a conclusion.

8.3.4 Acknowledaement of Responses 8.3.4.1 Actions Without Civil Penalty

'he regional of fice should review the licensee's response to any

( Notice of Violation for adequacy, acknowledge receipt of thei response, and request, additional information from the licensee.

if necessary. A licensee's response should be acknowledged within 15 days after r'eceipt.

8.3.4.2 Actions with Civil penalty The Of fice of Enforcement should acknowledge receipt of payment of the civil penalty and indicate that an inspector will examine the corrective actions during subsequent inspections. If it is determined that the corrective actions are inadequate, additional action will be considered.

8.3.5 Standard Formats Appendix B, in items 36 through 44, lists standard formats and pa agraphs to be used in preparing enforcement packages.

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8.4 CATEGORIES OF EXEMPT INFORMATION-All inspection information that is exempt from public disclosure must be separately identified and included. in enclosures to the inspection report, or in the case of sa feguards information, deleted as directed by NRC Manual Chapter 2101, "NRC Security Program."

The following categories of information are withheld from public disclosure:

1. Information classified as National Security Information (NSI) in accordance with the provisions of the President's Executive Order and the Information Security Oversicht Office Directive or that which is classified as Restricted

, Data in accordance with the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, 42 U.S.C. 2011, et seq..

t

2. Personal preferences of the inspector as opposed to presentation of technical positions on items and areas inspec,ted (ref. 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(5)). Note: Inspectors may make their personal concerns known through an evaluation memoranoum to NRC regional and headquarters management.

This memorandum may be subject to release under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), but in most cases could be withheld pursuant to exemption 5 of the Act.

3. Identity of persons providing information to the NRC under ar express pledge of confidentiality, or unde- circumstances such that confidentiality can be inferred, and any details of information tnat would reveal the identity of such

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persons (ref. 5 U.S.C. 55P.(b)(6) and 10 CFR 2.790(a)(7) and 19.15). Exception: If it is necessary to report infonnation to 50pport the inspection findings that would reveal the id*.'ntity of the source, the information should be included in an enclosure to the report and disclosed only to NRC personr.el who have a need to know. Such information should be clearly identified and the pages marked so that the information is not disclosed to tie 71censee or the public.

4 Names of individuals who have received exposure to radiation or any other identifying information of a personal or nedical nature, the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy (ref. 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(6) and 10 CFR 2.790).

5. Excerpts fror. NRC or other government agency documents that hava not been disclosed to the public (ref 5 U.S.C.

(

552(b)(5) aird 10 CFR 2.790(a)(5)).

6. Information exempt from mandatory pubite disclosure pursuant to 5 U.S.C 552(b)(4) and 20 CFR 2.790(a)(4), such as trade secrets and commercial or financial information.

7. Safeguards information pursuant to Section 147 cf the Atomic Energy Act of 1954.

8. Information exempt frcm mandatory disclosure under 10 CFR 2.790 and 10 CFR 9.5.

9. Information subject to a claim for withholding frem pubitc disclosure as set forth in 10 CFR 2.790(b)(1).

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F 8.5 CONTROL OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT DOCUMENTS r

8.5.1 Control Prior to Official' Issuance No portions of any inspection / enforcement document, or information contained therein, shall be discussed with, shown to, or given to licensees, vendors or any other group or person external to NRC before the official issuance of the inspection / enforcement document without the express permission of .*

the NRC Executive Director for Operations (E00).

8.5.2 Release of Safety ocr Safeouards Information Safety or safeguards information shall be immediately and clearly communicated to responsible licensee or vendor management to obtain prompt licensee evaluation and, if appropriate, corrective action. Such safety or safeguards communications shall be noted in the inspection report, and a copy of any releases given to the licensee or vender shall be appended to the inspection report.

The EDO does not require to be advised of appropriately released safety or safeguards information. '

8.5.3 Release of Briefino Documents Occuments prepared by the staff for use in management meetings with licensees or vendors relati~e v to inspection activities shall be reviewed and approved for release by regional management or the inspection team leader, as. the situation dictates, before distribution at a meeting. This information shall be appended to the inspection report.

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-- - _ _ - - _ - - - - - _ - _ _ _ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - . - - - - - --- - - --- -- ^

8.5.4 Release of Administrative Inspection Occuments To ensure that the proper and effective conduct of inspection or regulatory functions is not impeded, administrative inspection materials incident to the conduct of the inspection may be released to the licensee or vendor in any form without prior approval. In addition, these materials need not be placed in the NRC Public Occument Room or appended to the inspection report.

8.5.5 Release of Licensee or Vender Documents Any copy of a licensee or vendor document (clean copy or inspector annotated) obtained during the courte of the inspection may be returned to the licensee at any time the inspector deems necessary to further the conduct of the inspection. For example, it may be appropriate for the inspector to annotate a licensee drawing, strip chart, test procedure, or test result and then

( return this document to the licensee to aid in the commun: cation of inspector concerns. These document releases do not require any express permission, and these documents need not be included in the inspection report. If, however, the inspector deems it necessary to retain a copy of the inspector-annotated document to be released, that copy becomes an NRC document and, as such, must be placed in an addendum of the inspection report and released with the report to the NRC Public Document Room.

8.5.6 Exclusions From Released Information Information released to the licensee or vendor shall not incluc;e any of the following:

, 1. Potential severity level of any violation, except during enforcement conferences. During inspection exit meetings, the inspector may characterize the relative significance of 9

4 8-19

the violation with respect to the necessity for taking ,

prompt or immediate corrective action. This characterization 'shall not include inspector opinions concerning the potential severity level of the violation.

2. Opinions as to whether a civil penalty, enforcement conference, or investigation eill result.

3. Negotiations over inspection findings. Negotiations do not include the discussion of inspector findings or conclusions as further relevant information is made available. Rather, negotiations constitute arranging to drop certain inspector findings or concerns to obtain licensee or vendor agreement with or action on other inspector identified items.

Any departure from these guidelines shall be reported to the appropriate Office Director or Regional Administrator. No inspection / enforcement documents are automatically excluded from the release of agency records pursuant to a formal request under the Freedom of Information Act.

8.6 REVIEW AND O!STRIBUTION OF INSPECTION REPORTS <

Oraft inspection reports are reviewed at the bra nct, chief or section chief level. If exempt information must be included, such information is to be contained in a separate enclosure to the report or, if this is not possible, the inspector should ensure that the sections that contain exempt information are strictly controlled and clearly marked as required by the applicab;e portions of NRC Manual Chapter 2101, "NRC Security Program."

Inspection reports containing safeguards information shall also be controlled in accordance with NRC Manual Chapter 2101. Before '

placing these reports in the NRC Pubite Document Room or making j general distribution, all safegudeds information must be deleted.

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The summary shall contain no safeguards information. The description of subjects examined shall normally present no particular problem, b~ut care should be exere ied.

d Violations and deviations must be described in general terms to preclude disclosure of exempt information.

Review of draf t inspection reports for proprietary information is accomplished by the NRC staff without licensee or vendor review.

It is the responsibility of the licensee or vendor to identify and/or tell the inspector if the material provided in the' course of an inspection is proprietary.

If the report contains proprietary information, those portions containing this information shall be marked in accordance with NRC Manual Chapter 2101, Part XVI. If there is significant doubt as to whether or not the material is proprietary, clarification ,

should be requested from the Itcensee. The letter transmitting

( this clarification request should contain a paragraph that i provides specific review and notification instructions. One example is as follows:

"In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790(a), a copy of this letter ,

and the enclosed information will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room unless you notify this office, by telephone, within 10 days of the date of this letter, and submit a written application to withhold the information contained therein. Such apolication must be consistent with the requirements of 10 CFR 2.790(b)(1). If we do not hear s

from you in this regard within the specified periods noted above, this information will be made available to the pubite in the NRC Pubite Document Room " !

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When a significant violation is identified and an enforcement ,

l conference is not promptly convened, the violation should be l

identified by the prompt issuance of a Notice of Violation, with a cover letter indicating that details will be provided in the inspection report to be issued later. The inspection report will reference the Notice of Violation.

8.7 INVESTIGATIONS The Office Jf Investigations (01) conducts and supervises NRC investigations of allegations of wrongdoing by licensees, apolicants, an'd their contractors and vendors, and assures the quality of investigations. Inspectors may be requested to assist or provide technical assistance for investigations. The investigatier, process may include referencing inspection reports or extracting information from inspection reports to be included in investigation reports. No rma lly, OI will have the responsibility for conducting an investigation and coordination of inputs for the investigation report.

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CHAPTER 9 EVALVA'l0N OF LICENSEE MANAGEMLNT EFFECTIVENESS 9.1 BA3IC PRINCIPLES AND FUNCTIONS OF MANAGEMENT All managers have, in general,.the same task - to astablish and maintain an organizational environment in which people, working together in groups, can be efficient and effective in the attainment of common goals. Managers accomplish this task by means of functions that are common to all management endeavors, regardless of organizational level or structure. These functions are: . planning, organiz'ing, staffing, directing, and' controlling.

They are basic to managerial activity at all levels, from foreman to Chief Executive Officer and, taken together, may be considered ,-

to constitute the duties of a manager. A critical evaluation of '

these functions, individually or in sum, provides a measure of

( management effectiveness.

The inspector must be familiar with the fund,amental s of management and thi concepts, requirements and indicators that will provide for an evaluation of the effectiveness of liceasee i management during construction and operation of a nuclear power

plant or fuel facility. Although the material presented here is specifically pertinent to nuclear utilities, the principles involved and many of the specific areas discussed are applicable to fuel f acility -and materials license.es.

9.1.1 Plannino The planning function involves selecting from among alternatives the t,bj ecti ve s , policies, programs, and procedures and 'the strategies for e,chieving the objectives. Pians take many ;

4 d' fferent forms:

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1. Objectives goals, or the end toward which group activity is aimed.

2. Policies - general statements that guide or channel thinking and action in decision making.

3. Strategies - a general program or action for deployment of resources to attain objectives - usually.long-range.

4. Procedures - sequences of required actions that apply to future activities.

5. Rules - specific and definite actions to be 'taken with respect to a situation.

6. Programs - a complex of goals, policies, procedures, rules, task assignmerts, resources to be employed, and other elements necessary to carry out a given course of action.

7. Budgets - plans expressed in dollars.

9.1.2 02 panizino b Organizing is the grouping of activities necessary to obtain an objective and the assignment of each group to a manager with the requisite authority to supervise it. Important concepts in the organizing function are:

1. Unity of command - no member of an organization should report to more than one superior for any single activity.

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, 2. Eyception principle - recurring decisions should be handled

)

routinely at low levels with problems and unusual matters i

'eing c referred to higher levels. l l

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+r av , ~ ,.

3. Span of control - the limit to the number of-subordinates that one superior can supervise.

4. Scalar principle - authority and responsibility should flow in a clear unbroken line from the highest authority to the lowest.

5. Depart.ientation - the manner in which activities are divided

}

and formed into specialized groups to maintain control.

6. Delegation - assignrrent of tasks, passing of authority and exacting of responsibility for accomplishing t,acessary activities.

Simple models are generally used to clarify organizational relationships: organization charts, position descriptions and charts combining organizational relationships and objectives.

9.1.3 Staffino Staffing involves manning the organization structure through effective selection, appraisal, training and development of per-sonnel to fill the positions established by the planning and or- '

ganizing functions. It is probably the most critical and the most difficult of the management functions. It is the area where ;

NRC sets forth the most prescriptive requirements in technical specifications.

9.1.4 Directino Directing is the function by which the manager puts into action ,

the decisions, plans and programs selected to achieve the goals 1 and objectives of the group. Directing includes the concepts of leading, executing, supervising, guiding, motivating and communi- ,

cating; it is at the center of the managerial process because it 9-3

is the function that initiates action. Effective communication ,

is essential to direction and to all management functions because it serves to link them and because a manager expends a major portion of his activity communicating ideas and requirements up and down the organizational structure.

9.1.5 Controllina Controlling is the management function that measures current per-formance to ensure that all activity is working toward the pre-determined . 'goal . The control process is dependent upon the planning and organizing functions to establish performance criteria and standards; it depends on the directing and staffing functions to take corrective action when deviations from the plan occur.

9.2 REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS FOR MANAGEMENT OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS , ,

The regulatory requirements for management of nuclear facilities derive from 10 CFR 50, "Oomestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities." Section 50.36 requires technical specifications covering administrative controls: "...

administrative controls are the provisions relating to '

organization and management, procedures, recordkeeping, review and audit, and reporting necessary to assure the operation of the f acility in a safe manner." A description of these controls and a commitment to their establishment and use are written intt .he technical specifications for each plant. Section 50.34 requires that the FSAR contain "the following in forma tion concerning facility operation: (1) The applicant's organizational structure, allocations or responsibilities and authorities, and personnel qualifications requirements. (11) Managerial and administrative controls to be used to assure safe operation."

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2 Section 50.34 also contains . requirements for a preliminary organization plan to be included in tne PSAR.- Guidance for ,

icelusion of manageria~1 information in both the PSAR and the FSAR is given in Chapter' 13 of the NRC Standard Review Plan (NUREG-0800). Appendix 8 of 10 CFR 50 sets forth criteria for the establishment and organizatior, of the licensee's Quality ,

Assurance P-egeam, which should constitute a principle management control mechanism at a nuclear facility. .

9.3 LICENSEE ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE 9.3.1 Mt.ility and Coroorste Oroanization No single optimum organizatior and administration structure has yet emerged from the study of nuclear utilities. Utilities differ in terms of: ..

,( 1. size, number and location of plants and statioas,

. 2. .

financial, economic, social and state regulatory environments, and

3. background and experience in operating nuclear plants.

These and other factors have impeded the development of an +

P

, industry-wide uniform scheme of organization and administration. '

Within the guidelines of the Standard Technical Specifications and the Standard Review Plan (NUREG-0800), NRC provides the Itcensee an opportunity to develop a unique organizational structure that will meet the needs while satisfying requirements for safe operation. In addition, several documents published by the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) provide 4

, guidelines, criteria and performance objectives for the '

l organization and administration of a nuclear utility; these areas are assessed as part of the recurring INPO evaluation program.

1 9-5

Since nuclear utility organizations vary widely, an evaluation of management effectiveness must take into account the similarities '

and differences. All utilities have a division of activity between headquarters and the operating plant. A senior utility manager, commonly termed tha Nuclear Vice president, is usually responsible for all nuclear functions, including plant operations, support and monitoring. Under him, the Plant or Station Superintendent is responsible for the safe operation of

, the nuclear power plant. The term "corporate" is normally applied to nuclear activity which takes place at the utility headquaiters; corporate efforts involve monitoring and support of plant operations under the direction of the Nuclear Vice l President. A representative corporate organization for a nuclear

[ utility is depicted in Figure 9.1.

i 9.3.2 Operatino plant Oreanization ,,

Most operating plant organizations have much in common, since j they are based on the criteria established by Standard Technical Specifications. Positions, titles, organizational relationships and division of responsibility vary from plant to plant. An '

operating plant organization is shown in Figure 9.2.

The plant Superintendent is the individual assigned responsibility for overall safe operation of the nuclear plant.

All persons directly responsible for plant operation report to this individual.

An Assistant Superintendent may be assigned, as shown, or may report directly to the Plant Superintendent without having direct line responsibility for plant operation. Some plants, particularly those with single units, may not have an Assistant Superintencent.

The Operations Supervisor is responsible for day-to-day operation of the plant.

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( The Maintenance Supervisor _ is typically responsible for all '

mechanical, electrical and instrumentation maintenance. The Mechanical Maintenance Foreman, the Electrical Maintenance Foreman and the Instruments and Controls Supervisor report to the Maintenance Supervisor. '

The Technical Supervisor carries responsibility for most technical and engineering activities performed at the site. This normally includes chemistry, health _p hysics, radiological controls, engineering evaluation of operational and maintenance problems, initiation or review of facility design changes, oversight of the surveillance program (including performance or supervision of complex tests), and fuel-cycle management. Wide variations in the size and capcbilities of the onsite technical support group exist, depending on the size, capability, and l proximity of the offsite technical support to other segments of ,

the support and monitoring organization. In some utilities, such ;

( as those with only one nuclear plant, the bulk of this activity may occur at the site. Other licensees provide strong technical suport from offsite corporate organizations and keep onsite technical support to a minimum.

A Quality Control (QC) St.pe rvi sor is normally assigned and reports to an of f site manager to preclude any possibility of conflict of interest. This supervisor normally has responsibility for day-to-day quality-related activities, such as inspection of maintenance hold points and review of purchase and '

receipt documents for proper quality requirements. i An ensite Quality Assurance (QA) Supervisor is normally assigned i and also rerari t to an offsite manager to preclude any !

possibility of ce flict of interest. The QA Supervisor usually has responsibility for accomplisning a significant portion of the ;

9-7 !

.. - _ _ . _ ~. - .- -, _ _ _ -_ _ _ _ _ - _ . __. _

QA audit program. Both the QA and QC Supervisors perform essential control functions in the management of a nuclear '

station. Some licensees' combine the QA and QC responsibilities under one supervisor for Quality Assurance.

9.3.3 Orcanization of a Plant under Construction The organization of a facility under construction is less '

standardized than for an operating unit. There may be large variations that depend on whether construction and quality control functions are performed by the utility or by contractors.

Figure 9.3 presents a very general representation of the organizational structure for a facility under construction. This construction organization is that of a utility that contracts for all activities but retains a surveillance function through its

] > own QA organization. Other . utilities perform their own architectural-engineering functions and construction activities 4 and furnish their own QC and vendor inspection groups, with QA organizations assuming a much broader role.

9.4 MANAGEMENT INFORMATION AND CONTROL SYSTEMS I i

9.4.1 The OA/0C Orcanization i The Quality Assurance / Quality Control organization in a nuclear utility performs an essential management control function. While '

plant and corporate personnel should be committed to quality performance at all levels, prescribed quality programs provide j management with independent assurance of safe performance over 'a f spectrum of nuclear activities. A licensee's Quality Assurance i a Manual, which is derived from 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, and American National Standards Institute (ANSI) standards, normally provides ;

a definitive description of the operation of the QA/QC ;

e organization and the interfaces with other plant and corporate '

groups.

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QA audits and surveillances are required in all functional areas that affect safe plant operations. -These audits must be ;

performed in accordance with approved procedures and checklists that must cover significant items and parameters which affect plant safety. The QA program must provide a means of describing each significant audit finding, assigning each finding to a specific individual for action, documenting correctf Ye actions required and their completion, and ensuring timely notification of higher management and NRC when required.

The QC organization monitors, on a recurring basis and in a hands-on manner, selected activities that affect the safe opera- ,

tion of the plant. These efforts include: review of procurement t and receipt documents, receipt inspection of purchased materials l and components, examination of maintenance adequacy at prescribed or randomly selected check points, nondestructive examinations when required, and support to other plant groups upon request.

(. Support efforts should itsclude 13spection of plant modifications.

There should also be a QA or QC review of operations (surveillances, technical specifica' tion compliance, etc.)

To ensure complete independence, neither the QA nor the QC group is commonly under the Plant Superintendent; both report via a separate chain to the Nuclear Vice President or above. In some instances, however, the QC group may report to plant management.

An important measure of utility management effectiveness is the degree to which the QA/QC groups are integrated into the plant organization. They should be considered an integral ~part of the plant team, performing an invaluable and dif ficul t control function. An adversarial relationship between the QA/QC orgcnization and plant line and staff groups indicates possible overall management problems. The relationship should not be too close, however, it should be professional and "at arm's length."

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Some important characteristics of an effective QA/QC organization for evaluation by the inspector-are:

1. Quality assurance personnel should have sufficient technical expertise and operating experience to evaluate the assigned ,

area.

2. Quality evaluation should focus on program implementation and performance rather than the written program.

3. Follow-up action on deficiencies should be reported to the J

auditor or. inspector. Resolution should be verified.

4. Line management responsibility for correction of deficiencies should not be assigned to QA/QC personnel.

5. QA/QC concepts and evaluations may be applied to balance of plant components and systems.

6. Managers and superv,isors at all levels should actively support quality programs, cooperate with QA/QC personnel and

, ensure timely correction of deficiencies.

7 There should be a system to escalate QA/QC concerns to upper i level management if normal corrective action fails.

J These attributes can help identify quality programs that surpass 4 the minimum NRC requirements and serve as an effective management control mechanism for plant and corporate management. ;

9.4.2 Safety Review Committees Standard Technical Specifications prescribe the es+.ablishment of review groups and committees to monitor various nuclear activities. These groups perform invaluable management control functions. Close obsersation of their workings and products can l

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provide the inspector with valuable insight into the state of overall plant management effectiveneas. The names of the groups or committees vary from utility .o utility and all are administered somewhat differently.

An Independent Safety Engineering Group, for example, examines unit operating characteristics, NRC issuances, industry advisories, Licensee Event Reports, and other sources of unit design and operating experience information, including review of units of similar design, which may indicate areas for improving unit safety. The ISEG makes detafled recommendations for revised procedures, equipment modifications, maintenance activities, operations activities, or other means of improving unit safety to a high-level corporate official in a technically oriented position who is not in the management chain for power production.

The ISEG is responsible for maintaining surveillance of unit activities to provide independent verification that these

( activities are performed correctly and that human errors are reduced as much at practical.

The Unit Review Group (often called the Plant Review Group or the .

Plant Operating Review Couvnittee) is the onsite group charged with advising the Plant Superintendent on all matters related to nuclear safety. The group is typically chaired by the Plant Superintendent and usually as members has all the plant supervisors in the next lower level. The Unit Review Group has a vital directing and control function in the scheme of plant operations. technical specifications list the responsibilities of the Group in detail.

The Company Nuclear Review and Audit Group functions to provide independent review and audit of designated activities in the areas of;

1. Nuclear power plant operations.

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2. Nuclear engineering. .

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3. Chemistry and radiochemistry.

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4 Metallurgy. e

5. Instrumentation and control.

6. Radiological safety.

7. Mechanical and electrical engineering quality assurance practices.

8. Other appropriate fields.

The Company Nuclear Review and Audit Group reports directly to the Nuclear Vice President. Its duties are detailed in the Technical Specifications, including the responsibility for specific audits at prescribed frequencies. These audits are-normally performed by the QA organization onsite, but first responsibility remains with the Company Group to assure as much independence as possible.

Some important characteristics of effective safety review committees for evaluation by the inspector are:

1. Required technical disciplines are present for the specific subject under review.

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2. rambers meet qualifications and are knowledgeable of the functions of the groups.

3. Documents and occurrences are reviewed in sufficient depth to recognize significant safety deficiencies.

4 Reviews are accompitshed and reports are issued in a timely manner.

5. Required actions are tracked to compietion.

6. Interfaces with plant and corporate management and with other groups are clearly defined.

9-12

9.4.3 Coerect',7e Action Systems Deficiencies 9.oblems, and nonconformances identified by the QA/CC orjaM ration and the' Safety Review Committees provide inpu'es inn ~c he Corrective Action System which tracks and guides the corrective action required untti completion. Corr #;tive Action Systenes are described in Chapter.14 of this Manual.

9.4.4 Cowaitment Trackina Systems All licensees should have a system to identify and track commitments made to NRC. Most licensees, particularly the older ones, have a management control system that identifies cu'nitments, obligations, and requirements that arise outside the MRC regulatory framework. These may be administrative or techni-cai, internal or external, and may require action or merely a r9 cord of activity completed. Such a system is not an NRC

( regulatory requirement, but the myriad information demands imposed on a licensee from diverse sources make some sort of tracking scheme almost mandatory._ Observation and monitoring of these systems in action over a long period of time can provide an inspector with additional information regarding overall utilit) manageme9t.

9.o EVALUATION AND IMPROVEMENT OF UTILITY MANAGEMENT 9.5.1 Reactor Insoection Proaram The NRC inspection manual, in IMC 2500 "Reactor Inspection Program," contains many procedures that evaluate, directly or indirectly, the performance of plant and corporate management.

Some inspection manual chapters that address management effectiveness are:

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IMC 3000 - Management Meetings '

IMC 3500 - Quality Assurance IMC 3600 - Organization'and Administration IMC 4000 - Review and Audit IMC 4200 - Procedures IMC 6200 - Maintenance IMC 7100 - Operations (License and Technical Specifications Requirements) i In the aggregate, these procedures can provide a reasonable assessment of licensee performance in areas- that reflect on management. The inspector, over a period of time, can develop ;

his own criteria for adjudging management effectiveness based on the inspection procedures in these chapters.

l 9.5.2 Performance Aporaisal Team

, The NRC inspection manual, in Part 2g00, "Performance Appraisals," sets forth the Performance Appraisal Program, which has as its primary objective the evaluation of the effectiveness ,

[ of licensee management control systems in 1 important to safety. The Performance Evaluation Branch of the selected areas

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NRR Division of License Performance and Quality Evaluation performs periodic utility inspections in the following functional l areas:

1. Training

2. Design charges and modifications

3. Corrective action system

] 4 Committee activities

5. Maintenance

6. 0A audit program

7. P*ocurement

! 8. Radiological controls 1

I 9-14

The licensee's management activity in each furetional area is e examined against the following criteria:

1. Does the licensee have a written program (procedures or policy documents) to provide guidance in the management of the functional ares?

2. Are the procedures and policy documents adequate for controlling the activities in the functional areas to assure compliance with regulatory requirements and guidance?

3. Have the program requirements for the functional area been implemented to achieve compliance with the requirements and guidance in the area, and are these activities appropriately l documented?

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. 4 Do the individuals who have been assigned responsibilities g in the functional areas understand their responsibilities?

5. Are the licensee personnel with responsibilities in the functional area adequately qualified to perform their i, activities and have they been adequately trained and retrained to maintain their qualification level?

l These criteria have been used by the Performance Appraisal Team to develop a Management Evaluation Tree (MET) that is general enough to be applied in any functional area. The Management Evaluation Tree provides a conceptual framework for assessing management effectiveness in the context of a corporate or site inspection. It may also be used to develop detailed, program-oriented check lists in any functional area. The Management Evaluation Tree is included as Figure 9.4, which is followed by a' guide to its use.

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The major focus of the Perfomance Evaluation Branch is the ,

implementation of programs in the areas of operations, i surveillance, and design changes and modifications.

Part 2900 of the NRC inspection manual also describes the Construction Appraisal Team Inspection Program, which evaluates the quality of construction and hardware programs at nuclear plants under construction. Among other items, utility management involvement and quality programs are evaluated.

9.5.3 T.h'e procram for Systematic Assessment of 1.icensee Performance The Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance (SALP) program, an integrated NRC offert, is described in Chapter 0516 "Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance (SALP)," of the .

NRC Manual. Available observations are collected on a periodic basis (usually 12 to 18 months), and licensee performance is evaluated on the basis of these observations both during '

construction and operation. Emphasis is placed on understar, ding the reasons for a licensee's performance in important functional '

areas and sharing this understanding with the licenseh. The program consists of a comprehensive review of the manner in which ;

If eensee management directs, guides, and provides resources for assuring plant safety. The goal of a SALP review is to direct NRC and licensee attention toward areas affecting nuclear safety that need improvement. In short, tha sal.P program focuses on management - planning, organizing, sta f fing, directing, and controlling.

d An attempt is made to review all relevant licensee reports and activities. For operating reactors, the licensee is evaluated in elhven functional areas ( supplemen tal areas may be added, if required):

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l. Plant operations,

2. Radiological controls, 7

3. Maintenance, 4 Surveillance,

5. Fire protection, !

, 6. Emergency preparedness, !

7. Security,

8. Outages, o

9. Quality programs and administration controls

] affecting quality,

10. Licensing activities,.and '

11. Training and qualification effectiveness. '

There are similar functional areas for evaluation of construction '

and preoperational phases.

8 A regional SALP Board evaluates the licensee's perforsance

( against the following criteria:

i 1, management involvement in assuring quality, 2.

approach to the resolution of p'echnical issues from a safety standpoint, !

3. responsiveness to NRC initiatives.

4, enforcement history, 7 5. operational and construction events (including response to, analysis of, and corrective actions for), and

6. staffing (including management).

The licensee is given one of the following ratings in each l functional area: r 4

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Catecory 1. Reduced NRC attention may be appropriate. Licensee !

management attention and involvement are aggressive and oriented toward nuclear safety; licensee resources are ample and effectively used so that a high level of performance with respect

) to operational safety and construction quality is being achieved.

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Catecory 2. NRC attention should be maintained at normal levels. ,

Licensee management attention and involvement are evident and are concerned with nuclear. safety; licensee resources are adequate and reasonably effective, so satisfactory performance with respect to operational safety Pnd Construction quality is being achieved.

Cateaory 3. Both NRC and licensee attention should be increased.

Licensee management attention or involvement is acceptable and considers nuclear safety, but weaknesses are evident; licensee resources appear to be ' strained or not effectively used so that minimally satisfactory performance with respect to operational safety and construction quality is being achieved.

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After publication of the SALP report, a meeting is usually held '

with licensei management to discuss the SALP evaluation. This meeting provides a forum for candid discussion of issues relating to the licensee's performance. Those aspects of the Itcensee's operations that need improvement are identified, as well as the

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favorable aspects. ,

i I i The SALP program represohts the principle means by which NRC evaluates the performance of utility management. The process includes as much objective material as is available but it is l

ultimately a subjective appraisal of licensee management by the NRC resident inspector and regional and headquarters management.

i 9.5.4 Licensee improvement Precrams l In extraordinary circunstances, there are provisions for imposing a management improvement program on a licensee, either in the overall conduct of plant management or in a specific area such as radiological controls or staffing of certain functional areas.

Improvement programs are normally directed by the Regional Administrator and are usually the consequence of an unfavorable SALP report or special inspections.

j 9-18

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9.6 MEASURES OF MANAGENENT EFFECTIVENESS l A series of questions that can provide the inspector with a valid basis for evaluation of management effectiveness is presented '

below. These questions do not constitute an inspection plan but,

rather, represent subject'ive criteria for evaluating management based on the experience of many NRC inspectors. They should be in the inspector's mind as management is evaluated in the light of performance in functional areas. They are related, j ultimately, to the basic functions of management presented in Section 9.1: planning, organizing, staffing, controlling, and directing. '

9.6.1 Policies. Goals, and Objectives j 1. Are there written policies? Are goals and.cojectives '

2 clearly covered? !

2. Are all pertinent subjects of interest covered?

3. Does the policy, clearly and accurately reflect company goc.ls and objectives?

4 Do subordinates participate in establishing goals and l cbjectives?

i l 9.6.2 Resoonsibilities

1. Art responsibilities of ransgement and subordinates clearly defined? Are those resconsible clearly accountable for shortccmings and failures as well as successes? Is there an accurate definition of where one person's jurisdiction ends ard another's begins?

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2. Is there a minimum diffusion of responsibilities; for !

, 4 example, is one person in charge of a function and does that-t person have control- over the resources needed to perform that function? ,

3. Are diversions minimized so that management can focus on l significant issues?

4 Do management and subordinates ippear to completely understand their responsiblit:tes? I l .

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5. Are subordinates held accountable for assigned responsibilities?

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6. Are irterfacing activities between different organizational units clearly defined? ,

t j 7. Art all members of the security force and management interface personnel given the opportunity to practice and coordinate the execution of their responsibilities to attain j adequate skills?

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8. Is there evidence of inaporopriate delegation of responsibility? -

9.6.3 Manaoement Attitude and Commitment

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1. Is management comitted to providing high overall quality in !

management, employnes, and performance of work? Is management e.ommitted to proper supervision and discipline? I t

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2. Does management base and instill in employees the attitudes !

of "do it right the first time" and "proper eerformance and

results are everyone's responsibility?" Has managecent created an atmosphere that encouraget In' king for r@lems !

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and solving them rather than ignoring or putting thera off? ,

Does management motivate personnel to achieve quality l performance and provide incentives to improve? Is there peer pressure to perform well? Is teamwork encouraged; does it exist? Is management receptive to ideas for improvement?

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3. Does management share experience with other utilities, and ;

is there effective use made of this information?

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4. Does management view NRC requirements as minimum levels of performance (to be exceeded rather that met as thi goal),

and do they strive to establish and meet increasingly l higher, self-imcosed goals? Do negative attitudes toward j NRC requirements cause management to focus on meeting l specific commitments, rather than achic/ing the intent. l

5. Is periodic oversight by corporate managers provided at the C site? Does the Nuclear Vice President visit the plant .

frequently? Do corporate engineers? '

6. Does management take the initiative regardi3g safety issues or wait for expression of concern by others, especially NRC7 *

7. Oces management take prompt corrective action regarding i

unqualified or unsatisfactory personnel?

8. Is management responsive to NRC concerns and noncompliance ,

items?

9, Oces management require timely and thorough corrective action, including root cause analysis for deficiency j reports? Does management take prompt corrective action in !

response to audits, surveillanct, and periodic reviews? I i

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10. Does managetent requi*e compliance with approved prncedures? I

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J 9.6.4 Employee Attitude ,

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1. Are employees well-motivated and highly qualified professionals? Are employees proud of their work, their employer, fellow workers, and themselves?- Are their loyalty and personal pride so high that they have a sense of "ownership?"

2. Do workers feel personally responsible for the quality of their work? Have they been trained how to perform? Are recalls or repeats of work excessive? (NUREG-1055, "Improving' Quality and the Assurance of Quality in the Design and Construction of Nuclear Power Plants," noted that repeated rework as a-result of changes is demoralizing 4

and that craftsmanship problems were more a result of poor

management than lack of skill on the part of the craftsman.)

) 9.6.5 Awareness - Ce m unications and Coordinatien

1. Has management established effective feedback systems, even <

if not required by NRC7 Is there adeqJate vertical and r horizontal flow of information?

2. Is management kept adequately informed by subordinates?

3. Is management aware of current issues and ,'roblems?

4 Do individuals and groups adequately interact to inform one ;

another? '

5. Does management adequately coordinate planning and other activities to ensure that all parties are informed? Do

, various departments-0::erations, Maintenance, Health Physics, and Security-comunicate and coordinate their actions? ,

Formally or informally?

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9.6.6 Selection and Training of personecJ

1. Has management implemented a program and procedure for assuring that reliable, trustworthy employees of the highest quality are selected? Has management provided highly trained, qualified, and motivated professio:tal emp','oyees?

2. Is an adequate general employee training (GET) program provided? Is it kept current?

3. Do management and key employees possess requisite experience and qualifications comrnensurate with their responsibilities and assigned functions? :

4 Has management assured themselves that employees of contractors are trained and understand the duties to be ,

assigned in the event of emergencies? Have drills and exercises been conducted to ensure that the desired level of readiness and teamwork has been achieved and is maintained?

9.6.7 Collection (nd Analysis of Information

1. Has management identified key performance parameters. '

collected and analyzed the performance data, and acted on that data? Has management assured itself conce ning the quality and validity of information collected (that is, is ,

it accurate, complete, and relevant)? Can management observe trends and determine their signifi';ance? Does ;

management reset to trends?

2. Is mansgement capable of timely detection of major problems?

Does managemsnt identify and correct the root causes of problems? Does licensee f all to recognize ', hat '

ind'vidual or recurring "pmblems are mere 7y sypotoms of f

more fundamental programatic or management def fe,tencies?

( Oces management make s conscient+ous effort to analyze each inspection finding to determine its root cause?

9-23

4 3. Does management vies w , .. veillance, and reviews as a

management tool to p vm 'wdback on how well safety ,

objectives are attained?

J 9.6.8 overall Manaaement performance :

1. Is management overburdened with detail?L This may be !

determined from statements made by subordinates or by f studying management. reports. ;,

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2. Does management make adequate independent observations?

l This may be determined by the depth of management's j knowledge about subordinate attitude problems and i performance. Does management conduct periodic reviews in ;

l addition to required annual audits?

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3. Is management visibility to subordinate working personnel l

a adequate? Does management tour the plant? '

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4.

Do the QA Committee, the Unit Review Group, the !? dependent !

i

$afety Engineering Group and the Company Nuclear Review and i j Audit Group function effectively and efficiently? This may i be determined by a review of minutes and attendance at I

meetings. i

5. Does the Itcensee maintain a good relationship with the !

press? How does its public image rate? I

6. Is unagement aware of and sensitive to the symptoms of poor l

management practices as they relate to the plant? I f i 1

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9.7 TREND ANALYSIS There is much information available to an NRC inspector for trend analysis. Facility-specific snalysis involves - a comparison of . ,

current performance at a facility with past performance. The SALP Board evaluates certain performance indicators as part of the process of evaluating management effectiveness.

Comparative data analyses are made that involve comparison of data from,*a facility with similar data from another plant. If the facilities' operating histories and conditions are similar, data comparison may lead to valid insigha into performance and management at the respective sites. Some plant performance indicators that can be used for trend analysis are:

1. scrams and unplanned shutdowns, ;

2. safety system actuations,

3. unplanned transients, 4 safety system failures, ^

5. forced outages, -

6. fraction of abnormal control room alarms,

7. duration of outages,

8. correction time for ceficiencies,

9. maintenance backlog,

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10. personnel exposure,

11. staff turnover and vacancies, i

12. operator experience, '

13. maintenance effectiveness.

The NRC Office for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data (AE00) collects data and information from all utilities and '

publishes reports and detailed analyses. Trends and patterns analyses are published annually on the following: scrams, ;

engineered safety feature act.uati on s , system unavailability, j

technical specifications violatfors and shutdowns, and key l

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I component data 'from the Nucl0ar Plant Reliability Data System . '

(NPROS). !NPO tracks plant perforsaace indicators in 10 areas as measures of current utility and industry performance and guides

L to lo.ig-term industry improvement. AE00 ar.d INPO documents that contain performance indicators and other data suitable for-obtaining trends are available~at the NRC regional offices and at 4 each site. Some data required by NRC that may serve as '

indicators of management performance are:

1. LERs - based on months of operation, how does LER frequency compare with that of other plants? Increasing? Decreasing?

Are the reports timely? Repetitive?

2. Enforcement history - number and severity of violations.

l Trend in the facility - increasing or decreasing? Compared ,

with other plants?

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3. Numeers of outstanding deficiency reports or deviation l

notices. Are there a large number of unresolved items? '

Increasing? Decreasing?

[ 4 Number of reactor trips and unplanned shutdowns, e i 1

Although the results of data comparison and trend analysis may j not be completely reliabl4, significant variations from average i or worsening trends over time are symptomatic of poor management perfo rmance. Inspectors should be alert to recognise data and occurrtnces that might lend themselves to trend analysis.

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Users Guide For the MET Chart (Fiaure 9.4)

Prooram (Coroorate)

Policy - There should be a written, up to-date statee nt of management's policy, goals, and objectives regarding activities in this area. The policy document should express management's commitment to adhere to the regulatory requirements and any additional commitments to adhere to the regulatory requirements and any additional commitments which have been made to NRC. It should also acdress any additional requirements which management desires to be implemented. The policy statement should define the organizational responsibilities (corporate and site) for this area'.

The policy statement should be a written statement of policy in the OA Manual or other topical document of management's policy in this area.

Department Directives -

There should be written, up-to-date directives from the corporate manager assigned principle responsibility for this area. The directives should be broad enough in scope to include (1)

, regulatory requirements to be met, (2) stardards.

uides, codes, and other commitments made by the

( icensee (3) additional requirements (company policy) that have no regulatory bases, (4) organizational responsibilities ( AN$1 N18.7-1976, Section 3.2), and *

(5) functional descriptions of the departmental responsibilities and relationships (ANSI N18.7 1976, Section 3.2).

The dirtetives should preferably be in the form of departmental procedures or instructions but can be in i' the QA manual or other topical reports if their scope is such that they include the above features.

2 Position Cescription and Responsibility - The position or job descriptions of the individuals (managers and staff) assigned responsibilities should address their specific responsibilities and span of control with enough detail to assure an understanding of these responsibilities.

A job desertption that has a general statement such as "Responsible for the overall maintenarce of the plant" is not adequate.

9-27 f %-

Organizattons) Structure - The itcensee should have an approved, up-to-date organization chart that shows the lines of '

authority and communications for the corporate personnel having responsibilities in this area. The chart should show the lines of authority and communications from top level management to the site organization. The chart should be distributed, or made available, to all affected corporate personnel.

Procram ($tte)

Administrative procedures - There should be written, approved, up-to-date procedures that describe in detail the responsibilities for implementing the activities and provide detailed instructions and guidance on how these s a,c'tivities are to be performed. The procedures should reference the corporate policy statements and directives and cover all areas of responsibilities delineated in the corporate directives.

Position Description and Responsibility - The posttion. or job descriptions of the site individuals (supervisory and non-supervisory), assigned responsibilities at the 4

site, should address their specific responsibilities and span of control with eneugh detail to assure an 1

u9derstanding of these responsibilities. As noted in <

the corporate program a general statement of '

1 responsibility is not acceptable.

Organizational $tructure - The Itcensee should have an approved, up-to-date organization chart that shows the lines of authority and communications for the site personnel.

The chart should show the lines of authority and :

I communications from corporate management to the .

individual performing hands-on activities. The chart !

! should be distributed, or made available, to all

! affected site personnel.

Procrim Adequacy l Regulatory Requirements - The program should meet the regulatory requirements relative to program content, and it should i provide instructions and guidance that will assure !

compliance with regulatory requirements, including (1)

, the license. (2) the technical specifications, (3)

Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, and (4)

, approved plans (for example. 0A, training, security, r J

and emergency). The program instruction and guidance >

shculd be sufficiently comorehensive to assure that an i individual who is new to a cosition can understand the i responsibilities. !

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' r' Commitments - The pregram shall meet the commitments that the licensee made in (1) the technical specifications, (2) the FSAR, (3) approved plans, and (4) other commitments to guides, :ades, and standards.

The program should provide instructions and guidance that will assure conforman;e to these commitments.

particular emphasis should be given to conformance with the codes, standards and regulatory guides to which the licensee has made a commitment. As discussed in the "Regu'atory Requirements" section, the program should be suf ficiently comprehensive to be applicable to all experience levels of employees.

The licensee should have ;dentified all regulatory requirements and commitments and verified that they are covered by the program. A r.;a tri x of requirements /

commitments versus program elements is preferred, but other forms may be acceptable.

Progra.a Change Control -

The program should include provisions for implementing changes based on (1) changes in regulatory requirements, (2) changes in applicable codes, standards, and guides, (3) experience at the facility, (4) experiences throughout the industry.

Specific re spon sit.111 tie s should be assigned to an

( individual to stay abreast of the above areas and to initiate the appropriate program changes. The program changes should be subject to the same levels of review and approval as the original program. The program and implementing procedures should be periodically reviewed for adequacy, and review responsibilities should be established.

The program should speci fy the use of a requirements matrix to assure that all applicable program elements (procedures, instructions, data sheets, etc.) are changed.

Information Flow - The program should specify sufficient flow of inforsation to assure feedback of problems and status to management and to provide information to the lower levels. Management should receive the types of information that will inform them about the status of the system and operations and will identify problems for which action i s needed. The in forma ticn should also enable management to analyze activities for adverse trends. The program should specify the types of information to be communicated to management and the trend studies to be done. The lower ievels of the licensee's oroanization should receive', ir. addition to

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directives regarding routine activities, information ,

regarding (1) changes in regulations, codes, standards j and guides, (2) findings identified in inspection 1 reports (NRC), audit reports, and- other . surveillance :

activities, (3) certinent experiences at the facility and in the industry, (4). feedback from management reviews, audits and observations regarding problems, (5) planned activities.

This information, whicn should be specified in the program, will make . the individual more aware of the proolems and will improve performance. The program should _ assign speci fic responsibilities for the distribution of information, and it should identify the transmitting devices to be used. The program should also assign responsibilities for preparing any needed re.ponses.

Probler. Correction - The program should provide instructions and guidance regarding the documentation, follow-up and correction of identified problems. The program should make it clear to all levcis of licensee employees that they have respensibilities in identifying problems.

The program should use a Corrective Action System for documenting and following problems and should address responsibilities for affecting correct;/e action, determining generic implications, and preparing any required reports. The program should assure that all identified problems, even those that do not have to be reported to NRC, are assigned to higher supervision (above the foreman / shift supervisor level) for resolution, and that in formation regarding the disposition is disseminated.

A system in which an individual's immediate supervisor is alicwed to make the final disposition of a problem identified by the individual is not considered adequate.

Program Review -

The program should provide guidance and delineate responsibilities for management's periodic review and audit uf activities. Management personnel should be made aware of problems identified by NRC inspections, QA audits, and audits by other organizations, such as the of f-site review committee.

The program should also address manag0 ment's responsibilities for the periodic observations of activities (tours). The managers should also be recuired to document review findings and observations to assure feedback to the individuals performing the activities. The program should sperify the frequency of appropriate overview activities and require that identified problems be entered into the Corrective Action System. '

9-30 9

' Support Services -

he program should provide guidance and responsibi. .cies with regard to the support. services which are needed. Support services may include the following: (1). training, (2) _ maintenance, (3) calibration and testing, (4) radiation protection, (5)

- procurement, (6) quality control,, (7) quality assurance (8) technical services and contracts.

The - program may. reference the administrative controls established for any of the individual service areas, but responsibilities should be assigned for initiating and coordinating these services.

Program Appraisal -

The program should provide instructions and delineate responsibilities for tF: miodic appraisal of the effectiveness of the prograe . the performance of individuals. The evaluation of tne effectiveness of a program should go_ beyond verification that the program has been fully implemented. The licenses should determine the goals- and objectives of the program and determine whether they have been met. This requires the performance of trend analyses on performance /

effectiveness indicators.

A statement by a manager that he is aware of problems that occur and would recognize an adverse trend

is not acceptable.

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Proaram Implementation Regulatory Requirements -

The licensee shall implement that portion of the program for which regulatory requirements (license, technical specifications, regulations (10 CFR), and approved plans) have been i established. Inadequacies will result in items of I noncomplisnce or unresolved items.

Commitments -

The licensee shall implement that portion of the program which conforms to commitments which were made in the FSAR, QA manual, Fire Plan, and other written !

commitments to the NRC. Inadequacies will result in deviations or unresolved items.

l Procedures -

The licensee shall implement the procedures that !

have been developed under the program. Nonconformance '

to the procedural requirements will result in an item of noncompliance if the activities involved are safety i related. j l

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i Procram Awareness Position Description -

The individuals interviewed should I understand the responsibilities that have been assigned 1 to them in their position or job descriptions. If tha position or job descriptions are not specific, the individual's interpretation of the- stated responsibilities should be determined. Also the intent.

of the nonspecific statements from the manager who issued the job description should be determined. The. l two interpretations should then be compared.

Procedural Responsibilities - The individuals interviewed should understand the responsibilities that have been assigned l to them in the procedures and instructions issued. If the statements of responsibility are not sufficiently l sp,eci fi c , the interpretations of the responsibilities by the individual and by the manager who issued the procedures should be compared.

Additional Appraisal Criteria -

The individuals interviewed should understand their responsibilities for the activities that they perform for which there exist no procedural requirements or job description responsi-bilities. The extent to which the individual and supervisor agree on these unwritten responsibilities and the adequacy of the verbal instructions given to the individual should be determined.

Qualification and Trainina Qualification Requirements -

The individuals assigned responsi-bilities should conform to the qualification require-ments of Regulatory Guide 1.8, "Personnel Selection and Training." For positions not covered by this guide, the inspector should determine the adequacy of the individual's experience. The licensee should have established qualification requirements.

Initial Training -

The initial training received by the individuals should be in conformance with the guidance of Regulatory Guide 1.8; the requirements of the licensee's training program; and 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion II. Training requirements should reflect the experience (or lack thereof) of the individuals. The required trainir.g should be specified in the training 1 program and/or procedures.

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CHAPTER 10 l

HANDLING ALLEGATIONS 10.1 CONTACT WITH ALLEGERS An allegation is defined as a statement or assertion of impropriety or inadequacy associated with NRC-regulated 1

activities for which validity has not been established. This I includes all safety concerns identified by sources such as the media, individuals or organizations, and technical audit efforts from Federal, State and local government agencies regarding activities at a licensee's site. Excluded from this definition are matters being handled by more formal processes, such as 10 CFR 2.206 petitions and hearings. ;

l 1

Other sources of allegations regarding licensee activities could

( include Members of Congress, concerned private citizens, union i

members and officials, licensee competitors, current and former employees of the licensee, or licensee contractors and vendors.

Contacts with those who make allegations may be made in person, by telephone or in writing. In some instances, allegations are made anonymously in writing or by telephone.

When an item is to be handled as an allegation, regardless of the source or the method of communication involved, it must be documented and evaluated. Allegations can cover a broad range from the implausible to the highly focused technical issue. In each and every case, initiation of resolution begins with evaluation. There will be instances where allegations obviously have no substan:e. Even in these cases, appropriate documenta tion should be prepared to record the contact, the 10-1

nature of the allegation and the basis for the conclusion that '

the matter need not be pursued further. Other allegations, after evaluation, could lead to extensive inspection efforts or investigation which could result in a large commitment of NRC resources for resolution.

It is of the utmost importance that contacts with allegers be conducted in a professional manner. Those who provide allegations to the NRC staff must be treated with respect, consideration, and tact. Under no circumstances should allegers be dealt with brusquely or abusively. It is important to remember that the vast majority of allegers come forward with their allegations because they are concerned about safety. There will be cases when an alleger's motivation is questionable; however, all allegations should be evaluated on their technical merit, not personal motivation.

The inspector can anticipate contacts with allegers during his normal inspection duties. Often, the inspector in the field is the only contact an alleger will have with NRC. This perception of an NRC inspector as NRC should be realized and understood, since the inspector is the representative of NRC. NRC inspectors should be sensitive to this perception and conduct their l

interaction with allegers accordingly.

10.2 INITIAL CONTACT It is imperative that rappcrt be established with an alleger as soon as possible. Rapport is "a comfortable and unconstrained

{

relationship of mutual confidence between two or more persons." !

At times, rapport occurs immediately and effortlessly. Everyone has had the experience of taking an instant liking to a stranger.

Without knowing why, there is a comfortable feeling; a feeling of sharing attitudes and beliefs. Conversely, there is sometimes a dislike for the other person on first encounter without an ,

I awareness of the cues that evoke the disitke.

10-2

An immediate attraction to or dislike of someone tends to color all discussions and observations thereafter. The unstudied, first impression often forces the inspector to work through a "halo effect" of personal feelings. If the inspector likes the individual, every action is interpreted favorably, or at least the inspector tends to minimize behavior that ciispleases him.

The result is distortion, often of a subtle nature, that is difficult to correct. '

Rapport, or the lack of it, 'also affects the individual's l I

behaviorIII relation to the inspector. Rapport makes elicitation easier, but its absence need not deny the inspector of the kinds ,

of information needed. The objective is not necessarily to l create a warm and involving relationship, but rather to create an impression appropriate to the inspector's purpose of gathering i information. l The gathering of information is the primary purpose of the C initial contact between inspector and alleger. The inspector, mindful of the principles of rapport, elicits the inf m ation l from the alleger. Initially, the inspector should listen l carefully to the information being presented, while being aware l that the initial information will often be colored with emotion l and rhetoric. This initial "listening posture" on the part of l

the inspector often serves as a means of venting emotion for the l alleger. The initial diffusion of emotion will clear the air and allow the inspector to begin gathering information.

{

l 10.3 GATHERING THE FACTS The adage of "Who, What, When, Where, Why, and How" comes into play as the inspector begins to gather the facts and circumstances of the allegation. It is important to remember l

that this initial intake of information represents the first step 10-3 l

1 l

1 in the evaluation of the allegation. The inspector should ,

e recognize that a complete set of facts concerning the allegation l is required, since another individual may follow up on the allegation, and there will be an evaluation of the information before resolution action is developed and initiated.

As the fact gathering process is initiated, the inspector should consider the place the information is being gathered. After the initial contact with the allejer, the inspector should be able to determine whether or not the setting of the initial contact is the place to be conducting the interview. Based on the type of allegation, the inspector should have a sense for the amount and nature of information that will be received. If a lengthy interview will be required, arrangements should be made to interview the alleger at a suitable location. Consideration should be given to utilizing the Resident Inspector's office, a hotel room, or a mutually agreeable off-site location and, possibly, space in the licensee's facilities if appropriate and private. Once the options are considered and a room is selected, the inspector should consider having another NRC employee assist in the interview, particularly if an off-site location is chosen.

Only in extreme emergencies should an inspector agree to meet an alleger off-site without another NRC employee present, particularly if the individual claiming to have allegations requests that the inspector meet with the alleger alone someplace. Good common sense dictates that this could be a dangerous and/or hostile situation, especially if the individual involved is unknown to the inspector.

It has been a matter of long-standing policy and practice that interviews with personnel are private. It is however, the prerogative of the person being interviewed to have another individual of his choice present during the interview. In most instances this situation will not arise, but if the individual makes this request, it should be granted. {

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Ordinarily arrangements to interview licensee personnel privately can be made easily. Occasionally, however, licensee management may object.- The licensee should then be informed that it is NRC policy to interview personnel privately and that experience has shown this to be a practical' approach. If the licensee chooses to make an issue of the matter, the. Regional Office should be informed of the problem before proceeding -further with the inspection.

The inspector should obtain the full name of the alleger, complete mailing ' addre'ss, a telephone number where the alleger could be contacted at a later date, the alleger's position and/or relationship to the facility or activity involved, and the nature of the allegation. If the alleger declines to provide this in formation, the inspector should attempt to establish the reason.

The inspector should explain to the alleger that Public Law

(95-601 affords protection to an alleger by prohibiting an ernployer from discriminating against an employee for contacting NRC. If the alleger continues to be reluctant to provide sufficient information to evaluate the concern or expressly requests confidentiality, a Confidentiality Agreement could ,

possibly be extended in accordance with guidelines expressed in Section 10.2.2, "Confidentiality."

The alleger may be informed that the inspector does not have the capability to evaluate the information, to determine what followup action will be required, or to establish NRC jurisdiction in the matter; therefore, it will be necessary that someone else contact the alleger for addftional information regarding the allegation.

e 10-5

The inspector should inform the. alleger also, that, unless an ,

objection is registered, the alleger will be recontacted as soon as possible regarding the allegation. This contact will usually be a letter, but may involve a telephone call or a personal visit. This process will permit the alleger to review the information with NRC to provide maximum assurance that the information has been correctly interpreted and understood.

If the alleger persists in not offering identification after the above explanations, the inspector should document the allegation in as much" detail as possible and advise the alleger that a contact with the Regional Office Allegation Coordinator or designated staff member in 30 days or any other agreed upon period will provide information on the status of any actions being taken with regard to the information provided by the alleger. The inspector should provide the name and telephone of the Office Allegation Coordinator to the alleger so that such contact may be made by the alleger.

If the alleger is not familiar with NRC, information should be provided regarding the NRC mission and the interest of NRC in assuring that licensees are operating safely and in accordance I with NRC regulations. In addition to performing inspections for that purpose, NRC also uses information provided by allegers to l l

identify problems and to take action tc ensure th3t those problems are corrected. It should be impressed upon the alleger that NRC cannot become a participant in any dispute between the ;

'llcensee and other parties, such as an employee, a union or l competitors. NRC's primary interest is to determine whether the licensee's activitiet are in compliance with regulatory requirements and the information provided to NRC will be usea only for that purpose.

s 4 10-6

l C 10.4 REPORTING THE FACTS 1

The inspector receiving the allegation is responsible for documenting the facts of the allegation. This will normally be accomplished in a memorandum to the Office Allegation Coordinator through the inspector's supervisor.

The memorandum, or Allegation Report, should contain all available information pertaining to the alleger and the I allegation. The inspector may add personal comments and ;

evaluations in the report, but such comments should be clearly identified as such. There is no prohibition against such comments, in fact they are encouraged, as such first-hand insights aid in the evaluation of the allegation. Comments might include, for example, an initial evaluation of the validity of the allegation, a suggested course of action for resolution, possible motivation for the alleger reporting the information, or recommendations for followup. The inspector is cautioned, however, that remarks or personal observations should be limited to the allegation at hand. This material is subject to disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act and any comment:,

which may be construed as derogatory remarks concerning the alleger are unprofessional and unacceptable for the record.

10.5 ALLEGATIONS OF HARASSMENT AND INTIMIDATION For allegations of discrimination that fall under Section 210(a) of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. 5801, et seq., the alleger should be informed that NRC will look into the

, complaint and any safety concerns identified by the alleger, and that appropriate enforcement actions will be considered against the employer if the allegation is substantiated. To assure that personal employee rights are protected, the alleger should be advised that a complaint must be filed with the Department of 10-7

Labor within 30 days of the alleged discriminatory act. It is a '

good practice to provide the alleger with an NRC Form 3, "Notice to Employees," if possible, because it provides additional information and the address to which the complaint. should be addressed. Complaints should be filed with the Office of the Administrator, Wage and Hour Division, U.S. Department of Labor, Room 53502, 200 Constitution Avenue, N.W. , Washington, D.C. or with the local regional Department of Labor office. It is important to stress to the alleger that there is a statutory 30-dey time limit in which he must file his complaint.

The alleger should also be advised that when he files the complaint that the Department of Labor will notify the employer that a complaint was received and that the alleger will be identified to the employer as the source of the complaint. This is important to note if the alleger has requested confidentiality or elected to remain anonymous, since it will have a definite impact on the alleger.

The inspector should prepare an allegation report on the complaint and note that he advised the alleger of the Department of Labor reporting requirements. The report on the allegation should be forwarded to regional management.

20.6 HANDLING REQUESTS FOR CONFIDENTIALITY The ability of HRC to obtain information, particularly adverse information concerning indicators of noncompliance or violation of regulatory requirements, depends on the subsequent handling of such information within NRC. A fundamental premise sJpporting the information gathering process is a determination to maintain NRC's ability to protect the identity of individuals who provide information to NRC. fhe principle of idect!ty protection is necessary to ensure that no one will refrain from reporting information because NRC does not offer a suitable measure of ,

protection. While Public Law 95-601 makes it unlawful for 10-8

.-. =-. . -,

employers to take retaliatory action against employees who report information to the NRC and provides the means for employees to-obtain legal remedies, the legal process can be very lengthy.

The length of the legal process is such a deterrent that employees are reluctant to provide information for fear of being out of work for an extended period of time while going through the legal process.

Confidentiality is the means by which NRC protects and withholds from disclosure the identity of an individual who provides adverse and/or incriminating information to NRC. It is NRC policy not to' divulge to others the identity of an individual who was granted confidentiality, either during or subsequent to an inquiry based on the information provided to NRC.

Confidentiality is considered so important that a "need-to-know" r'ile is vigorously implemented both within and outside the agency and followed by all NRC personnel dealing with any aspect of confidentiality.

(

The Regional Administrator is the regional authority for granting confidentiality, and this authority may be delegated to regional staff members. Regional staff members authorized to grant confidentiality are thoroughly familiar with the NRC "Statement of policy on Confidentiality." (See 50 FR 48508, November 25, 1985; corrected at 50 FR 50864, December 12, 1985.) Those individuals involved with an alleger who have not been delegated the authority to grant confidentiality will be required to contact an authorized individual within their region who has the authority to grant confidentiality if ar, alleger requests it.

In most regions, this authority has not been delegated below the senior manager level. In those cases where an inspector is in contact with an alleger who has requested confidentiality, the '

inspector must contact an authorizing official for a grant of confidentiality for the alleger. This grant of confidentiality 10-9

l 1

can be given verbally to the alleger by the authorized staff ,

member and followed up in writing with a confidentiality agreement signed by both the alleger and the authorizing staff !

member. Confidentiali'.y is not granted formally until the Confidentiality Agreement is signed.

Confidentiality is not granted as a routine matter. Rather, confidentiality should be granted only when necessary to acquire the information related to NRC responsibilities or where l

warranted by special circumstances. It should not ordinarily be l

granted when the individual is willing to provide the information without being given confidentiality. Consequently, if an alleger is providing information willingly, confidentiality should not be granted and the individual should not be advised of its i

availability on a routine basis.

If an explicit request for confidentiality is made, the request I should not be automatically granted to the alleger. Rather, l information should be obtained from the alleger to make a determination as to whether the grant of confidentiality is warranted in the particular circumstances at hand. The following information should be solicited from the alleger to assist in making this determination:

l i

1. Has the alleger provided the information to anyone'else? Is j the information already widely known with the alleger as the source? l l

2. Is the NRC already knowledgeable of the information, anc l therefore there is no need for a particular confidential l source? I i

i 10-10

9

3. Does the alleger have a past record which would weigh either in favor of or against granting confidentiality in this instance; for example, has the alleger abused grants of confidentiality in the past?

4. Is the information which the alleger offers to provide within the jurisdiction of NRC7 Should the alleger be referred to another agency?

5. Why does the alleger desire confidential source status?

What would be the consequences to him if his identity were revealed?

Depending on the information gathered by the authorized NRC staff

, member who may grant the confidentiality, a determination will be made as to whether the granting of confidentiality wo"1d be in :

the best interest of NRC.

(. When an alleger does not expressly request confidential source status, an authorized NRC employee may raise the issue of confidentiality in certain circumstances. Such circumstances can vary widely. Authorized NRC employees have discretion to raise the issue of confidentiality when, in their judgement, it is appropriate. Situations that would require making this judgement would arise when it became apparent that an individual was not providing information because of a fear of identity disclosure, or when it was apparent from the circumstances that the alleger wished to remain unidentified. For example, if the interview was '

being conducted in a secretive manner or the alleger refused to provide identi fying in formation, there would be reason to consider granting confidentiality. Once the issue of confidentiality is raised with the alleger and a desire for confidential source status is indicated, the same considerations as those that apply to an explicit request for confidentiality are applicable.

l 10-11 ,

When confidentiality is granted, the following points should be '

discussed with the alleger:

1. The sensitivity of the information being provided by the alleger should be explored with a view to determining whether that information could identify the alleger.

2. The alleger should be informed that the controls within NRC on the release of identity information are tight. As a result, it may be that only the inspector and the authorizing staff member will know of the confidential source status. Therefore in contacts with other NRC personnel, it would be the alleger's responsibility to inform the NRC contact of the confidential source status.

3. If inquiries are made regarding the status of an alleger as a confidential source, NRC will neither confirm nor deny the confidential source status. l

4. The basic points of the standard Confidentiality Agreement should be reviewed if it is not possible to provide the alleger with a copy to read. This is particularly true when a verbal grant of confidentiality has been made.

An NRC employee wishing to grant confidentiality must either be expressly delegated to do so or must seek authorization from the appropriate regional official as noted above. Authorization can l be prearranged as circumstances warrant. This might include a planned meeting with the alleger. Regional Administrators are )

authorized to designate which NRC employees in their region may grant confidential source status to an alleger and/or further delegate the authority to do so. Authority to grant confidential i

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l source status must be documented in writing either through a standing delegation or an ad hoc authorization. In special circumstances, an oral authorization is permissible if confirmed in writing. The standard Confidentiality Agreement must be executed, and the circumstances surrounding the grant of confidentiality must be documented in a memorandum to the Office Allegation Coordinator as soon as possible.

In those circumstances where it is impossible to sign a Confidentiality Agreement at the time the information is obtained, such as when the information is obtained over the telephone, or in a location where the passing of papers would draw undue attention to the participants, confidentiality may be given orally pending signing of the Confidentiality Agreement within a reasonable amount of time, usually two weeks.

The Regional Administrator of the involved region must be informed of each grant of confidentiality. The Regional C Administrator must also approve any variance to the standard Confidentiality Agreement and each denial of confidentiality.

The inspector should be aware that NRC can provide only identity protection to an alleger. If an alleger raises the question of the need for physical protection as a result of contacts with NRC, the inspector should state that such protection would have to come from local law enforcement agencies. The alleger should be advised that if a threat is received or an overt act occurs that is suspected to be retaliation for reporting information to NRC, the matter should be reported immediately to the local law enforcement authorities. They should be advised of the nature of the threat and basis for believing that there is physical danger.

The alleger should also be advised to contact NRC after reporting the matter to law enforcement authorities.

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10.7 PROTECTING THE IDENTITY OF ALLEGERS -

As a general rule, the "need-to-know" principle should be imple-mented for the protection of all allegers. This means avoidance of unnecessary use of the identity of the alleger and other identifying information in discussions and in documents. With the exception of those prepared by the Office of Investigations, reports should normally not contain information that would reveal the identity of an alleger. Individuals using documents containing information that could reveal the identity of an alleger are responsible for controlling such documents, a s by placing them in closed storage when not under the individual's personal control.

If asked whether a person is an alleger, the inspector should respond that it is NRC policy not to identify an alleger unless it is clear that the individual concerned has no objection.

10.8 WRONGDOING For those matters where there is a reasonable basis for belief of wrongdoing, in contrast to those involving technical issues, and for which the staff concludes an investigation is necessary to determine whether enforcement or other regulatory action is required, a referral to the Office of Investigations should be made following the procedures and policy for requesting an investigation.

Wrongdoing consists of both intentional violations of regulatory requirements and violations resulting from careless disregard of or reckless indifference to regulatory requirements amounting to intent. A reasonable basic for belief of wrongdoing exists when the circumstances indicate that a violation of a regulatory requirement appears likely to have been intentional or to have resulted from careless disregard or reckless indifference in contrast to error or oversight. i 10-14

Inspectors need to exercise caution when dealing with allegers making aliegations of wrongdoing. This caution does not pre-clude obtaining all pertinent information regarding the allegation, but further action should be coordinated with the staff to preclude any possibility of compromising a potential OI investigation. If the inspector receives allegations of wrongdoing, guidance should be obtained before proceeding with any further actions.

10.9 FOLLOWUP OF ALLEGATIONS IN THE INSPECTION PROCESS The followup of allegations in the inspection process may be required following evaluation of the allegation by the regional staff. If a decision is made to resolve an allegation through the inspection process, there will usually be an action plan developed by the regional staff. This action plan will serve as a roadmap for the inspector in following up on allegations. The assigned inspector should follow the general guidelines listed C below:

1. The inspector should understand as thoroughly as possible what the allegation involves. Decisions must be made as to the sequence to be followed in examining equipment, reviewing records, making independent measurements, staging reenactments if required, and conducting additional interviews. Some thought should be given as to who st 1d be interviewed and in what order the interviews shou 17, conducted.

2. The inspector should have a reasonable plan for studying the allegation, but ir. formation acquired may prompt alterations in the plan. The inspector should remain flexible, since changes in the action plan are more often the rule than the exception.

10 45

3. The inspector should always be aware that he must protect ,

the identity of the alleger during the followup of the allegation.

4. The inspector should have a sense of what he can and cannot do during the followup that could possibly compromise the identity of the alleger. This understanding is particularly important during followup interviews with other individuals that may be conducted at the site.

5. The inspector should feel free to contact regional management at any time when in doubt about actions or the possible impact of any planned action on the followup.

The inspector should also consider conducting a file review prior to initiating followup activities if time permits. The licensee's file should be reviewed to enable the inspector to become familiar with the nature of the licensed activities or, at least, that portion of the activities involved in the allegation followup. This should include a review of pertinent manuals, procedures, license conditions, or other related commitments to NRC. It would also be worthwhile to review available information concerning the facilities, equipment and organizational structu e and to identi fy personnel occupying key positions in the organizatio i.

In most followup activities, records are an important source of information and may also provide tangible evidence of noncompliance. Any record should be examined for completeness.

R3 cords may also provide leads to other sources of information to be pursted. Information obtained from records may form the basis for matters to be explored during interviews. Records may also aid in corroborating information obtained orally, or, on the other hand, indicate apparent discrepancies in information provided by licensee personnel that may need to be resolved.

10-16

Frequently, one record is dependent upon another or has some relationship with other records. Checking one record with another is a means of checking validity and also may reveal discrepancies that require resolution. Efforts should be made to resolve discrepancies through interviews with personnel. If the matter is significant, it should be brought to the attention of licensee management so that they have an opportunity to explain or comment on it. The fact that no record exists for an activity does not necessarily mean that the activity was not performed.

Copies of significant records should be obtained. Tney may serve either to document noncompliance or provide evidence that an allegation is unfounded.

Inspector observation inay also play a key role in the inspection process during followup of an allegation. An inspector may decide that independent measurements are appropriate, such as the need to make radiation surveys and obtain smears or samples of C materials. '

In incidents involving personnel exposures, reenactments can be ,

helpful to the inspector. Reenactments are usually performed after the individuals involved have described the event during irterviews. There is no objection to the presence of licensee management personnel during reenactments. Ideally, reenactments should be conducted at the actual scene of the incident using similar equipment but, of course, without the use of actual radioactive material. It may, however, not be possible to use the same equipment or to perform the reenacteents at the actual scene of the incident. In such instances, an effort should be made to mock up the circumstances as closely as possible. The inspector should request the individuals involved to perform the same actions as they did when the incident occurred. Times and distances should be measured to obtain a basis for calculating 10-17

exposures. The process or segm2nts of it may have to be repeated several times to obtain the desired data. It 'is not unusual for '

the individual to recall some significant piece of information while performing these reenactments that they had not recalled during the interview process. The individuals should be encouragni to ignore the fact that they are being observed and perform as they did when the incident occurred. The inspector should also consider taking photographs at key points during the reenactment as they may be of value in dest:ribing the incident and evaluating exposures. Drawings and sketches d:picting the physical surroundings may also be useful to the inspector.

Some inspections may also involve the examination of equipment or facilities to determine the cause of a malfunction or, conversely, to assure that a piece of equipment i s functioning properly. It may be useful to observe licensee personnel performing operations pertinent to the matter being reviewed.

The inspector should understand that success in allegatien resolution will sometimes depend to a large extent on his resourcefulness and tenacity. Often success can turn on one more record review, one more interview, one more sample, one more measurement, or five more minutes in an interview. The inspector ,

should be sensitive to nuances as they often represent a ,

subconscious sum total of int 3rnalized experbnces. Intuition has often been important.

10.10 SIGNED STATEMENTS The Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, 42 U.S.C. 2011 et seq.

states in Section 161c that In the performance of its functions the Commission is authorized to makes such studies and investigations, obtain such information, and hold such meetings ;

or hearings as the Commission may deem necessary or proper to l

assist it in exercising any authority provided in this Act, or in !

l f

l I

l 10-18 ne - - - m m

the administration or enforcement of this Act, or any regulations or orders issued thereunder. For such purposes the Commission is authorized to administer oaths and affirmations, and by suapoena to require any person to appear and testify, or to appear and produce documents, or both, at any' designated place..." Section I 161c thus gives inspet. tors authority to obtain signed statements.

Although no specific guidance has been issued for determining when signed statements should be obtained, in general, signed statements should be obtained when the circumstances are such that conflicting information may be anticipated from individuals who are interviewed. Signed statements would also be~ appropriate in matters of significance and those in which the findings depend primarily on information obtained from people and not from records or other tangible evidence. Signed statements would also be appropriate for those individuals who can be expected to change or alter the information they provided at a later date.

Such statements also serve to focus the individual being interviewed on a spnific matter and ensure that available information is obtained and recorded.

If a signed statement is to be obtained, it is preferable to first interview the individual to obtain the information needed.

At the end of the interview, the individual is then asked if he would be willing to sign a statement containing the significant information he provided. Signed statements must be provided on a voluntary basis and if the individual declines to execute a signed statement, that fact should be contained in the inspection report.

1 The mechanics of obtaining a signed statement may vary. In the ideal situation the individual being interviewed will prepare the l

statement in his own words and writing. The individual may request that the inspector assist in the preparation of the statement, and this procedure is acceptable as long as the statement explains that the assistance was provided at the 1

l 10-19 !

l l

request of the interviewee. An individual may request and be ,

permitted the assistance of a lawyer or another individual. The statement may include anything desired by the interviewee,' but the inspector should indicate the specific points that should be addressed. The statement does not have to be a literary masterpiece, since the main objective is that it contain the information needed. It need not be lengthy to se rve this purpose.

l The inspector may prepare the statement for the individual upon

, request, with the individual agreeing with what is included sentence by sentence.

When the statement is completed, the l individual should be requested to read it before signing and dating it. If the statement was prepared by the inspector, a

)

sente.9ce should be included in the statement which says that the !

inspector prepared the statement at the request of the individual.

l l

After the individual reads the statement, any desired changes, corrections, additions, or deletions may be made and initialed next to the change.

Also the lower right-hand corner of each page, except the signature page, should be initialed and dated. The suggested format for signed statements is shown in Figure 10.1.

Normally, a copy of the statement is not provided to the individual unless specifically requested. Such a request should be honored. When a statement is included in an inspection report as an exhibit, the statement is typed and identification symbols are substituted for the names of any individuals mentiontd in the statement, including the individual providing the statement. The original statement and a typed transcript are maintained in the Regional office files.

i 4

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, , _ - , _ , _ _ . . _ . _ - . _ _ _ ~, m y_ y -r --y -

7 ,

( 10.11 DISCUSSIONS OF FOLLOWUP WITH LICENSEE i

The inspector will normally conduct an entrance meeting with the I Ifcensee upon initiating an allegation followup. During this '

entrance meeting the inspector should inform the licensee that he will be conducting a followup to ' allegations received by the region. This briefing to the licensee must not include the l

specifics of the allegation, although the general area of the allegation should be discussed, such as a health physic concern, or a welding concern. This will also provide a lead-in for the inspector should he require the availability of personnel, equipment or records. If the allegation is sensitive or would by its nature disclose the identity of the alleger, the licensee should be informed only of the area to be inspected and no ;

mention of an allegation should be made.

l l

The licensee should be advised that the purpose of the inspection '

is to obtain complete information concerning the allegation and

( that if items of noncompliance are identified in the course of gathering information, they will be noted in the inspection report.

The licensee should also be informed that NRC is not concerned about the source of the allegations, but whether there is substance to the information provided by the alleger. At this point, the licensee may attempt to determine the identity of the a11eger. The licensee should be advised that it is NRC policy not to divulge the identity of individuals who provide information to NRC. Licensee personnel may state that they know, or they are reasonably sure, who reported the allegation, and the inspector must be careful so that no confirmation is afforded the licensee.

In some instances, specific. ally when it is desirable to observe the licensee's day-to-day mode of operation to determine the validity of an allegation, efforts should be made to observe the Itcensee's operations on an unannounced basis. For example, it 10-21 er gg. ,- - w -y- -p. - - ._ ,,e3m -_qy.- --

may be alleged that a radiographer is performing field r <

radiography in an unsafe manner. To avoid possible compromise of an inspection effort to detect this action, an attempt should be made to observe these operations.without the radiographer being aware that he is being observed.

In those instances in which an allegation is received under the provisions of 10 CFR 19, "Notices, Instructions, and Reports - to Workers; Inspections," that -is, from a worker or worker's representative who believes a violation exists or has occurred t with regard to radiological working conditions in which the worker is engaged, a copy of the worker's notice must be provided to the licensee. In those cases where the alleger has been granted confidentiality, the specific allegation should not be provided to the licensee at the beginning of the inspection in ,

order to avoid the possibility of the claim being made subsequently that the results of the inspection were compromised because the licensee had the opportunity to effect changes in those areas before they could be examined by NRC.

An exit meeting is normally held with Itcensee management at the conclusion of the followup inspection, at which time the findings may be provided to the licensec. Prior to the exit meeting, the

~

inspector should contact regional management to discuss the findings and obtain guidance relative to discussing the findings with the licensee. If management authorizes discussion of the a findings with the licensee, the inspector will discuss the specific allegations with the licensee and the inspectic!t findings.

There may be situations, however, when discussions regarding the ;

allegations and findings may not be appropriate at the exit meeting. In this situation, tha inspector should receive guidance from his regional management. The licensee will be informed that the allegattens were reviewed, however, and at the 1

10-22

I direction of regional management, a detailed' discussion will not !

be conducted. The Itcensee will oe advised 'that regional l managenent will review the findings and the licensee will be !

contacted at a later date and advised of the findings by regional management.

10.12 DOCUMENTATION OF ALLEGATIONS IN IliSPECTION REPORTS The format for documenting allegation review and resolution in inspection reports is somewhat flexible, with each region having specific policies with regard to allegation documentation. On j the whole, however, the allegation should t,a stated in full in I the inspection report, followed by (1) a paragaph that discusses ;

the inspectiun activity conducted relative to the allegation, (2) l a paragraph that discusses the findings, and (3) a concluding statement as to whether or not the allegation was substantiated, i Copies of p9rtinent records, correspondence, sketches, drawings,- 1 signed statements (appropriately sanitized), and photographs, if

{- any, should be attached to the report as exhibits.

While there may be exceptions, inspection reports should not contain the names of individuals, except licensee managen:ent personnel with whom the entrance and exit meetings were held. In lieu of names, personnel should be identified in inspection reports as Individual A, B, C, etc. An individual's job title may also be used a; appropriate. This saay be pertinent in that

, it gives perspective to the information or actions attributed to the individual. However, care should be taken to avoid ;

identifying the alleger through personal identifiers or characterizations so specific as to lead the reader to a reasonable conclusion of the alleger's identity. 1 l

l The report should be sufficient for an independent reader to come to the same conclusion as that reached by the inspector.

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10.13 pUBLIC RELATIONS RESPONSIBILITIES Inspectors must realize that public relations are an important part of their jobs as representatives of NRC. The publir perception of NRC as the guardian of public health and safety ir<

the nuclear industry can only be enhanced by an inspector who deals fairly with allegers and does a professional job on followups of allegations.

Too often the inspector can "get caught up" in his professional world of work and forget the imaae the general public has of an NRC inspector. It is extremely important for the inspector, as well as all NRC emp!)yees, to realize that many people see the NRC as their insurance that everything is all right in the industry. A professicnal attitude, sincere concern for the welfare of the public, and a determination to do tlie job as, best as it can be done, will go a long way in fulfilling NRC's regulatory mandate.

Inspectors must strive to maintain objectivity, especially when following up on allegations. It is just as important to gather information and evidence that demonstrates an allegation is untrue as it is to substantiate an allegation. Reports must contain sufficient in formatiori to assure anyone whb reads the '

report that the matter was thoroughly an1 professionally examined.

b The inspector should be sensitive to the rights, interests and

, feelings of all those with whom there is contact. An attitude of fairness and sincerity must be projected at all times.

l The insp<ctor must always rem 6mber that whatever is said or d)ne

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will b done as a representative of NRC and not as an indivit .

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CHAPTER 11 ENFORCEMENT OF NRC REGULATIONS AND LICENSE CON"'TIONS 11.1 PURPOSE OF ENFORCEMENT PROVISIONS Enforcement provisions are used to assure the radiological health and safety of employees and the public and to promote the common defense and.' security by:

1. Ensuring compliance with NRC regulations and license conditions.

2. Obtaining pro: apt correction of noncompliance.

3. Deterring future noncompliance.

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4. Encouraging improvement of licensee performance and, by example, that of industry, including prompt notification and l

reporting of safety problems.

These goals are the goals of the inspection program, which l

includes enforce ent as one of several tools to achieve the goals.

11.1.1 Enforcement Toph There are three types of enforcement tools that require I l

documentation. These are: Notice of Violation, Civil Penalty, and Order. The Notice of Violation is a written statement that describes the NRC requirement that was violated and the date and I circumstances of the violation, it calls attention to the problem and requires the licensee to respor.d to NRC regarding corrective actions.

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A Civil Penalty is levied for more serious problems. It focuses ,

more attention because of adverse publicity and financial effects, which are relatively minor but which get the attention of stockholders, directors, and ra;e commissions.

An Order is a written NRC directive to modify, suspend, or revoke a license; to require a licensee to cease and desist from a given practice or activity; or to take such other action as may be proper. Orders may be issued in lieu of, or in addition to civil penalties, as appropriate. They may be issued only by the Directors of,the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation and Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards.

An Order is used to require the licensee to do something specific and, at the same time, to make a statement on the importance of correcting a particular problem, or to remove an imminent threat to public health and safety.

11.1.2 Types of Ordets There are four types of Orders avai?s51e. These are:

1. License Modification Orders that are issued when some change in licensee eqeipment, procedures, or management controis is necessary, r

2. Cuspension Orders that are

a. issued to remove a threat to the public health and safety, common defense and security, or the environnent, i

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( b. issued to stop construction when further work could preclude or significantly hinder the identification or correction of an improperly constructed safety-related system or component, or the licensee's quality assurance program impleraertation is not adequate to provide confidence that construction activities are being properly carried out, 1

c. issued when the licensee has not responded adequately to other enforcement action,

d. issued when the licensee interferes with the conduct of an inspection or investigation,

e. issued for any reason not mentioned above for which license revocation is legally authorized. :

A Suspension Order may apply to all or part of a licensed ;

C. activity.

3. Revocation Orders that are issued

a. when a licensee is unable or unwilling to comply with l NRC requirements, 1

b. when a licensee refuses to correct a violation,

c. when a licensee does not respond to a Notice of Violation when such a response was required,

d. when a licensee refuses to pay a fee required by 10 CFR 170, "Fees for Facilities and Material licensee and Other Regulatory Services Under the Atomic Energy Act {

of 1954, as Amended."

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e. for an.v other condition which would warrant refusal of ,

a license on an original application.

4. Cease and Desist Orders that are typically issued to stop an unauthorized activity that has continued.after notification by NRC that such activity is unauthorized.

11.1.3 Issuino Orders Orders are issued in conjunction with a violation, show cause, a modification cf a license, or a civil penalty. The Order states the basis for the violation or action involved and allows the licensee a period of time, usually 30 days, to respond. In the t case of an order involving a show cause, modification of Itcense, or civil penalty, the licensee can request a hearing.

Orders may be esde effectivw immediately without prior opportunity for a hearing when it is determined that the public health, interest or safety is threatened, or when the Order is

, respondin; to a violation which may involve willfulness.

11.2 DETERMINIKa APPROPRIATE ENFORCEMENT ACTION Violations may be symptomatic of large safety problems; ,

similarly, but less of ten, there may be serious safety problems without violations. In such cases, where a Notice of Violation or a Civil Penalty would not be appropriate, an Order is used to ensure corrective action.

When a violation is found, the inspector determines what requirement was violated. The Commission imposes a requirement when it makes a determination that the requirement is necessary to enhance safety. Since requirements have various levels of safety significance, one of an inspectors jobs is to determine the severity Icvel of a violation and the implications for even greater problems. '

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( Once a violation has been identified by an inspector, all pertinent facts that relate to the circumstances of the violation must be assembled and documented in the inspection / investigation report. Answers to the following basic questions must be obtained:

1. What requirement was violated?

2. How was the requirement violated?

3. When was it violated and for how long?

4. By whom was it violated?

5. Who discovered the vio'stion?

6. How was it reported are oy whom?

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7. Were thev , previous violations of a similar nature?

8. Are there multiple examples of a particular violation?

9. What was the cause of the violation?

10. Was there careless disregard of NRC requirements or indications that a requirement was deliberately violated?-

11. Was management aware or should it have been aware of the violation?

l 12, 15 there evidence that management was involved directly or indirectly in the violation and to what extent?

13. How many opportunities did the licensee have to discover ;

that it was in violation?

14. What corrective action was or is being taken?

After the facts are obtained the underlying problem can be assessed and a severity level assigned. The Enforcement Program (IMC 0400 and 10 CFR 2, App. C) gives examples of five severity levels. The inspector should determine the severity level and the overall regulatory significance of the problem, and then look at the basis for the requirements to determine how the NRC Commission and staff will view them in the overall context.

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In areas such as emergency preparedness and fire protection, y' where the Commission has placed major emphasis, the significance of the violation should reflect this emphasis. The significance of the underlying causes should also be determined. Programmatic violations, management involvement in violation, and willfulness should be reflected in assignment of higher severity levels.

To determine the appropriate action, examinations are made of past performance and enforcement history, including Civil Penalties assessed, violations of severity level, IV and V, and SALP ratings, with attention being given especially to trends. ,

If mitigation is warranted for a severity level III violation, the enforcement package should say: "for a violation at this severity level, we would normally impose a $50,000 Civil Penalty, but since you have a good performance record, we will not impose it. However, the next time, enforcement action will be considered."

After the facts have been gathered and a decision has been made as to the appropriate severity level, a decision must be made regarding holding an enforcement conference. In the event an enforcement action is to he taken and the violations are of severity levels I, II, or III, or a selected Severity Level IV (rapeat offense), an enforcement conference should be held. It must be held before the issuance of a Notice of Violation and should be held within four weeks after the inspection is completed or an Investigation report issued. The licensee should be informed at least three working days in advance that the meeting is an Enforcement Conference.

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( 11.3 ISSUANCE OF ENFORCEMENT DOCUMENTS 11.3.1 htice of Violation The content of a Notice of Violation is discussed in Section IV (a) of the Enforcement Policy. It consist of (1) a brief description of the circumstances of the violation, (2) the legal citation. for the violation, which gives the requirement or requirements that were violated, the date of the violation, and the way in which the requiroment was violated, (3) the severity level of the violation, and (4) the amount of the proposed civil penalty, if ap'propriate. The Notice of Violation should be si.gned and dated by the signer of the transmittal letter.

11.3.2 Notice of Deviation A deviation consists of a licensee's failure to satisfy a written

. commitment; for example, an FSAR commitment to conform to the C provision of applicable codes, standards, guides, or accepted ir.dustry practices, when the code, standards, or guides or practice involved has not been made a legally binding requirement by the Commission. Notices of Deviation are written in the same format as Notices of Violation and are contained in a separate enciosure to a transm'ittal letter. The letter asks the individual to respond with a description of any corrective action taken to prevent recurrence and to state the date when the corrective action will be completed. Each Notice of Deviation should referer.ce and should quote or paraphrase the commitment a

and should describe the manner in which the licensee failed to meet it. Notices of Deviation should be signed and dated by the signer of the transmittal letter.

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NRC Form 591 is used for er./orcement actions based on inspections y of materials licensees of inspection priority II through VII.

When properly acknowledged by licensee management to indicate '

that corrective action will be taken for any violattens noted, this form serves as the official notification of enforcement action. Its use is limited to inspections which result in severity level IV or V violations. Some severity level IV or V violations are preprinted on the form and others may be written in by the inspector.

In certain instances, NRC may impose enforcement actions on employees of licensees or on nonlicensees who are subject to NRC requirements (such as 10 CFR Part 21,10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, or 10 CFR 73.21) when a violation of a requirement directly imposed on them is committed. Such sanctions are handled on a case-by-case basis with consultation among the involved regional office, the Office of Enforcement, and the Assistant General Counsel for Enforcement.

11.4 CIVb. PENALTY ASSESSMENT A civil penalty should be considered for violations of severity level I, II, or III and may be considered for severity level IV violations for which a licensee was cited previously. Even if the regional office does not intend to recommend a civil penalty '

action for a violation of severity level III, concurrence of the Office of Enforcement is required. :

11.4.1 Base Monetary Amount Table IA of the Policy should be used to determine the appropriate base monetary assessment. Depending on +he !

circumstances of a case, Table IA may be applied in a number of

, ways:

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_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ - - - , - -- -- '~ - ~~~~~'

1. Each severity level I, II, or III violation of an NRC requirement may be assessed a separate civil penalty.

2. Several violations stemming from the same cause or problem area may be assessed a single civil penalty. Th se violations will be evaluated in the aggregate and assigned one severity level.

3. If more than one cause or problem area is identified, separate civil penalties may be assessed for each. The determination of whether there is more than one cause or problem area can be made by evaluating whether cor'rective action for one violation would prevent recurrence of the other violation. If corrective action is required in more I than one area, separate civil penalties may be assessed.

4. I Separate civil penalties may be assessed for separate violations stemming from one problem area if the violations were separated over time.

11.4.2 _ Adjustment Factors Based on the five adjustment factors outlined in the Enforcement l Policy, the base civil penalty may be increased or decreased as described below:

11.4.2.1 Licensee Identification and Reporting Prior to NRC Action The base monetary amount of a civil penalty for a violation may be decreased if:

1.

the licensee identified the occurrence or existence of the l violation before an NRC empicyee or other nonlicensee employee identified it;

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2. the violation had not existed for so long that the licensee y should have discovered it earlier; and

3. the licensee reported the violation to NRC within the time limits established by regulation.

11.4.2.2 Corrective Action Corrective action that is considered average but acceptable will result in no adjustment to the amount of the civil penalty.

However, corrective action that is considered below or above average may: '

1. Decrease the amount. of a civil penalty Ua licensee's action is unusually prompt and extentive. "Unusually prompt" generally means the licensee immediately initiated corrective action and/or took appropriate compensatory measures upon discovery of a violation. Corrective action should be considered unusually extensive only if it incorporates programmatic changes and identifies and remedies problems related to, but not necessarily identical to, the cited violation. For some violations, the expected average corrective action may, by the nature of the violation, have to be prompt. For these instances, no mitigation would be considered if it were only prompt, but would be considered if it were extensive. l l

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2. Increase the amount of a civil penalty if the licensee's corrective action is not prompt or provides incomplete corrective action.

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-( 11.4.2.3 Past Performance Past performance may be a factor in increasing or decreasing the amount of a civil penalty. Consideration of past performance should include review of SALP ratings and similar violations over the past two years or violation detected during the last previous inspection of a materials licensee.

11.4.2.4 Prior Notice of Similar Events When information about a potential weakness in a system has been made available to a Itcensee who has not used it effectively or not used it at all, the amount of a civil penalty may be -

increased. "Prior notice" may involve weaknesses identified in Itcensee audits; industry notifications; vendor reports of equipment defects or failures; NRC Circulars, Bulletins, or other formal notifications; or any authoritative document or report that should cause a licensee to evaluate possible weaknesses in its program.

11.4.2.5 Multiple Occurrences Civil penalty amounts may be increased in cases involving more than one instance of the same violation. The only case involving multiple occurrences in wnich this factor may not be applied is that in which the licensee identifies and reports all the instances of the violation.

11.4.2.6 Continuing Violations Although not included among the adjustment factors, the Enforcement Policy allows civil penalties to be increased for duration of continuing violations, including computing the increase on a daily basis. If a licensee took compensatory measures fer a violation but corrective action was necessarily

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delayed (for example, because equipment had to be procured), the y civil penalty would not be computed for each day. If the licensee did not know the violation existed, but would have known ,

if proper tests had been conducted or surveillance procedures followed, a civil penalty could be computed on a per day basis, depending on the seriousness of the violation.

11.5 PRESS RELEASES Press releases on "escalated" enforcement actions will be prepared by the , regional Public Affairs Officer, who will obtain the necessary regional concurrences. The press release will be issued 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months after the licens9e has been notified and has received a copy of the action. In special cases the Director, Office of Enforcement may approve issuance of a press release before the 24-hour hold is over.

11.6 COMMISSION CCHSULTATION Certain cases require Commission consultation before an enforcement action is taken. A Commission paper must be prepared ,

(See Section VII of the Enforcement Policy for requirements).

l 11.7 VIOLATIONS OF REPORTING REQUIREMENTS Violations cf reporting requirements may result from a licensee's not filing a required report, filing an incomplete or incorrect report, or filing a late report. A Notice of Violation may be issued for a reporting violation if a itcensee had information it !

was required to report, whether or not it knew it had to report !

the information.

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A Notice of Violation will not usually be issued for a reporting violation if a licensee did not have the information that it was required to report, even if it should have had the information it was required to report. If the licensee's failure to have the information was itself a violation of an NRC requirement, however, that requirement should be used as the basis for a Notice of Violation. For example, if a Itcensee was required to conduct audits that would have produced the information and the licensee failed to conduct those audits, issuance of Notice of Violation for the latter failure would be appropriate.

When a reportable event is itself c violation, a licensee should be cited for both the event and the failure to report the event.

11.8 VIOLATIONS OF RECORD-KEEPING REQUIREMENTS When a licensee is required to perform a given task and to keep a record of having done so, but cannot produce that record, a

( Notice of Violation should be issued for failure to keep the record. Failure to keep a required record may be considered supporting evidence that a licensee did not perform a required task.

Without additional evidence that the task was not performed, however, the absence of the record is insufficient to support a Notice of Violation for failure to perform the task.

11.9 MATERIAL FALSE STATEMENTS New guidar,ce is being developed by the Commission with respect to material false statements. In view of the significance that the Commission places on material false statements, all potential cases must be submitted to the Office of Enforcement and OGC for review. In addition, the Commission must be consulted on any enforcement action involving a material false statement.

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11.10 EMPLOYEE PROTECTION CASES

, E If NRC receives a complaint concerning a possible violation of Section 210(a) of the Energy Reorganization Act, 42 U.S.C. 5801 et seq., it will refer the complainant to the Department of Labor and will promptly notify the Department of Labor to ensure that it is aware of the complaint and to determine whether it is investigating the incident. NRC will not normally initiate 'an investigation of a complaint if the Department of Labor is conducting an investigation or has completed it and found no violations. If the Department of Labor concludes that a '

violation ucurred, NRC may initiate an investigation to develop i

additional information for its enforcement action. The Department of Labor will notify NRC of the decision of the Administrator, Wage and Hour Division, at the conclusion of the l

investigation. Notification at this stage is done at the regional level.

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If the Department of Labor receives a complaint' concerning a possible violation of Section 210(a), it will promptly notify NRC and inform NRC of whether the Department of Labor intends to conduct an investigation into the matter. If the Department of !

Labor does not intend to conduct an investigation. NRC will !

consider whether to initiate its own investigation.

NRC will facilitate the investigations by taking all reasonable I steps to assist in obtaining access to licensed facilities and any necessary security clearances. Each agency shall designate, i and maintain current, points of contact within its headquarters '

and regional offices for purposes of implementation of the Memorandum of Understanding between NRC and the Department of Labor. Matters affecting program and policy issues will be i handled by the headquarters offices of the agencies.

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( Enforcement actions of the Department of Labor are primarily directed at restoring benefits or employment status unfairly denied. If it finds that no violation of Section 210(a) occurred, NRC normally will not initiate enforcement action. If, however, the Department of Labor finds that a violation occurred, NRC may take enforcement action, including issuance of a Notice of Violation, imposition of a Civil Penalty, or issuance of Orders suspending, modifying, or revoking licenses, but will normally consider the effect of the action taken by the Department of Labor before deciding on its action.

The regional offices of each agency will normally develop the initial recommendations on enforcement action for their agency and will forward them to headquarters for review. Each organizational element (regional office and headquarters) will consult with the appropriate level of the other agency in processing enforcement actions.

The Enforcement Coordinators in the Regional Offices and the Director, Office of Enforcement are the NRC points of contact on violations of these requirements. It is the Enforcement Coordinator's responsibility to ensure that these actions are carried out.

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CHAPTER 12 BACXFITTING 12.1 NRC PROCESSES FOR MANAGING BACRFITTING OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS The backfitting of a nuclear power plant is defined in NRC Manual ,

Chapter 0514 "Management of Plant Specific Backfits," and 10 CFR 50.109, which state that backfits are "the modification of or addition to systems, structures, components, or design of a facility; or the design approval or manufacturing license for a facility; .or the procedures or organization required to design, constmt or operate a facility; any of which may result from a new or an. ended provision in tL Commission rules or the imposition of a regulatory staff position interpreting the

,( Conaission rules ti,et is either new or different from a

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\ previously applicable staff position .... " Backfitting may be required on a generic basis or on a plant-specific basis. For guidance in generic backfitting (one that applies to all of a like category of itcensees, for example, fuel facilities and PWR power plants), NRC established the Committee to Review Generic Requirements (CRGR) in 1981. More recently (1985/1986), guidance on plant-specific backfits was provided by NRC Manual Chapter 0514, "Management of Plant Specific Backfits," and each Office and Region was directed to establish internal procedures to handle these (see Office or Region procedures).

Backfits are expected to occur as part of the regulatory process to assure adequate safety in the operation of NRC-licensed facilities. It is important for sound and effective regulation, that lbackfitting be conducted in a controlled process. It must ;

be recognized, however, that management of backfits does not i

relieve the Itcensee of responsibility for compliance with NRC regulations. The management processes are intended to provide 1

12-1

disciplined NRC review of new or changed positions prior to ,F imposing them at facilities without regard to the status of the facility owners efforts to meet previously applicable requirements or positions which were considered by the staff to provide acceptable levels of safety. The CRGR and plant-specific backfit management processes enhance regulatory stability by assuring that changes in rules or' regulatory staff positions are either required to provide / maintain adequate safety or to provide in a cost beneficial manner a substantial increase in the overall protection of the public health and safety or coneon defense and security.

12.2 NRC REGULATORY STAFF POSITIONS APPLICABLE PRIOR TO BACKFITTING 4

A position already specifically imposed on or committed to by a licensee at the time a plant-specific backfit is imposed is termed an "approved / applicable regulatory staff position." There are several different types of positions and sources, as follows:

1. Legal requirements, as in explicit regulations, Orders and plant licenses, and in amendments, conditions, and technical specifications. Some regulations include built-in updating features; for example,10 CFR 50.55a, "Codes and Standards."

The applicability of the updating requirement is described in the regulation.

2. Written commitments, as in a licensee's FSAR, LERs, and docketed correspondence, including responses to NRC Bulletins, Generic letters, Inspection Reports, or Notices ,

of Violation, and in Confirmatory Action Letters.

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( 3. NRC staff positions that are documented and approved explicit interpretations of more general regulations. These appear in documents such as the Standard Review Plan, Branch

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Technical Positions, Regulatory Guides, Generic letters, and Bulletins. These positions are not considered "applicable regulatory staff positions" to the extent the staff tacitly or explicitly exempted the licensee from part or all of the position in an action taken before the proposed plant-specific backfit was considered.

l As used here, a licensee is the entity that holds a utilization i license, a license to operate a nuclear power plant, a construction permit to build a nuclear power plant, or a preliminary or final design approval for a standardized plant.

12.3 REGULATORY STAFF POSITIONS THAT CONSTITUTE BACKFITTING l When a staff position is issued, it is considered a backfit if it is issued (1) after the issuance of the construction permit for the facility (for facilities with construction permits issued after October 21,1985),(2) less than six months before the date of docketing of the operating license application for the facility (for facilities with construction permits issued before October 21,1985), and (3) af ter the issuance of the operating l license for the facility (for f acil i^.t e s having an operating )

license on October 21, 1985).

12.4 TYPES OF BACKFITS Licensee-specific backfitting is different from generic backfitting in that the former involves the imposition on a licensee of positions unique to that particular licensee, whereas generic backfitting involves the imposition of the same or similar positions on more than one itcensee in that category.

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If an inspector identifies a concern and it appears to fall ,F within the purview of generic backfitting, it should normally be resolved through the CRGR process.

Backfitting is plant-specific when it involves the imposition of a position that is unique to a particular plant. To be plant-specific, a staff position must meet conditions involving both (1) the substance of the elements of a proposed staff position and (2) the time of the issuance of the staff position relative to the licensing status of the plant (see 12.3).

12.5 GENERIC BACKFITS 12.5.1 The Committee to Review Generic Requirements The Committee to Review Generic Requirements (CRGR) has the responsibility to review and recommend to the Executive Ofrector for Operations (E00) approval or disapproval of requirements to be imposed by the NRC staff on one or more like categories of licensees (See "Charter --

Committee to Review Generic Requirements Rev. 4, April 1987, attached as appendix A.) The objectives of the CRGR process are to eliminate or remove any unnecessary burdens placed on ifcensees, reduce the exposure of workers to radiation in implementing these requirements, and conserve NRC resources while at the same time assuring the adequate protection of public health and safety. This control should ensure that requirements in place or to be issued (1) contribute effectively and significantly to the health and safety of the public, and (2) lead to utilization of both NRC and licensee resources in as optimal a fashion as possible in the overall achievement of the protection of public health and safety. A single agency-wide point of control is provided by having the Committee submit recommendations directly to the EDO.

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The CRGR focuses primarily on proposed new requirements, but also reviews selected existing requireme.Ms that may place unnecessary burdens on licensee or agency resources. In developing recomendations, the CRGR consults with the proposing office to ensure that the reasons for the proposed requirement are well understood. If the CRGR recommends disapproval or major

modifications of a proposed requirement, it submits to the EDO a statement of the reasons for its recommendations. This statement provides a clear indication of the basis for the recommendation not to apply the requirement to an individual licensee or a like category of licensees.

The Committee is chaired by the Director, Office for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data and consists of, in addition to the Chairperson, one individual each from NRR, NMSS, the Regions, and RES appointed by the EDO and one Individual from OGC appointed by the EDO with the concurrence of the General Counsel.

The Office for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data provides staff support. The Committee uses, on occasion, several non-NRC persons as consultants in special technical areas.

A list of some of the items within the scope of the CRGR follows:

1. All proposed new generic requirements including: (a)adop- :

tion of rules or policy statements affecting power reactors or modifying any other rule so as to affect technical requiremants applicable to reactor licensees, including technical information required of reactor licensees or applicants for reactor licerses or construction permits; (b) all proposed new or revised rules of the type described in '

(a), including Advanced Notices; (c) all proposed new or i

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revised regulatory guides; all proposed new or revised F Standard Review Plan (SRP) sections; all proposed new or >

, revised branch technical positions; all proposed generic letters; all multiplant orders, show cause orders, and 10 CFR 50.54f letters; all bulletins; Unresolved Safety Issues discussed in NUREG documents; and all new or revised Standard Technical Specifications.

2. All licenses; license amendments; approvals of Preliminary Design Approvals and Final Design Approvals; minutes of conferences,with owners groups, licensees or vendors, staff approvals or communications that are submitted for review by i

the offices and which are represented to reflect or interpret NRC staff positions, unless such documents refer only to requirements or staff positions (see your office or 1 regional procedures) previously approved by the appropriate officials. Some examples of approved requirements that do not require CRGR review are: (a) Positions or interpreta-i tions contsined in regulations, policy statements,

gulatory guides, the Standard Review Plan, branch technical positions, generic letters, orders, topical approvals, preliminary and final design approvals, and licenses and license amendments promulgated prior to November 12, 1981. Any document or communication of this j

type cites and accurately states the position reflected in a previously promulgated regu!ation, Order, Regulatory Guide, I or SRP. (b) Positions taken af ter November 12, 1981 which l

have been approved through this estabitshed generic review l process.

For those rare instances where it is judged that an emergency i I

action is needed to protect the health and safety of the public, no prior review by the CRGR is necessary. The CRGR Chairman must be notified, however, by the Office originating the action.

These emergency action requirements are reported to the Committee for information and are included in the report to the Commission. i i

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t Packages submitted to CRGR for review should include the 3 following: l i 1. The proposed generic requirement.

2. Supporting draft staff papers or other underlying staff ,

documents, t

3. Identification of the category of reactors to which the generic, requirement is to apply (that is, whether it is to apply to new plants only, plants with new operating licenses only, plants with operating licenses obtained after a

certain date, plants with operating licenses obtained before a certain date, all operating plants, all plants under construction, all plants, all water reactors, all PWRs only, I some vendor types, some vintage types such as BWR 6 and 4, ,

jet pump and nonjet pump plants, etc.).

C 4. For each such category of reactor plant, (a) an assessment of risk to the public; (b) an assessment of NRC costs and licensee costs, to include resulting occupational dose

increase or decrease, added plant and operational .

complexity, and total financial costs; (c) consistent with (a) and (b), above, the basis for requiring or permitting hplementation by a given date or on a particular schedule; '

5. For each proposed requirement, the sponsoring Office's post-tion as to whether the requirement implements existing regulations or goes beyond them.

6 The proposed method of implementation, along with the con-currence (and any comments) of the Deputy General Counsel for Licensing and Regulation on the method proposed.

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Aa p 7. Regulatory' analysis sufficiunt .ta address-the Pape mork F, i

Reduction Act, the Regulatory Flexibility Act and Executive Order 12291. I i'

1 At each meeting, for each package - scheduled for discussion, the '

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sponsoring Office presents - to the CRGR the proposed' generic

! i requirement and responds to comments and questions, j i !

j The CRGR then recommends to the E00 -approval, disapproval, j modification, or conditioning of generic requirements considered '

by . it, as well as the method of implementation of such. I j

requirements. The E00's action taken in respense to the Committee's recommendations is provided in wri ting to the !

Commtssion. I j- 12.6 LICENSEE - SPECIFIC BACKFITTING !

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12.6.1 Determinino The Need For Plant-Secific Backfits t

The NRC staff is responsible for proposing plant-specific !

backfits. All NRC staff at all levels evaluate' proposed !

4 plant-specific positions with respect to whether or not the i 1

position constitutes a proposed backfit. No' staff position may !

A be communicated to a licensee unless the NRC

. .- official ,

communicating that position has escertained whether or not the -l

! position is to be identified as a backfit. When a staff-proposed !

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position is deemed to constitute a backfit and imposition of the

l backfit is not necessary to provide adequate protection for the l

public healt' and safety, the appropriate staff office should

! proceed promptly with the preparation of a regulatory analysis of {

{

j the proposal. At any point in the' development of the regulatory

analysis, it may be decided that further analysis is likely to !

show either (1) that the proposed safety benefit is not likely to '

j be substantial additional overall protection or (2) that the~ !

I direct and indirect costs of implementat19n are not likely to be i justi fied.

In this case, the issue may be closed and an appro- ;

priate notice sent to all concerned parties and recorded. !

1 i g

1 A

I- 12-8

When a staff proposed position is (1) determined not to be a backfit because the proposed modification is necessary to bring a l facility into compliance with a Itcense or the rules or Orders of l

the Commission, or into conformance with written commitments by the licensee, or (2) the Director of NRR or NMSS determines that imposition of a backfit is necessary to ensure adequate protection of the public health and safety, no regulatory analysis is required. Instead, the appropriate Director provides a documented evaluation to support the action taken. The evaluation includes a statement of the objectives and reasons for the modification and the basis for invoking the exception.

In the case of a backfit needed to assure that acequate protection is provided for the public health and safety, the documented evaluation also includes an analysis to document the safety significance and appropriateness of the action taken.

Should it be neces sary or appropriate for the Commission to prescribe a way to achieve adequate protection, the evaluation can include a consideration of how costs contribute to selecting the solution among variou: acceptable alternatives. Such an evaluation is to be issued with the backfit request, except that when an immediately effective regulatory action is necessary and the safety need is so urgent that full documentation cannot be completed, the documentation may follow the backfit request.

12.6.2 Reaulatory Analysis A regulatory analysis conforms, in general, to the directives and guidance of NUREG/BR-0058, Rev.1, May 1984, "Regulatory Analysis Guidelines of the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission," and NUREG/CR-3568, December 1983, "A Handbook of Value -

Impact Assessment," which are the NRC's goveraing documents conceri,ing the need for a regulatory analysis and its preparation. The complexity arid comprahensiveness of the analysis should be

(

12-9

t i

Ifmited to what is necessary to provide an adequate base for l i

decisionmaking. Section !!I.A.2, "Scope of the Analysis," of F .

NUREG/8R 0058, states: "The emphasis in- (doing the analysis) ,

should be simplicity, floxibility, and common sense, both in terms of the type of information supplied and in the level of ;

detail provided." As a minimum, however, the following are '

included in the regulatory analysis: '

1. A statement of the specific objective the proposed backfit is designed to achieve. ;

I :

2. A general description of the activity that would be required by the Itcensee to accomplisn the backfit. !

4 s a i

3. A description of the potential safety impact of c.har.ges in

" l plant or operational complexity, including the relationship to propJSed and existing regulatory requirements, j ,

j 4 A statement as to whether the proposed backfit is interim or !

final and, if interim, the justification for imposing the l proposed backfit on an interim basis, i s

4

5. A description of the benefits to be achieved and the cost to

be incurred.

l

6. A consideration of important qualitative factors bearing on j the need for the backfit at the particular facility, such j as, but not limited to, operational trends, significant plant evefits, management effectiveness, or results of performance reports, such as the Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance.

l)

7. A statement affirming appropriate interoffice coordination j related to the proposed backfit and the plan for implementation, i

4 i

1

12-10 1

l :

- - - -. .-.-- - - . . . , . . - . . - - - . . - . - - .- - . . -. w

9

( 8. The basis for requiring or permitting implementation on a l

particular schedule, including suf ficie.it information to demonstrate that the schedules are realistic and provide adequate time for in-depth engineering, evaluation, design, procurement, installation, testing, development of operating procedures, and training of operators and other plant personnel, as appropriate.

9. A schedule for staff actions involved in implementation and verification of implementation of the backfit, as appro-priate. l 7

10. A statement about the importance of the proposed t,ackfit considered in light of other safety-related activities underway at the affected facility.

12.6.3 Licensee Claims of Nontdentified Backfits

( A proposed staff position not identified by the 'NRC staff as a backfit position may be claimed to be a backfit position by a licensee. A licensee claim of backfit is rromptly considered to i reevaluate whether the claimed backfit qualifies as such.

Licensees identifying such items must send a written claim of backfit (with appropriate supporting rationale) to the Office 4

Otractor er Regional Administrator of the NRC staff person who

issued the position with a copy to the Executive Director for '

Operations (EDO). If the hRC staff determination is that the issue is a backfit, ths appropriate staff of fice will proceed f immediately with the preparatio,1 of a regulatJry analysis. I i !

If the determination is that the proposed staff position is not a backfit, the appt')priata staff office documents the basis for the decision and transmits it together with any required documented evaluation required f

to the licensee. In any case, the !

appropriate Office Director or Regional Administrator reports to {

t 12-11

. .- -- .-__. . . . . . - . . - . . - . _ .. - ~ . .

h i i 1 ,

n' i

the E00 and inferas tha licensee, within three weeks af ter i P

i: receipt of the licensee's written backfit claim, of the results :

4 of the determination and the plan for resolving the issue. When a Ifcensee is informed that a cleined backftt is, in the ,fvogment -;

of the NRC, not a backfit, the licensee may appeal this !

a determination to the Office Director or Regional Administrator. '

4 12.6.4 Licensee Anneals of Pronosed 8ackfitj '

Appeal processes in this system are of two types and are app 11ed a q to two distinctly different situations: ;

j

1. appeal to en Office or Region to modify or withdraw a '

backfit which has been proposed and for which a regulatory

} analysis has been prepared and transmitted to the licensee;- ,

f or '

l 2. appeal to an Office or Region to reverse a denial of a prior i licensee claim that a staff position, not proposed by NRC as

{

l a backfit that requires a regulatory analysis,. is a proposed >

backfit that requires a regulatory analysis. I

! 12.7 EXAMPLES OF ANALYSES OF STAFF POSITIONS $

i -

j 1 Pertinent regulatory activities and documents provide an ;

j understanding of the conditions under which a staff position may '

be viewed as a plant-specif!c backfit. It is important that the i j necessit,y for making backfit dete rminaticns not inhibit the j i

l normal informal dialogue between the technical reviewer, the .!

t i inspector and the licensee. The intent is to manage backf tt l imposition. '

! l

!~

I I j ;

i 12-12 l

. _ _ _ _ , __. ~ _ _ _ , . _ _ _ . . _ . , . _ , . . _ _ _ _ _ , _ . . _ - , _ _ , , _ _ . . - . . . ,,_.._-,--.-__-_m.-_

4 4

9 6

f N Actions proposed by the licensee are not backfits, even though -

such actions may result from normal discussions between the staff and the licensee concerning an issue, and even though the change or additions may meet the definition of a backfit.

12.7.1 Acolicability of licensino Conditions i

12.7.1.1 Use of Standard Review Pli The Standard Review Plan (SRP) de'*,.v '\: ripe and depth of staff review of licensee submis ,e .ocitted with various licensing activities. It is a defin' ~ dve NRC staff interpretat, ten of measures which, if tuer. ' .11 satisfy the requirements of the more generally statec., legally binding body of regulations primarily found in 10 CFR. Since OcteNr 1983, changes to the SRP are reviewed and approved through a generic review process involving the Committee to Review Generic !

Rcquirements (CRGR), and the extent to which the changes apply to

( classes of plants is defined. Consequently, appiteation of a current SRP in a specific operating license review is not, in ,

general, a plant-specitic backfit, provided the SRP was effective l six months prior to the start of the operating linnse review.

Asking questions of an appitcant for an operating license to clarify staff understanding of proposed actions, in order to i dctermine whether the actions will meet the intent of the SRP, is not sensidered a backfit.

On the other hand, using acceptance criteria inore stringent than those contained in the SRP or taking positions more stringent than or in addition to those specified in the SRP, whether in writing or orally, is a plant-sp9eific backfit. During meetings with the Itcensee, staff discussion or comment > regarding issues and licensee actions volunteered that are in excess of the i criteria in the SRp usually do not constitute plant-specific l l

(

l 12-13 1

backfits; however, if the staff implies or suggests -that a r specific action in excess of the already applicable staff position is the only way for the staff to be satisfied,- the action is considered a plant-specific. backfit whether or not the licensee agrees to take such action. The staff should recognize, however, that a verbally implied or suggested action should not be accepted by a itcensee as in NRC position of any kind, backfit or not; only written and authoritatively approved position statements should be taken as NRC positions.

Application of an SRP to an. operating plant review af ter the license is granted is usually considered a backt.t unless the SRP was approved specifically for operating plant implementation and is applicable to that operating plant. It is important to note, however, that in order to issue r- amendment to a license, there must ce a current finding of compliance with regulations applicable 10 the amendment. Licensee proposed revisions in design or operation that raise staff questions only about potential reduced margins of safety, as defined in the basis for any technical specification, should be reviewed by reanalysis of the scme accident sequences and associated assumptions as thote analyzed in the FSAR for the initial license issuance.

12.7.1.2 Use of Regulatory Guides As part of the generic review process pursuant to its charter, the CRGR decides which plants or groups of plants are affected by new or modified Regulatory Guide provisions. Such implementation is therefore not governed by the plant-specific backfit procedures. Any staff proposed plant-specific implementation of a Regulatory Guide p avision, whether o. ally or in writu.g, for a plant not encompassed by the generic implementation determination O

12-14

.. - . . , , _ - . .. .- ...- .._ ,x . . . . . . . . . - . - . - - . , - . , . . . . - - - .

i l

l l

I l

( 1s, however, considered a plant-specific backfit. A staff action with respect to a specific licensee that expands on, adds to, or modifies a generically approved regulatory guide, such that the position taken is more demanding than intended in the generic positions, is a plant-specific backfit.

s 12.7.1.3 Use of Plant-Specific Orders An Order issued to cause a licensee to take actions that are not otherwise applicable regulatory staff positions is a plant-specific backfit. An Order effecting prompt imposition of a backfit may be issued prior to completing any of the analytical procedures, if the appropriate Office Director determines that prompt imposition is necessary.

An Order issued to confirm a licensee commitment to take specific action, even if that action is in excess of previously applicable staff positiens, is not a plant-specific backfit provided the commitment was not obtained by the staff with the expressed or implied direction that such a commitment was necessary to gain acceptance in the staff review process. '

Discussio1 ce comments by the NRC staff identifying deficiencies observed, whether in meetings or written reports, do not constitute backfits. Definitive statements to the licensee directing a specific action to satisfy staff positions are backfits unless the action is an explicit and already applicable regulatory staff position.

12.7.2 Aeolicability *f Inspection and Enforcement Processes 12.7.2.1 Inspections I

NRC inspection procedures govern the scope and depth of staff inspections associated with licensee activities such as design, l construction and operation. As such, they define those items the

( staff is to consider in its determination of whether the licensee l

12-15

is conducting its activities in a safe manner. The conduct of an F ,

inspection establishes no new staff positions for the licensee and is not a plant-specific backfit.

Staff statements to the licensee .that the findings of an NRC inspection procedure are staff positions that must be met by the licensee do constitute a plant-specific backfit, unless the finding is based on an applicable regulatory staff position.

Discussion or comment by the NRC staff regarding deficiencies observed in the licensee's conduct of activities, whether in meetings or in written inspection reports, do not constitute backfits, unless the staff suggests that specific corrective actions different from those required by previous applicable )

regulatory staff positions are the only way to correct the problem. In the normal course of inspecting to determine whether the licensee's activities are being conducted safely, inspectors may examirie aH rnake findings in srecific technical areas wherein j

prior NRC positions and lice commitments do not exist. {

Examining such areas and making findings are not considered I backfits. Likewise, discu: Con of findings with the ifcensee is not considered a backfit. .If during such discussions, the licensee agrees that it is appropriate to take action in response to the inspector's findings, such action is not a backfit '

provided the inspector does not indicate that the specific-l actions are the only way to take corrective action. On the other l

hand, if the inspector 1;.dicates that a specific action must be taken, such action is a backfit unless it constitutes an applicable regulatory staff position. Further, if the licensee decides to claim that the inspector's findings are a backfit, the staff must decide whether they are a backfit, as discussed above.

12.7.2.2 Notices of Violation I

A Notice of Violation requesting description of a licensee's proposed enrrective action is not a backfit. The licensee's commitments in the desi:ription of corrective action are not backfits. A request by the staff for the licensee to consider 12-16

( some specific action in response to a Notice of Violation is not a backfit. If the staff is not satisfied with the . licensee's proposed corrective actions, however, and requests that the licensee take additional actions, those additional actions (whether requested orally or in writing) are a backfit, unless they are an applicable regulatory staff position or unless the corrective actions proposed do not result in compliance with the original regulatory requirement.

Discussions during enforcement conferences and responses to the licensees requests for advice regarding corrective actions are not backfits. Definitive statements to the-licensee directing a specific action to satisfy staff positions are backfits, however, unless tFe action is an explicit existing regulatory requirement or an applicable regulatory staff position.

12.7.2.3 NRC Bulletins

( .

NRC Calletins and resultant required actions undergo generic review by the CRGR. Therefore, in general, it is not necessary to apply the plant-specific backfit process to the actions requested in a Bulletin. If the staff expands the action requested by a Bulletin during its application to a specific licensee, however, such expansion is considered a plant-specific backfit. Temporary instructions covering Bulletin-following activities are treated like regular NRC programatic inspection !

procedures, j

i 12.7.2.4 Reanalysis of Issues l

Throughout plant lifetime, many individuals on the NRC staff have an opportunity to review the requirements and commitments incumbent upon a licensee. Undoubtedly, there will be occasions when a reviewee concludes that the licensee's program in a specific area does not satisfy a regulation, license condition or l

{

l 12-17 u . -- , . - -

1 1

commitment. In the case where the staff previously accepted the F licensee's program as adequate, any staff-specified change in the program would be classified as a backfit.

A somewhat different situation exists when the 'icensee has made a commitment to a specific course of action to e.eet an applicable position, the staff has not yet responded, arj therefor has not indicated that the commitment is or is not su ficient to meet the applicable position. Subsequent staff a c'.i or , which must be taken within a reasonable time to p' eclude delaying the applicants' implementation plans, that we.fid cause the licensee to meet the applicable regulatory st'.ff position is not a backfit. If the licensee has moved ahesJ in the intervening time to implement that which the licensee proposed in the submittal and the staff has failed to provide a timely responsa, the itaff position may be considered a backfit. Thus, if a licensee has implemented a technical resolution intended to meet an applicable regulatory staff position, and staff . for an extended period simply allows the licensee resolution to stand with tacit acceptance indicated by no n a c ti c,.. on the part of NRC, a subsequent action to change the licensee's design, construction,

.. operation is a backfit.

12.8 HANDLING OF POSSIBLE BACKFIT SITVATIONS While conducting inspections, questionable situations are of ten encountered that cannot be resolved by reference to license conditions, applicable regulations, licensee commitments, or NRC I guidance (NRC Manual Chapter 0514). It is imperative, however, that the inspector consider these situations. They cannot be simply ignored because there are no specific references to them.

I 12-18 l _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ - - - _ _

i

\ 12.8.1 Determining the Effect on Safety Once having arrived at a determination that an item of concern was not addressed by the licensee or his contractors and that it is not covered by existing requirements or regulations, the next order of activity is to determine whether the item is actually within those activities regulated by NRC. This is normally one of the more difficult areas, since items that are clearly safety related are already defined as such. The inspector should start by considering:

1. Whether the product has a function that supports a safety-related system or otherwise affects radiological health and safety, security or safeguards.

2. Whether there are factors at variance with accepted practice, codes or standards.

( 't . Whether the concern has been previously addressed at another facility (generic issue).

4. Whether an activity of concern could significantly effect the performance of a safety-related system.

5. Why th; .'censee believes the item or activity is not safety related.

12.8.2 Categorization by Signif f t.ance Concerns may be readily grouped by sig,1ficance into immediate, potential, and generic categories that ,suggest the appropriate actions to be taken.

(

12-19

Safety-related concerns categorized as immediate are those that have either a high probability or could have a large-magnitude '

effect, or there is a special time constraint.

Immediate concerns sustained by NRC management would normally be handled in one of the following ways:

1. In the event the licensee failed to respond or to further assure that adequate corrective actions were being taken, an Order could be issued by NRO. Provisions exist in 10 CFR 40.81 and 50.110 for obtaining an injunction or other court order from a Federal District Court if the Itcensee remains uncooperative following issuance of an NRC Order. Four types of Orders discussed in the hRC inspection manual IMC 0400 (Sect. 05.07) are: (1) Show Cause,'(2) Confirmatory Action, (3) Orders Imposing Civil Penalties, and (4)

Immediately Effective Orders.

2. A formal Confirmatory Action Letter may be used to solicit or confirm a licensee commitment and may precede an Order.

Initiation of an Order or a Confirmatory Action Letter would necessitate issuance of a Preliminary Notification in accordance -

with the NRC inspection manual IMC 1120, "Telephone and Written Preliminary Notification."

The majority of concerns not covered by regulatory requirements fit the category of potential concerns. These matters may be handled by one of the following means:

1. A memorandum may be sent from the cognizant Regional !

Administrator to the appropriate NRR or NMSS Division for review and action. The memorandum should clearly state the concern but should not indicate a specific response. Usually l

12-20 1

l l

l discussions with appropriate personnel will have been held so that the memorandum . serves to formalize the discussions.

Consideration should be given to issuance of a Task Interface Agreement to document the actions each interfacing NRC organization will perform.

2. For matters of lesser significance, a transmittal memorandum for the inspection report or an information memorandum may be used to focus attention, transmit information or opinion, or request action.

It is the responsibility of the inspector who identified the concern and the supervisor to consider possible generic aspects of the concern.

The classification of generic adds another dimension, since other licensees or permit holoers must be notified of the problem in a timely manner. Thr primary mechanisms of notification include:

1. Licensing Generic Letter

2. NRC Bulletin (see NRC inspection manual IMC 0720)_

It is unacceptable to "bury" a concern in the details of an inspection report and expect someone else to assume responsibility. The concern is the responsibility of the inspecter who identified it until appropriate action is initiated. The temptation to work out some verbal arrangement with a licensee for correction of a safety-related concern should be avoided no matter how responsible and conscientious the licensee may seem to be.

.I 12-21 4

W , . - . -

ge -,,----,-em- ,

CHAPTER 13 LICENSEE CORRECTIVE ACTION SYSTEMS 13.1 REGULATORY BASIS FOR A CORRECTIVE ACTION SYSTEM The establishment and implementation of a corrective action system are required by NRC to be an integral part of a licensee N -

Quality Assurance Program. Specifically, Criterion XVI of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, states:

"Measures shall be established'to assure that conditions adverse to quality, such as failures, malfunctions, deficiencies, deviations, defective material and equipment and nonconformances are promptly identified and corrected. In the case of significant conditions adverse to quality, the measures shall assure that the 'cause of the condition is determined and

( corrective action taken to preclude repetition. The identification of the significant condition adverse to quality, the cause of the condition, and the corrective action taken shall be documented and reported to appropriate levels of management."

The guidance provided by NRC to licensees for the development of I corrective action systems is given in Section 16 of the Standard j Review Plan. Section 16 states:

Activities related to Corrective Action (17.1.16) are acceptable {

if:

16.1 Procedures are established and described indicating an effective corrective action program has been established.

The QA organization reviews and documents concurrence with the procedures.

13-1 l

I 16.2 Corrective action is documented and initiated following the i determination of a condition adverse to quality (such as a F nonconformance, failure, malfunction, deficiency, deviation, )

and defective material .and equipment) to preclude-

)

recurrence. The QA' organization is involved in the I documented concurrence of the adequacy of the corrective 1 l

action.

16.3 Followup action is taken by the QA organization to verify proper implementation of corrective action and to close out 3

the corrective action in a timely manner. I 16.4 Significant conditions adverse to quality, the cause of the -

conditions, and the corrective action taken to preclude repetition are documented and reported to immediate management and upper levels of management for review and assessment, l

Clearly, this guidance does little more than repeat the rquirements of Criterion XVI, with the exception of specifying that the QA organization be involved and that action to preclude recurrence applies to all conditions adverse to quality, not just significant ones.

The guidance provided by the industry is not much better. The industry standard, ANSI N18.7-1976, "Administrative Controls and Quality Assurance for the Operational Phase of Nuclear Power Plants," prnvides very little additional guidance in this area.

Section 5.2.11 of ANSI N18.7-1976 states: '

5.2.11 Corrective Actions. The program shall provide measures to ensure that conditions adverse to plant safety, such as failure, malfunctions, deficiencies, deviations, defective material and equipment, abnormal occurrences, and nonconformances are promptly identified and corrected. In I

13-2

the case of significant conditions adverse to safety, the measurras shall assure that the cause of the condition is determined and corrective action shall be documented and reported to appropriate levels of management and for independent review in accordance with Section 4.3.

This is essentially a restatement of Criterion XVI, with the added provision that the independent review groups are to become involved in the process. It is also of note that Regulatory Guide 1.33, "Quality Assurance Program Requirements (Operations)," Revision 2, which implements ANSI N18.7-1976, provides no further details or amplification to the guidance given in the standard for the corrective action system.

The Standard Technical Specifications for operating reactor power plants are also silent on the requirements of a licensee s 8 corrective action system. The specifications require only that the corrective action system be audited periodically, it is also of note that NRC has only recently issued an inspection procedure that specifically addresses corrective I action (see NRC inspection manual IMC 92720, "Corrective Action,"

March 1986) and is to be performed annually at all reactor power plants in the construction, preoperational testing, and operations phases. It is apparent that lack of sufficient NRC guidance in this area and the lack of strong inspection procedures has contributed in part to the failure to implement effective corrective action systems. It must be remembered, however, that the licensee has the ultimate responsibility for {

the safe operation and construction of the licensed facility and therefore has resonsibility for implementing an effective system.

The key elements of an effective corrective action system are set forth here to give the NRC inspector an understanding of a corrective action system that, if fully implemented, will have degree of success.

( some If any of the key elements are l

13-3

nonexistent or not functioning in a licensee's corrective action y system, the inspector should be able to communicate the deficiencies to the licensee in the expectation that the licensee will cause them to be corrected.'

Since the regulatory requirements for corrective action systems are vague, it is likely that the inspector will have no regulatory basis to effect a' change in the corrective action system when weaknesses are found. The inspector should identify the concern to the licensee, but if the licensee argues that it is not a requirement and will not make the change, the inspector should bring the concern and the licensee's reluctance to the d?tention of management. Weaknesses in a licensee's Corrective action system may be effectively resolved through the SALP process. '

13.2 ELEMENTS OF AN EFFECTIVE CORRECTIVE ACTION SYSTEM An effective corrective action system must assure that adverse conditions will be promptly (1) identifled, (2) evaluated and (3) corrected. Some programs inay have additional elements, but the additional elements can easily be classed as subelements of these three basic elements. In addition, significant conditions detrimental to quality will require the determination of cause and action to prevent recurrence. l l

13.3 IDENTIFICATION OF THE PROBLEMS l

The first step in constructing a corrective action systea is to determine the types of problems to which it' will be applied.

Criterion XVI of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, lists things such as failures, malfunctions, deficiencies, deviations, defective material and equipment, and nonconformances. The ANSI N18.7 standard repeats this list and adds one moro problem, namely, abnormal occurrences. The inspection manual adds faults and I 13-4 I i

i i

i l

t incorrect or inadequate procedures. It is easy for the licensee to get caught up in a concern for naming all the "problems" or "conditions adverse to quality," but the name or title is insignificant compared with the possible detrimental impact on plant safety, which the corrective action system must be designed to address. The inspector should watch for programs that are so preoccupied with naming the problem that employees could become frustrated in trying to classify the problems and therefore fail to place the problems into the system. 1 There are many ways in which problems can be identified, and the corrective action system must provide the means and guidance for each. The four principal methods of problem identification are:

(1) self identification, (2) monitoring, (3) inspection and l 1

audit, and (4) reviews. Each of these methods of identification ,

is important and must be fully addressed and implemented in an effective corrective action system. A licensee's corrective action system that fails to consider any one of these methods

( could cause a major system breakdown because certain types of problems can be effectively identified by only one of these -

methods.

13.3.1 Self Identification The most important method of identification of problems is self identification. Self identification means that the individual I employee identifies problems initiated, caused, or found by the j employee. This includes component failures and problems initiated or caused by others. This is the "first line" of identification.

It can be, and should be, the most effective means of problem identification, but unfortunately it has been one of the weaker elements in licensee corrective action systems.

l l \

i 13-5

l l

Licensees have traditionally tried to impress on their employees, r through general employee training, that everyone has a responsibility for quality. The specifics of this training, however, emphasize only procedure adherence and documentation.

Certainly these two elements of the QA program are important, but errors are part of the human condition, and the employees must be made to feel responsibility for identifying and correcting problems.

Even though the 1,dentification and correction of problems is not stressed by management, the conscientious employee should realize when he has made an error and bring it to management's attention, but this has not been the case in practice. It would be easy to debate the cause of this practice, for it has often been stated that the individuals of today take no pride in workmanship. j Others have stated that the production pressures by management are a deterrent to individuals admitting that they have made a mistake and they will have to redo the job. The fear of loosing their job or other benefits (promotion, bonus, raise, etc.) force the individuals to overlook their error, or poor workmanship, and hope that no one will catch it. {

There is a documented case in which the constructiu manager of a problem plant stated, while he was being questioned as to why his craftsman were not identifying problems, that if any of his l

craftsmen identified a problem that they had caused they would be "out the gate." He said that they were being paid to do the job right the first time.

It is no wonder that the craftsmen under l that supervisor never identified problems and that this plant was in serious trouble.

13-6

Another contributor to this problem is the attitude often expressed by management that they do not worry about it because QC will find the problem. The worker-to-QC inspector ratio at most plants is typically 20 or 30 to 1. There is no way that QC inspectors can provide oversight to all activities of the workers. Simply put, the licensee (or NRC) cannot inspect quality into the facility.

It is important for the NRC inspector to verify that a licensee's corrective action system has strong provisions for assuring that i all employee,s' understand that they have a definite responsibility for identifying problems. Licensee corrective action systems typically have mechanisms for identifying problems such as a nonconformance report, a deficiency report or some other type of required document or form. The concern is that licensee programs often relegate the preparation of these problem-identi fying documents to those in QA, QC, or management. For those licensees, the individual worker can only report a concern or problem orally or by some other lower tier' notice. The licensee's program must allow, and specifically require, all !

levels of employees to initiate corrective action documents. ;

These programmatic requirements must be emphasized in the employee's initial treining, and they must be fortified by periodic refresher training.

i i

l Most utilities have now instituted a SAFETEAM, QUALITY FIRST, or '

similar program to provide a means for an employee to bring to ,

management's attention any concern. These programs currently have no regulatory basis and are not an integral part of the licensee's corrective action system. They are, l'owever, just as important, and like the corrective action system, the SAFETEAM program must emphasize that all employees should consider it their responsibility to bring forward their issues and concerns. !

These responsibilities must also be outlined in the initial and refresher training that the employee receives.

13-7

13.3.2 Monitorina '

v The second important method of problem identification is called the monitoring or oversight function. This method of problem identification is pr'marily for supervisors, but each individual has a measure of responsibility for thi> type of problem :

l identification. The supervisor's principle responsibility is to assure that the employees perform their jobs in accordance with !

the specific requirements of the job. Even if a licensee fully 1 supports and encourages an individual to identify problems, some individuals may not do so because of pride or fear of reprisals.

l It is therefore important that the supervisor work in the field and observe (monitor) the activities of employees. This monitoring effort cannot be done at the supervisor's desk.

The responsibility of the supervisor to monitor employee l

activities is seldom stated in the written program, but many 1 supervisors say that this is an implied expectation of management. In reviewing a licensee's corrective action system, the inspector should determine how such management expectations !

are communicated to the supervisors. This will probably not be an integral part of the corrective action system, but because it is so important to the effectiveness of the system, the inspector should look into this area. The inspector should also determine how these expectations are fortified or reemphasized, such as by refresher training.

l The individual worker also has a responsibility for monitoring the surrounding ongoing activities. Individuals should be !

i encouraged to come forward when they observe something wrong. If the work is ongoing, the problem can be brought to the attention of those involved in the activity. This is a difficult thing for many people to do because they do not want to get involved, and because there are many people who are not receptive to someone 13-8

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( pointing out problems in their work. This is unfortunate because many times an individual will fail to recognize a problem in what he is doing 'because he is too close to it; whereas the outside observer may readily detect the problem.

Because this type of activity is hard for people to accept, it is i

l not itkely to be found as an integral part of a corrective action l system. In fact, there is a case at one plant in which a QC I

inspector was terminated because he inspected areas he was not assigned to inspect. The licensee did not appear to be swayed by the fact that the QC inspector had identified some valid deficiencies.

The NRC inspector should determine the extent to which the licensee allows or encourages this independent type of monitoring. If the licensee's corrective action system does not contain guidance or directions in this area, the licensee should be encouraged to consider it. The benefits derived will likely C I outweigh the cost in employee dissatisfaction. The disincentives i

I can be minimized if the Itcensee provides training on the benefits of such a system and further assures the employees that there will be no retribution for problems that are identified by fellow workers.

Other activities which involve the monitoring of ongoing work include QA surveillances, NRC inspections, and the observations of the onsite review committees. Licensee corrective action systems have typically been silent on these particular types of monitoring activities, with the pessibie exception of the QA surveillances. Since these types of monitoring activities provide an independent means of monitoring ongoing activities, the licensee should be strongly encouraged to use them in their corrective action system. The QA surveillances can be very

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13-9

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l important at a construction site or for contractor activities at an operating plant. The QA surveillances not only provide F oversight of the work activities, but they provide insight to the effectiveness of the contractor's oversight. I 13.3.3 Inspection and Audit Activities The two methods of identifying problems discussed in the previous sections apply to problems identified with ongoing activities.

In this section, and in the subsequent section, after-the-fact identification of problems is discussed.

The first type of af ter-the-fact identification process is the l inspection and audit function. This function involves the l examination of a completed job or task to assure that specific events or parameters of the job or task have been completed in accordance with the specific requirements. The examination, or inspection may involve the actual observation of the equipment or job site, or it may . involve the examination of documents to verify that the job or task was done in accordance with the requirements. !

l 1

There is a common misconception in the industry that the inspection function ' is clearly the respoh sibili' 'ty of the QC inspector. The QC inspector certainly has such responsibility.

{

Most test, inspection, maintenance, and construction procedures, l

and even some operating procedures, include one or more QC hold i points that specify a measurement, parameter, or condition that '

must be met and verified by a QC inspector before the procedure continues. All employees, however, have inspection responsibilities.

Within the area of self identification, the individual who is observing his own completed work, or that of others, verifies that it meets specific object.ves. When these oversight or observation activities are performed using logs or 13-10 l

_ . - . - - . - - . . .- -- -. -- -- - -- ~

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( checklists with detailed acceptance criteria, they can be categorized as inspection activities. Similarly, the examination of a completed job by a supervisor has elements of an inspection activity, when the supervisor verifies and documents that spec.i fic acceptance criteria have been met. The effective performance of these inspection activities is vital to the success Jf the corrective action system and must be well-structured in the program.

Experience has shown, however, that theso supervisory and peer inspection activities are generally not well-documented in ifcensee corrective action systems. For a licensee to have a strong corrective action system, these inspection requirements ,

must be included in the work procedures and specifications.

Other inspection activities include those of data takers, QA auditors, and onsite and offsite committee members in the performance of their reviews (inspections), and NRC inspectors.

C The activities of these individuals f'all within the inspection category when they are performed in accordance with procedures or checklists that contain detailed acceptance criteria. The licensee's corrective action system must provide means for documenting the problems identified by these inspections, and the individuals who identify such problems must be assigned specific responsibility for identifying and documenting the problems.

The inspection is generally the second line of defense in identifying problems. If the individual fails to identify the problems during the performance of a job or task, the inspections I by the supervisor, by QC, or by the other oversight functions provide the means to assure that the problems are identified and corrected. '

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Data takers, however, become the first level of identification.

During the performance of testing activities, the data taker will '

usually be the person who has the first opportunity to recognize

) and identify a problem. During normal operations of the plant, the operator also has a data-taker function while' filling out the logs. Since these data-taking responsibilities are so significant, it is vitally important that the acceptance criteria for test data and log data be provided in a clear, concise, and easily used manner. It is not acceptable to reference a technical specification or other requirement. The acceptance criteria must'be expressed in the same units as the reading being recorded by the data taker. The data taker and the operator must be given specific training in the importance of this function and how the problems they find are to be documented and identified in the corrective action system.

There are numerous examples of licensees operating for exte,ded periods of time with an important parameter out of specification because a data taker, or an operator filling out his log, failed to recornize that the recorded reading was an indication of a problem.

For operators, the training should also emphasize being obsersant of adverse trends in logged parameters. Identifying an ad';erse trend may allow a problem to be fixed before exceeding some limit. The licensee should also provide periodic refresher training in the importance of data taking and log recording.

The inspector who is reviewing a licensee's corrective action 1 system may not find specific reference to data-taker or log-recorder responsibilities in the corrective action program, but a i licensee with a strong corrective action system should have established these responsibilities and the necessary training.

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( 13.3.4 Review Activities The third method of problem identification is that provided by the licensee's work and program review function. The review function includes activities ranging from the review of a specific activity such as the performance of a task (for example, a preventive maintenance), up to and including a major effort like the performance of a detailed trend analysis of plant operations.

Since this area 1s so very broad, this discussion first addresses 1

the review of single activities, which are categorized as specific reviews. The discussion then addresses those efforts that look at an overall program or a group of activities over an extended period of time. These broad review efforts are categorized as general reviews.

l 13.3.4.1 Specific Reviews Specific reviews involve the individual review of the mounds of I documents generated at a nuclear power plant in the performance of operations, maintenance, design, surveillance, and inspection activities. The documentation reviewed includes records such as operating logs, mainte".snce records, surveillance tests records, training records, and inspection checklists. In short, this review effort includes the records of all activities at the site, with particular attention given to "problem identifiers." The problem identifiers that should be reviewed in detail include

{

LERs, nonconformance reports, plant trouble reports, corrective :

action reports, deficiency reports, OA audit reports, NRC inspection reports, reports of the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations, and others. Some of these reports may also address issues of broader scope, but to the extsnt that they address specific activities, their review 9s into this specific review category.

4 13-13 ,

l These reviews are similar to inspection activities but are !

broader in scope. They are generally not covered by a specific r '

j and detailed checklist or procedure, and they are not limited to l

the verification that the detailed acceptance criteria have been l met. The review is designed to verify that the activity, as a whole, was performed in accordance with the requirements, but l

they go much further, even to -the point of determining whether l

the stated acceptance criteria are accurate and appropriate.

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The licensee's corrective action system should address these types of reviews and should include the family of documents to be reviewed; the individuals or groups who will perform the reviews; l general guidance as to what the reviews should look for; the way in which the reviews are to be documented; and the mechant:m to be used to document identified problems. It is also important that the licensee's training program provide instructions to the reviewers regarding how to perform the reviews, as well as refresher training to periodically reemphasize the review requirements and to discuss lessons learned from past failures This training and retraining may not be an integral part of the' licensee's corrective action program, but it should be examined by the inspector because it is important that reviewers understand management's expectations regarding reviews. If the inspector finds that the licensee is not adequately training (and retraining) reviewers, it should be stressed to the licensee that the adequacy of the reviews will be only as good as the people doing the reviews.

An unfortunate example of this problem was found during an NRC inspection of licensee activities at an operating plant. As the NRC inspector was interviewing the members of the onsite review committee to determine the extent of their review, each member indicated that the reviews included such things as procedures, 13-14 '

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A design changes, and LERs to determine the impact the issue had on the specific group he/she supervised. The inspector then asked !

if they understood what was meant by the term "unreviewed safety question."

To his amazement not one knew the 10 CFR 50.59 definition of an "unreviewed safety. question." The thing that l wcs amazing about their lack of knowledge was that the technical specifications, which defined the respinsibilities of the committee, stated that the committee was to review such things as !

procedures, design changes, LERs, inspection and audit reports, l and other documents to determine whether they constituted any unreviewed safety questions. Obviously the licensee had provided no training, instruction, or guidance to the committee, and therefore it would be difficult to say that the committee was performing its intended function. It is not surprising that i

this facility has not had a good performance record. The lack of !

training for the review committee was only an indicator of other proolems.

I Although the focus of the inspector's evaluation should be on the performance of the reviews, the evaluation should also assure that the reviews are appropriately documented. The completed j

reviews and the problems icientified through the reviews can be l

documented in many different forms, depending on the type of j review and who performs it.

The documentation of the reviews should, as a minimurr, provide the following:

1. the document / activity reviewed,

2. the name of the reviewer,

3. the date of the review,

4. reference to the review criteria used,

5. the acceptability of the activity reviewed, and !

6. the documents issued to correct identified problems. I i

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13-15 )

The inspector will usually find, however, that the licensee's r documentation of reviews is much less detailed than that for inspections. The licensee might rightly argue that the detailed documentation requirements are for "inspection" activities and not "review" activities. Tho definition given for inspection activities in Criterion X of 10 CFR 59, Appendix B, cculd certainly t,0 Interpreted to include the definition used here for review activities. Since the reviews are designed to assure that i

activities are performed in accordance with requirements, the licensee should be encouraged to provide better documentation of t,hese reviews.

The most significant omission in documenting review efforts is the indication of the acceptability of the activity and the d2tr.

reviewed. A case can certainly be made for a licensee's position j

that even if the reviewer had to certify that all the acceptance criteria had been met, errors could still slip through the review I process. Since certification could ' prevent some errors from 1 going undetected, however, the NRC inspector should strongly encourage the licensee to ensure that this element and the others j

listed above are included in the documentation of reviews. !

The licensee's corrective action system will have many means for documenting problems and placing them into the system. The I review program should, therefore, clearly define the vehicle to be used to document the prcblems identified through the various review processos. The inspector should discourage the licensee from orally communicating identified problems to the responsible I individuals or groups, rather than providing written instruction.

It is recognized that in many cases it is expedient for the reviewer to simply bring the problem, document, or report to the responsible individuals or groups so that corrective action can he tnen. This would get the problem solved, but it would circumvent the important aspect of determining why the problem 13-16

-- - _ . ~ - ._. - -__ - - - -

occurred in the first place. If the root cause is not found and

( corrected there is nothing to prevent recurrence of the event.

The licensee must be encouraged to docurant all review findings in a manner that will assure that the cause of the problem can be determined and corrected.

13.3.4.2 General Reviews The general review function includes the review activities designed to look at a program (or process) to determine that it is performed in accordance with the appropriate requirement or in a manner that is most effective or efficient. Ef forts in this category include programs for performing trend analyses of violations, LERs, reactor trips, nenconformance reports, and others; QA audits, committee r eviews, evaluations, and audits; special inspections ano investigatius; third party evaluations and audits; and performance indicator studies.

C These reviews are not intended to assure that individual acceptance criteria have been met, but are designed to obtain an overall view of the effectiveness of a process or program.

Examples of failures to meet specific criteria, as identified through inspections and other review efforts, are important information for these reviews Trend anclysis programs have been develcred and implemented by most licensees and can be very effective in identifying programmatic problems, provided the programs are properly designed and implemented. A common failing of these efforts is to allow them to become a simple number count of specific problems identified by LERs, notices of violations, nonconformance reports, and other indicators. For example, a trend analysis of the number of LERs reported might show that the total number of LERs per month were declining, but the number of 13-17 n- >- ,,- - -

,a - , e~ ,-, -v.. , - -

monthly LERs resulting from personnel errors increasing. The t end analysis that looks at only the total number of LERs would F not surface a potential problem regarding the increase in personnel errors. To carry the example further, the trend analysis programs should also be able to detect 'an increasing number of personnel errors in the maintenance department, even though the overall number of personnel errors at the site was constant or declining.

The inspector should critically review the trends the licensee is studying and what an adverse trend would indicate. It is very important that trend aralysis activities be perforfred and reviewed by individuals knowledgeable of the plant and the parameters being analyzed. To have a clerk collect and track data that are not understood could render the program useless.

The ideal trend analysis program rot only detects the change in a number of specific parameters or indicators, but it may also show links between the causes of the indicators. If, for example, a :

number of noncompliance events are reported each month that indicate a repeat of previous errors, such as welding defects, these repeated failures indicate that the actions to prevent recurrence have not been effective. The tracking and analysis of "causa'ly linked" events, or other problems. should be an integral part of a truly effective trend analysis program.

Much effort has been expended in recent yeartc in the development and implementation of a program for tracking performance indicators, and NRC has established a number of indicators that

' are being tracked by the agency for all operating plants. The indicators are compiled and published periodically to give NRC a feel for how the plants are performing. Individual regions have expanded this program to additional indicators that are not in the NRC nationwide program. Certain industry groups have also taken the initiative to develop performance indicator programs.

13-18 ,

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( Such programs can De valuable tools for licensee management, because they are similar to the trend analysis programs discussed above. The indicators have, however, much broader scopes than the types of events ar:d problems tracked in a trend analysis program. This is not. to minimize the performance indicator l programs, but to note that these programs do have some ;

limitations, The performance indicator prograus could be strengthened by the addition of an effort to find causal linkage i of the reported parameters (for example, scrams and engineered l safety feature actuations). I 1

The programmatic reviews performed by the various audit functions are also important eleaents of the corrective action system. The audits that provide programmatic information are performed by the QA organization, the offsite review committee, the Independent Safety Engineering Group, third party groups cor'-acted to do effectiveness reviews, and NRC inspection efforts.

(=

The audits in this' category are much broader in scope than those discussed in Section 13.2.4. Most audits performed by the QA organization are of the limited type, since they examine ' specific :

activities. The audits conducted in general reviews are those special reviews that encompass a whole program or process. These audits require more resources and time, as well as much more preparation and planning.

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The key to the succe:s of one of these audits is the preparation l and planning. The first thing to be determined is what the program or process being audited is designed to achieve. j Frequently an audit team assumes that the program is correct, so they review the program requirements and verify that they hava l been tr4plemented.

This approach presupposes that the program developers did not miss elements that would be important to effectiveness.

13-19 l o

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In reviewing the licensee's corrective action system, tha ,

{

inspector should verify that the development of audit plans includes a determination of the adequacy of the program being audited. The inspector should also review the audit plans to verify that program adequacy has been reviewed,by the audit.

Examples of thest concerns have been found in the review of program effectiveness and adequacy when the review is carried out by independent (third party) auditors to satisfy specific requirements. For example, the adequacy and effectiveness of QA programs must be reviewed periodically for conformance with Criterion II of 10 CFR 50, Appendix 8. A training program effectiveness review is sisggested (see ANSI N18.1), and reviews of the adequacy of the security and emergency preparedness programs are required by the technical spectfications.

The concern with these audits arises when the audit group does a comprehensive review of each element of the program and verifies that each elennt has been appropriately implemented, but fails to determine whether the program is adequate. Audits of the training program, for example, have looked at only the appraisals completed by the students, which address the adequacy of the I

classroom instruction given. This 'does not assess the adequacy of the program but only the effectiveness of its implementation.

If, for example, the program did not include adequate cra f t training, as in the area of welding, such an omission would not be detected in these types of audits. The audit must first determine what the program was intended to do. The. audit should then examine indicators that will point to the adequacy of the training program. For example, a high reject rate for welds would lead the auditors to look at the adequacy of the trrining program for welders.

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( Similar problems have been observed in the adequacy and effectiveness reviews of licensee QA programs. In some cases the auditors failed to consider what the program was intended to accomplish and did not look at the indicators that would answ=;-

that question. They only looked at the implementation of thi program, and presumed that the program was adequate.

The inspector should review these audit efforts to determine the extent to which program adequacy was reviewed. The inspector should also verify

hat the adec,uacy of the corrective action system was tiso reviewed and evaluated. The importance of evaluating the "causal linkage" of events ar 8 other problems, which was discussed earlier, becomes very clear when an attempt is made to determina the effectiveness of a program or process.

The Itcensee should be encouraged to incorporate these audit provisions, as well as the findings, into the corrective action system.

(

13.4 TRACKING PROBLEMS AND CORRECTIVE ACTION An important element of a corrective action system is tha tracking mechanism to follow identified problems through the system until they are corrected. The tracking mechanism, in addition, provides a means by w'ich the effectiveness of the corrective action system can ce measured.

Ideally, there will be only one integrated tracking system incorporated in the corrective action system. In years past, many licensees developed tracking sy3tems for each of the major departments or divisions at the plant. These systems were reasonably ef'ective for tracking problems or issues that were identified within that department and would be closed out by the i

people or groups within that department. The difficulty arose '

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i 13-21 i 1

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l when the c0rrective action had to be performed by another department. Often the other department would also enter the '

l ttems into their tracking system. The initiating organization thus lost track of the prograss being made to fix the item, and oftan the organization correcting the problem would close it in their tracking system but neglect to get it closed in that of the '

originating organization. The multiple systems also made it difficult for management to provide the oversight that is so badly needed for a corrective action system to function adequately. The result was an ineffective system that resulted in struggles between organizations.

This is an area to which the inspector should pay particular attention. If a licensee has multiple tracking systems, the inspector should closely examine the mechanisms the licensee has established to overcome the above-mentioned pitfalls of the multiple systems, and then verify that these mechanisms have been fully implemented. The objectives of the review are to assure that the corrective action system is working. If a multiple tracking system is leriing to power struggles and squabbles between organizations, the people in these organizations will become less inclined to put problems and issues into the corrective action system, and the system will become ineffective.

The tracking sy7 tem must have a provision for estab11shing prioritus among the issues entered into it. In the course of operating or constructing a nuclear power plant, issues will be raised that vary from those ns.eding to be fixed irrediately to keep the plant going, to those that would be nice to have but ,

could be deferred for months or even years. The tracking system must clearly break out thosa items that have priority and must have high managament visibility until the problem is fixed.

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'( Each issue of lower priority must be brought to management's attention with decreasing frequency. This concept of having problems and issues brought to management's attention with a frequency and visibility that is proportional.to the significance ,

i of the problem or issue will assure that management is not i overburdened by the system. Management needs to focus maximum ;

4 attention on the truly major issues- and not be' distracted by

having the "nice to have" items included while it is addressing those major issues. Management does, however, need to see the lesser issues at some lesser frequency. The lesser issues must be r' siewed to assure that the timing of resolution is ;

commens ste with the need for corrective action. This also enabl, management to upgrade (or downgrade) an issue that has '

been inappropriately classified.

i The tracking system must be periodically reviewed by the licensee to assure that scheduled corrective action which has been delayed '

and not performed at the right time is called to the attention of C the managers and supervisors who were responsible for identifying

[

the problem originally and to those who have the responsibility for correcting the problem. Ideally, the tracking system will show how many times the completion date has slipped and the fact j that the managers involved are aware of, and concur in, the slippage. ,

The status of the corrective action system must be periodically reported to all those who have a need to follow the problems identified in the system. The individual who initially identified the problem should be given a periodic status report on the correction or resolution of the problem. The originator should also be notified when the corrective action has been completed. There have been examples in the past in which a l licensee prepared a work order, or a maintenance request, to fix a problem and then closed out the item in N corrective action i

I 13-23

system. The inspector should be sensitive to this type of practice because, if the work order, maintenance request, or other document used to initiate the corrective action becomes lost or is canceled, the problem remains uncorrected, as if it had never been identified. The tracking system must not permit '

the closure of a problem, or issue, until it is actually corrected.

Because the tracking system is such a vital element or subelement of an effective corrective action system, the inspector should verify that . 'the individuals who have the responsibility for maintaining the tracking system are well trained and have a good understanding of the system. They should also have a reasonable knowledse of the facility, because they provide a quality check to assure that individual iteins being tracked are assigned to the appropriate individuals or groups.

13.5 EVALUATION OF THE PROBLEMS The second major element of an effective corrective action system is the evaluation of the problems or issues entered into the system. This element of the system is equal in importance to the identification element because, if the problems and issues are not adequately evaluated, the corrective action may not be appropriate or sufficient.

i Each problem or issue entered into the corrective action system ,

should be examined for the following:

t

1. safety impact of the problem,

2. reporting needs and requirements,

3. generic implications, i 4. corrective action needed,

5. root cause and action needed to prevent recurrence, i

n 13-24

Certain problems or issues do not require detailed evaluation of each of these aspects, but the evaluatirn process should assure that each aspect is considered and that there is a clear indication of why it does or does net apply. The failure to address all the evaluation aspects could result in incomplete corrective action.

13.5.1 Safety Impact The problem or issue must be examined first to determine whether it has an impact on safety. This is most important because the safety impact has a major bearing on the priorities established for corrective action. If the problem must be corrected before the plant can be allowed to operate (or continue to operate), the licensee should give the problem the highest priority.

Conversely, a problem that has little or no safety impact shou'd receive a lower priority.

A determination should then be made as to whether those problems or issues that have no potential sa'ety impact are really problems. These are very difficult 4 terminations for an l

evaluator to make. It is tempting when evaluating a minor problem to write it off rather than expend the effort to deal effectively with it. Difficulty arises when the problem or issue doos not appear to be sign'ficant to a reasonable evaluator, but the individual who identified the problem still has a concern.

If the evaluator falls into the trap of minimizing the identified problems, there may be two pitfalls that are detrimental to the system.

First, the individual who identified the problem may not have adequately described it. The real problem may be buried beneath the words that were originally provided. Unless the evaluator sufficiently probes into the issue, the real problems may never be identified and corrected. Jecondly, the problem or issue is important to the ort;pnator who made the effort to surface it.

{ If the evaluation is not sufficient to bring out the 13-25

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real concern so that the problem can be taken care of, the e originator will become disenchanted and fail to bring forward any future issues. For a corrective action system to really work, it must be accepted and trusted by everyone onsite. People must believe that they can identify concerns without fear of reprisal and they can trust thst the problems will be promptly and adequ6tely considered and corrective action taken. Many licensses have failed to give that sense of trust to their empleyets and have suffered detrimental consequences.

It is important to determine why the initiator thought there was a problem. Possible answers might include: (1) the employee did not understand the issue, and (2) the employee was disgruntled.

If the problem is the lack of understanding by the employee, the '

licensee needs to critically review the training of the individual. If he fails to understand the area of the perceived problem, the employee may have ser*ous shot tcomings that could have a real safety impact.

If the employee is disgruntled, the li:eccee needs to ask why.

Some employees are basically unhappy anil will have difficulty in most environm$nts, but in some casei the employee may be disgruntled because of mistreatment or inproper supervision. The licensee needs to seriously consider ti ese possibilities. If there are a number of these types of items being identified in the system, it may be a strong indication of a training or !

supervisory problem. If a critical and objective review !

discounts these causes, and the problem is attribui.ed to a generally unhappy employee, the licensee should take a critical !

look at the screening process for new employees. This type of employee will typically have a record of this kind 6f behsvior at I other jobs, and if a good screening process would hava uncoverard this trait, the licensee should critically evaluate the screenir.g l

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l program. The licensee should also give strong consideration to the undesirability of having that type of person working at a '

nuclear power plant and take whatever action is appropriate for the current situation and to prevent future hiring of that type of person, 1

This is an important area and the inspector should give it more than a cursory review. The inspetor should look into the training and guidance provided to the individuals who perform critical evaluations. Experience has shown that very few corrective action programs address this aspect of the evaluation process. The inspector shacid, however, determine whether any effort is made by the licensee to evaluate the reasons for such indicators. The inspector should also look into the adequacy of 6 the licensee's second level of review and evaluations. The program should call for this second level of review to provide oversight of the adequacy of the initial reviews.

13.5.2 _Reportino Needs and Reauirements Reporting is important because of the need to keep senior management and the industry informed regarding problem arecs.

Inspection manual chapter MC 92720 identifies reporting as the 4

initial item to be reviewed in the licensee's program regarding the handling of problems and issues.

The evaluations should determine whether a problem or issue satisfies criteria for reporting the problems to the licensee's '

senior management. Above some threshold level a problem or issue will require some action that has more than a minor impact on the licensee; for example, an event that would force the plant into an outage, or an issue that would require unusual expenditure of company resources.

13-27

The inspector will find that some corrective action programs do not address the reporting aspect. The inspector should therefore '

determine what type of informal guidance and training the reviewers receive in this area. The evaluation - should also include the reporting that a Itcensee makes outside the company, ,

since all licensees have some form of reporting requirements in their license and technical specifications. The reports issued in accordance with these requirereents are submitted to NRC and i are designed to keep NRC and the industry informed 'of plant problems.

The licensee's corrective action system should assign specific responsibilities for the review of all identified problems to determine whether the reporting requirements or criteria have been met. This writi.en guidance should be sufficiently specific to interpret the requirements and give the reviewer guidance.

The written program should also address notifications to owners groups of those problems and issues that could have an impact on '

a sister plant, The inspector should verify that the guidance provided by the NRC inspection manual for LERs,10 CFR 73 and 50.55(e) reports has been incorporated into the licensee's written program. The inspector should also review the specift: training and the periodic refresher training given to the reviewers regarding reporting, and the extent to which management provides oversight of this aspect of the review process. All the reporting decisions made t,y the reviewers should also be reviewed periodically and the periodic audits of the corrective action system should spec.ifically consider this area.

l 13.5.3 Generie Implication _

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A very impor, ant aspect of the evaluation of an identified !

problem or issue is the determination of generic implications.

The industry has become much better in recent years in ,

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determining whether a problem is likely to occur someplace else in the plant or in the industry. There are many examples from years past in which a licensee experienced a failure of a component and corrected the problem but gave no consideration to an identical or similar component elsewhere in the plant. Of course the other coriponent failad shortly thereafter, and in some l cases the failure caused an outage for the plant. Some l licensee's even had to expertance several failures before they

} really corrected the problem.

I The determination of generic implications requires a knowledge of the root cause of the problem. Once the root cause is established the licensee may find that the failure mechanism is applicable to other components or systems 'that are not l necessarily similar to the one in which the failure first

{ occurred. A programmatic failure such as the use of improperly calibrated equipment or poorly trained craftsmen can have far reaching generic implications and require extensive corrective i k -

action. !

1 The inspector should verify that the licensee's corrective action system specifically addresses this aspect of the evaluation of problems and issues.

The corrective action documents and forms should also require this aspect of the evaluation to be specifically addressed and reviewed.

The inspector should also verify that the reviewers receive specific trainir;g and retraining in this aspect of the evaluation process. The licensee's training program for the reviewers should incorporate examples of where the failure to determine and correct the generic implication of a problem has resulted in subsequent failures.

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13.5.4 Corrective Action Needed r

An important aspect of the evaluation of an identified problem, but one which is often given little emphasis, is the determination of the appropriate corrective action. The corrective action must fix the specific problem, and it must also prevent recurrence of the problem.

As was mentioned before, licensees often devote insufficient attention to the corrective action needed to fix the identified problem. The applicable craftsman is frequently given instructions to determine the cause Of the problem and fix it.

Unfortunately, the craftsman will do just that. There is seldom any effort, or interest, on the part of the craftsman to preserve the pieces or parts which would help to determine the root cause of the problem. Replaced parts are scrapped and replacements are installed. If the problem is a failed fuse or electronic component, it is scrapped and replaced.

The corrective action must also be evaluated to determine whether it could further degrade the plant. Limitir.g conditions for operations, for example, may be exceeded if the corrective acticn is not well planned. The repair of a defective component may require that the system involved be taken out of commission. The corrective action determination should consider the plant status and determine what limitations might apply. This is important and the evaluation guidance should specifically cause the reviewer to address this aspect in evaluation. There are many examples of cases in which a licensee actually degraded plant safety to correct a problem that could have awaited conditions that would a

permit the repair to be made with no safety impact or, the plant.

For programmtic problems, the corrective action has to go beyond

, fixing the program deficiency. If the program deficiency could have caused problems in the past, the corrective actica must include a review of past activities under the program to 1

13-30

determine whether other problems exists that have not yet been identified. If, for example, the identified problem is a '

defective part which was allowed to be placed in spares because of deftetive inspection procedures, the corrective action must, i as a minimum, include a sampling inspection of other parts in the warehouse that were inspected by the defective procedures.

The important point is that the licensee's corrective action ,

system must assure that the r, . . .. a r includes generic implications in the review process. The inspector should verify that tiie cor'rective action program specifically addresses the generic implication of the evaluation and that the reviewers have received the appropriate training and refresher training to assure that they understand these aspects of the evaluation process.

13.5.5 _Roet Cause und Action Needed to Prevent Recurrence The most important, most misunderstood, and most risused of the evaluation processes is that of determining the actions to be taken to prevent recurrence of a problem. It is necessary for j

the licensee's reviewer to first determine the root cause of the problem. This aspect of the evaluation process requires a critical look into the inner workings of the licensee's organization and an honest and frank realization of the !

weaknesses that led to the problem. !

13.5.5.1 Root Cause Determination i

The determination of the root cause of a problem requires much ;

introspection by the reviewer. The reviewer must be objective in

{

evaluating why the licensee's processes and/or people failed to

prevent the problem. The most common failurd of licensees in j

this area is that of not doing an evaluation that is of j i sufficient depth.

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13-31 e

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l NRC has contributed 'to this . failure. In 10 CFR 2, licensees are required to . identify action to prevent -recurrence of a cited F!

violation, but no guidance is provided. For the reporting of 1

licensee events (LERs) NRC has given some gu! dance regarding'the '

identification of the cause; that is, NUREG-1022. "Ltcensee Event !

Report System," estabitshes several causes that are coded and i used to identify the cause of' the event. -

i The causes outlined in NUREG-1022 are:

e

1. personnel error,

2. design, manufacturing, construction or installation errors, !

3. external cause,

4. defective procedures, i

5. management and quality assurance deficiency,

6. other.

6 Unfortunately, the NUREG document. provides little in the way of l

detailed guidance regarding these cause categories or the need '

for the licensee to provide a more indepth cause determination.

j' If, for example, a licensee had an event that occurred because a written procedure was not followed or because individuals did not '

i perform in accordance with accepted practices, the event cause would be listed as personnel error, and the corrective action 3

might typically be that of counseling the individual (s).

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This does not adequately address the root cause of the problem. l l

3 If the individual involved failed to follow a written procedure, a more detailed evaluation might determine that:

1. the written procedure was not provided to or was not available to the individual, i

2. the individual did not know about the procedure or did not l understand it. '

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3. the individual was aware of the procedure and had it, but

( becau*e of distractions, or pressures, or other factors,.

several steps in the procedure were missed or overlooked,

4. the individual was not mentally or physically fit to perform the activity, or

5. the individual was aware of the procedure but because of an attitude problem chose to ignore it.

In each of these cases the categorization of personnel - error would fit, but the real cause, the root cause, is quite different-in each case. In the first case, management failed to provide the individual with the tools (that is, the procedure) to do the job. This may also indicate that the individual was not adequately trained about the need for using procecrres and so did nos have the knowledge or motivation to ask for a procedure. In the second case, the individual clearly had not received adequate

( training to perform 'the assigned tasks. This could be an

. indication of a weak training program and/or a weak supervisor who had not provided sufficient oversight of the individual's performanca.

< l In the third case, the licensee had not provided the individual with a suita le work environment to perform the job safely. This case cay also indicate a failing on the part of senior management to provide the kind of resources (people and equipment) necessary to do high quality work. l In the fourth case, management had not been effective in assuring that its employees were physically or mentally capable of i performing at the attention level required in a nuclear power plant. This could indicate an inadequate fitness for duty program and/or a supervisor who was not observant and sensitive to the telltale signs of an employee's abilities to function in the job.

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l 13-33 .

The latter case is one of the most dangerous and ona of the hardest to evaluate. The attitude of the individual may be r indicative of the attitude of. management, and this may be a difficult reality for a reviewer to face. This caso could also indicate that the individual's supervisors are weak and would not, or could not, deal with the attitude problem. This may also ,

be difficult for the reviewer, depending on the relationship to the supervisor (s). This case also questions the adequacy of the licensee's employee screening program.

If a component failed because of the failure of a defective part, the guidance of the NUREG-1022 document would have the licensee assign a cause code of "design or manufacturing error." The root cause determination should, however, address such things as the adequacy of:

1. the vendor audit program to identify defective vendor practice,

2. the receipt inspection conducted by the licensee,

3. the postmaintenance or postinsta11ation testing to detect defects, and J

4. the original design to meet the intended function.

The reviewer must ask whether there is anything that the licensee should hava done or could have done to identify the problem with s

the component before it failed and became an operational problem.

If the problem is one in which defective procedures or an J

inadequate program is involved, the reviewer needs to determine why or how the originator allowed the problem or defect to get into the procedure or program, why the various reviews (by managers and comittees) did not catch the defect, and whether other procedures or programs are subject to a similar defect. '

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' 1 The reviewer must also determine what impact the procedure or program defect may have had on other activities performed under i the procedure or program in the past. This may requir, an '

I extensive inspection or review effort. Licensees have in the past, resisted this type of. extensive review, but if the original problem that surfaced the procedural or program defect had safety l impact, such an inspection must be done to assure that no other

{ problems exist as a result of the procedure or program defect..

13.5.5.2 Fixina the Root Cause

] If the licensee is to truly prevent recurrence of a problem, the

root cause of the problem must be fixed in such a manner that the

. problem does not resurface. This means that the correction must

assure that the problem is not likely to recur in the future. f

, If the corrective action involves additional training for certain

! Individuals to assure their awareness of some specific

!(

requirement, a training session for current employees will not !

suffice. The one-time training will not assure _that the emp1'oyee ,

who is hired next month or next year will- be aware of the problem, and thus the new employee could cause the same proble:n l in the future. When training is needed, it must be factored into t the training program to assure that future employees are properly l {

trained in the problem area and that current employees are given periodic refresher training to remind them of the problem, f

, When the corrective action involves changes to procedures or l

program documents, the licensee's commitment tracking system

! {

should document the specific changes as being made to correct an l

) identified problem. This will assure that future questions I

regarding the reason for a specific requirement in a procedure, j !

or program document, can be addressed and will not be j

{ inadvertently dropped and result in a repeat of the initial :

) problem, t

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This is an area that should be the subject of much specific ,

guidance in a licensee's corrective action system. Corrective '

action to prevent recurrence is very resource intensive, and licensees will typically resist doing it. The inspector should communicate to the licensee the need for more detailed guidance t

in this area, but since there is no regulatory guidance or requirements to provide a basis for including this guidance in the licensee's program, the licensee may decline to do so. There is little that the inspector can do without going through the backfit review provisions.- Since this aspect of the evaluation process is so.'very important to the effectiveness of a corrective action system, the inspector should verify the adequacy of the training and periodic refresher training in the performance of the licensee's specific program requirements in this area. This will at least assure that whatever provisions the licensae has built into theie program has been fully and effectively implemented.

13.6 CORRECTIVE ACTION The third element of the corrective action system is the correction element. If the system has provided exceptional me;ns for identifying and evaluating problems but does not follow !

through in assuring that the problem is fixed, the program is l worth very little.

I Licensee corrective action programs typically do not say much about the correction element. Once a problem has been identified and evaluated, the problem is fixed by using a maintenance request, design change, or other document to make the fix.

Licensees have been known to close out a problem in the <

> corrective action systee when the maintenance work request, or i l

design change request, or procedure change request was issued.

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- - . ~ . . . . - . . - . --\

(' This approach has many pitfalls. It does not provide assu.nnce that the problem. will get fixed, since the maintenance work l request, or other document, could get lost or cancelled. This approach also fails to assure that the proposed corrective action is appropriate and that the problem has been'truly fixed.

To do it right, the corrective action system should assure that -

the evaluator, and if possible the originator, reviews' and approves the document which orders the corrective actions to be taken, including those to prevent recurrence. This requires time, but the correction of a problem should be well. planned and not rushed, un1ess, of course, the problem impacts on plant safety.

In reviewing the proposed action to fix the problem the evaluator should review the appropriateness of the work procedure, if possible.

The evaluator should also determine whether the ij individuals performing the work need training (or retraining) i\ -

before doing the work. Consideration must also be given to the '

need to verify the operability of associated redundant systems.

The key is to assure that the corrective action is done right so it will not have to be redone or will cause a more severe problem.

The same deliberate controls must apply to the actions to prevent recurrence.

The whole process must be controlled when the licensee is planning corrective actions.

First there should be assurance that another problem will not result from the action. A few years ago, a itcensee was repairing a problem in the lube oil cooler of one of the diesel generators. The problem was fixed, but when the generator was being restnred to service, the workers failed to apen the cooling water valves to the cooler. There had not been an independent check of the valve lineup, and the valve problem was not discovered. The testing (postmaintenance)

( performed on the diesel generator involved nothing more than a

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I startup of the generator according to surveillance test F procedures. The generator was not run for a suff tetent period of time to detect the new problem, so the diesel generator was declared operable and remained in that condition for some time before the new problem was detected.

Problems of this nature could also be introduced in fixing a programmatic deficiency., If the licensee does not carefully review the the change in the program, a program element or feature could be eliminated that had been introduced previously to satisfy a commitment or other requirement from the past.

Finally, the correction of the problem must include the assembly and filing of all documents related to the issue. The documentation package should include:

1. the identifying document and the evaluations of the reviewers, ,

2. the action documents (work orders, change requests, etc.),

3. the mechanism (memo, form, etc.) used to report the completion of the problem to its original identifier,

4. the closure action in the tracking system (s),

1

5. i the input needed to up-date the trend analysis programs, if l appropriate. ;

)

Not every problem will have all these documents, but it is important that the appropriate documents be brought into the system to have a complete record of how the problem was handled and resolved. i l

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The inspector will review activities in this area as part of other inspection activities. It is important also that these aspects of corrective action be considered when inspecting other functional areas, because most of the activities o f- other functional areas are closely linked to the implementation of an effective corrective action system.

13.7 THE IWSPECTOR'S DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES It has been unfortunate that in the past licensees have not put more resources into establishing and implementing strong and-effective corrective action systems such as the ideal corrective action system described here. The industry may never have corrective action systems that include all the elements discussed, since to implement this ideal type of system, the Itcensee would have to expend substantial resources. Most licensees will assume the risk of establishing and implementing a i system that meets all the regulatory requirements but falls short

( of the ideal. The inspector should be sensitive to the licensee's need to justify expenditures and the risks assumed by falling short of the ideal system or program, i

l The inspector is cautioned that this discussion does not imply l

that in the performance of the inspection program described in !

MC 92720 all the elements of the ideal corrective action system should be sought. The inspection manual requires that the

{

inspector consider only the most important elements of a corrective action system. The other parts of the system not covered by MC 92720 can be used as background information to apply to the way in which the licensee handles and deals with other issues reviewed by the inspectcr. t If the NRC inspector finds that the licensee may be able to eliminate some of the problems being experiencing by incorporating some of the elements of the ideal system, the inspector should not hesitate to encourage the licensee to 13-39 l

consider additions that may be of benefit. In discussing these F

issues with the licensee, the inspector should be sensitive to any perception of backfitting. Most licensees are interested in improving their performance and will be receptive to suggestions.

Documenting uncorrected weaknesses in the licensee's SALP report may also be effective.

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CHAPTER 14 EMERGENCY RESPONSE AND FOLLOWUP'0F A MAJOR ACCIDENT 14.1 NRC RESPONSE OBJECTIVES AND ROLES A plan (NUREG-0728, "NRC Incident Response Plan") and procedures

[ (NUREG-0845, "Agency Procedures for the NRC Incident Response Plan") for re'sponse to incidents involving licensed material and activities has been developed by NRC to fulfill its legislated ;

mandate to protect the public health and safety. In its emergency response plan NRC recognizes that there are two primary decisionmakers in a radiological emergency at a licensed power reactor, the licensee and the State or local government. . The i licensee has primary resp 0nsib'ility for mitigating the consequences of the event by taking the necessary and appropriate ;

offsite protective actions. The State, or local government, has i primary responsibility for determining whether and how to implement the protective action as it was recommended by the licensee. ,

NRC has several roles in a radiological emergency at a licensed ,

facility. The piimary role is that of monitoring the activities i of the licensee to assure that appropriate actions are being [

taken to mitigate the consequences of the incident and to assure l l that appropriate protective action recommendations are provided i

o offsite officials. In addition, NRC supports and assists state and local officials by performing independent assessments ,

j and confirming, where appropriate, the licensee's protective <

i action recommendation. In addition to interfacing with offsite i

officials, the NRC response organization becomes the conduit of

] technical information from the facility to other Federal agencies i and keeps the media informeo of NRC's actions and knowledge of ;

l,( event status. NRC may be required, in an extreme and unique

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14-1 i .

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__ _ . _ _ . - . . . . _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ,- ._a

9 situation, to take action to direct the licensee's response by issuing formal orders to the licensee and then monitoring F implementation of actions ordered. The Commission's intent is that this authority not be exercised from headquarters, but it ,

might be exercised by the Regional Mainistrator at the site based on situation-specific approval by the NRC Chairman.

Significant improvements in the NPC response to incidents have

, occurred since the accident at the Three Mile Island Nuclear Plant in March 1979. These include the establishment of a single decisionmaker for NRC duriag an emergency, development of a Federal and agency response plan, the establishment of direct communication lines between 5,ower reactor sites and NRC headquarters to improve communications capability, the ~

establishmentofadesignatedstaffofoperationsofficersandan[

upgrade in their training in reactor systems, and an upgrade in '

response facilities at headquarters and the regions. Also NRC is developing a means to receive digitized information on key plant parameters directly from the site to provide valuable current information to assist in accident assessment.

The NRC response to an incident begins with Operations Officers located in the Headquarters Incident Response Center on a 24-hour per day basis. Direct lines have been installed to each commercial nuclear reactor and some fuel facilities and are referred to as the Ernergency Notification System. All initial notifications of events are reported to the NRC Onerations Officer, who has had specific training in reactor systems. All l

reports of significant events are brought to the attention of the NRC regional Duty Officers and a headquarters Einergency Officer.

Decisions to place in standby or to activate the NRC emergency response organization are usually made cooperatively by regional '

and headquarters upper management through these Duty Officers.

1 14-2

14.2 NRC RESPONSE MODES NRC's basic philosophy is that the accident site is the best place to gather information, understand the situation, and interface with the licensee and offsite officials. Therefore.

NRC procedures for serious accidents are geared toward getting the appropriate people to the site as soon as possible (within 2 to 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months ).

14.2.1 Standby Mode For a situation that is uncertain and presents a potentially serious condition requiring monitoring, NRC enters the Standby Mode, NRC will usually go into the Standby Mede when the licensee declares an alert or when events warraat monitoring.

While in the Standby Mode, a cadre of members with expertise specific to the particular event is called into the Headquarters

( Operations Center, and the appropriate Regional Incident Response Center is staffed to monitor the situation. A small group of regional personnel may also be dispatched to the site. The l

Regional Office has the lead when NRC is in the St,ndb';Mode. I i

14.2.2 Initial Activation Mode The Initial Activation Mode will take effect after NRC management (Exacutive Team members in conjunction with the Regional Administrator) decides that the event is serious enough to call t

for an NRC management presence at th( site. During this j transitional period, headquarters takes the lead, the regional staff and Site Team leader (usually the Regional Administrator) leave for the site, and directin, of the NRC response temporarily transfers to the Executi'.s Team Cirector (Chairman of the Commission or designee) at the Headquarters Operations Center.

14-3

-Q _ ______s----_-------

While the regional team is in transit to the site and is being ,

briefed at the site (2 to 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months ), the Executive Team Director sperks Officic11y for NRC, Headquarters monitors the situation primarily via dedicated and commercial phone -lines to the site and normal phone lines to offsite officials. After arriving and i receiving an onsite briefing by the licensee, the Site Team leader may be designated as the Director of Site Operations by '

the NRC Chairman. The intent is to transfer as much decisionraking authority to the site as necessary, with headquarters and the regional office serving in supporting roles.

14.2.3 Expanded Activation Mode Once the Site Team leader has been designated as the Director of ,

Site Operations, the mode is called Expanded Activation. In this mode, NRC recommendations, information releases, and guidance are provided by the Director of Site Operationt,. The specific authority and responsibility that may be conferred on the Director of Site Operations are discussed in Section 14.4.1.

During this mode, the headquarters response organization supports the Site Team and the Director of Site Operations. !

14.3 ACTIVITIES OF THE EMERGENCY ORGANIZATION During normai operations, a Headquarters Operations Officer is the only person staffing the Operations Center, which is staffed 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months per day. This Officer receives all event notifications, reccrds the initial information, provides an initial evaluation of its classification, and informs the regional Duty Officer and the Headquarters Emergency Officer. The Emergency Officer and i the regional Duty Officer are muoers of headquarters and the regional management who are en call 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months 'per day. The Headquarters Operat.t ons Officer will involve the site, the Emergency Of ficer, and the regional Duty Officer in a "party line" telephone conference to discuss the svent, If they decide , ;

, 1 14-4 1

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that further NRC action is necessary, the Emergency Officer and the regional Outy Officer will contact an Executive Team member and the Regional Administrator, who . will decide whether NRC should go to 'the Standby Mode or the . Initial Activation Mode.

Outside regular office hours, all inquiries .and notifications to NRC go to the Headquarters Operations Officer who is the licensee's initial point of contact with NRC during an incident.

The NRC response is based on the _ principle that there should always be a single spokesperson and chat the spokesperson should be located at the site as soon as. possible. In the Normal .and Standby modes, the lead is with the NRC regional office. In the !

Initial Activation Mode, the lead transfers. to headquarters and. .i the Executive Team Director ~(normally the Chairman). In. the. [

Expanded Activation Mode, the lead'shif ts to the site, . with the !

t appointment. of .a Director of Site Operations (normally the i

Regional Administrator). ;

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There are three components of the NRC response organization: (1) l headquarters (2) the Regional Base liam, and (3) the Regional Site Team. Each of these organizations has personnel assigned to i cover:

i

1. respon;e management,

2. reactor safety assessment, if appropriate

3. protective measures assessment, i

4 safeguards and security as:,essment, if appropriate,

5. public and news media '.nformation, .

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6. government coordina*,1on, ;

7. administrative srpport, and l

8. response coordination. f

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I 14-5 j

In addition, headquarters has personnel assigned to Congressional coordination. F Table 14.1 shows the titles of the individual team members responsible for each of these areat. In general, herefquarters has "teams," the Base Team has "managers," and the Site Team.has '

"coordinators" assigned to each functional area. j l

The Reg'ional Office Base Team is composed of 12 to people, with on,e oc two assigned to each function. During the $tandby

Mode, the Bas,e Team makes critical contacts with the licensee'and i I

offsite officials and directs the NRC response. Once NRC goes '

into the Initial Activation Mode, with the transfer of authority to headquarters, the Base Team continuss to monitor the situation ard provide support to the Site Team. Figura 14.1 shows the Base Team organiration. '

The headquarters team is led by the Chairman of. the Commission (or a designated Commissioner) as Director of the Executive Team. ;

The leader is supported by teams for each function. Each team consists of up to 12 people and is supported by other

headquarters of fices and by designated national laboratories. ;

Figure 14.2 shows the headquarters organization.

The initial Site Team con <ists of about 15 people, supplemented

as seen as possible by about 15 mors. Typically, each major functional area is represented by only one person, a Coordinator. ;

The typical Site Team organizataon is shown in Figure 14.1.

)

The initfal team will be exprnded within 24 to 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months to l

l i

enhance coverage of functional areas, as well as to provide all

]

i response facilities with liaison personnel. This will result in an expanded Site Team of approximately 50 per shift, as indicated !

I in Figure 14.4. I 14-6

, I

- 14.3.1 Response Manaaerent by Executive Team and Director of Site Operations The primary roles of the Executive Tets Otrcctor and the Director of Site Operations are to manage the NRC response and act as the

, primary spokespersons.

4 Some authority and respo.*iibility may be transferred to the 7 Director of Site Operations by the Executive Team Director, suen as :

1. authority to recommend actions to the licensee;

2. authority to recommend offsite actioris, either confirming l licensee recommendations or providing additional NRC recommendations;

3. authority to direct the licensee to tale specific actions (for example, for controlling "the ' reactor); and to make !

( ,

technical recommendations (including reentry; that is, '

returning to evacuatfd areas) j 4. responsibility to act as the primary spokesperton for NRC in

] responding to the media; i 5. authority to supervise all NRC personnel at the site; and I

6. authority to represent NRC in interactions with other -

agencies. .

Before making this decision, the Executiva Team Director has to 4

determine that a Site Team has been deploy id and 11 functions are covered, the Site Team has been briefed by the licensee, and 4 the Site Team leader is ready to assume the respcosibilities of the Director of Site Operations. ,

It is importa.it that the Executive Team Director and the Director of Site Operations have adequate infor.aation to support their decisionmaking roles. This includes information about: ,

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, . - , - -_. , _, , _ . , .__..._.,r__- _,-.- _-- _- .- _

. 1. significant developments; P

2. assessments of all parties: licensee, state, and staff assessments that bound the conditions and uncertainties;

[ 3. Ifmitations and degree of sensitivity of the analysis;

4. recommendetions and options; including information about actions e.urrently being taken and the basis therefore; and

$, proper contacts; that is, the peopie in charge of various e functions (for example, protective action decisionmaking).

i Although the other four Commissioners are notified of Operations j Center activation, they have no predetermined positions or tasks at the Center. Instead, they are kept infurmed so that they may assist the Executive Team Director, if requested. Congress nas authorized granting the authority to act to one individual, and

therefore, on activation, the NRC Chairman or his designee is i fully in charge. The Commission form of decisionmaking is not

~

l used; only one person is in charge. -

The Executive Team is comprised of a Director (the Chairman of ,

the NRC or other designated Commissioner), the Executive Director for Operations, and the trirectors of the Offices of Nuclear i Reactor Regulation, Nuclear Materials Safety and Safegeards, Nuclear Reactor Research and Analysis and Evaluation of i Operational Cata.

l Tht authority and respons2111ty of NRC are vested sole'y with i

the Emecutive Team Director during Initial Activation. The responsibilities of the other Executive Team members during Initial Activ4 tion Are essentially to assist the Director. This Q done by evaluating the event, licensee actions, and NRC j

actians based on information from all available sources. The I Execnive Team members provide feedback and recommendations to !

the Director, i a

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The Headquarters Status Officer, who reports to the Executive Team constructs str.tus summaries and orchestrates briefings and information flow to and from the Executive Team. The Status Officer also ensures that the Executive Team receives periodic integrated briefings that address information needs and keeps a record of the Executive Ter.m deliberations.

14.3.2 Protective Measures Assessment by protective Measures Team and Coordinato.r The se M9asures Team and Coordinator assesses the ade q ua r., c. the protective measures being recohdnended by the licensee and being implemented by offsite officials. Tha Protective Measures Team and Coordinator either confirm the licensee's recommendations or, if appropriate actions are not being taken to protect the public, make recommendations to the Executive Tom or Director of Site Operations. The Protective Measu*es Team and Coordinator have the responsibility to pull

( together all available information related to possible offsite consequences and to determi o whether adequate protvetive actions are being recommended by the licensee or being implemented by cffsite officials.

For severe core-damage accidents, the Protective Measures Team assesses the recomendations of the licensee using the basic philosophy shown in Figure 14.5. In general, the licensee should recommend protective actions (t <acuation or sheltering) as soon ,

as core damage (general emergency) is projected. These initial actions are not based on dose projection but on an assessment of plant co:1ditions provided by those conducting reactor assessment.

The Protective Measures Team and Coordinator may also attempt to botnd the possible offsite doses. To perform their functions, l the Protective Measures Team a 3 Coordinator will also attempt to l establish contact with the licensee personnel at the site, as '

well as state radioactive health officials, so that assessments ,

can be discussed and differences can be resolved.

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14-9 i

The objectives .of the Protective Measures Team and Coordinator ,

are to: r

1. monitor the licensee's implementation of emergency plans and procedures to confirm and assess the licensee's public protective action recommendations;

2. obtain the status of protective actions implementation by-offsite officials;

3. confirm ano assess the onsite protec*ive actions taken Ly che licensee;

4. exchange technical information with the licensee and state and local agencies to evaluate the significance of an;'

dif fercreas; and

5. provide independent protective action assessments based on reactor status and dose analyses and evaluate external (licensee, state, local, and other agency) assessments for the Executive Team or Director of Site Operations. In particular, the Protective Measures Team or Coordinator must ensu e that the Executive Team or Director of Site Operations is given an immediate (within 15 minutes) assessment of any licensee protective action recommendation or of any conditions which indicate that protective actions are warranted.

14.3.3 Reactor Safety As>essments by Reector Safety Team and Coordinator The Reactor Safety Team and Coordinator must assess the condition of the core, containment, and other engineered safety features to (1) provide ccre and containment projections to the Frotective M9 sures Team and Coordinator for an assessment of protective 14-10

-, .. ~ , , - - , . , . - ,y.- w .,... ,, ., ,,, , _,

I l

actions; (2) provide estimates of core damage and possible radioactivity release pathway information to the Protective Measures Team and Coordinator to allow boundirg of poss ble offsite consequences (doses), and (3) assess the system-related accuracy of the event classification by the licensee (all response starts with event classification). These. ascessments must be discussed with the appropriate licensee staff before they are forwarded to the Executive Team or Director of Site Operations. The Reactor Safety Team and Coordinator attempt to describe plant conditions and to project the possibility of further accident events that could have offsite consequences.

The objectives of the Reactor Safety Tean and Coordinator are to

1. develop NRC assessments (and/or confirm the licensee's assessments) of current and projected core and containment conditions;

2. monitor licensee response (for example, implementation of Emergency Operating Procedures) to ensure that proper corrective actions are being taken to minimize the consequences of the accident;

3. characterize possible core conditions and release patt. ways for the Protective Measures Team's or Coordinator's dose assessment; and l l

4. furnis,i these assessments to the Protective Measures Team, .

the Executive Team Director, and the Director of Site )

Operat:ans, along with advice and direction for the licensee, if appropriate.

(

14-11 e y _

14.3.4 Safeguards and Security Assessment by Safeguards Team and Safecusrds and Security Coordinator '

The primary functions of the Safeguards Team ant the Safeguards and Cecurity Coordinator are to evaluate each event for safeguards, security and law enforcement significance and to coordinate with appropriate' Federal law enforcement agencies (for example, the Federal Burs:u of Investigation). The objectives of the Safeguards Team and Safeguards and Security Coordinator are to:

1. advise the' Executive Team or Director of Site Operations about security and safeguards developments and recommend appropriate actions;

2. provide safeguards information to appropriate law enforcement igencies (including the Federal Bureau of Investigation) and coordinate efforts for evaluating appropriate remedial actions; and

3. give decisionmakers plant-specific information and analysis concerning the safeguards contingency plan.

14.3.5 Government Liaison by Government Liaison Officer and Coordinator The objective of government liaison is to interface with out'.ide interested individuals and groups to ensure that these persons understand the actions being taken to mitigate the event. At the Headquarters Operations Center, the Government Liaison Officer ensures that all Federal agencies are notified and kept informed of the of 4

status the event and response. As Federal representatives arrive at the Operations Center, the Government Liaison Officer, in cooperation with the Protective Measures s

a 14-12 9

l l

Team, ensures that they are briefed and that their respective technical cxpertise is considered in Protective Measures Team

)

assessments. As noted in Section 14.5.2, some Federal agencies I will continue to direct their operations from Washington. In l these cases, the Headquarters Government Liaison Officer will J

continue to support the Site Team after entering the Expanded 1 Activation Mode by coordinating with these agencies. The Government liaison Officer is also responsible for contacting the governors of affected states to ensure that they are aware of NRC actions. The Protective Measures Team also contacts the state, but at a tecnnical level. Therefore, the Government Liaison Officer must work closely with the Protective Measures Team.

At the site, the principal function of the Government Liaison Coordinator is to contact and coordinate with state and local officials who have authority and responsibility for protective action decisionmaking. This will aid in establishing contact between the Director of Site Operations and these officials in the event the Director of Site Operations needs to make (or oncur in) a protective action recommendation.

The objectives of the Headquarters Government Liaison Team and the Government Liaison Coordinator at the site are to:

1. inform state and other Federal organizations of the status of the NRC response;

2. coordinate with other Federal agencies with regard to responses related to onsite activities;

3. keep Federal and state agencies informed (this includes estaolishing contact with the state and offsite protective action decisionmakers and keeping abreast of their consideretions in the event that NRC decides to make or discuss protective action recommendations); and

(

14-13

_ _ i ., __ . . - _ - - ._. _ _ _ _ _ ,

l

4. brief the Executite Team and the Di ec br of Site Operations on the status of other responses, r 14.3.6 Concressional Liaison The responsibilities of the Congressional liaison (at Headquarters only) in thr, event of a major incident are to provide adequate, accurr.te, timely, and consistent information regarding the incident i.o members of Congress and their sta" and to principal Congressic.nal oversight committees. Communic 6tions to and from Congress are channeled through the Congrossional Liaison Officer. All Cocaressional interfaces are .:enducted at Headquarters. No one is assigned to this function on the Base Team or Site Team.

14.3.7 Public Affairs Team and Ccordinatol The Public Affairs Team and Public Affairs Coordinator ensure that the public and media are kept informed of the course of the event and NRC actions. The Public Affairs Team and Coordinator also ensure that information is coordinated with the licensee, state and local government, and other Federal agencies before its release. The team prepares and coordinates releases of information during Initial Activation. It also supports the Site Team and addresses Washington media requests during the Expanded Activation Mode.

l At the site, provisions are made to have an NRC Public Affairs l

officer at the licensee media center. Additional Public Affairs support is provided by other regions and at the licensee's Emergency Operations Facility through the Director of Site Operations.

l l

14-14 I I

. j 4

The objectives of the Public Affairs Team and Coordinator are to:

1. prepare and coordinate information releases,

2. support the Executive Team and the Director of Site Operations,

3. monitor national media coverage, and

4. keep the public and media informed of NRC actions.

14.3.8 Response Coordination Functions and Objectives For each response team (for example, the Protective Measures Team) at headquarters and in each region, a Response Coordinator is assigned who is responsible for ensuring the continued readiness of the organization. This includes personnel training, analysis, development, and headquarters

(' logistics.

Coordinators form the Headquarters Response Coordination Team The during an event and are responsible for initial notifications and startup of the Operations Center. The headquarters Coordinators then support their teams as needed. The regional Emergency Response Coordinator accompanies the Site Team to ensure that the team's logistical needs are met. The Emergency Response Coordinator also acts as an advisor and facilitator during the response.

14.4 THE ROLE OF THE RESIDENT INSPECTOR l

The Resident Inspector will usually be the first NRC employee at I the site. Initially, the Resident Inspector should assist the Executive Team and the Base Team in evaluating the status of the incident and licensee actions in deciding the appropriate NRC response mode. Early in the event, the Executive Team Director (that is, the NRC Chairman) or the Regional Administrator may 14-15 l

l yant the _ Resident Inspector's opinion as .to what is happening technically -and .to what degree ' the utility is or is not in '

control of the situation. The Resident Inspector should attempt l to remain in the plant Control' Room or tne ' licensee's Technical !

Support Center to stay abreast of the reactor status until the iSite Team arrives .

l The Resident inspector should not be put in the position of replacing the licensee's communicator on the Emergency Notification System. The Resident Inspector must be able to stand back, watch, and analyze the event as it progresses. The Resident Inspector represents NRC at the site until the regional Site Team arrives. When this team arrives, the Resident Inspector briefs the team members and then follows directions given by the Site Team leader.

14.5 ROLES OF OTHER FEDERAL AGENCIES 14.5.1 Federal R6dioloaical Emeraency Response Plan The Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan defines the Federal response role in support of state and local agencies. It was published in the Federal Reoister on Novtmber 5, 1985. Under this plan, four agencies have major roles in radiological emergencies. The first is the Cognizant Federal Agency. In the case of nuclear power reactors the Cognizant Federal' Agency is NRC. The Cognizant Federal Agency is responsible for dealing directly with state agencies and for all technical assessments of the accident.

The second major agency is the Department of Energy, which is responsible for coordinating all offsite Federal radiological monitoring assistance to the states under the Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Plan portion of the i

14-16

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f- Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan. In an emergency

(

the Department of Energy will establish a Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center +.o coordinate che collection and assessment of field monitoring efforts. The Department of Energy will also provide field and airborne monitoring assistance at the request .of state officials. Radiological survey teams will usually be called out as a result of requests from the state (s) or licensee. This could also be done by the NRC regional office through the Department of Energy Regional Coordinating Office.

The third major agency is the Environmental Protection Agency.

After the situation has stabilized and the accident moves out of the emergency phase, the Environmental Protection Agency (by agreement with the Department of Energy) assumes the role of coordinator of Federal offsite radiological monitoring assistance. The Department of Energy and the Environmental Protection Agency together are also an important source of radiological monitoring capabilities and technical assistance for the _s ta te( s ) . NRC does not normally request Environmental Protection Agency assistance; the Department of Energy and the Environmental Protection Agency have established arrangements for requesting Environmental Protection Agency assistance.

The fourth agency is the Federal Emergency Management Agucy, which coordiaates all Federal nonradiological assistance in support of the state (s). If NRC needs support from other Federal agencies for whhh there are no arrangements or established relationships, the Federal Emergency Management Agency will be asked to seek that scoport. The two primary examples are (1) j communications, transpor:ation, and other logistical support from the U. S. Department of Defense and (2) logistical support for the licensee when the source of that support or resource is not apparent.

14-17 )

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14.5.2 Location of Federal scency Decisionmakers and Coordinator r Table 14.2 summarizes the 19 cations from which the various agencies will direct their respective activities. Most agencies will attempt to direct their ef forts from locations close to the site, and two major centers will be establisFed for coordinating offsite ce dtral activities:

1. Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center - a center f. rom which the Department of Energy coordinates radiological monitoring and assessment operations, typically at an airport near the accident site. In general, this center need not be located near the onsite or Federal-state centers so long as its operations can be coordinated with them.

2. Federal Response Center - a center established by the Federal Emergency Management Agency at a location identified in conjunction with the state; it serves as a focal point for Federal response team interactions with the state.

For some agencies (for example, the Department of Health and Human Services), policy decisions will be made from Headquarters in Washington, DC.

14.6 $UMMARY OF MAJOR ASSIGNMENTS ANC RESP 0NSIBILITIES The principal roles for NRC in incidents involving licensed activities are to monitor actions by the license to ensure that people in the vicinity are adequately protected and to provide assistance requested by the licensee or offsite officials. NRC response procedures for serious events are geared toward establishing the NRC lead and focus at the site is soon as i

14-18 e .

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( possible. During an emergency, the Chairman or his designee has the authority of the Commission; only one person is in charge.

Once the Director of Site Operations has been designated, the lead for NRC is at the site, and the response teams at NRC headquarters work for and support the Site Team. The Resident Inspector will usually be the first NRC employee at the site and is the NRC person most knowledgeable about the site. The Federal Emergency Management Agency is responsible for coordination of the Federal responsa to all radiological emergencies that require '

a significant multiagency presence. NRC is, however, the lead for the technical aspects of any Federal response involving NRC-licensed activities.

14.7 FOLLOWUP OF A MAJOR INCIDENT The followup of a major incident may occur regardless of whether or not the event involved emergency response. The incident investigation will be started imediately following deactivation of the emergency response or after there is no longer an imminent threat to public health and safety. The NRC Incident Investigation Program (see NRC Manual Chapter 0513) was established to ensure that the investigation of significant operational events is timely, structured, coordinated, and formally administered; and that a complete technical and regulatory understanding of such events is achieved, Incident investigation is conducted for the purpose of accident prevention and includes the gubering and analysis of inforrentiu; the drawing of findings and conclusions, including tho determination of probable cause( a,); and dissemination of the investigation resul',s for NRC, industry, and public review.

The i nt. ldent investigation is initiated by dispatching an Incident Invettigation Team or an Augmented Inspection Team to the site. An Incident Investigation Team is a group of techt.ical experts led by a senior NRC manager who has not had prior

.14-19

.s .

., _ __ ~~. .-- , - _ _

significant direct involvement with licensing and inspection activities at the affected facility. The incident investigations r are performed as described in NRC Manual Chapter 0513, Appendix, Part II. Each Incident Investigation Tom reports directly to the Executive Director for Operations and is independent of regional and headquarters office management.

An Augmented Inspection Team i s a group of regional technical experts augmented by Headquarters personnel. The Team is led by a '

regional manager, and the investigation covers significant operational events, as described in Manual Chapter 0513, Appendix, Part III. The Augmented Investigation Team reports directly to the Regional Administrator, and its members may have had prior involvement with licensing and inspection activities at the affected facility.

The decision as to which type of team to use will depend on the potential safaty significant of the event, the nature and complexity of the event, and the potential generic implications of the event. In general, the Incident Investigation Team will be selected to respond to an event that is determined to be a ,

"significant operational event."

A significant operational event can be defined as any radiological and safety-related incident arising from an operational event which, by its consequences, poses an actual or potential hazard to public health and safety, property, or the environment. Examoles of significant operational events are listed below:

1. a significant radiological release or personnel overexposure;

2. plant operation that exceeded, or was not included in, the design basis of the f acility; 14-20 9 s ---'e- ,'g-- 2 y P ?e --2-T --- w

3. an event that may have involved a major deficiency in design, construction, or operation with potential generic safety implications;

4. accidental or unintended criticality that occurred ,

substantially outside the normal range of parameters;

5. an event in which a safety limit of the licensee's technical specifications was exceeded;

6. a significant loss of integrity of the fuel, the primary coolant pressure boundary, or the primary containment boundary; 7, loss of a safety function or multiple failures in systems used to mitigate the event; l

i

8. an event that is sufficiently compTex, unique, or not 1 understood to warrant an independent investigation.

i l

Events of lesse- safety significance from which facts, l conditions, circumstances and probable cause(s) would contribute i to the regulatory and technical understanding of a generic safety concern or an important lesson of experience would be assessed by ;

an Augmented Inspection Teau.

l 14.7.1 Functions of NRC Offices in Establishina and Implementino the Followup Procram The Executive Director for Operatir>ns (EDO):

1. Determines whether a potentially significant operational event is to be investigated by an Incident Investigation Team (IIT). .

14-21

i

2. Selects the leader and team members. Member selections'are made to ensure the independence of'the Incident F-

. Investigatior Team.

~

3. Determines that the investigation was effectively conducted and was consistent with the goais of the program.

The' Director. Office for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data:

1. Develops, coordinates, and administers the Incident Investigation Program with the assistance of other NRC Offices.

2. Assures that procedures governing Incident Investigation- l Teams are defined, developed, coordinated, approved, .

distributed'and maintained.

3. P ;vides staff to be members and leaders of-both Incident Investigation and Auomented Inspection Teams.

i

4. Provides the administrative support needed by Incident ;

Investigation Teams to achieve the objectives set forth in Manual Chapter 0513, Appendix, Part II, with assistance from other NRC Offices. Coordinates with the Director, Division of Publications Services, to provide the support needed to publish Team reports as NUREG documents. Provides advice and consultation to the Team leader on procedural matters '

and completeness of reports.

i S. For significant events that warrant at least an Augmented Inspection Team response, consults with the Regional i

Administrator and the Directors of NRR or NMSS to determine whether an Augmented Inspection or Incident Investigation

) response is appropriate. Provides recommendations to the 4

EDO on events warranting an Incident Investigation Team -

response.

14-22 i

. . i

6. Establishes and maintains rosters of potential team' leaders and team members who are certified in incident investigation via formal training, and makes recommendations to the ED0 concerning Incident Investigation Team composition.

7. Identifies needed training and coordinates training requirements for Incident Investigation Team candidates with the Office of Personnel.

8. Assesses the effectiveness of the Incident Investigation Projram activities and initiates action, as aopropriate, to improve the program.

The Director. Office of Nuclear Reactr Reaulation:

1. Assures that procedures governing Augmented Inspection Teams are defined, developed, coordinated, approved, distributed

( and maintained.

2. Provides staff to be members and leaders of Incident Investigation and Augmented Inspection Teams.

3. Provides assistance in impicmenting the NRC Incident Investigation Program.

4. For significant events that warrant at least an Augmented Inspection Team response, consults with the Regional Administrator and the Directors of NMSS and AE00 to 2

determine the appropriate response. Provides recommenda-tions to the ED0 on events warranting an Incident Investiga-tion Team response.

5. Recommends to and coordinates with the appropriate Regional Administrator on events that may warrant an Augmented Inspection Team.

14-23 !

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The Director. Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeouards:

1

1. Provides staff to be members and leaders of Teams.

2. Provides atsistance in implementing the NRC Incident Investigation Program.

3. For significant events that warrant at least an Augmented Inspection Team response, consults with the Regional Administrator and the Directors of NRR and AE00 to determine the appropriate response. Provides recommendations to the EDO on events warranting an Incident Investigatten Team response.

4. Recommends to and coordinates with the appropriate Regional Administrator on events which may warrant an Augmented Inspection Team.

The Director. Office of Personnel:

1. Provides staff to assist Incident Investigation Teams to accomplish the objectives of NRC Manual Chapter Appendix 0513, Part II.

2. Manages, directs and coordinates the training program for Incident Investigation Team candidates through the Associate Director for Employee Development and Training.

The Recional Administrators:

1. Determine, in consultation with the Directors of NRR or NMSS, those operational events that warrant investigation by an Augmented Inspection Team.

2. Select the Team leader and members and direct, coordinate and approve the performance of the Team. '

14-24

3. For significant events that warrant at least an Augmented Ir.spection Team response, consult with the Directors of NRR or NMSS and AE00 to determine the appropriate response.

Provide recommendations to the EDO on events warranting an Incident Investigation Team response.

I 4. Provide assistance in implementing the NRC Incident Investigation Program.

5. Provide staff to be members and leaders of Teams.

I

6. Provide onsite support for an Incident Investigation Team during an investigation.

7. Provide assistnace in briefing and providing background information to an Incident Investigation Team when it arrives onsite.

8. Identify and provide staff to monitor licensee activities to assess equipment periormance.

i

9. Issue a Confirmatory Action Letter, as appropriate, to tha l affected licensee requiring that, within the constraints of l ensuring plant safety, relevant failed equipment be !

quarantined and suoject to agreed upon controls for evaluation ano corrective action, and that the plant be maintained in a safe shutdown condition until concurrence is received from NRC for restart.

The Director. Office of public Affairs:

1. Follows established NRC public information policies for release of information relating to NRC investigatory responses to operational events.

1 C

14-25

2. Promotes the NRC policy of encouraging licensees.to take the lead in information dissemination activities related to r incident investigations at their facilities.

3. Provides staff to support Incident Investigation Teams.

The Director. Office of Nuclear Reculatory Research:

1. Provides staff to be members and leaders of Teams.

2. Provides assistance in implementing the NRC Incident Investigation Program.

14.7.2 Functions of an Incident Investication Team 14.7.2.1 Objective and Scope of an Investigation The objective of an Incident Investigation Team is to conduct a prompt, thorough, systematic, and independent investigation of safety-significant events at facilities licensed by NRC. The scope of an investigation must be sufficient to ensure that the event is clearly understood, the relevant fac'.s and circumstancer are identified and Ofilected, and the probable causs(s) and contributing cause(s) .a re identified and substintiated by the evidence associated with the event. The timeliness and adequacy of licensee and NRC activities preceding and contributing to the event are also considered.

It is expected that an investigatfor will establish the conditions preceding the event, event chronology, systems i response, human factors considerations, equipment performance, precursors to the event, safety significance, and radiological )

considerations, and will report findings and conclusions. l t

14-26 I 1

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An investigation will not include:

1. specific assessment of violations of NRC rules and requirements,

2. specific assessment of wrongdoing or individual responsibility for the event,

3. assessment of the generic applicability of issues identified during the invest'gation, or s

4. re-review of the design and licensing bases for the facility, except as necessary to assess the cause for the event under investigation.

14.7.2.2 Schedule An Incident Investigation Team will be activated as soon as

{

practical after the safety significance of an operational event is determined and will begin its investigation as soon as possible after the facility has been placed in a safe and stable condition.

The Team shall prepare and transmit its reports to the Commission and the EDO in about 45 days from activation, unless relief is granted by the EDO.

14.7.2.3 Team Composition and Qualifications An Incident Investigation Te,tm will be composed of technical experts selected on the basis of their expertise, potential contributions to the event investigation, and their freedom from significant direct involvement in the licensing and inspection of 14-27

e the facility involved or other activities associated with issues '

that had a direct impact on the course or consequences of the event. The number of members and areas of technical expertise required for each Team will be determined based on the type of facility and characteristics of the event.

The team leader and expert members will, in general, be selected from rosters of candidates who have been certified through formal training in incident investigation. The team leader shall be an NRC manager from the Senior Executive Service.

14.7.3 Functions of an Augmented Inspection Team 14.7.3.1 Objectives and Scope of an Augmented Inspection The ob,jective of an Augmented Inspection Team is to conduct a prompt, thorough and syste:natic assessment of operational svents at facilities licensed by NRC. The team will assess the safety significance of the event and communicate to regional and headquarters management the facts and safety concerns related to the event so that appropriate followup actions can be taken (for example, study a generic concern, i ssue an Information Notice or Bulletin).

The Augmented Inspection Team response should be sufficiently broad and detailed to ensure that the event and related issues are well-defined, the ralevant facts and circumstances are identified and collected, and the probable cause(s) and

{

contributing cause(s) are identified and substantiated by the )

information and evidence associated with the event. The investigation should evaluate the adequacy of licensee actions du:ing the event. The scope of the inspection shall be defined and revised, as appropriate, by the Regional Administrator directing the inspection.

14-28

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1 l

l 14.7.3.2 Schedule i

The Team will be activated as soon as practical after the safety significance of the event is determined and will begin its !

inspection as soon as possible after the facility has been placed ,

in a safe and stable condition.

The Team will prepare and transmit its report to the Regional Administrator within 30 days from activation, unless relief is granted by the Regional Administrator.

l 14.7.3.3 Team comoosition and Qualifications ,

An Augmented Inspection Team will be composed of technical experts from the responsible regional office, augmented by personnel from headquarters or other regions with special technical qualifications to complement the technical expertise of the regional experts. The size of the Team and the areas of

{- expertise needed will be determined by the Regional Administrator ,

and coordinated with other NRC offices based on the event and its implications.

14-29

+ - - . -.- - . . _ - . -

Table 14.1 NRC response organizations responsible for control functions

Headquarters (HQ) Regional Base Team (BT)

Function [ Operations Center (OC)) [ Incident Response Center (IRC)] Regional Site Team

Management Executive Team Base Team . Site Team (ET) Director Manager Leader (STL)/ Director -

of Site Operations (DS0)

Reactor Safety Reactor Safety Reactor Safety Reactor Safety Assessment Team (RST) Manager (RSM) '

Coordinator (RSC) o- Protective Measures Protective Measures Protective Measures Pratective Measures Assessment Team (PMT) Manager (PMM) Coordinator (PMC)

Safeguards / Security Safeguards Safeguards / Security Safeguards / Security Assessment Team (SGT) Manager (SM)

, Coordinator (PMC)

Public and News Public Affairs (PA) Public Affairs Public Affairs Media Information Manager (PAM) Coordinator (PAC)

Government Government Liaison Government Liaison Government Iiaison Coordination Officer (GLO) Maniger(GLM) Coordinator (GLC)

Administrative Administrative Support Resource Support Team (AST) Manager (RM)

[ Response Coordination Administrative Support Emergency Response Emergency Response j Team (RCT) Manager (ERM) Coordinator (ERC)

Congressional Congressional Coordinattun Liaison

The STL becomes the DSO on the transfer of authority and responsibility (declaration of Expanded Activation).

4

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Table 14.2 Location of federal agency decision makers l

a l Location of decision makers l '~

Licensee Federal Headquarters (in Emergency Federal Radiological Washington, D.C.,

Agency Operations Response Monitoring and NRC Operatigns Facility Center Assessment Center Center)

Department of M Energy (DOE) X,C Environmental ,

X,C,M PR Protection Agency (EPA)

Department of P,R,M Health and Human Ser-vices (HMS)

Department of P,R Agriculture (USDA)

Federal P,R,(SFO) '

Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)

Nuclear (P,A,X,C) M Regulatory Commission (NRC)

I The Agency in the lead for a respective function is indicated by parentheses.

a M = field monitoring measurements; P = protective actien assessment; R = reantry-(relocation and resettlement) assessment; C = dose calculations (per hour); X = dose :

commitment (per hour); SFO = senior FEMA official.

Af ter an agency's representative arrives at the NRC Operations Center, information will flow to and from that agency.

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14-31

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TYPICAL ORGANIZATION OF THE BASE TEAM BASE TEAM MANAGER I I I I REACTOR PROTECTIVE EMERGENCY GOVERNMENT SAFEGUARDS /

SAFETY MEASURES RESPONSE _lAISON SECURITY

! y MANAGER MANAGER MANAGER MANAGER MANAGER g -

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ORGANIZATION OF NRC HEADQUARTERS (LEAD DURING INITIAL ACTIVATION)

EXECUTIVE TEAM CHAIRMAN. EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF OPERATIONS. AND DIRECTORS OF OFFICES OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT.

NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION, AND NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY AND SAFEGUARDS STATUS OFFICER

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I CONGFIESSIONAL GOVERNMENT PUBLIC i

LIAISON RESPONSE LIAISON AFFAIRS COORDINATION TEAM I

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REACTOR SAFETY PROTECTIVE MEASURES SAFEGUARDS * ^

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ADMINISTRATIVE SITE TEAM SUPPORT TEAM

'NOT ALWAYS ACTIVATED.

i FIGURE 14.2 ORGANIZATION OF NRC HEADQUARTERS

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TYPICAL ORGANIZATION OF THE SITE TEAM (LEAD DURING EXPANDED ACTIVATION) j SITE TEAM LEADER (DURING INITIAL ACTIVATION)

DIRECTOR OF SITE OPERATIONS (DURING EXPANDED ACTIVATION)

I

\ p y STATE LIAISON PUBLK) AFFAIRS

) COORDINATOR _ EMERGENCY RESPONSE COORDINATOR i COORDINATOR REACTOR SAFETY PROTECTIVE MEASURES SA.FEGUARDS/ SECURITY COORDINATOR COORDINATOR 1 COORDINATOR 1

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FIGURE II. 3 TYPICAL ORGANIZATION OF THE SITE TEAM 4

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rm o n EXPANDED ACTIVATION SITE TEAM ORGANIZATION CHART DIRECTOR OF SITE OPERAIlONS DURING EXPANDED ACTIVATION I

STATE LIAISON _ _

PUBLIC AFFAIRS 1 EMERGENCY RESPONSE COORDINATOR COORDINATOR COORDINATOR REACTOR SAFETY __

PROTECTIVE MEASURES SAFEGUARDS / SECURITY COORDINATOR COORDINATOR COORDINATOR L.

EXECUTIVE TEAM I

i CONGRJSS GOV'T PUBLIC RESPONSE LIAISON LIAISON AFFAIRS COORDINATION DIRECTOR DIRECTOR DIRECTOR TEAM DIRECTOR ;

REGION REACTOR SAFETY PROTECTIVE MEASURES SAFEGUARDS BASE TEAM DIRECTOR DIRECTOR DIRECTOR MANAGER

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FIGURE 14.4 EXPANDED ORGANIZATION OF THE SITE TEAM

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1 14-36 l 1

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CHAPTER 15 PARTICIPATION IN PUBlic HEARINGS 15.1 NE PUBLIC HEARING PROCESS An NRC public hearing is conducted by a three-member Atomic Safety and- Licensing Board. The Board is composed of two techn' cal Mperts and one lawyer, who acts as Chairman of the Board for the hearing.

The NL "Rules of Practice" (10 CF'< 2) pe 1.i t persor.s whose interest may be affected by the proceeding to intervene as parties in accordance with the requirements of the regulations, which include a requirement to specify contentions or issues.

( (Persons wha wish only to make a statement of their views cor.ce rning the project may be perritted to make limited appearances. Persons making limited appearances do not have the rights of parties.) In addition, interesi.ed sts.tes have a right to fully participate sithsut being required to set forth contentions. Other parties to proceedings are the utility seeking to construct, operate, or continue to construct or operata a commercial nuclear power plant and NRC staff. The staff ,

special review responsibilitiu in advance of a hearing, but at .

hearing, the staff is on an equal footf ng with the other parties befor- the Board and does not have greater procedural or subst .v' ., h i s ,

Const -

w rmu ?- 'ngs are mandatory. They can be uncor

1 -

.N no part1Js oprme'i to the granting of the s u , o' '

,owever they are heavily contested, as f are all e m iearings involving licenses for commercic)

-( 4 - Satr power p)

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The hearings are adjudicatory in nature. The direct testimony, ,

, along with the professional qualifications of the expert witness, is almost always written and served in advance of the hearing.

The preffled tesUmony is not admitted into evidence until the hearing, however, at which time it is subject to objections to admission made by other partier or the Board. The expert witness is then available for questions on cross-examination by the other ,

parties and the Board. After crors-examination, tha witntss' attorney may ask him questions on redirect examination on me.tters raised by the cross-examination. If there is redirect examination, th,e other parties have a right to recross-examination, and so on (and sometimes on and on). In addition, a witness may 'oe asked by his attorney to prepare additional testimony in response to the testimony presented by other witnesses. This is rebuttal testimony. There is flexibility as to whether rebuttal testimony is written or oral (in the form of responses to questions posed by the witness' attorney) and as :o the proper time in the hearing when it may be presented.

All testimony is taken under oath or affinnation. Oral testimony is recorded by a court reporter on either a tape recordor or a stenotg nachine and typed up the same day as part of the daily transcript. Prepared written testimony and professional qualifications statements are usually physically bound into the a transcript "as if rv.ad" and therefore become readily accessible as part of the transcript, er they may be referenced in the transcript as exhibits admitted inte evidencL It is common for voluminous documents a party desires to admit into evidence to be re Mncad as exhibits (f,r e sple. FSARs). The di '*%rences are merely mechanical. All of the above methods have the legal effect of naking the evidence part of the record of the t

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(- proceeding. Admitted evidence is subject to motions to strike made during or after direct and cross-examination. Stricken portions are considered to be deleted from the record, although they are not physically removed.

After the evidentiary portion of the hearing is completed, the parties file proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law in the form of an initial decision that the party would like to see the Board issue. The proposed findings assemble the evidence by referencing th.e record to support the facts and the conclusions -

of law the party believes flow from those facts.

The Licensing Board considers all admitted evidence, proposed findings of fact, and conclusions of law filed by the parties and then issues an initial decision. 'An initial decision is subject to review by the Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board and, ultimately, on a discretionary basis, by the Commission. This '

( appellate review by the Appeal Board and the Coni.nission may be upon their own motion or upon the filing of an appeal by a par +.y.

When a dacision becomes the final agency action, either because there was no appellate review by the Appeal Board or Comcission or their decision on review has been issued, a party may elect to appeal the decision to a U. S. Circ Jit Court of Appeals (either the District of Columbia Circuit or the Circui' where the power plant is sited). From there, the U. S. Supreme Court may-grant a ;

petition to review the decision of the Circuit Court.

15.2 THE RELATIONSHIP OF STAFF WITNESSES AND NRC LAWYERS INVOLVED IN THE HEARING l R

It is perhaps the chief task of trial counsel in a complf cated i

, administrative proceeding, such as an NRC proceeding, to produce a written evidentiary re:ord in which appear, as clearly as possible, the facts that lead to the result believed to be the correct one by the NRC technical staff who aJvise staff counsel

\ and who serve as expert witnesses in the hearing. This cannot be l I

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done effectively unless a prospective staff witness understands certain matters about the nature of the hearing process, the r relationship with an NRC nearing attorney, the preparation of testimony, and practical advice for participation at the hearing.

If the case is not clearly and supportably presented, the presiding licensing board or an appeal panel is not Itkely to be persuaded that the position supporttd by the staff is the reasonable one for it to adopt in its decision, no matter how technically correct a staff expert's position is.

The relationship between the staff and the NRC lawyers is one of '

mutual dependence on each other's expertise. The attorney must learn as much as possible of the tecnnical subject matter as soon as possible. Likewise, the expert witness must learn about the legal context of the subject matter, the procedural and strategic aspects of the hearing, and the positions cf the other parties.

There should be a continuous process of educating each other.

The many discussions and draf' of testimony that are necessary are sometimes frustrating to Luth the attorney and the witnes:,

but the required, extensive interaction pays off in many tangible ways. If the attorney asks hard, even hostile questions, the staff witness is in a better position te prepare direct testimony that will support staff conclusions in the face of hostile cross-examination and/or rebuttal testimony at the hearing. The staff witness will also be going through the process of learning to respond to possible cross-examination. If it appears that the attorney does not have the right to challenge the staff expert's opinion, the staff expert should remembut that conclusions which can only be supported by judgement will ha of little or no use to the Board. What is required is a clearly supported basis for the !

statf opinion. It is sometimes difficeit for an expert witness to expressly set out the veiy basic step-by-step reasoning process that has become part of the exoert judgment, but this must be done to be persuasive, l i

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The staff testimony has to be understandable to an informed layman. The process of interacting with the attorney should have the effect of simplifying the testimony so that all members of the Board, the Appeal Board, the Commission, and the reviewing courts can understand it. The Board is not likely to make findings of fact in its decision which it does not understand.

Of course, the task of simplifying complex subjects without becoming misleading or feaving out important knowledge is not an easy one.

The NRC attorney needs staff assistance in preparing cross-examination of other parties in advance of the hearing. In addition, the more the attorney knows of the subject matter, the better the attorney can represent the staff witness being cross-exaained. The knowledgeable attorney can ma\e proper arguments related to the nature and substance of the testimony.

Bare legal objections, such as "irrelevant," without a substantive explanation by the lawyer, are not likely to carry

( mu:h weight with the Board. Furthermore, if the attorney understands the subject matter, the staff witness can be asked redirect questions that assist in clarifying the record after F

cross-examination.

It is unethical for an attorney to tell a witness what to say.

It is proper, however, and a part of the attorney's duty to participate scroletely in the preparation of what is to " said in the testimony. It is also an attorney's duty to exp n to ,

prospectivt witnesses the legal implications of their testimony and to prepare witnesses by posing questions that may be asked at i thn hearing. !

The tttorney tan htlp structure testimony to assure that expert analysis is put in a form proper for the hearing. The attorney

can also assist by familiarizing the witness with: (1) the i findings that will have to be covered based on previous cases dealing with similar i sues, t (2) the aspects of the issue that >

15-5 !

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will be most heavily focused on by the Board and the parties, (3) r whether the Board is likely to have questions not yet ideatified that go beyond the scope of the contention, and (4) any discovery l or prior rulings in this proceeding that bea on the issues.

Staff who have not previously testified should attend a hearing . l (on any subject) for at least one day. Even if the witness has testified before, observing the proceedings prior to the time of testifying is helpful. Each hearing has its own particular J dynamics that a witness should observe before taking the stand.

Of course, if witnesses for other parties are scheduled to I testify on the staff issue before or after the staff witness, it is essential to be there to assist the NRC attorney in cross-examination of other witnesses, i

At any stage of the preparation or hearing process, if there is something the witness does not understand about the hearing, ask the attorney. No question is too simplistic to ask. Likewise, the attorney should feel co:::fortable asking what may seen like simplistic questions. It is important that neither the attorney nor the witness avoid communication with each other.

1he attoeney must be informed of all relevant information, expert opinions, theories, correspondence, etc. of which the witness has know. edge. This is especially important if the information coes not appear to support expert opinions and conclusions. .

I i

If the witness believes that the staff position is wrong or 1 cannot support it, the witness' supervisors and the attorney should be informed at the earliest possible time. Under no i circumstances will staff be asked to testify in suppo-t of a I position the indivfdual pe'sonally feels is wrong. <

first i

duty of an.v witness is to tell the truth.

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( 15.3 PREPARATION OF DIRECT TESTIMONY The direct testimony of an expert witness consists of four parts:

(1) the individual's qualifications as an expert, (2) the data from which the opinion was fashioned, (3) the process or reasoning by which it is possible to progress from the data to the conclusion or opinion, and (4) the conclusion or opinion.

In the ordinary course, the qualifications of an expert are demonstrated by the individual's (1) practical experience in fields related to the expertise, (2) education, (3) acceptance as an expert on the subject by other tribunals before which testimony has been givan, (4) membership in professional societies (5) authorship of papers or books on the subject and (6) honors or other recognitions by colleagues or by the public.

Of course, all these indices of qualificctions may not exist in a carticular expert; a graduate engineer may later become an expert ;

a in some other field, or an expert may never have testified

[' i before. Generally speaking, the more qualified an . individual is, I

the more weight will be given to the conclusions. It should also j be noted that in combinetion with these paper qualifications, the cogency of the substantive ar.alysis presented by the witness is a prime factor in demonstrating expertise.

The professional qualifications statement should contain information on each point that shows the expertise of the witness. Those matters most directly related to the witness' expertise with respect to the particular testimony being given should be presented in greater detail than other matters that are part of the general professional background of the witness. It is for this reason that a qualifications statemert prepared for another proceeding may have to be modified and updated. For example, in a nroceeding involving the QA program implementation at a reactor, the inspector preparing testimony should state the number of inspections conducted at a sr-sci fic reactor in a certain time period. !

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There is no special format for a professional qualifications statement. It is preferable that it be on as few pages cs possible, ideally one (not counting an attached listing of publications if the' list is extensive). Therefore, it is preferable for the professional qualifications statement bt typed in single spacing. It should be simply headed PROFESSIONAL QUALIFICATIONS OF JOHN DOE or (DR. JOHN DOE to slip in one of the possible qualifications early in the statement). The caption (case name heading) of the proceeding need not be given.

The statement,'should be written in the first person. A good way to begin is, for example, "I am an NRC senior reactor inspector with Region II, Atlanta, Georgia. This should be followed by a description of duties, especially as related to the testimony to be presented.

It is usual to continue in a second part; aph with other professional experience, in reverse chronologica'. order. A list format should be avoided unless the list is long. Indications of length of time in each position are necessary. Usually this is most conveniently given by approximate beginning and ending dates.

The next paragraph should identify proceedings in which testimony i has been given as an expert on the same or similar subjects. A concise identification of the subject of the prior tastimony

! should be included, if it is somewhat different.

The next paragraph should give the witness' education in reverse chronological order. Graduate schools and colleges attended, degrees received, and any special training (for example, the Oak Ridge school and courses taken at schools when in military service) should be cited. Avoid k list format unless the list is ,

extensive.

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( The professional societies to which f.he witness belongs and any honors received should then be covered, including any professional licenses if they were n >t noted in the description of professional experience.

Finally there should be a list of papers or books authored. This can be an attachment to the qualifications statement if the list is extensive.

In formal legal procedure, the professional qualifications statement is moved into evidence ahead of the substantive testimony. Atthitpoint,aprocessknownasvoirdire(thatis, to speak the truth) may take place. In this process the witness is questioned on the qualifications statement as an expert by the parties or the Board. Proposed expert test %ony may be disallowed if the voir _ dire shows the witniss lacks the requisite expert qualifications. In the alternative, the results of the voir fire may strongly affect the relative weight a Board gives to C contradictory testimony by different witnesses.

Usually in somewhat more informal practice, the qualifications statement is admitted into evidence at the same time as the rest of the tastimony. The admission is subject, however, to a motion to strike (remove) the testimor,y from evidence on the grounds that the cross examination shows that the witness lacks the requisite expert qualifications. Under this less formal procedure, the cross-examiner may normally a sk y_ph di re type J

questions at any point during the overall questioning.

The mechanics of moving prepared written testimony into evidence is, with minor variations where the-e are multiple documents, several witnesses sponsoring the same document, or referenced exhibits, for the attorney to identify the docurrents by heading and number of pages and to ask if the witness has to refer to a copy. The witness is then asked:

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Q. Was this document prepared by you or under your supervistoa?

y Q. Do you have any corrections (or clarifications or updates, as the case may be) to this document? (Make sure the sttorney knows well in advance of any changes).

Q. As corrected, is this document true and correct to the best of yuur knowledge?

Q. Do you adopt this document as your testimony in this proceeding? !

The attorney will then request the Board to admit the testimony '

into evidence and bind it into the transcript as if read.

It is not uncommon for the attorney to then ask the witness to briefly summarize the testimony for the benefit of the members of the public and the press who may be present. The witness will ,

, have been asked to prepare this brief summary in advance, with the attorney's assistance. '

L It is difficult to offer meaningful general guidance in the !

preparation of the written direct substantive testimony. It is ,

usually prepared in narrative form by Staff witnesses, although Question and Answer form is sometimes useful. The testimony must include the data from which the opinion was obtained, the process or reasoning by which it is possible te progress from the data to '

the conclusion or opinion, and the conclusion or opinion. The i attorney should work very closely with the witness in structering !

the testimony based on the dictates of the particular proceeding.

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( The Board will not be interested or impressed by mere concluding opinions in the testimony. The Board will be interested in the material used and will be impressed by the reasoning followed.

The staff, the same as any party, has to expressiv set forth the oetailed bases in its testimony to support its reasoning and conclusions drawn fern that reasoning.

Opinions and conclusions of experts are important. Where they are unfavorable to the cross-examiner, three courses are open to the examiner: (1) drop the matter, (2) inquire into the process by which the expert reached the conclusion, or (3) affirmatively put on counter expert testimony. A staff witness should be prepared for a cross-examining attorney to elect the second option.

A staff expert witness should, prior to a hearing, review the opinions and conclusions and be knowledgeable in the actual steps

(\ taken to arrive 2t the conclusions, as well as the basic data from which the analysis and conclusions were derived. It is quite acceptable for a cross-examiner to ask, "Describe the process you went through to arrive at such an opinion aad set forth the assumptions, facts, methodology end calculations used in that process."

If the testimony is more than just a few pages, the cor.clusion and a summary of the bases for the conclusion should be given at the beginning. The testimony should be typed in double spacing and each page (after the first rage) should be numbered.

Subheadings are normally very usefp1 if the testimony is in narrative form. :

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15.4 ADVICE FOR A WITNESS GIVING ORAL TESTIMONY * '

r' Tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

Give loud and clear audible answers so that the reporter may record them. Do not respond with head nods.

Relax and take as much time as is necessary. Take sufficient time to fully understand the question and to formulate a responsive answer. A witness is entitled to time to think, but ,

this does not include a right to stall.

Listen carefully to the question and answer the question that is asked. This is very important and is usually difficult. It requires that the witness listen, understand the question, think e

before answering and then cnswer truthfully. Do not answer a question you want asked -- answer the question that is asked.

If the question can be recalled, but not understood, simply say that it is not understood. Do not rephrase the question and pose it aloud. Be prepared to answer tne follow-up question of "What don't you understand about the question?"

If all the question was not heard or some of it may have been missed, request that it be read back. The Board will then a:k the court reporter to read it back, or the attorney will offer to repeat it or at times rephrase it. Do not rephrase the question and pose it aloud.

"I wish to thank Charles A. Barth, Esq. of the NRC legal Staff l for his collection of advice to prospective witnesses in an unpublished document entitled "Witness Preparation". I have !

extensively relied on Mr. Barth's paper for parts of this l presentation. I l

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( If the question is thought to be ambiguous, ask for clarification; however, do not argue with the examining counsel.

If the answer has any untoward implications, it is the duty of the NRC counsel to straighten the matter out' on redirect examination. Too of ten witnesses try to out guess the attorneys and make answers that sound good; this should be avoided.

Do not volunteer information gratuitously. This is an important matter which many witnesses fail to appreciate. It is the duty of the examinar to ask questions which will elicit the desired information. At the same time, do not give half answers and do not emit important facts. A witness should be cooperative and truthful but sbculd not try to anticipate what is on the examiners mind or what is behind the questions. A short answer pertinent to the question is most desirable.

If the answer to a question is not known, say so. Do not guess. ,

Do not answer instantly when being, cross-examined. The NRC attorney may wish to object to the question, so allow time to hear and analyze the question and to object if necessary. After an objection is made, do not answer unless and until the board overrules the objection and directs an answer.

Listen carefully to all objections made by the attorney, even though the objections are directed to the board. 1 l

Be serious, courteous and respectful to board members and the attorneys of all parties. Avoid "cute" answers and wisecracks.

The hearing process is a serious r3atter and merits dignity. Do not argue. The decision to argue is for the attorney.

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Remember to maintain dignity when off the stand also. Remain serious. Do not discu;s the testimony with any persons other F i than NRC staff. Avoid all conversations with members of the board, and absolutely do not say anything that even remotely has anything to do with the substance of the case to a member of the board. ,

A witness may be asked if the testimony was discussed or prepared with NR0 attorneys and if prospective cross-examination was ,

discussed. The answer should be "yes." Do not be afraid to answer "yes" if that is the case. This is an entirely ,

appropriate preparation procedure.

The witness may be asked if a specific matter was discussed with other NRC personnel. Often the truthful answer to this question is "yes." This is not surprising, regardless of hew the cross-examiner might pretend to react to a "yes" answer.

Do not accept the invitation of a questioner to simply agree or disagree with a statement until the statement is understood. !

If a question can be answered e.iirectly in a concise manner, but a further explanation is believed to be required to avoid a ,

misleading answer, subdivide the answer accordingly, beginning '

with the concise direct answer (for example, "Yes, but I'd like i to explain my answer."). Then immediately go into the explanat;on if no one interrupts. l If a questioner interrupts the answer, :almly ar.d in a noncombative voice state that the answer had not been finished or that an explanation of the previous answer was about to be given.

Wait for the interruption to end before doing this.

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1 Do not answer a geestion in such a way as to evoke more ;

questions; for example, "Is that a problem?" Answer: "That is one of the problems." This leads to the question "What are the other problems? Discuss them." This whole matter is obviated if the witness answers "yes."

Almost all NRC witnesses will be exoerts in some technical field.

TSey may be experts by academic training, work experience, or both. As experts they are permitted to rely on work they have performed, their education, their experience and on data prepared by others (who are qualified experts) which they have reviewed and relied on, While testifying, it is permissible to refer to notes, papers, and other materials. Be aware, however, that the questiener is entitled to examine the materials. Bring all I references with you to the hearing.

An expert witness may be ask2d whether additional research would be useful in a particular area. Most scientists advocate

( research, and of course, NRC 1: engaged in research. Therefor, the answer is often "yes," with an explanation that enough information is now availsble to support the conclusions, if in fact this is the expert opinion.

The witness may be asked "hava you made a study cr an analysis."

Of ten the answer sheald be "yes." It is for the cross-examiner to develop by interrogation the size, scope, and depth of that study or analysis. The words "study or analysis" 3 ot automatically imply a long, complicated or extensive amount of -

work. '

There is no possible substitute for knowledge of the subject matter. Neither the attorney nor anyone else can help. The witness must be knowledgeable. Sometimes a question may be bette- 'swered by another staff witness scheduled to testify.

If thh is the case, say so.

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o If, while still on the stand, it is realized that an incorrect or misleading answer was given inadvertently, ask for permission to '

correct it. If off the stand, inform the attorney.

Do not ask for permission to confer with anyone, including the attorney, while responding to questions. There can =be an exception in cases where there is a panel of witnesses.

Conferences among witnesses testifying jointly on a panel normally are pe rmitted. This is particularly vteful where questions cross iosely related, but different, fields of expertis6.

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15.5 REFERENCES

1. "Trial by Agency", E. Barrett Prettyman (Virginia Law !.eview -

Association, 1959); especially Part III, pp. 19-42. (58 pages -

available at NRC Bathosca Law Library.

2. "The Rule of Reason - A New Approach to Corporate Litigation",

Milton R. Wessel (Addison-Wesley Publish 123 Co., 2.916); L especially pp. 69-78, 190-207 (221 pages available at NRC

Bethosca Law Library)

_ 3. Appendix A to 10 C.F.R. Part 2 (The Commission's "Mules of ;

Practice"). This is a reasonably accurate summary of 10 C.F.R. !

Part 2. For greater detail, refer to 10 C.F.R. Part 2 itself.

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CHAPTER 16 FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT 16.1 REQUIREMENTS OF THE ACT The Freedom of Information Act (F0IA) (5 U.S.C. 552) directs disclosure of records to "any person" without . egard to the purpose or need of the individual requesting the records unless nondisclosure can be justified under one or more of nine exemptions given in the Act. The Act was passect by Congress in 1986 and became law on July 4,1967. It was amended in 1974 and 1976.

The Act requires agencies to make determinations on providing access to requested records within 10 working days of the receipt C of the request, or 20 working days in "unusuti circumstances" where regional and other separate offices must conduct searches, a voluminous amount of records are subject to the request, or consultation among various offices or another agency is needed.

NRC procedures for implementation of the Act are detailed in NRC Manua? Chapter 0211, "Freedom of Information Act." ,

16.2 RECORDS SUBJECT TO FOIA REQUESTS A record, to be subject to an FOIA request, must be an "agency record" as defined in 10 CFR 9.3a(b), as follows:

Record means any bcok, paper, map, photograph, brochure, punch card, magnetic tape, paper tape, sound recording, pamphlet, slide, motion picture, or other documentary material regardless of forn or characteristics, made by, in 16-1

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l the possession of, or under the control of the NRC pursuant to Federal law, or in connection with *.he transaction of F public business as evidence of NRC organization, functions, policies, decisions, procedures, operations, programs or other activities. (10 CFR 9.3a(b))

Only agency records relevant to the subject of the FOIA request that are in the possession of NRC on the date the FOIA res'sest is received are considered subject to the request. An agency is not required by the Act to create a record that does not exist to satisfy a request (NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co, 955. Ct. 1504 (1975)). Also, an agency is not required by the Act to reprogram information in a computer to. the form requested, even if it is technically possible. to do so. (Yeager v. Drug Enforcement .;

Administration (678 F. 2d 315 (1982)).

All records are "agency records" unless they are " personal records." An inspector's notes are usually considered to be the personal property of the inspector and not agency property subject to an FOIA request because the notes are (1) not required to be taken by NRC policy or procedures, (2) they were prepared !

for the staff member's own use to refresh recollection, (3) they <

are retained or discarded at the author's sole discretion, and (4) the NRC exercises no control or dominion over the notes.

(See porter County Chapter of Frank Walton League v. Atomic !

Energy Corr.ission, 389F).

An inspector's notes are not, however, personal records but become subject to an FOIA request if the notes are (1) shown to anyone else to transmit official information and (2) filed in NRC files, as opposed to the inspector's personal files, or otherwise commingled with .p ncy records. (Supp. 630 (N.D. Ind. 1974)).

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"Personal records" pertain only to a person's private notes.

Records prepared by and obtained from licensees or a licensee's employees during an inspection, even when given in confidence, are subject to the provisions of the Act if they are in NRC's possession, .ncluding the inspector's possession and the resident inspector's trailer at the time NRC receives the FOIA request.

. Forms or. check . lists used in inspections are agency records rather than personal records.

If the inspector does not want personal notes to become publicly available, it is de:irable to dispose of them as soon as they have served their purpose. If there is concern about release of a licensee document, it should not be borrowed or copied.

Such material can be reviewed or copies obtained later if needed.

The inspector should agree to protect a document given in '

confidence only if the person has baen granted confidentiality in accoidance with NRC policy and procedures. Advice on such

( matters can be obtained from regional counsel.

16.3 FOIA EXEMPTIONS Exemotion 1: Records "(A) specifically authorized under criteria establisted by an Executive Order to be kept secret in the '

interest of national de' mse or foreign policy, and (B) are in fact properly classified pursuant to such Executive Order."

To withhold information from disclosure under Exemption 1, the ,

information must be (1) classified in, acccrdance with the crite.ria set forth in the current Executive Order (now E012356) and (2) classified by en authorized classif fer. Classification legends are Top Secret, Secret, and Confider' lal; "Of ficial Use Only" is not a classification. All classifiec documents subject to FOIA recuests murt undergo a declassification review to 4 segregate exeapt classified i nforma*.t on from nonexempt unclass'fied information.

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Periodically, NRC offices identify records that have not been properly classified but which are thought to contain clissified F information. When this occurs, the requester is notified that the records are being withhelo pstavant to Exemption 1 pending a classification review. ,

Subsequent to the initial dental of the records pursuant to Exemption 1, the originating office conducts a declassification review of the documents. Upon completion of that review, nonclassified information is released to the requester unless it is withholdab,le under another exemption.

Documents classified by other agencies (DOE, 000, etc.) have to be referred to those agencies for declassification review.

Courts have also adopted a "jigsaw puzzle" or "mosaic" approach

, that allows agencies to classify information that is otherwise unclassified if it could provide the "missing link" to classified information. (halperin b. CIA, 629 F. 2d 144 (1980)). This theory can also be used to protect a "compilation" of materials not otherwise classified in their component parts. (Taylor v.

Dept of the Army, 684 F. 2d 99 (1982)).

i Exemption 2: Records "which relate solely to the internal person-nel rules and practices of an agency."

Exemption 2 may be utilized to exempt internal personnel rules and practices that do not significantly affect the public. The Senate Report on the Act cites as examples the use of parking facilities, the regulation of lunch hours, and policies on sick and annual leave. The House report is broader because it covers "operating rules, guidelines, and man'al s of procedure for government investigators." This exemption was used in the past k

i 16-4 a

/

s to withhold Section II of the NRC inspection manual, which specifies the inspection requirements at licensed facilities; however, the manual is now available to the public in the NRC Public Document Room.

Exemption 2 has been of little practical use to NRC, except that '

it may still be used to withhold testing materials, such as clerical or typing tests.

Exemption 3: Records "specifically exempted ftom disclosure by statute provided that such statute (A) requir9s that the matters be withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave no discretion on the issue, or (8) establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to particular types of matters to be withheld."

Exemption 3 is utilized as the authority to withhold "Restricted Data" from disclosure as required by Sections 141-145 of the

(' Atomic Energy A-t of 1954, as amendad, 42 U.S.C. 2161-2165. -

Exemption 3 is also used to protect safeguards information as a result of Section 147 being added to the Atomic Energy Act on June 30, 1980. Under Section 147, NRC can protect infomation which specifically identifies a licensee's or applicant's detailed security measures for the physical protection of special nuclear material, source material, or byproduct material if release of the information could reasonably be expected to have a "significant adverse affect on the health and safety of the public or the common defense and security by significantly increasing the likelihood of theft, diversion, or sabotage."

Examples of safeguards information that is withheld are security plans, procedures, and equipment; safe havens; lo:A1 law enforcement response times; radio frequency transmission data; departure times; and anything else that could reasonably be '

ag expected to significantly increase the likelihood of theft, !

l g diversion, or sabotage. '

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Section 147 specifically prchibits NRC from withholding information pertaining to shipment' routes and the quantities of shipments.

Transcripts of closed Commission meetings under the Government in the Sunshine Act are withheld under appropriate exemptions in that Act rather than Exemption 3.

Exemption 4: Records "containing trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential."

Exuption 4 is utilized to exempt from disclosure information that meets the following two tests: (1) the information is a trade secret or commercial or financial information, and (2) disclosure of the information would either (a) result in substantial harm to the competitive position of the owner or (b) harm the government's ability to obtain information in the '

future. (National Parks Conservation Association v. Morton, 498 F. 2d '65 (1974)).

NRC deals basically with three types of propriet:.ry information:

(1) tachnical proprietary, (2) financial proprietary (costs, prices, lists of customers, etc. ), and (3) information of the type specified in 10 CFR 2.790(d); that is, (a) information received in confidence from a foreign source, (b) material i control and accounting information, and (c) physical security '

information at certain facilities.

1

, If NRC disagrees with a proprietary claim, the matter is normally negotiated with the owner of the information. The owner of the proprietary information has to show that the information (1) was submitted to the NRC in confidence, (2) is not available in public sources, (3) is normally treated as confidential by the !

\

l j

16-6 I i

f k

company, and that (4) disclosure would cause substantial harm to the competitive position of the' company. If NRC plans to release information claimed to be proprietary, the company is given two weeks notice in order to file in court for an injunction. NRC then has to prove, through expert testimony, that release would not harm the competitive position of the company.

3 An inspector who obtains a utility document should ask the person providing the document whether the information is proprietary.

Lower level emoloyees and confidential sources providing documents may not, in fact, know whether the document is proprieta ry. This may require that NRC consult with the utility or contractor prior to release of the doe.ument to the public at come later time to determine whether it is proprietary.

Exemotion 5: "Intei-agency or intra-agency memorandums or

'( letters which would not be available by law to a party in litiga-tion with the agency."

I To exempt a record from disclosure utilizing Exemption 5, the record must normally be eithe.: (1) an interagency memorandum or letter (that i s, memorandum or letter transmitted from one Federal agency to another), or (2) an intraagency memorandum or letter (that is, memorandum or letter transmitted from one person in a federal agency to another person in the same agency). To withhold information under this exemption the inter- or intrangency memoranda must be covered by a privilege such as the attorney-citent privilege, or a legal work-product privilege, or be advice, opinions, or recommendations developed during a deliberative process.

In general, the purpose of the exemption is to encourage the full, frank, and candid exchange of opinions needed for good decisionmaking. Congress recognizes that the government cannot operate in a fish bowl.

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Only that part of the record which contains predecisional advice, y opinions, and recommendations of the staff given during a deliberative process (that is, the process in which the agency makes its decision) can be exeripted. Factual information must be segregated from advice, opinions, and recommendations in predecisional cocuments, except for drafts, certain legal work products, and records co*iered by the attorney-client privilege.

In some cases, it is also possible to witthold information under i

Exemption 5 even if the records were prepared by persons outside of the government. These cases recognize that in some situations the government may have a special need for the opinions and j recommendations of temporary consultants who are experts in their i field. If these consultations were (1) solicited by the agency i and (2) are an integral part of the deliberative process, the ,

information may be withheld. (Ryan v. Dept of Justice (D.C. Ct.

of App., January 7, 1980)) NRC cannot, however, withhold a document purchased by NRC that is a report or study. NRC will look to the underlying contract for the purpose whether ilRC is purchasing a product or someone's special expertise and advice.

Exemotion 6: Records "which are personnel and medical files and similar files, the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy."

Where privacy information is found in requested records, the Act requires a balancing of interests between the protection of an individual's private affairs from unnecessary public scrutiny and the preservatior. of the public's right to government information.

The term "clearly unwarranted" contained in the exemption instructs an agency "to tilt the balance in favor of disclosure."

Where misconduct by a government employee is involved, balance is tilted heavily in favor of disclosure. Courts speak in terms of the public having "an interest in whether public servants carry 16-8

out their duties in an efficient and law-abiding manner."

(Columbia Packing Co. v. Dept of Agriculture (563 F. 2d 495 (1977)). Upon request, NRC routinely discloses an NRC employee's name, tit!e, grade, salary, present and past position titles, and duty station.

Exemption 6 applies to the intimate and personal details of one's life, and covers information such as the legitimacy of children, medical conditions, welfare payments, religious affiliations, and school records. The following information about any individual should always be withheld:

1. social security number,

2. home address and home telephone number,

3. personal medical conditions, including radiation exposure,

4. personal financial matters,

5. date of birth,

6. derogatory informatici. such as being fired from other

( employment or employment wi.5 HRC, if the NRC firing was not due to a conduct matter covered by the FOIA request.

In response to an FOIA request by an unselected candidate on a vacancy announcement, NRC makes available essentially everything i

on the SF 171, "Application for Federal Employment," form that l deals with Oducation, training, and qualifications for employment. Personal information, such as birthdates, social security numbers, home addresses, home phone numbers, personal references, and information about relatives is withheld. An employee's performance evaluations are also withheld.

The right to privacy is a personal right. There is no right to privacy in a corporation. There is also no right to privacy in a dead person. NRC has disclosed, for example, the name and amount of adiation erposure received by one who is deceased. If personal information about a dead person would harm the living, 16-9

it may be protected. Examples are (1) President Kennedy's y 1

autopsy report and photos, (2) information concerning the legitimacy of children, and (3) information concerning the personal and family life of an organized crime figure.

Exemption 7: Investigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes (criminal, civil, or administrative), but only to the extent that production of such records would:

1. interfere with enforcement proceedings. This applies to open cases only, .where disclosure would result in substartial harm to NRC's case. NRC must show, by more than a conclusion statement, how the particular kinds of records requested would interfere with a pending enforcement action.

To be withheld, the mai.erial must show the scope, direction, and focus of the inquiry. The NRC showing does not have to be done on a document-by-document basis. (Campbell v. Dept of Health and Human Services, 682 F. 2d 256 (D.C. Cir.

1982))

2. deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication. This applies to third parties only; it cannot be used to withhold information from a requester who is the subject of the investigation.

3. constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. NRC applies a balancing test as in exemption 6, which gives types of information that can be withheld.

4 disclose the identity of a confidential source, such as, in the case of a record compiled by a criminal law enforcement authority in the course of a criminal investigation, or by an agency conduct.ing a lawful national security intelligence investigation, or confidential information furnished only by the confidential source. This covers individuals, police files, and Federal and state grand jury information.

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5. dicciose investigative techniques and procedures. This is designed to protect the future effectiveness of procedures.

6. endanger the life or physical safety of law enforcement personnel. This is used by the FBI.

NRC may deny release of the following information to protect the identity of a confidential source:

1. name of t,he confidential source,

2. social s'ecurity number,

3. date of birth,

4. home address,

5. home telephone number,

6. employment information that would identify the individual, such as employee badge number, work phone number, work office location, job titis, and dates of employment,

7. eduntion background that would identify the individual,

( such as date of degree or journeyman certification, school attended, dates attended, and degree received,

8. previous employment information that would identify the individual, such as previous employers, job titles, professional certifications, dates of previous employment,

9. references to date and time of events and meetings, and events and meetings which could reasonably lead a knowledgeable person to identify the confidential source,

10. references to a supervisor, co-workers, or relatives which could lead a knowledgeable person to identify a confidential source,

11. date and time of meeting with NRC staff regarding allegations.

It should be noted, however, that sometimes the deletion of the name of a confidential source might identify the confidential source. Obvious examples are: (1) when a utility document contains a list of all QC personnel when only some are 16-11

confidential sources and (2) deletion of a confidential source's F name and signature on a licensee document but disclosure of the rest of the document. These deletions would enable the licensee or contractor to identify the confidential source, since the licensee or contractor has a copy of the complete document.

Also, documents provided by a confidential source could on occasion identify the source as th's person providing the information to NRC. This could b6 the case where the document, '

such as a rnemorandum, had very limited distribution or was available to a very limited group of persons, among whom was the confidential source.

At the time an inspector obtains a document, it is important for future uses for the inspector to identify the manner in which the document was obtained. For public disclosure and FOIA purposes, it is important to know whether a document was obtained from a confidential source, from utility or contractor files, given by a high-level utility or contract manager or executive, or by a lower-level employee not in management.

Inspectors should become thoroughly familiar with NRC policy and procedures for granting confidentiality and maintaining documents on anyone provided confidentiality. The investigation phase starts when evidence of possible wrongdoing is uncovered.

Exemption 8: Records which relate to the regulation or supervision of financial institutions.

This exemption is not applicable to NRC.

Exemption 9: "Geological and geophysical information and data, including maps, concerning wells."

Exemption 9 pertains primarily to information relating to oil and j gas wells, and has been used on only one occasion by NRC.

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16.4 SPECIAL PRIVACY ACT ISSUES Any group of records normally maintained or retrieved by an individual's name or other personal identifier is a System of Records under the Privacy Act (5 U.S.C. 552a). A notice on a System of Records must be published in the Federal Register. A group of records retrievable by an individual's name or other personal identifier may not be maintained unless it is a duplicate of an existing System of Records or its existence is published in the Federal Register. A copy of a current set of notices of NRC's Privacy Act Systems of Records can be rbtained by from the Freedom of Information and Privacy Acts Branch. NRC has Systems of Records for general personnel matters, performance matters, investigative matters, etc. Therefore, if a supervisor maintains a file of his employees, the supervisor wou7d have a duplicate of the general personnel System of Records. It is important not to keep files by allegers or confidential source names. NRC should maintain such files' by allegation numbers,

( since such a file would not constitute a Systems of Records. NRC procedures for implementation of the Privacy Act are detailed in NRC Manual Chapter 0204, Privacy Act.

If a person requests information under the Privacy Act for records in files retrieved by his or her name, there is no predecisional exemption to keep the information from t ~ sing disclosed.

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4>

CHAPTER 16 FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT 16.1 REQUIREMENTS OF THE ACT The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) (5 U.S.C. 552) directs disclosure of records to "any person" without regard to the purpose or need of the individual requesting the records unless nondisclosure ca'n be justified under one or more of nine exemptions given in the Act. The Act was passed by Congress in 1986 and became law on July 4, 1967. It was amended in 1974 and 1976.

The Act requir as agencies to make determinations on providing access to requested records within 10 working days of the receipt

(~ of the request, or 20 working days in "unusual circumstances" where regional and other separate offices must conduct searches, a voluminous amount of records are subject to the request, or consultation among various offices or another agency is needed.

NRC procedures for implementation of the Act are detailed in NRC Manual Chapter 0211, "Freedom of Information Act."

16.2 RECORDS SUBJECT TO FOIA REQUESTS A record, to be subject to an FOIA request, must be an "agency record" as defined in 10 CFR 9.3a(b), as follows:

Record means any book, paper, map, photograph, brochure, punch card, magnetic tape, paper tape, sound recording, pamphlet, slide, motion picture, or other documentary material regardless of form or characteristics, made by, in

(

16-1

( "Personal records" pertain only to a person's private notes.

Records prepared by and obtained from licensees or a licensee's employees during an inspection, even when given in confidence, are subject to the provisions of the Act if they are in NRC's possession, including the inspector's possession and the resident inspector's trailer at the time NRC receives the FOIA request.

Forms or check lists used in inspections are agency records rather than personal records.

If the inspector does not want personal notes to become publicly available, it is desirable to dispose of them as soon as they have served their purpose. If there is concern about release of a licensee document, it should not be borrowed or copied.

Such material can be reviewed or copies obtained later if needed.

The inspector should agree to protect a document given in confiderce only if the person has been granted confidentiality in accordance with NRC policy and procedures. Advice on such

( matters can be obtained from regional counsel.

16.3 FOIA EXEMPTIONS Exemption 1: Records "(A) specifically authorized under criteria l established by an Executive Order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy, and (B) are in f act properly classified pursuant to such Executive Order."

l To withhold information from disclosure under Exemption 1, the information must be (1) classified in. accordance with the criteria set forth in the current Executive Order (now E012356) and (2) classified by an authorized classifier. Classification legends are Top Secret, Secret, and Confidential; "Official Use Only" is not a classification. All classified documents subject to FOIA requests must undergo a declassification review to segregate exempt classified information from nonexempt

( unclassified information.

16-3

I to withhold Section II of the NRC inspection manual, which specifies the inspection requirements at licensed facilities; however, the manual is now available to the public in the NRC Public Document Room.

Exemption 2 has been of little practical use to NRC, except that it may still be used to withhold testing materials, such as clerical or typing tests.

Exemption 3: Records "specifically exempted from disclosure by statute provided that such statute (A) requires thct the matters be withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave no discretion on the issue, or (B) establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to particular types of matters to be withheld."

Exemption 3 is utilized as the authority to withhold "Restricted Data" from disclosura as required by Sections 141-145 of the

(- Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, 42 U.S.C. 2161-2165.

Exemption 3 is also used to protect safeguards information as a result of Section 147 being added to the Atomic Energy Act on

. lune 30, 1980. Under Section 147, NRC r.an protect information which specifically identifies a licensee's or applicant's detailed security measures for the physical protection of special nuclear material, source material, or byprcduct material if release of the information could reasonably be expected to have a "Significant adverse affect on the health and safety of the public or the common defense and security by significantly increasing the likelihood of theft, diversion, or sabotage."

Examples of safeguards information that is withheld are hecurity plans, procedures, and equipment; safe havens; local law enforecaent response times; radio frequency transmission data; departure times; and anything else that could reasonably be expected to significantly increase the likelihood of theft, diversion, or sabotage.

16-5

(

company, and that (4) disclosure would cause substantial harm to the competitive position of the company. If NRC plans to release information claimed to be proprietary, the company is given two weeks notice in order to file in court for an injunction. NRC then has to prove, through expert testimony, that release would not harm the competitive position of the company.

An inspector who obtains a utility document should ask the person providing the document whether the information is proprietary.

Lower level' employees and confidential sources providing documents may not, in fact, know whether the document is proprietary. This may require that NRC consult with the utility or contractor prior to release of the document to the public at some later time to determine whether it is proprietary.

Exemotion 5: "Inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or

( letters which would not be available by law to a party in litiga-tion with the agency."

l To exempt a record from disclosure utilizing Exemption 5, the record must normally be either: (1) an interagency memorandum or letter (that is, memorandum or letter transmitted from one i

i Federal agency to another), or (2) an intraagency memorandum or letter (that is, memorandum or letter transmitted from one person in a federal agency to another person in the same agency). To withhold information under this exemption the inter- or intraagency memoranda must be covered by a privilege such as the attorney-client privilege, or a legal work product privilege, or be advice, opinions, or recommendations developed during a deliberative process.

l l In general, the purpose of the exemption is to encourage the full, frank, and candid exchange of opinions needed for good decisionmaking. Congress recognizes that the government cannot I operate in a fish bowl.

16-7

I out their duties in an efficient and law-abiding manner."

(Columbia Packing Co. v. Dept of Agriculture (563 F. 2d 495 (1977)). Upon request, NRC routinely discloses an NRC employee's name, title, grade, sala.t , present and past position titles, and duty station.

Exemption 6 applies to the intimate and personal details of one's life, and covers information such as the legitimacy of children, medical conditions, weifare payments, religious affiliations, and school records. The following information about any individual should always be withheld:

1. social security number,

2. home address and home telephone number,

3. personal medical conditions, including radiation exposure,

4. personal financial matters,

5. date of birth,

6. derogatory information, such as being fired from other employment or employment with NRC, if the NRC firing was not due to a conduct matter covered by the FOIA request, i

In response to an FOIA request by an unselected candidate on a i

vacancy announcement, NRC makes available essentially everything l on the SF 171, "Application for Federal Employment," form that I deals with education, training, and qualifications for employment. Personal information, such as birthdates, social security numbers, home addresses, home phone numbers, personal references, and information about relatives is withheld. An employee's performance evaluations are also withheld.

l The right to privacy is a personal right. There is no right to privacy in a corporation. There 1:; also no right to privacy in a dead person. NRC has disclosed, for example, the name and amount of radiation exposure received by one who is deceased. If personal information about a dead person would harm the living,

(

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5. disclose investigative techniques and procedures. This is ;

designed to protect the future effectiveness of procedures.

6. endanger the life or physical safety of law enforcement personnel. This is used by the FBI.

NRC may deny release of the following information to protect the identity of a confidential source:

1. name of the confidential source,

2. social security number,

3. date of birth,

4. home address,

5. home telephone number,

6. employment information that would identify the individual, such as employee badge number, work phone number, work office location, job title, and dates of employment.

[ 7. education background that would identify the individual, such as date of degree or journeyman certification, school attended, dates attended, and degree received,

8. previous employment information that would identify the individual, such as previous employers, job titles, professional certifications, dates of previous employment,

9. references to date and time of events and meetings, and events and meetings which could reasonably lead a knowledgeable person to identify the confidential source,

10. references to a supervisor, co-workers, or relatives >

which could lead a knowledgeable person to identify t confidential source,

11. date and time of meeting with eC staff regarf.ing allegations.

It should be noted, however, that sometimes the deletion of the name of a confidential source might identify the confidential source. Obvious examples are: (1) when a utility document t

I contains a list of all QC personnel when only some are 16-11

16.4 SPECIAt. PRIVACY ACT ISSUES Any group of records normally maintained or retrieved by an individual's name or other personal identifier is a System of Records under the Privacy Act (5 U.S.C. 552a). A notice on a System of Records must be published in the Federal Register. A group of records retrievable by an individual's name or other personal identifier may not be maintained unless it is a duplicate of an existing System of Records or its existence is published in the Federal Register. A copy of a current set of notices of NRC's , Privacy Act Systems of Records can be obtained by from the Freedom of Information and Privacy Acts Branch. NRC has Systems of Records for gensral personnel matters, performance matters, investigative matters, etc. Therefore, if a supervisor maintains a file of his employees, the supervisor would have a duplicate of the general personnel System of Records. It is important not to keep files by allegers or confidential source names. NRC should maintain such files' by allegation numbers, since such a file would not constitute a Systems of Records. NRC procedures for implementation of the Privacy Act are detailed in NRC Manual Chapter 0204, Privacy Act.

If a person requests information under the Privacy Act for records in files retrieved by his or her name, there is no predecisional exemption to keep the information from being disclosed.

(

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CHAPTER 17 INFORMING THE PUBLIC 17.1 THE RESIDENT INSPECTOR AS THE INTERFACE WITH THE NEWS MEDIA The principal and quickest means ef keeping the public informed about the regulatory activities and pregrams of the NRC is to release the information through the news media. Nearly one-third cf NRC's current resources are used to develop and carry out its inspection program, and the resident inspectors are at the heart of that program. At times they are the best source in NRC for providing information to the news media. Therefore, . hey should understand the news media interfacs and the potential pitfalls in speaking for the agency.

17.2 PUBLIC AFFAIRS POLICY ,

In NRC, th) Office of Governmental and Public Affairs is charged with responsibilities for informing sne news media of events of public interest. Puolic Affairs Officers prepare, coordinate and spread the word about NRC activities by issuing public announcements; preparing speeches and fact sheets; distributing NRC Orders, decisions and reports; or talking to the news media in person or by telephone. Much of the time of a Public Affairs Officers is spent answering questions about actions taken in meetings and about the many NRC reports, Orders and other documents that reflect NRC actions.

If there is a question about whether to release information, there is almost alwavs a tendency to do so. It is the policy of Public Affairs Officers to treat information as if it has to be announced, with a few exceptions, such as investigation ar.d other 17-1

reports that are not completed or proprietary information is involved. All decision on whether to release information by F means of a public announcement should be made in consultation with Public Affairs Officers.

The philosophy behind the NRC open policy is that the public has a right tt, know, since NRC is a tax-supported government agency.

Actually, there is not much of a problem in this regard in NRC.

Most employees are geared toward having all information placed in the Public Document Room, so there are few times when release of information really becomes an issue. Occasionally the timing becomes an issue bacause certain cou*tesies are adhered to, such as making sure a Congressman has a chance to review requested information before it is relea :1.

The ope 1 policy is made easier by the fact that flRC is a highly visible agency that oversees a highly visible industry. Much of NRC business is conducted in public meetings. Reporters of ten learn about cajor Commtssion decisions at the same time as the staff. Frequently, therefore, the staff role is not preparing an announcement but, rather, trying to help newsmen undirstand what happened in a public session.

The news media's thirst to know what happens at a nuclear power plant has increased greatly over the years, particularly following the accident at Three Mile Island in 1979 and the nuclear disaster at Chernobyl. "Nuclear" makes news, and NRC must accept the fact that at times what would be insignificant at a fossil plant or other industrial operation is significant to the news media when it relates to nuclear plants. The public controversy surrounding nuclear power and the accidents that have occurred have kept interest at a high pitch.

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l Some may think that the Public Affairs Officer's job is to make NRC look good, but that does not necessarily coincide with the philosophy of making everything available to the public. The basic job is to issue information, good or bad. NRC regulates the nuclear industry for the health and safety of the public, and if the public accepts the fact that NRC is doing its job, credibility will flow frorr that fact. Much of the news NRC generates is negative or bad news because, as regulators, the staff is looking for problems or potential problems. NRC applauds those who are doing well but does not spend much time doing studi e's , writing reports, or issuing Orders on those matters. Rather, NRC dwells on what needs to be improved; so most of the news deals with things gone wrong.

17.3 INFORMATION ROLE OF THE RESIDENT INSPECTOR Although it obviously is not the resident inspector's primary job, there are times when resident inspectors should respond to inquiries from the news media. Sometimes the resident inspector will be the best and maybe the only source for the information that is being sought by the reporter. Also, since the resident inspector lives in the community near the plant and may be looked upon as the NRC person doing most to prc,tect its citizens, the resident inspector is probably the most credible spokesperson.

If information, positive or negative to a particular licensee, is documented in completed inspection reports, SALP (Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance) reports or other documents, there is no reason not to discuss it.

If facts are not clear when the resident inspector is questioned, or there is uncertainty about information, or the request interferes with more pressing regulatory activities, requests for information should be referred to a Public Affairs Officer in the region or Headquarters. Public affairs officials might ask the resident inspector for information and then handle the request 17-3

or, after some clarification, the resident inspector may be asked P to follow up on the request. The point is that being open and forthright does not mean that time may not be taken to consult with others. The best and most accurate information is often provided af ter some consultation or clarification. Also, there are other reasons it might not be possible to discuss a particular matter. For example, an inspection report should not be discussed while it is being prepared. The details of the incident might be available publicly but the report findings or conclusions do not have to be released until the report is final.

It is not a comfortable feeling when there is a desire to fully inform the public about a situation, such as an accident, but everything known is preliminary and not solid enough to discuss.

publicly. For example, press briefings have been held when Incident Inve:tigation Teams arrived at sites to study serious incidents. Obviou:ly the team does not know much at that point, but newsmen are not satisfied with a report that a team is there and starting to investigate. They want to know why it happened, what caused it and how did it compare with other significant accidents. These questions cannot be answered very well.

Obviously, unsubstantinted information should not he provided.

It is not necessary to speculate, but it must be recognized that it is the job of the reporter to learn as much as possible and press for information on the chance that there will be comment.

The Chernobyl accident in the Soviet Union was a good example of speculators at work. There were early reports of 2000 deatits during and immediately following the accident. The right number in those early days was two deaths, and it reached 31 during the next four months. The U.S. moved fast to start providing as much information to the press as posstble. This was done through an 17-4

(

interagency Task Force that was gathering as much official data as it could. It was a focal point for whatever official information and guicance could be provided. It had the effect of dramatically reducing wild speculation.

17.4 NEWS SOURCES Another thing to be aware of is that sometimes rsporters will seem to have more information of a more solid nature than NRC has. How can that be so? Well, they talk to many people, many experts. Some of these people do not hesitate to speculate and often such spec';1ation gets translated into hard and fast information by the time it gets to NRC. It is important to realize that official fact gathering is usually not fast enough to beat the speculators.

Then there is the semi-official word that is passed to those up the line and maybe to Congress to keep them as well informed as '

( possible. When that information gets out, and it will, the fact that it is "preliminary" is lost. For, example, a preliminary report describing a sequence of events was cireviated internally but it was not given to the Public Affairs Officer because it was not final. The draft version got to a reporter, however, who started asking questions of the Public Affairs Officer who had not seen it and was saying there was no report on the sequence of events available. That was embarrassing. Of course preliminary information is developed and circulated for internal review, maybe even by the resident inspector. It should be recognized, however, that the demands for information are so great that the preliminary in formation prcbably will get out. Therefore, if information must be released, make it firm as quickly as possible.

t b

i 17-5

There is seldom a simple case where the press will wait for the NRC experts, or any other principal source, to verify and -

finalize the facts before they do a story. If the other sources do not really have firsthand knowledge or if their knowledge is only preliminary, the real story could get lost. To deal with this, develop the facts rapidly and distribute the best information possible as fast as possible.

17.5 A NEWS VACUUM CREATES MISINFORMATION Those who experienced the Three Mile Island accident can testify to the urgent need to provide information promptly, establish good lines of communication, and avsid at all costs the appearance of not being forthcoming. It is important not to leave a vacuum even on lesser events that are likely to get press attention. It is best to confer immediately with the Public Affairs Officer and move quickly to say what can be said. At the same time, bear in mind that it is not necessary to answer when the answer is not known. It is fine to say "We don't know."

Evan though newsmen will always press for more answers, they understand that it takes time to develop information.

Also, when holding a briefing for a specific purpose (that is, an accident or event), do not respond to questions in unrelated areas. Especially, the resident inspector should never try to answer questions that are not within that field of expertise. In other words, do not guess or speculate. The Public Affairs Officer can help track down the right person to answer the unrelated question.

17.6 WORKING WITH THE PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICER There are Public Affairs Officers assigned to each of the five regional offices and headquarters. They are professionals, and it is their job to deal with the news media on a daily basis, so 17-6

make use of their services. When necessary, pars a reporter on to the Public Affairs Officer for answers to questions, but take time to let the Public Affairs Officer know to expect a call from ,

that reporter.

A big problem for the Public Affairs Officer is receiving word '

late on an issue that might surface in the news media. For example, when a Congressman or another public official is informed of something, the Public Affairs Officer should be told too. It helps to prepare for news media calls if word is received early on an issue or problem. For that reason, do not think that an issue is unimportant or that unnecessary waves might be made by telling the Public Affairs Officer. If the information is of any news value, it will eventually surface.

The need for help works both ways. When the Public Affairs Officers need technical people to explain things, such as how or why a specific plant system failed, they will contact the

( resident inspectors.

17.7 GUIDANCE FOR DISCUSSION WITH REPORTERS Communicating in person or by telephone can be difficult and misunderstandings can occur at times. The following pointers for dealing with reporters may be helpful:

1. Try to establish, in advan:e, the ground rules of the interview. Ask the reporter to explain, in general, the line of questioning that will take place. Let the reporter know in what areas there is news to convey. Try to focus on key areas of interest, and set a time limit for the interview.

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2. Once the interview is underway, do not talk "off the y record." Everything said is "on the record."

Off-the-record means that the reporter will not attribute to the interviewee the information supplied, if the reporter is ,

agreeable to such a ground rule. A variation is "background" or "not for attribution," which means that a reporter may use the information but not attribute it to you directly. The distinction is not widely observed outsids Washin; ton. It's best to stay away from these situations.

3. Stick to your area of expertise. Know what you are talking about. Do not think that a reporter expects you to be an expert in all areas. If the answer to a question is not known, tell the reporter. Offer to get the answer and then get back to the reporter. If the question is out of your area of expertise, call a Public Affairs Officer or refer the reporter to the public Affairs Officer for assistance.

4 Provide accurate information. Don't guess. It only makes you and the agency look incompetent. Take the time to check out the information if not sure about its accuracy.

5. Make sure you both are on the same "wavelength." If you can l see that a reporter fails to comprehend the answer, repeat it. Ask the reporter if the answer is clear and understandable. If the reporter is confused, take time to explain the answer in another way.

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6. If a reporter's question is not clear or does not make sense, tell the reporter and ask for repetition or j elaboration. The answer could be inaccurate if the question I

was not understood. Do not be intimidated or afraid of asking the reporter a question just because the interview is being taped for broadcast.

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7. Do not speculate, especially on future agency directives.

Again, do not guess, and do not respond with "I cannot talk" or "No comment." Put it simply, "I cannot speculate on this question. . ." or "I do not know the ariswer."

8. Keep answers simple. Remember, that you work in a highly technical field, and there are not many reporters who have strong technical backgrounds, so do not use technical jargon. Present the information in layman's words, and define any technical tenas.

9. In some situations, it may be necessary to put the information in proper perspective. For example, 1 curie is a thousand times more than 1,000 micro-curies. A reporter may be very impressed by the "1,000" and not understand which is the larger number. In discussing a release of radioactivity, it might be better to point out that the number is a small percentage of that allowed by Federal

( regulations than to let the number stand on its own.

10. Listen to a reporter's question and, first, give a direct, short answer, yes or no, if possible. Then, amplify, if necessary. Provide a complete answer. Do not hold back or talk around the answer and hope to get away from it. You probably will not, and you do not want to be accused later of withholding information or misivading someone.

Evasiveness or dishonesty will quickly lead to a loss of credibility.

11. Avoid opinions. Again, stick to the facts. If you do give an opinion, make sure the reporter knows it is your opinion.

To a reporter, you are an NRC spokesperson. Your opinion could very well be portrayed as the NRC official position, f

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12. On questions of policy, refer the reporter to management through the Public Affairs Officer. The obvious exception F is written policy, which is in the NRC Public Document Room.

Further, refer all questions on investigations to the Pubite l

Affairs Officer. '

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13. If pressed for answers not available, be trathful. There's nothing wrong with saying, "We don' t know the answer to that."

14 Once the interview has ended, do not let the reporter leave without getting his or her telephone number. At times, stories require clarification or exoansion later. It will i

be helpful both to the reporter and NRC if you are available for further questions as the story is being written or if you know how to reach the reporter with new developments.

This is especially important if key information changes shortly after the interview. Don't let a reporter use wrong numbers or details in a story when they have changed. Make r

corrections promptly, i i

i 17.8 QUESTIONS MOST LIKELY TO BE ASKED It is helpful to anticipate questions from the news media. The following are basically areas that receive the most interest. ,

1. Reactor shutdowns. What caused the plant fatiure and at what time? Was there any leakage and, if so, how much? Was l there a release of radioactivity? If so, what are the l radiation readings offsite? Were any workers exposed or [

[ contaminated? What level of emergency did the event reach?

How long will the plant remain shut down?

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2. How does this event compare with others that have occurred? f i

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3. Inspection and SALP reports. What are your findings and conclusions? Again, normally these reports are not discussed until they are final.

4. Commission or staff action on a generic reactor problem or rule change. Reporters will want to localize the story.

How does the reactor problem or rule change affect the plant in their area?

5. What are the risks of nuclear power plants? The Commission issued on August 4, 1986, a Policy Statement on Safety Goals for Operation of Nuclear Power Plants. (See 10 CFR Commission Notices) It focuses on the risk to the public from nuclear power plant operation and established goals that broadly define an acceptable level of radiological risk from operating these facilities.

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APPEN0!X A C

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Revision 4 April 1987 CHARTER COMMITTEE TO REVIEW GENERIC REQUIREMENTS

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Revision 4 April '.987

i Revision A !

April 1987 :

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TABLE OF CONTENTS i Pa21

1. Purpose............................................................ 1 l II. Membership......................................................... 2 !

111. CRGR Scope......................................................... 2 !

IV. CRGR Operating Procedures.......................................... 5

r. t V. Reporting Requirements............................................. 9 Attachment 1: New Generic Requirement and Staff Position Review Process Attachment 2: Procedures to Control Communication of Generic Requirements and

Staff Positions to Reactor Licensees ,

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APPROVED BY THE COMMIS$10N JUNE 16, 1982 (SECY-82-39A) !

l REVISION 1 APPROVED BY THE COMMIS$!ON (SECY MEMO DTD JANUARY 6, 1984) l REVISION 2 APPROVED BY THE COMMIS$10N (COMSECY 86-5, JUNE 20, 1986)

( l REVISION 3 APPROVED BY THE COMMIS$10N (SECY MEMO DTD AUGUST 13,1986) L a

REVISION 4 APPROVEC BY THE EDO (MEMO TO COMMISSIONERS, APRIL 6, 1987) !

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1. PURPOSE The Committee to Review Generic Requirnents ',CRGR) has the responsibility to review and recommend to the Executive Director for Operations (EDO) approval or disapproval of requirements or staff positions to be imposed by the NRC staff on one or more classes of power reactors. This review applies to staff propos-als of requirements or positions which reduce existing requirements or posi-tions and proposals which increase or change requiremants. The implementation i

of this responsibility shall be conducted in such a manner so as to assure that the provisions of 10 CFR 2.204, 10 CFR 50.109 and 10 CFR 50.54(f) as pertaining

' to generic requirements and staff positions are implemented by the staff. The objectives of the CRGR process are to eliminate or remove any unnecessary bur-dens placed on licensees, reduce the exposure of workers to radiation in imple-menting some of these requirements, and conserve NRC resources while at the same time assuring the adequate protection of the puolic health and safety and furthering the review of cow, cost-ef fective requirements and staff positions.

l The CRGR and the associated staff procedures will assure NRC staft implementa-i tion of 10 CFR 50.54(f) and 50.109 for generic backfit matters. The overall i

process will assure that requirements and staff positions in place or to be issued (a) do in fact contribute effectively and significantly to the health and safety of the public, and (b) do lead to utilt24 tion of both NRC and licensee resources in as optimal a fashion as possible in the overall achi se-3 d

ment of protection of public hes',th and safety. By having the Committee submit recommendations directly to the EDO, a single agencywide point of control will

( be provided.

) The CRGR will focus primarily on proposed new requirements and staff positions,

but it will also review selected existing requirements and staff positions

!- which may place unnecessary burdens on licensee or agency resources. In reach-

ing its recommendation, the CRGR shall consult with the proposing office to ensure that the reasons for the proposed requirement or staff position are well i

understood and that the provisions of 10 CFR 50.109, 50.54(f), and 10 CFR i 2.204, if applicable, are appropriately addressed by the staff proposal. The j

CRGR shall submit to the EDO a statement of the reasons for its recomenda-

tions. This statement shall provide a clear indication of the basis for the l recommendation and, wten appropriate, relate this basis to the provisions of 10 CFR 50.109, 50.54(f), and 10 CFR 2.204

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l Tools used by the CRGR for scrutiny are expected to include cost-benefit analy-1 sis and probabilistic risk assessment where data for its proper use are ade-quate. Therefore, to the extent possible, written staff justifications should

, make use of these evaluation techniques. The use of cost-benefit analyses and

cther tools should help to make it possible to determine which proposed re-quirements and staff positions have real safety significance, as distinguished j

from those proposed requirements and staff positions which should be given a lower priority or those which might be dropped entirely. When such techniques

. cannot be applied for lack of available, appropriate, or relevant data, other

< methods will be used, i The ED0 may authorize deviations from this Charter when the EDO, after con-l((

suiting with the Chairman, finds that such action is in the public ir.terest and the deviation otherwise complies with applicable regulations including I 1-l .

Reeision 4 April 1987 F

10 CFR 2.204, 50.54(f) and 50.109. Such authorization shall be written and shall become a part of the record of CRGR actions. The rulemaking proposal presented to and considered by the CRGR and ultimately, if presented to the 3

Commission, should include any necessary exemption request with supporting etasons for the proposed exemption.

II. MEMBERSH!p This Committee shall be chaired by the Office Director, AE00, and it shall consist of, in addition to the'CRGR Chairman, one individual each from NRR, NMSS, the Regions, and RES appointed by the Executive Director for Operations and one individual from OGC appointed by the E00 with the concurrence of the General Counsel. The regional individual ri-3'1 be selected from one of the regional offices, and this assignment shali D- cJnsidered developmental, with a new selection made by the appointing offir.l. viter that official judges that sufficient experience has been gained by tax ie.cumbent regional representative.

The CRGR Chairman shall assure that process controls for overall agency manage-ment of the generic backfit process are developed and maintained. These pro-cess controls shall include specific procedures, training, progress monitoring systems, and provisions for obtaining and evaluating both staff and industry views on the conduct of the backfit process. The CRGR Chairman is a' *espon-sible for assuring that each licensee is informed of the existence a i .t'uc-ture of the NRC program described in this Charter. The CRGR Chairmar. g i assure that substantive changes in the Charter are communicated to all heen-sees.

AEOD will provide staff support. The Committee may use several non-NRC pe. sons as consultants in special technical areas.

New members will be appointed as the need arises. If a member cannot attend a meeting of the CRGR, the applicable Office Director may propose an alternative for the appointing official's apprc/al. It is the responsibility of the alter-nate member to be fully versed on the agenda items before tht Committee.

III. CRGR SCOPE A. The CRGR shall consider all proposed new or amenced generic requirements and staff positions to be imposed by the NRC staff on one or more class-es of power reactors. These include:

(i) All staff papers which propose the adoption of rules or policy statements affecting power reactors or modifying any other rule so as to affect requirements or staff positions applicable to reactor licensees, including information required of reactor licensees or applicants for reactor licenses or construction permits.

(ii) All staff papers proposing new or revised rules of the type de-scribed in paragraph (i), including Advanced Notices.

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Revision 4 April 1987 (iii) All proposed new or revised regulatory guides; all proposed new or revised Standard Review Plan (SRP) sections; all proposed'new or revised branch technical positions; all proposed generic lette allmultiplantorders,showcauseorders,and50.54(f) letters {s;;

all bulletins and circulars; and USI NUREGs; and all new or re-vised Standard Technical Specifications.

All staff proposed generic information requests will be examined by the CRGR in accordance with 10 CFR 50.54(f). Except for

, information sought to verify licensee compliance with the current licensii.g basis for a facility, the staff must prepare the reason or reasons for each information request prior to issuance to ensure that the burden to be imposed on respondents is justified in view of the pctential safety significance of the issue to be addressed in the requested information. CRGR examination of generic letters will include those letters proposed to be sent to construction permit holders. For those plants for which an operating license is not yet issued, an exception to staff analy-sis may be granted by the Office Director only if the staff seeks information'of a type routinely sought as part of the standard procedures app?icable to the review of applications. If a request seeks to gather information pursuant to development of a new stiff

. position,,then the exception does not apply and the reasons for the request must be prepared and approved prior to issuance of the request. When staff evaluations of the necessity for a request C are required, the evaluation shall include at least the following

. elements:

(a) A problem statement that describes the need for the infor-mation in terms of potential safety benefit.

(b) The licensee actions required and the cost to develop a re-sponse to the information request.

(c) An anticipated schedule for NRC use of the information.

B. The CRGR shall consider all licenses, license a.nendments, approvals of Preliminary Design Approvals (PDAs) and Final Design Approvals (FDAs),

minutes of conferences with owners groups, licensees or vendors, staff approvals of topical reports, information notices, and all other docu-ments, letters or communications of a generic nature which are presented 1 It is expected that the offices will develop internal procedures to ensure that information requests are developed in accordance with 50.54(f)

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to reflect or interpret NRC staff positjons, unless such documents refer l

only to requirements or staff positions previously applicable to the '

affected licensees and approved by the appropriate officials. The following are examples of approved staff positions not requiring CRGR review:

l (i) positions or inteie etations r which are contained in regulations, i policy statements, regulatory guides, the Standard Review Plan, branch technical positions, generic letters, orders, topical ap-provals, PDAs, FDAs, licenses and license amendments which have l

been promulgated prior to November 12, 1981. Any document or com-munication of this type shall cite and accurately state the posi-tion as reflected in a previously promulgated regulation, order, j Regulatory Guide, SRP, etc.

l (ii) positions after November 12, 1981 which have been approved through this established generic review process.

C. For those rare instances where it is judged that an imediately effec-tive action is needed to ensure that facilities pose no undue risk to l the health and safety of the.public (10 CFR 50.109(a)(4)(ii)), no prior ,

review by the CRGR is necessary. However, the staff shall conduct a l documented evaluation which includes a statement of the objectives of l

' and reasons for the actions and the basis for invoking the exception.

The analysis referenced in 50.109(a)(2) may be conducted either before or after the action is taken and shall be subject to CRGR review. This analysis shall document the safety siprificance and appropriateness of the action taken and consideration of low costs contribute to selecting the solution among various acceptable alternatives. The CRGR Chairman

( should be notified by the Office Director oiiginating the action. These l immediately effective requirements will be reported to the Committee for l information and will be included in the report to the Commission.

D. For each proposed requirement or staff position not requiring immedi-

, ately effective action, the proposing office is to identify the require-ment as either Category 1 or 2.

Category I requirements and staf f positions are those which the propos-ing office rates as urgent to overcome a safety prob"em requiring imme-diate resolution or to comply with a legal requirement for immediate or near-term compliance. Category 1 items are expected to be infrequcnt and few in number, and they are to be reviewed or otherwise dealt with within 2-working days of receipt by the CRGR. If the appropriateness of l designation as Category 1 is questioned by the CRGR Chairman, and if the question is not resolved within the 2 working-day limit, the proposed 2 It is expected that the offices shall develop internal procedures to en-sure that the documents and communications referenced above will contain only previously approved requirements or staff positions.

Revision 4 April 1987 C

requirement or su the EDO for decision.gosition is to be forwarded by the CRGR Chairman to Category 2 requirements and staff positions are those which do not meet the criteria for designation as Category 1. These are to be scrutinized carefully by the CRGR Jn the basis of written justification, which must be submitted by the proposing office along with the proposed requirement or staff position.

Staff proposed generic modifications considered necessary to bring fa-cilities into compliance with licenses or the rules or orders of the Commission, or into conformance with written commitments by licensees, will not require analyses of the type described in Section IV (B)(vii).

The proposed action shall be presented to the CRGR Chairman with a docu-mented evaluation including a statement of the objectives of and reasons for the proposed requirement or staff position and the basis for involv-ing the exception under 10 CFR 50.109(a)(4)(i).

E. The CRGR Chairman shall compile and maintain a list of projected generic requirements and staff positions based on input from the NRC offices.

The CRGR may receive early briefings from the offices on the proposed new generic requirements or staff positions before the staff has developed the requirements or positio~ns and held discussions with the ACRS.

( F. The CRGR may be consulted en any issue deemed appropriate by the CRGR Chairman.

IV. CRGR OPERATING PROCEDURES A. Meeting Notices Meetings will generally be held at regular intervals and will be sched-uled well in advance. Meeting notices will generally be issued by the CRGR Chairman 2 weeks in advance of each meeting, except for Category 1 items, with available background material on each item to be considered by the Committee.

B, Contents of Packaoes Submitted to CRGR The following requirements apply for proposals to reduce existing re-quirements or positions as well as proposals to increase requirements or positions. Each package submitted to the CRGR for review shall include fifteen (15) copies of the following information:

(i) The proposed generic requirement or staff position as it is pro-posed to be sent out to licensees.

3 The requirements of the backfit rule and the Commission guidance for re-laxation of requirements and staff positions shall continue to apply.

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i (ii) Draft staff papers or other underlying staff documents supporting the requirements or staf f positions. (A copy of all materials i

referenced in the document shall be made available upon request to the CRGR staff. Any committee member may request CRGR staff to obtain a copy of any referenced material for his or her use.)

1 (iii) Each proposed requirement or staff position shall contain the sponsoring office's position as to whether the proposal would in- l l

crease requirements or staff positions, implement existing re- l quirements or staff positions, or would relax or reduce existing I requirements or staff positions.

(iv) The proposed method of implementation along with the concurrence (and any comments) of OGC on the method proposed.

l (v) Regulatory analyses generally conforming to the directives and I

{ guidance of NUREG/BR-0058 and NUREG/CR-3568.

l (vi) Identification of the category of reactor plants to which the ge-neric requirement or staff position is to apply (that is, whether it is to apply to new plants only, new OLs only, OLs af ter a cer-tain date, OLs before a certain date, all.0Ls, all plants under 4 construction, all plants, all water reactors, all PWRs only, some I vendor types, some vintage types such as BWR 6 and 4, jet pump and nonjet pump plants, etc.).

(vii) For each such category of reactor plants, an evaluation which dem-onstrates how the action should be prioritized and scheduled in light of other ongoing regulatory activities. The evaluation shall document for consideration information available concerning any of the following factors as may be appropriate and any other information relevant and material to the proposed action:

(a) Statement of the specific objectives that the proposed action is designed te achieve; (b) General description of the activity that would be required by the licensee or applicant in order to complete the action; (c) Potential change in the risk to the public from the accidental offsite release of radioactive material; (d) Potential impact on radiological exposure of facility employ-ees and other onsite workers.

(e) Installation and continuing costs associated with the action, including the cost of facility downtime or the cost of con-struction delay; 6-

Revision 4 April 1987 (f) The potential safety impact of changes in plant or operational complexity, including the relationship to proposed and exist-ing regulatory rtquirements and staff positions; (g) The estimated resource burden on the NRC associated with the proposed action and the availability of such resources; (h) The potential impact of differences in facility type, design or age on the relevancy and practicality of the proposed action; (i) Whether the proposed action is interim or final, and if inter-im, the justification for imposing the proposed action on an intpHm basis.

(viii) For each evaluation conducted pursuant to 10 CFR 50.109, the pro-posing office director's determination, together with the ration-ale for the determination based on the considerations of paragraphs (i) through (vii) above, that

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(a) there is a substantial increase in the overall protection of public health and safety or the common defense and security to be derived from the proposal; and (b) the direct and indirect costs of implementation, for the fa-( cilities affected, are justified in view of this increased protection.

(ix) For each evaluation conducted for proposed relaxations or de-creases in current requirements or staff positions, the proprsing office director's determination, together with the rationale for the determination based on the considerations of paragraphs (i) through (vii) above, that (a) the public health and safety and the common defense and security would be adequately protected if the proposed reduction in requirements or positions were implemented, and (b) the cost savings attributed to the action would be substantial enough to justify taking the action.

C. CRGR Staff Review CRGR staff shall review each package for completeness. If the package is not sufficient for CRGR consideration, it shall be returned by the CRGR Chairman to the originating office with reasons for such action.

Prior notice to the Committee is not needed; however, CRGR members shall be informed of such actions.

An accepted package shall be scheduled for CRGR consideration; however, scheduling priorities shall be at the discretion of the CRGR Chairman.

Rovision 4 April 1987 F

All requests for particular scheduling shall be made to the CRGR Chairman.

The CRGR staff may obtain additional information from industry and consultants on such proposals, particularly with respect to the cost of implementation, realistic schedule for implementation and the ability of licensees to safely and efficiently carry out the full range of safety-related activities at each facility while implementing the proposed requirement or staff position. The CRGR staff normally shall provide a brief summary analysis of each package to CRGR members prior to the meetings.

D. CRGR Meetino Minutes At each meeting, for each package scheduled for discussion, the sponsor-ing office shall present to the CRGR the proposed generic requirement or staff position and respond to comments and questions. A reasonable amount of time, within the discretion of the CRGR Chairman, shall be permitted for discussion of each item by Committee members. At the con-clusion of the discussion, each Committee member shall summarize his position. The minutes of each meeting, including CRGR recommendations and the bases therefor shall be prepared. Minutes normally shall be circulated to all members within 5-working days af ter the the meeting, and each member shall have 5 working days to comment in writing on the minutes. It is the responsibility of each member to assure that the minutes accurately reflect his views. All comments received within that period shall be part of the minutes of the meeting.

The Committee shall recommend to the EDO, approval, disapproval, modifi-cation, or conditioning of generic proposals considered by the Committee, as well as the method of implementation of such requirements or staff positions and appropriate scheduling for such implementation, s

which shall give consideration to the ability of licensees to safely and efficiently carry out the entire range of safety-related activities at each facility. The minutes shall give an accurate description of the basis for the recommendations and shall accurately reflect the consensus decision of the Committee. Copies of the minutes shall be distributed to the Commission, Office Directors, Regional Administrators, CRGR Mem-bers, and the Public Document Room. The E00's action taken in response to the Committee's recommendations shall be provided in writing to the Commission.

E. Reccrdkeeoing System 1 The AE00 Assistant for CRGR Issues will assure that there is an archival system for keeping records of all packages submitted to the CRGR Chair- )

man, actions by the staff, summary minutes of CRGR consideration of each package including corrections, recommendations by the Committee, and decisions by the EDO.

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Revision 4 April 1987 V. REPORTING REQUIREMENTS The AE00 Assistant for CRGR Issues shall prepare a report to be submitted by the EDO to the Commission each month. The report will provide a brief summary of CRGR activities, including a list of all items that have been sent to the CRGR.and their current status. The report shall be distributed to CRGR Members, Office Directors, Regional Administrators and the Public Document Room.

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r Attachment 1 to CRGR Charter September 1986 Revision 3 NEW GENERIC REQUIREMENT AND STAFF POSITION REVIEW PROCESS The attached chart is a schematic representation of how new generic require-ments and staff positions are developed, revised and. implemented.

In the early stages of developing a proposed new requirement or staff position, it is contemplated that the staff may have discussions with the industry, ACRS and the public to obtain preliminary information of the costs and safety benefits of the proposed action. On the basis of this information, the pro-posing office will prepare the package for CRGR review.

The CRGR may recommend approval, revision, or disapproval or that further public comment be sought. After CRGR and EDO approval, there may be further review by the ACRS or the Commission. Decisions by the Commission are controlling.

Once final approval is received, the individual project managers will normally work with each licensee to develop a plant-specific implementation schedule taking into consideration all of the other requirements and staff pot 'tions that are being implemented at each plant. s

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SCHEMATIC REPRESENTATION OF NEW REQUIREMENTS REVIEW s

U51s Generic !ssues Prioritize and ,

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) Requirement pg 3951etins & Orders O' "' alysis Regu r t

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1 Optional Dis o ssions CMGR Review With Industry :

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EDO : Revise Proposal or Solicit Public Coment er

No Further Work Further Review ACRS, Commission u

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Licensees PM: Work Wnh input r U a nsees n

Integrate 3 ,

Into i Composhe Agreed.Upon Plant L Schedule

Specific implementation Schedule

Attach ent 2 to CRGR Charter April 1987 Revision 4 PROCEDURES TO CONTROL GENERIC REQUIREMENTS AND STAFF POSITIONS A. Background In a memorandum from the Chairman to the Executive Director for Operations dat-ed October 8,1981, the Commission expressed concern over conflicting or incon-sistent directives and requests to reactor licensees from various components of the NRC staff. By that memorandum, the Commission outlined certain recommended actions to establish control over the number and nature of requirements placed by NRC on reactor licensees. These included: establishing a Committee to Review Generic Requirements (CRGR); establishing a new position of Deputy Executive Director for Regional Operations and Generic Requiremtnts (DEOROGR);

conducting a survey of formal and informal mechanisms to communicate with reactor licensees; and developing and implementing procedures for controlling communications involving significant requirements covering one or more classes '

of reactors. In February 1987 the Commission approved a NRC reorganization that, among other changes, placed the CRGR operations under the Office of Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data (AE00). CRGR responsibilities and authorities were not directed to change under the new organizational structure; only the organizational location was changed. The following pro-cedures have been established for controlling generic requirements or staff positions and are designed to implement the provisions of 10 CFR 50.109,

( 50.54(f) and 2.204.

B. Committee to Review Generic Requirements (CRGR)

Except for immediately effective actions, the CRGR shall review all proposed new generic requirements and staff positions to be imposed on one or more classes of power reactors in accordance with the Charter of the Committee, before such proposed requirements or staff positions are forwarded to the E00 and Commission and imposed on, or communicated for use or guidance to, any re-actor licensee.

C. Office Responsibility Each office shall develop internal procedures to assurc that the following pol-icy requirements regarding reactor licensees are carried out:

(1) All proposed generic requirements and staff positions (Table 1 attached) shall be submitted for CRGR review. Such submittals shall conform to the provisions of the CRGR Charter relating to the contents of such submittals.

(2) All generic documents, letters and communications that establish, reflect or interpret NRC staff positions or requirements (Table II attached) shall be submitted for review by CRGR unless these documents refer only to re-quirements or staff positions approved prior to November 12, 1981. In the latter case, the previously approved requirement or staff position should be specifically cited and accurately stated. Offices should be careful to

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Attach 2ent 2 to

.CRGR Charter April 1987 Revision 4 F

review new or specific interpretations to assure that they are only case-specific applications of existing requirements rather than initial applications having potential generic use. Case-specific applications are governed b" NRC Manual Chapter 0514.

(3) For all other communications with licensees (Table III, attached), no statements shall be used that might suggest new or revised generic requirements, staff positions, guidance or recommendations unless such statements have been approved by the EDO or the Commission.

(4) In developing a proposed new generic requirement or staff position for rRGR review, an office may determine that it is in possession of important

,afety information that should be made available to licensees. It is the responsibility of that office to take immediate action to assure that such information is communicated to the licensees by the appropriate office.

Such actions rnay be taken before completion of any proposed or ongoing CRGR reviews.

D. Immediately Effective Action for those rare instances where it is judged that an immediately effective ac-tion is needed to ensure that facilities pose no undue risk to the health and safety of the public (10 CFR 50.109(a)(4)(ii)), no prior review by the CRGR is necessary. However, the staff shall conduct a documented evaluation which in-cludes a statement of the objectives of and reasons for th$ actions and the basis for invoking the exception. The analysis referenced fa 50.109(a)(2) may be conducted either before or after the action is taken and shall be subject to CRGR review. This analysis shall document the safety significance and appro-priateness of the action taken and consideration of how costs contribute to selecting the solution among various acceptable alter.atives. The CRGR Chairman should be notified by the Office Director originating the action.

These immediately effective requirements will be reported to the Committee for information and will be included in the report to the Commission.

3 Attachment 2 to CRGR Charter April 1987 Revision 4

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TABLE I PRINCIPAL MECHANISMS USED BY NRC STAFF TO ESTABLISH OR COMMUNICATE GENERIC REQUIREMENTS AND STAFF POSITIONS Rulemaking 1 Advanced Notices Proposed Notices Final Rules Policy Statements Other Formal Recuirements Multiplant orders including show cause orders and confirmatory orders Staff Positions 3 Bulletins Circulars Multiplant letters (including 10 CFR 50.54f and TMI Action Plan letters)

Regulatory Guides C SRP (including Branch Technical Positions)

Standard Tech Specs USI NUREGs 1 While Rulemaking is an action of the Commission rather than the staff, most rules are proposed or prepared by the staff.

2 The document itself imposes a legal requirement; e.g., regulatory orders or license conditions.

3 Documents that reflec'. staff positions which, unless complied with or a satisf actory alterrative of fered, the staf f would impose Gr seek to have imposed by formal requirement.

3 3 *

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Attachment 2 to CRGR Charter April 1987 Revision 4 TABLE II MECHANISMS OFTEN USED TO INTERPRET GENERIC REQUIREMENTS OR STAFF POSITIONS Action and Petitions for Rulemaking Action on 10 CFR 2.206 Requests Approval of Topica1s Facility Licenses and Amendments SERs FDAs, PDAs NRC Inspection Manual Headquarters Positions NUREG Reports (other than USIs)

Operator Licentes and Amendments Single Plant Orders Staff Positions on Code Committees Unresolved Issues Resulting from Inspections i

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Attachment 2 to CRGR Charter April 1987 Revision 4 TABLE III ADDITIONAL MECHANISMS SOMETIMES USED TO COMMUNICATE GENERIC PEQUIREMENTS OR STAFF POSITIONS DES & FES Entry, Exit and Manage 2nt Meetings Information Notices Licensee Event Reports; Construction Deficiency Reports (Sent to Other Licensees)

NRC Operator Licensirg People Contact with Licensees Phone Calls or Site Visits by NRC Staff or Commission to Obta n Information i

(i.e., Corrective Actions, Schedules, Conduct Surveys, etc.)

Pleadings Preliminary Notifications Press Releases

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Proposed Findings Public Meetings, Workshops, Technical Discussions Resident Inspector Day-to-Day Contact SALP Reports SECY Papers (Some Utilities Apparently Sent Operators to College Based on Re-cent SECY Paper on Operator Qualifications)

Special Reports Speeches to Local Groups or Industry Associations Technical Specifications Telephone Calls and Meetings with Licensees, Vendors, Industry Representatives, Owners Groups Testimony

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APPENDIX B LIST OF TYPES OF INSPECTION REPORTS

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1. Operations Inspection Report, Region Base Inspections

2. Operations Inspection Report, Resident Inspecticn

3. Radiation Probation Inspection Report

4. Emergency Preparedness Inspection Report

5. Physical Security Inspection Report

6. SALP Report

7. Performance Appraisal Team Report

8. Non-Power Reactor Inspection Report

9. Fuel Facility Inspection Report

10. Vendor Inspection Report

11. Material Inspection Report (Radiography)

12. Uranium Mill Inspection Report

13. Material Inspection Field Notes

( 14. Materials Form 591

15. Inspection Report Cover page

16. Proprietary Paragraphs

17. Clear Inspection Letter

18. Inspection Report with Notice of Violation

19. Notice of Violation

20. Inspection Report with Notice of Deviation

21. Notice of Deviation

22. Notice of Deviation letter

23. Notice of Violation Forwarded Earlier

24. Notice of Violation and Deviation Letter l 25. Escalated Enforcement / Investigation Conference Letter l

26. Investigation Report Letter

1. Operations Inspection Report, Region Base Inspections F

2. Operations Inspection Report, Resident Inspection

3. Radiation Probation Inspection Report

4. Emergency Preparedness Inspection Report

5. Physical Security Inspection Report

6. SALP Report

7. Performance Appraisal Team Report

8. Non-Power Reactor Inspection Report

9. Fuel Facility Inspection Report

10. Vendor Inspection Report

11. Material Inspection Report (Radiography)

12. Uranium Mill Inspection Report

13. Material Inspection Field Notes

14. Materials Form 591

15. Inspection Report Cover page

16. Proprietary Paragraphs

17. Clear Inspection Letter

18. Inspection Report with Notice of Violation

19. Notice of Violation

20. Inspection Report with Notice of Deviation

21. Notice of Deviation

22. Notice of Deviation Letter

23. Notice' of Violation Forwarded Earlier

24. Notice of Violation and Deviation Letter

25. Escalated Enforcement / Investigation Conference Letter

26. Investigation Report Letter 4 .

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( 27. Acknowledgement Letter Adequate Response

28. Acknowledgement Letter Inadequate Response

29. Second Response Inadequate

30. Second Response Adequate

31. Generic Transmittal Letter (Materials)

32. Transmittal Letter with Notice of Violation (Materials)

33. Transmittal Letter for Field Inspection Notes

34. Report of Apparent Violation Without Notice of Violation (Materials)

35. Transmittal Letter when Civil Penalty Has Been Imposed (Materials)

36. Letter Transmitting Notice cf Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty

37. Notice'of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty

38. Notice of Violation for Violations that do not Include a Civil l Penalty

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39. Letter Transmitting Notice of Violation with no Civil Penalty

40. Notice of Violation with no Civil Penalty

41. Notice of Safeguards Violation

42. Letter Transmitting Order Imposing Civil Monetary Penalty

43. Order Imposing a Civil Monetary Penalty

44. Appendix to Accompany Order Imposing a Civil Monetary Penalty I

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IA-88-390, Fundamentals of Insp Course

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15.5 REFERENCES

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