HNP-03-015, TS Bases Change - Containment Isolation Valves

TS Bases Change - Containment Isolation Valves

ML030560395
Person / Time
Site:	Harris
Issue date:	02/19/2003
From:	Caves J Progress Energy Co
To:	Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
HNP-03-015
Download: ML030560395 (5)

Text

Progress Energy FEB 1 9 2003 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission SERIAL: HNP-03-015 ATTENTION: Document Contro 'Desk Washington, DC 20555 SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT DOCKET NO. 50-400/LICENSE NO. NPF-63 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES CHANGE - CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES Ladies and Gentlemen:

Progress Energy Carolinas, Inc. (PEC, alternately Carolina Power & Light Company) is providing revised Technical Specifications (TS) Bases pages for TS 3/4.6.3, Containment Isolation Valves, for the Harris Nuclear Plant. This TS Bases change provides clarification wording consistent with the TS 3/4.6.3 Limiting Condition for Operation and is being made as an improvement to the TS Bases.

The revised TS Bases page is provided in the Attachment to this letter.

Please refer any questions regarding this subject to me at (919) 362-3137.

Sincerely, John R. Caves Supervisor Licensing and Regulatory Programs Harris Nuclear Plant RTG

Attachment:

c:

Mr. J. B. Brady, NRC Sr. Resident Inspector Ms. Beverly Hall, Section Chief, Radiation Protection Section, N.C. DENR Mr. C. P. Patel, NRC Project Manager Mr. L. A. Reyes, NRC Regional Administrator Progress Energy Carolinas, Inc Harris Nuclear Plant Pe Boxl65A o New Hill, NC 27562

ATTACHMENT TO SERIAL: HNP-03-015 SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT NRC DOCKET NO. 50-400/LICENSE NO. NPF-63 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS BASES CHANGE CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES PAGE B 3/4.6.3

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS BASES The Containment Fan Coolers and the Containment Spray System are redundant to each other in providing post-accident cooling of the.containment.atmosphere..

As a result of this redundancy in cooling capability, the allowable out-of-service time requirements for the Containment Fan Coolers have been appropriately adjusted. However, the allowable out-of-service time requirements for the Containment Spray-System have--been-maintained-consistent with that assigned other inoperable ESF equipment since the Containment Spray System also provides a mechanism for removing iodine fromthe containment atmosphere.

3/4.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES ----

The OPERABILITY of the containment isolation valves ensures that the containment atmosphere will be isolated from the outside environment in the event of a release of radioactive material to the containment atmosphere or pressurization of the containment and is consistent with the requirements of General Design Criteria 54 through 57 of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50.

Containment isolation within the time limits specified for those isolation valves designed to close automatically ensures that the release of radioactive material to the environment will be consistent with the assumptions used in the analyses for a LOCA.

3/4.6:4 COMBUSTIBLE-GAS CONTROL .

The OPERABILITY of the equipment and systems required for the detection and control of hydrogen gas ensures that this equipment will be available to maintain the hydrogen concentration within containment below its flammable limit during post-LOCA conditions. Either recombiner unit is capable of controlling the expected hydrogen generation associated with:

(1) zirconium-water reactions, (2) radiolytic decomposition of water, and (3) corrosion of metals within containment. This hydrogen control system is consistent with the recommendations of RegulatoryGuide_1.7, "Control of Combustible Gas Concentrations in Containment Following a LOCA," Rev. 2, November 1978.

3/4.6.5 VACUUM RELIEF SYSTEM The OPERABILITY of the primary containment to atmosphere vacuum relief valves ensures that the containment internal pressure does not become more negative than -1.93 psig. This condition is necessary to prevent exceeding the con tainment design limit for internal vacuum of -2 psig.

SHEARON HARRIS - UNIT I B 3/4 6-4 Amendment No. 81

Insert A Reopening of an inoperable containnfhnitisOlation v-alveis allowed to permit sutveillatnce testing to demonstrate its operability or the operability of other equipment per Specification 4.6.3.1, or to change to compliance with another action statement for the LCO. An example of choosing an alternate action statement would be installing a blind flange versus using the failed closed containment isolation valve to isolate the penetration. This action would facilitate-repair of-the failed isolation valve, then removing the blind flange and re-installing the repaired valve. This process is acceptable because it results in restoring the penetration to its design configuration sooner than waiting for a plant shutdown to complete the repairs.

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS BASES The Containment Fan Coolers and the Containment Spray System are redundant to each other in providing post-accident cooling of the containment atmosphere.

As a result of this redundancy in cooling capability, the allowable out-of-service time requirements for the Containment Fan Coolers have been appropriately adjusted. However, the allowable out-of-service time requirements for the Containment Spray System have been maintained consistent with that assigned other inoperable ES F equipment since the Containment Spray System also provides a mechanism for removing iodine from the containment atmosphere.

3/4.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES The OPERABILITY of the containment isolation valves ensures that the containment atmosphere will be isolated from the outside environment in the event of a release of radioactive material to the containment atmosphere or pressurization of the containment and is consistent with the requirements of General Design Criteria 54 through 57 of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50.

Containment isolation within the time limits specified for those isolation valves designed to close automatically ensures that the release of radioactive material to the environment will be consistent with the assumptions used in the analyses for a LOCA.

Reopening of an inoperable containment isolation valve is allowed to permit surveillance testing to demonstrate its operability of the operability of other equipment per Specification 4.6.3.1, or to change to compliance with another action statement for the LCO. An example of choosing an alternate action statement would be installing a blind flange versus using the failed closed containment isolation valve to isolate the penetration. This action would facilitate repair of the failed isolation valve, then removing the blind flange and re-installing the repaired valve. This process is acceptable because it results in restoring the penetration to its design configuration sooner that waiting for a plant shutdown to complete the repairs.

3/4.6.4 COMBUSTIBLE GAS CONTROL The OPERABILITY of the equipment and systems required for the detection and control of hydrogen gas ensures that this equipment will be available to maintain the hydrogen concentration within containment below its flammable limit during post-LOCA conditions. Either recombiner unit is capable of controlling the expected hydrogen generation associated with:

(1) zirconium-water reactions, (2) radiolytic decomposition of water. and (3) corrosion of metals within containment. This hydrogen control s stem is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.7, "Control of Combustible Gas Concentrations in Containment Following a LOCA," Rev. 2, November 1978.

3/4.6.5 VACUUM RELIEF SYSTEM The OPERABILITY of the primary containment to atmosphere vacuum relief valves ensures that the containment internal pressure does not become more negative than -1.93 psig. This condition is necessary to prevent exceeding the con tainment design limit for internal vacuum of -2 psig.

HNP-03-015 SHEARON HARRIS - UNIT 1B 3/4 6-4 February 18, 2003