05000483/FIN-2010003-02
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Failure to Maintain Two Operable Source Range Channels During Core Alterations |
| Description | The inspectors identified a self-revealing noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a, Procedures, when the licensees inadequate procedure and failure to control work activities during a reload of the reactor vessel fuel assemblies resulted in deenergization of all available source range nuclear instrument channels. On May 6, 2010, while in Mode 6 Refueling, licensee testing of nuclear instrument power range channel N44 and maintenance on 120 Vac instrument bus NN03 affecting power range channel N43 made up the logic for permissive P-10. The permissive sent a protective logic signal to deenergize both available source range nuclear instruments. The control room immediately directed the fuel handling crew to stop fuel movement until the source range channels could be restored. A fuel assembly was in the upender ready for transfer to the reactor vessel core location at the time. The licensee placed this issue into the corrective action program as Callaway Action Request 201004301
This finding is more than minor because it was associated with the configuration control attribute of the Barrier Integrity Cornerstone and affects the cornerstone objective to provide reasonable assurance that physical design barriers protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or releases. Using Manual Chapter 0609 Appendix G, Attachment 1, Shutdown Operations Significance Determination Process Phase 1 - Operational Checklists for Both PWRs and BWRs, this finding was of very low safety significance because it did not increase the likelihood of a loss of reactor coolant system inventory, did not degrade the licensees ability to terminate a leak path or add reactor coolant system inventory when needed, and did not degrade the licensees ability to recover decay heat removal once lost. This finding had a crosscutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with the work control component because the licensee failed to coordinate work activities by incorporating actions to address the impact of the work on different job activities and communicate, coordinate, and cooperate with each other during activities in which interdepartmental coordination is necessary to assure plant and human performance. |
| Site: | Callaway  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000483/2010003 Section 1R20 |
| Date counted | Jun 30, 2010 (2010Q2) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Barrier Integrity |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.2 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | D Dumbacher B Henderson C Graves J Adams G Miller A Fairbanks J Groom T Buchanan D Reinert N Hernandez J Braisted N Greene |
| CCA | H.5, Work Management |
| INPO aspect | WP.1 |
| ' | |
Finding - Callaway - IR 05000483/2010003 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Callaway) @ 2010Q2
Self-Identified List (Callaway)
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