05000483/FIN-2009009-01
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Finding | |
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Title | Turbine-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Inoperable Due to Inadequately Lubricated Trip Throttle Valve |
Description | The team identified a self-revealing apparent violation of Technical Specification 3.7.5, Auxiliary Feedwater System, due to the failure to adequately lubricate turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump trip throttle valve FCHV0312. During May 25, 2009, surveillance testing, the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump did not start as expected due to hardened grease on the valve spindle of FCHV0312. The previous lubrication preventative maintenance had been missed and lack of lubrication increased friction between the sliding nut and spindle preventing FCHV0312 from opening. Following lubrication FCHV0312 and the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump tested satisfactorily. The licensee entered this deficiency in their corrective action program as Callaway Action Request 200904216. This finding is greater than minor because it was associated with the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Using Manual Chapter 0609.04, Phase 1 Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, the issue screened as potentially risk significant since the finding represented a loss of system safety function because the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump PAL02 failing eliminates the capability of the plant to cope with a station blackout. The finding required a Phase 2 analysis. When evaluated per Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, Determining the Significance of Reactor Inspection Findings for At-Power Situations, and the Callaway Plant Phase 2 pre-solved table item Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Fails to Start, the inspectors determined this finding to be potentially risk significant. The finding was forwarded to a senior reactor analyst for review. The final outcome of the Phase 3 significance determination analysis, Attachment 4, determined the finding was of low to moderate safety significance. The inspectors determined that this finding had a crosscutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with the work practices component because 3 Enclosure the licensee failed to follow the procedural guidance provided when changing the scope of a preventive maintenance task H.4(b) |
Site: | Callaway |
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Report | IR 05000483/2009009 Section 4OA5 |
Date counted | Sep 30, 2009 (2009Q3) |
Type: | NCV: Green |
cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
Identified by: | Self-revealing |
Inspection Procedure: | IP 93812 |
Inspectors (proximate) | D Chamberlain D Dumbacher D Loveless J Groom M Chambersm Chambersd Chamberlain D Dumbacher D Loveless J Groom |
Violation of: | Technical Specification |
CCA | H.8, Procedure Adherence |
INPO aspect | WP.4 |
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Finding - Callaway - IR 05000483/2009009 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Callaway) @ 2009Q3
Self-Identified List (Callaway)
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