05000483/FIN-2009007-01
From kanterella
Jump to navigation
Jump to search
Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Failure to Ensure Suitable Replacement Parts Essential for Emergency Diesel Generator Train B |
| Description | The inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, after the licensee failed to adequately select suitable replacement parts essential to the operation of emergency diesel generator Train B. On December 24, 2008, during performance of Procedure OSP-NE-0001B, Standby Diesel Generator B Periodic Tests, Callaway operations personnel identified that the emergency diesel generator Train B had an approximately 0.82 gallon per minute jacket water leak resulting in operators declaring the equipment inoperable. Upon removal, the gasket was found to be soft and extruding from the flange edge. The licensee originally concluded the gasket failed due to vibrations associated with engine shutdown but altered that conclusion after discussions with the resident inspectors and additional investigation. The licensee ultimately determined that the cause of the failure was due to incorrect gasket material being used during Job W200773 performed on October 16, 1999. The gasket was 1/8 thick versus 1/16 thick which resulted in a lack of compression. Since the gaskets are composed of an aramid fiberous material, the lack of compression allowed the gasket to absorb water and soften. The leak identified on December 24, 2008, developed once the gasket softened sufficiently to extrude from the flange edge. This issue has been entered into the licensees corrective action program as Callaway Action Request 200812985. This finding was greater than minor because it was associated with the mitigating systems cornerstone attribute of design control and affects the associated cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Using Manual Chapter 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, this finding was determined to represent an actual loss of safety function of a single train for greater than its Technical Specification allowed outage time. When evaluated per Manual Chapter 0609 Appendix A, Determining the Significance of Reactor Inspection Findings for At-Power Situations, and the Callaway Plant Phase 2 pre-solved table item Diesel Generator Fails to Run after Start, the inspectors determined this finding to be potentially risk significant. This finding was forwarded to a senior reactor analyst for review. The results of the senior reactor analysts Phase 3 analysis determined the finding to be of very low safety significance. This finding did not have a crosscutting aspect since it was not a performance deficiency indicative of current licensee performanc |
| Site: | Callaway  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000483/2009007 Section 1R15 |
| Date counted | Jun 30, 2009 (2009Q2) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.15 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | D Dumbacher D Loveless V Gaddy J Groom |
| INPO aspect | |
| ' | |
Finding - Callaway - IR 05000483/2009007 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Finding List (Callaway) @ 2009Q2
Self-Identified List (Callaway)
| ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||