05000483/FIN-2008005-06
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Failure to Comply with High Radiation Area Entry Requirements |
| Description | The inspectors reviewed a self-revealing, noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.7.1, which resulted from a failure of three individuals to comply with high radiation area entry requirements. Specifically, on October 20, 2008, three engineers touring the reactor building entered a posted high radiation area without signing in on a radiation work permit which allowed entry into a high radiation area, and did not receive a briefing on dose rates in the high radiation area. Shortly after entering the high radiation area, one of the engineers received an electronic dosimeter rate alarm when dose rates in the area exceeded the 50 millirem per hour setpoint. The licensee entered this event into their corrective action program and conducted an Event Review Team meeting to determine the probable causes that led to the event and recommend corrective actions to prevent the event from happening in the future. Failure to comply with high radiation area entry requirements is a performance deficiency. This finding is greater than minor because it was associated with the cornerstone attribute of exposure control and affected the cornerstone objective, in that, the failure to meet high radiation area entry requirements increases the potential for increased radiation dose. This finding involved an individual workers\' unplanned, unintended dose or potential of such dose (resulting from actions or conditions contrary to Technical Specifications) which could have been significantly greater as a result of a single minor, reasonable alteration of the circumstances. Using the Occupational Radiation Safety Significance Determination Process, the inspectors determined the finding to have very low safety significance because (1) it was not associated with ALARA planning or work controls, (2) there was no overexposure, (3) there was no substantial potential for an overexposure, and (4) the ability to assess dose was not compromised. Additionally, the finding had a crosscutting aspect in the area of human performance, work practices component, because the workers failed to use error prevention tools such as self- and peer-checking H.4(a) (Section 2OS1) |
| Site: | Callaway  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000483/2008005 Section 2OS1 |
| Date counted | Dec 31, 2008 (2008Q4) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Or Safety |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71121.01 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | L Ricketson D Dumbacher R Kopriva D Stearns J Adams V Gaddy J Groom |
| CCA | H.12, Avoid Complacency |
| INPO aspect | QA.4 |
| ' | |
Finding - Callaway - IR 05000483/2008005 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Callaway) @ 2008Q4
Self-Identified List (Callaway)
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