05000461/FIN-2016003-02
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Exceeded Technical Specification Allowed Outage Time for Main Turbine Bypass System |
| Description | The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance and an associated NCV of Technical Specification 3.7.6, Main Turbine Bypass System, for the licensees failure to meet the limiting conditions for operation and complete the associated required actions after making a deficient change to the turbine bypass valve surveillance testing frequency. Specifically, with the main turbine bypass system inoperable and without the Core Operating Limits Report (COLR) limits for thermal power, minimum critical power ratio (MCPR), and linear heat generation rate (LGHR) with the main turbine by pass system inoperable applied, thermal power was not reduced to less than 21.6 percent of rated thermal power within six hours. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program as AR 02690657. The licensee restored compliance by applying the COLR limits for reactor thermal power, MCPR and LGHR. The inspectors determined the failure to meet the limiting conditions for operation and complete the associated required actions prior to the end of the specified completion times was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The finding was screened against the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and determined to be of very low safety significance because all of the associated questions in IMC 0609, Appendix A, were answered no. The inspectors determined this finding affected the cross-cutting area of human performance, in the aspect of change management, where leaders use a systematic process for evaluating and implementing change so that nuclear safety remains the overriding priority because the licensees change management process was not fully utilized by senior management when evaluating and implementing a change to the turbine bypass valve surveillance testing frequency. (H.3) |
| Site: | Clinton  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000461/2016003 Section 1R15 |
| Date counted | Sep 30, 2016 (2016Q3) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.15 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | C Phillips G Edwards G Roach J Bozga J Wojewoda K Stoedter N Fields S Mischke W Schaup |
| Violation of: | Technical Specification |
| CCA | H.3, Change Management |
| INPO aspect | LA.5 |
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Finding - Clinton - IR 05000461/2016003 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Clinton) @ 2016Q3
Self-Identified List (Clinton)
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