05000458/FIN-2016009-02
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Finding | |
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Title | Failure to Establish Adequate Procedural Guidance |
Description | The team reviewed a self-revealing, non-cited violation of Technical Specification 5.4, Procedures, for three examples of the licensees failure to establish sufficient procedural guidance. Specifically, the licensees operations and radiation protection procedures did not provide sufficient direction to plant personnel to expeditiously establish a reactor vessel vent path, restore from a loss of shutdown cooling, and perform time sensitive entries into radiologically controlled areas. This issue was entered into the licensees corrective action program as Condition Reports CR-RBS-2016-0210, CR-RBS-2016-0370, and CR-HQN-2016-0132. Corrective actions included revising the applicable procedures. The failure to establish adequate procedural guidance in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.33 was a performance deficiency. Specifically, Procedures GOP-0002, Power Decrease/Plant Shutdown, Revision 72, and AOP-0051, Loss of Decay Heat Removal, Revision 313, failed to provide adequate direction to operations personnel to expeditiously establish a reactor vessel vent path and recover shutdown cooling following an isolation. Additionally, Procedure EN-RP-101, Access Control for Radiologically Controlled Areas, Revision 11, failed to provide adequate guidance to perform time sensitive entries into radiologically controlled areas. This performance deficiency is more than minor, and therefore a finding, because it is associated with the procedure quality attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the licensee failed to ensure that adequate procedural direction was provided to operations personnel following a loss of shutdown cooling. This resulted in a delay in the restoration of shutdown cooling and plant heatup. The team performed an initial screening of the finding in accordance with NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix G, Shutdown Operations Significance Determination Process. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix G, Attachment 1, Exhibit 3, Mitigating Systems Screening Questions, the team determined that the finding is of very low safety significance (Green) because it: (1) affected the design or qualification of a mitigating structure, system, or component, and (2) the structure, system, or component maintained its operability and functionality. A cross-cutting aspect is not being assigned to this finding due to the timing of the performance deficiency not being indicative of current licensee performance. |
Site: | River Bend |
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Report | IR 05000458/2016009 Section 4OA5 |
Date counted | Mar 31, 2016 (2016Q1) |
Type: | NCV: Green |
cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
Identified by: | Self-revealing |
Inspection Procedure: | IP 93812 |
Inspectors (proximate) | B Parks C Cowdrey G Warnick M Bloodgood R Deese S Makor |
Violation of: | 10 CFR 50 Appendix G Technical Specification |
INPO aspect | |
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Finding - River Bend - IR 05000458/2016009 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (River Bend) @ 2016Q1
Self-Identified List (River Bend)
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