05000458/FIN-2016009-03
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Failure to Implement Corrective Actions to Prevent the Recurrence of a Reactor Scram Due to Grid Disturbances |
| Description | The team reviewed a self-revealing, non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, for the licensees failure to establish measures to assure that corrective action is taken to preclude repetition of a significant condition adverse to quality. Specifically, following a November 27, 2015, reactor scram, the licensee failed to implement corrective actions associated with the alternate power lineup of the reactor protection system buses to preclude repetition of a significant condition adverse to quality during the January 9, 2016, reactor scram. This issue was entered into the licensees corrective action program as Condition Report CR-RBS-2016-0180. Corrective actions included supplying reactor protection system bus A from the normal power source on January 12, 2016. The failure to assure corrective actions are promptly taken for a significant condition adverse to quality to preclude repetition of a reactor scram associated with both buses being affected by a switchyard voltage transient was a performance deficiency. This performance deficiency is more than minor, and therefore a finding, because it is associated with the human performance attribute of the Initiating Events Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. Specifically, the licensees failed to implement corrective actions to address grid instabilities following the November 27, 2015, reactor scram to preclude the January 9, 2016, reactor scram. The team performed an initial screening of the finding in accordance with NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, the team determined that this finding is of very low safety significance (Green) because it did not involve the loss of mitigation equipment or a support system. This finding has an evaluation cross-cutting aspect within the problem identification and resolution area because the licensee failed to thoroughly evaluate the cause of the November 27, 2015, reactor scram and ensure that the resolution addresses causes and extent of conditions commensurate with their safety significance [P.2]. |
| Site: | River Bend  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000458/2016009 Section 4OA5 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2016 (2016Q1) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Initiating Events |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 93812 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | B Parks C Cowdrey G Warnick M Bloodgood R Deese S Makor |
| Violation of: | 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion XVI |
| CCA | P.2, Evaluation |
| INPO aspect | PI.2 |
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Finding - River Bend - IR 05000458/2016009 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (River Bend) @ 2016Q1
Self-Identified List (River Bend)
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