05000458/FIN-2008006-01
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Finding | |
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Title | Eight Examples of a Failure to Meet 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Design Control (1R21.b.1) |
Description | The team identified a finding of very low safety significance involving a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, with eight examples. • Example 1: Non-conservative inputs and assumptions used without adequate technical justification to evaluate the minimum terminal voltage and actuator output torque for safety-related motor operated valves. After identification, the licensee entered the issue into the corrective action program as Condition Report CR-RBS-2008-03339. • Example 2: Failure to perform a conservative analysis to ensure that Technical Specification Setpoints were adequate. After identification, the licensee entered the issue into the corrective action program as Condition Report CR-RBS-2008-03911. • Example 3: Non-conservative inputs and methodologies used in calculating control circuit voltages to safety-related 480V motor operated valves motoroperated valve and motors that would be required to operate for mitigation of design bases events. After identification, the licensee entered the issue into the corrective action program as Condition Report CR-RBS-2008-03858. • Example 4: Failure to evaluate E12-MOV-F042A, residual heat removal injection valve, and E12-MOV-F064A, residual heat removal minimum flow valve, to verify adequate voltage would be available to operate the associated 120VAC control circuit devices. After identification, the licensee entered the issue into the corrective action program as Condition Report CR-RBS-2008- 03641 • Example 5: Inadequate design basis documentation for hydrogen concentration control in the Division I and II Battery Rooms in the control building. After identification, the licensee entered the issue into the corrective action program as Condition Reports CR-RBS-2008-02566 and CR-RBS- 2008-03403. • Example 6: Failure to ensure design basis information for safety related 125VDC batteries was controlled and correctly translated into procedures and instructions. After identification, the licensee entered the issue into the corrective action program as Condition Report CR-RBS-2008-03659. • Example 7: Failure to maintain adequate design basis calculations for ultimate heat sink loading. After identification, the licensee entered the issue into the corrective action program as Condition Report CR-RBS-2008-3712. • Example 8: Failure to account for the technical specification allowed emergency diesel generator frequency variation in the diesel loading calculation. After identification, the licensee entered the issue into the corrective action program as Condition Report CR-RBS-2008-03556. The examples associated with this finding were more than minor per Manual Chapter 612, Appendix E, Appendix E, Examples of Minor Issues, Example 3j, in that each example resulted in a condition where there was reasonable doubt on the operability of a system or component. The finding was associated with the design control attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Traditional enforcement does not apply because the issue did not have any actual safety consequences or potential for impacting the NRCs regulatory function, and was not the result of any willful violation of NRC requirements. In accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Attachment 4, Phase 1 Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, a Phase 1 screening was performed and determined each example was of very low safety significance (Green) because it was a design or qualification deficiency confirmed not to result in a loss of operability or functionality. (Section 1R21.b.1 |
Site: | River Bend |
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Report | IR 05000458/2008006 Section 1R21 |
Date counted | Sep 30, 2008 (2008Q3) |
Type: | NCV: Green |
cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
Identified by: | NRC identified |
Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.21 |
Inspectors (proximate) | B Henderson R Kopriva D Loveless S Graves P Gage R Bywater H Campbell G Nicely |
INPO aspect | |
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Finding - River Bend - IR 05000458/2008006 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (River Bend) @ 2008Q3
Self-Identified List (River Bend)
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