05000458/FIN-2008006-04
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Inadequate Implementation of Temporary Installation Procedure (1R21.b.4) |
| Description | The team identified a finding of very low safety significance involving a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, for five examples of failure to follow the requirements of ADM-0073 Temporary Installation Guidelines\" during the installation of modifications to the plant. Specifically, four modifications were installed in the plant that did not meet the criteria of a temporary installation and one was not removed when no longer needed, as required by the procedure. After identification, the licensee entered the issue into the corrective action program as CR-RBS-2008-3410. Although the team considered each of the above examples minor in significance, the team determined that this finding, which was associated with design control attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone, was more than minor per Manual Chapter 612, Appendix E, Examples of Minor Issues, Example 4a. The finding involved multiple examples of failure to follow licensee procedural requirements and if left uncorrected it could result in design modifications to the plant that were not properly evaluated, controlled, documented and installed. Traditional enforcement does not apply because the issue did not have any actual safety consequences or potential for impacting the NRCs regulatory function, and was not the result of any willful violation of NRC requirements. In accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Attachment 4, Phase 1 Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, a Phase 1 screening was performed and determined the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the condition did not represent a loss of system safety function, did not represent an actual loss of safety function of a single train for greater than its Technical Specification allowed outage time, did not represent an actual loss of one or more risk-significant non-Technical Specification trains of equipment for greater than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, and did not screen as potentially risk-significant due to seismic, flooding, or severe weather. The finding had a crosscutting aspect associated with resources in the human performance area because the licensee failed to ensure that personnel, equipment, procedures, and other resources were available and adequate to assure nuclear safety. Specifically, those necessary for maintaining long term plant safety by maintenance of design margins, minimization of long-standing equipment issues, minimizing preventative maintenance deferrals, and ensuring maintenance and engineering backlogs which were low enough to support safety. [H.2 (a)] (Section 1R21.b.4 |
| Site: | River Bend  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000458/2008006 Section 1R21 |
| Date counted | Sep 30, 2008 (2008Q3) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.21 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | B Henderson R Kopriva D Loveless S Graves P Gage R Bywater H Campbell G Nicely |
| CCA | H.6, Design Margins |
| INPO aspect | WP.2 |
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Finding - River Bend - IR 05000458/2008006 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (River Bend) @ 2008Q3
Self-Identified List (River Bend)
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