05000445/FIN-2008005-03
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Failure to Access and Manage Risk Associated with Maintenance Activities |
| Description | The inspectors identified three examples of a noncited violation of 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) (Maintenance Rule) for the failure to adequately assess and manage the risk of maintenance activities during the outage. In two instances the licensee performed maintenance activities that initiated plant transients and increased the time at midloop without managing the risk. First, workers created a breach of the reactor coolant system boundary and loss of nitrogen cover gas pressure in the system. This caused the pressurizer level to rapidly increase approximately two feet. Second, the licensee removed high pressure seals for the flux thimble tubes creating a cold leg vent path during nozzle dam installation. This also caused spikes in level instrumentation and operators were required to stay in a midloop condition for an additional two hours. The third example involved emergency diesel generator synchronization to the 6.9 kV bus that was supporting the only running residual heat removal pump in a midloop condition with time to boil less than 10 minutes. The testing was originally schedule outside the midloop window. The licensee had started the activity but, after the inspectors raised concerns, the shift manager took actions to back out of the testing. After being properly assessed, the risk for this activity was classified as a red condition (the highest risk threshold), but the licensee was only in an orange condition. The licensee entered the finding into their corrective action program as Smart Forms SMF-2008-003143, SMF-2008-003172, SMF-2008-003196, and SMF-2008-003209. The finding was more than minor because it was similar to non-minor Example 7.e from Manual Chapter 0612, Appendix E, Examples of Minor Issues, in that, for the first two examples the activities required additional risk management actions and for the third example, the plant changed from a risk level of Orange to Red. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix K, Maintenance Risk Assessment and Risk Management Significance Determination Process, the finding had very low safety significance because the incremental conditional core damage probability deficit was less than 1x10-6. The cause of the finding was related to the Human Performance crosscutting component of work control for the failure of the licensee to appropriately coordinate work activities |
| Site: | Comanche Peak  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000445/2008005 Section 1R13 |
| Date counted | Dec 31, 2008 (2008Q4) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Initiating Events |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.13 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | L Ricketson J Dixon K Clayton B Tharakan L Carson G Replogle B Tindell M Bloodgood D Reinert G Tutak J Kramer N Okonkwo N Hernandez |
| CCA | H.5, Work Management |
| INPO aspect | WP.1 |
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Finding - Comanche Peak - IR 05000445/2008005 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Comanche Peak) @ 2008Q4
Self-Identified List (Comanche Peak)
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