05000443/FIN-2012005-01
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Finding | |
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| Title | Failure to Correct a Condition Adverse to Quality for the L-5 Fici Connection |
| Description | A self revealing, non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Actions, was identified because the high pressure Swagelok fitting for the L-5 fixed in-core detection instrument failed and caused an unisolable reactor coolant leak. Specifically, NextEra did not implement timely and effective corrective actions to address a degraded Swagelok fitting associated with the L5 in-core instrument connection that was identified as a condition adverse to quality in 2006. The inspectors determined that not taking timely and effective corrective action to correct a condition adverse to quality was a performance deficiency. The inadequate corrective actions led to the failure of the L-5 fixed in-core detection instrument Swagelok fitting on October 21, 2012. The inspectors determined that this issue was within NextEras ability to foresee and correct, because this fitting was identified as leaking during previous operating cycles, was assigned additional monitoring and the adverse trend of increased leakage at L-5 at low pressures continued from the time it was identified in 2006. NextEra entered this into their corrective action program as AR 01815351 and implemented immediate corrective actions to cut the connection for the L-5 instrument, as well as two others showing signs of leakage, and capped the tubes prior to recommencing start-up. The inspectors determined that the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Equipment Performance attribute of the Initiating Events cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstones objective to limit the likelihood of events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. Additionally it is similar to example 4.d of Inspection Manual (IMC) 0612, Appendix E, because this was a failure to implement a corrective action that did have a safety impact, because the fitting failed and caused a 4 gpm non-isolable leak from the reactor coolant system. The inspectors evaluated the finding using IMC 0609, Attachment A, because the operational impact occurred after the residual heat removal pump was secured for start-up. The inspectors determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the deficiency would not result in exceeding the small loss of coolant accident (LOCA) leak rate and would not have affected other systems used to mitigate a LOCA. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Human Performance, Resources, because actions were not taken to maintain long term plant safety by minimization of long standing equipment issues. Specifically, NextEra did not manage the ongoing degradation of the L-5 in-core instrument connection fitting connection while long term corrective actions were implemented. |
| Site: | Seabrook  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000443/2012005 Section 1R19 |
| Date counted | Dec 31, 2012 (2012Q4) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Initiating Events |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.19 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | D Silk D Schroeder C Newport S Rich B Dionne M Jennerich |
| CCA | H.6, Design Margins |
| INPO aspect | WP.2 |
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Finding - Seabrook - IR 05000443/2012005 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Seabrook) @ 2012Q4
Self-Identified List (Seabrook)
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