05000443/FIN-2012002-02
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Licensee-Identified Violation |
| Description | Technical Specification 3.8.1.1, A.C. Sources, requires as a minimum, the following A.C. electrical power sources shall be operable: (a) two physically independent circuits between the offsite transmission network and the onsite Class 1E Distribution System, and (b) two separate and independent diesel generators. TS 3.8.1.1 Action a. requires that with one of the required offsite AC electrical power sources and one of the required independent diesel generator power sources inoperable, operators must demonstrate the operability of the remaining A.C. source by performing TS surveillance requirement (SR) 4.8.1.1.1a. within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> and at least once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> thereafter. Contrary to the above on October 31, 2011, for 110 minutes, and from January 10 to 17, 2011, when both the A EDG and one of the required offsite power sources were inoperable, NextEra did not perform TS SR 4.8.1.1.1a. within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> and at least once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> thereafter. In both instances, the offsite AC source via the RAT was not declared inoperable and the applicable TS action was not entered because NextEra did not recognize the impact of the EDG operation on the fast transfer feature in the TS Bases change process. Specifically, NextEra did not ensure appropriate technical evaluations were performed to review change implications against all normal plant configurations. This finding is of very low safety significance (Green) per IMC 0609 because the issue did not result in a total loss of safety function and did not contribute to both a transient initiator and the likelihood that mitigating functions would be unavailable. Specifically a fast transfer would occur following an opening of the EDG breaker if the bus and RAT were in synchronism. If the bus and RAT were not in synchronism, the RAT breaker would close when residual bus voltage relays actuated. Since the issue is of very low safety significance and was entered into the corrective action program as AR 1718306, the issue is considered a licensee-identified, non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2.a of the NRC Enforcement Policy. |
| Site: | Seabrook  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000443/2012002 Section 4OA7 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2012 (2012Q1) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | Licensee-identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | |
| Inspectors (proximate) | J Deboer P Cataldo T Moslak L Scholl J Noggle W Raymond A Burritt J Johnson R Montgomery S Hammann |
| INPO aspect | |
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Finding - Seabrook - IR 05000443/2012002 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Seabrook) @ 2012Q1
Self-Identified List (Seabrook)
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