A self-revealing finding was identified for the licensees failure to adequately implement their administrative tagout procedure resulting in the isolation of main
feedwater while Unit 1 was in Mode 4. The licensees corrective actions included revisions to operations administrative procedures and incorporation of lessons learned from the event into operator training. The performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the
Initiating Events cornerstone attribute of configuration control and adversely affected the cornerstone objective in that the isolation of main
feedwater caused the CA system to autostart. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because no checklist criteria were met that required a phase 2 analysis and there was no loss of the
decay heat removal safety function. The cause of this finding was related to the cross-cutting aspect of the need to keep personnel appraised of the operational impact of work activities as described in the Work Control component of the Human Performance cross-cutting area because the scope and plant impact of the tagout was not adequately understood by operations personnel responsible for implementation due to inadequate turnover and review
H.3(b).