05000397/LER-1989-038, :on 890121,two 3/8-inch Drain Line Valves Associated W/Standby Liquid Control Flow Transmitter Not Labeled & Not Contained in Checklist.Caused by Inadequate Procedures.Walkdown Will Be Conducted

:on 890121,two 3/8-inch Drain Line Valves Associated W/Standby Liquid Control Flow Transmitter Not Labeled & Not Contained in Checklist.Caused by Inadequate Procedures.Walkdown Will Be Conducted

ML17285B083
Person / Time
Site:	Columbia
Issue date:	03/02/1990
From:	Fies C, Powers C WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
LER-89-038, LER-89-38, NUDOCS 9003140391
Download: ML17285B083 (6)

LER-1989-038, on 890121,two 3/8-inch Drain Line Valves Associated W/Standby Liquid Control Flow Transmitter Not Labeled & Not Contained in Checklist.Caused by Inadequate Procedures.Walkdown Will Be Conducted

Event date:
Report date:
Reporting criterion:	10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications
3971989038R00 - NRC Website

text

ACXXLERATED D UTION DEMONSHRATION SYSTEM REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)'CCESSION NBR:9003140391 DOC.DATE: 90/03/02 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET FACIL:50-397 WPPSS Nuclear Project, Unit 2, Washington Public Powe 05000397 AUTH.NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION FIES,C.L.

Washington Public Power Supply System POWERS,C.M.

Washington Public Power Supply System RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION

SUBJECT:

LER 89-038-01:on 890913,inadequate primary containment integrity verification.

W/8 ltr.

DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22T COPIES RECEIVED:LTR ENCL SIZE:

TITLE: 50.73/50.9 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incide t Rpt, etc.

NOTES:

RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME PD5 LA SAMWORTH,R INTERNAL: ACNW AEOD/DOA AEOD/ROAB/DS P NRR/DET/ECMB 9H NRR/DET/ESGB 8D NRR/DLPQ/LPEB10 NRR/DREP/PRPBll NRR/DST/SICB 7E NRR/DST/SRXB 8E RES/DSIR/EIB EXTERNAL: EG&G WILLIAMS,S LPDR NSIC MAYS,G NUDOCS FULL TXT COPIES LTTR ENCL 1

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RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME PD5 PD ACRS AEOD/DSP/TPAB DEDRO NRR/DET/EMEB9H3 NRR/DLPQ/LHFB11 NRR/DOEA/OEAB11 NRR/DST/SELB 8D LB8D1 REG FILE 02 LE 01 L ST LOBBY WARD NRC PDR NSIC MURPHYIG A COPIES LTTR ENCL 1

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NOTE TO ALL"RIDS" RECIPIENTS:

PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE WASTEt CONTACT THE DOCUMENI'ONTROLDESK, ROOM Pl-37 (EXT. 20079) TO ELIMINATEYOUR NAMEFROM DISIRIBUTION FULL TEXT CONVERSION REQUIRED TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED:

LTTR 37 ENCL 37

@~i WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM P.O. Box 968

~ 3000 George Washington Way

~ Richland, Washington 99352 Docket No.

50-397 Harch 2, 1990 Document Control Desk U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.

20555

Subject:

NUCLEAR PLANT NO.

2 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT NO. 89-038-01

Dear Sir:

Transmitted herewith is Licensee Event Report No. 89-038-01 for the WNP-2 Plant.

This revised report is submitted to correct some minor errors present in the original report.

Very truly yours, D@<A--~

C.

H.

Powers (H/D 927H)

WNP-2 Plant Hanager CHP:lr

Enclosure:

Licensee Event Report No. 89-038-01 cc:

Hr. John B. Hartin, NRC Region V

Hr.

C. J.

Bosted, NRC Site (H/D 901A)

INPO Records Center Atlanta, GA Hs. Dottie Sherman, ANI Hr.

D. L. Williams, BPA (H/D 399)

IP gS 9003i4039i 900302 PDR ADDCK 05000397 PDr

NRC FORM 366 (669)

~

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORYCOMMISSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LERI APPROVEO OMB NO. 31504)104 EXPIAESI 4I30l92 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WTH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION AEOUESTI 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENTBRANCH (P+30), U.S. NUCLEAR AEGULATORYCOMMISSION. WASHINGTON. DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWO4K REDUCTION PROJECT (31500104),

OFFICE OF MANAGEMENTANO BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITYNAME (I)

Washington Nuclear Plant - Unit 2 TITLE (4)

Inadequate Primary Containment Integrity Verification DOCKET NUMBER (2)

PA E

3 0

5 0

0 0

3 9

7 1

OF MONTH DAY YEAR EVENT DATE (5)

YEAR LER NUMBER (6)

SSOUENTIAL N?:

NUMSEII P?6 RLYrSION NUMBER MONTH OAY YEAR REPORT DATE (7)

DOCKET NUMBER(6) 0 5

0 0

0 FACILITYNAMES OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED(6) 0 9 13 89 8 9

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OPERATING MODE (9)

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COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

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EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE I'I6)

MONTH OAY YEA4 On September 13,

1989, a reportability evaluation was approved by the Plant Techni-cal Manager which directed that an event which began on January 21, 1989, be reported per 10CFR50. 73.

On the later date, plant equipment operators discovered two small 3/8 inch valves which should have been included on the primary containment integrity verification surveillance.

The immediate corrective action placed these valves on the surveillance to allow verification of their closed condition to occur on a monthly frequency.

The Plant Manager also directed that the containment integrity procedure be compared with the local leak rate testing procedure to iden-tify any other missing valves.

Four additional 1/2 inch valves were discovered during that review.

The root cause of this event was less than adequate procedures that did not identify all the containment items that require verification.

Further corrective action will include a physical walk-down of all containment pen-etrations to provide assurance that all items are now contained on the checklist.

This event posed no threat to the health and safety of either the public or plant personnel.

N4C Form 366 (669)(64)9)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORYCOMMISSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

TEXT CONTINUATION t

APPROVED 0MB NO. 31504)104 EXPIRES; 4/30)92 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER

RESPONSE

TO COMPLY WTH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 500 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENTBRANCH (P4)30), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, ANDTO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PRO)ECT (31504104). OFFICE OF MANAGEMENTAND BUDGET, WASHINGTON,DC 20503.

FACILITYNAME (11 DOCKET NUMBER (2)

LER NUMBER (6)

SEQUENTIAL NUMSSII PPF 115vasloN I.4 NUMBSII PAGE (3)

Washin ton Nuclear Plant - Unit 2 0

0 0

3 7

TEXT ()/mare z>>ce ia mqukat, u>> eddldruael HRC Farm 36643l (17)

OF Pl ant Conditions Power Level - 10(C Plant Mode -

1 (Power Operation)

Event Descri tion On September 13,

1989, a reportability evaluation was approved by the Plant Techni-cal Manager which directed that an event which began on January 21, 1989, be reported per 10CFR50. 73.

On January 21, 1989, while doing the primary containment integrity verification sur-veillance procedure (7.4. 6.1. 1), plant equipment operators, discovered two 3/8 inch drain line valves (SLC-V-52 and SLC-V-53) associated with a standby liquid control flow transmitter (SLC-FT-1) which were not labeled and not contained on the primary containment integrity valve checklist (see Sketch 1).

These valves are used to drain the instrument lines when calibrating SLC-FT-1 which is required on a yearly surveillance.

These valves are located inside the outboard isolation valves (SLC-V-4A and SLC-V-4B) and therefore require closed verification on a monthly fre-quency per Technical Specification surveillance 4.6.1.1.b.

During the review of the problem evaluation request, the Plant Manager directed that the containment integrity verification procedure, PPM 7.4.6.1.1, be compared with the Local Leak Rate Test (LLRT) procedure to check for additional missing valves.

This review identified four Containment Monitoring System (CMS) valves which should have been on the primary containment integrity verification surveillance (PI-V-X29bl, PI-V-29f1, PI-V-X30al, PI-V-X30f1).

The purpose of these 1/2 inch valves is to allow operability tests to be performed on the associated excess flow check valves (PI-EFC-X29b, PI-EFC-X29f, PI-EFC-X30a, and PI-EFC-X30f) located directly downstream from the containment (see Sketch 2).

These four valves were added to the plant during the refueling outage in May 1986.

Immediate Corrective Action

The primary containment integrity verification procedure was updated to show the additional valves.

Further Evaluation and Corrective Action A.

Further Evaluation 1.

This event is being re~orted as a "....deviation from the plant's Techni-cal Specifications.... 'er the requirements of 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B).

2.

There were no structures, components or systems that were inoperable prior to the start of this event which contributed to the event.

NRC Sana 3(rrSA (669)

NRC FOAM 366A (64)9)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORYCOMMISSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

TEXT CONTINUATION l

APPROYEO OMB NO,31500104 E XP IR 6 S: 4/30/92 ESTIMATED BURDEN PEA RESPONSE TO COMPLY WTH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REOUEST: 50A) HAS. FOAWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPOATS MANAGFMENTBRANCH (P4)30), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION. WASHINGTON, DC 20555, ANDTO 1HE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (31504)104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENTAND BUDGET, WASHINGTON,DC 20503.

FACILITYNAME (1)

DOCKET NUMBER (21 LER NUMBER (6)

YEAR gP SEOUENTIAL NUMBER IIEVISION NUM 6 II PAGE (3)

Washin ton Nuclear Plant - Unit 2 <<

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0 OF 3.

The root cause of this event was less than adequate procedures that did not identify all the containment items that require verification.

A con-tributing cause was inadequate review of procedures impacted by the plant modification which installed the four excess flow check valve test connec-tions and valves.

4.

The Plant modification process has been improved to provide a more com-plete review of impacted plant procedures.

B.

Further Corrective Action A physical walkdown will be performed of all containment penetrations to pro-vide assurance that all items are now contained on the checklist.

This walk-down will also identify the items that may have been added by plant modification.

Safet Si nificance The establishment of primary containment integrity ensures that the release of r adi-oactive material from the containment will be restricted to those leakage paths and rates assumed in the FSAR.

This restriction is relied upon to limit the control room and site boundary radiation doses to within the limits established by General Design Cr iterion 19 and 10CFR100 during accident conditions.

The two valves associated with SLC-FT-1 (SLC-V-52 and SLC-V-53) are located outside containment and outboard of SLC-V-6, a check valve in the SLC injection line.

The inboard containment isolation valve (SLC-V-7) is the inboard isolation valve located inside primary containment.

Thus, there are two check valves in a series between the two drain valves and the primary containment.

The second check valve (SLC-V-6) is not considered a containment isolation valve, but for purposes of this analysis, it does exist upstream of the valves in question and provides assurance of contain-ment integrity.

During plant operations, the lines leading to SLC-V-52 and SLC-V-53 are continually filled with water.

Thus, any leaks in these valves would be apparent as they are in a very accessible area of the reactor building.

These valves are only used during the 18 month surveillance which is performed during the annual refueling outage.

In addition, the lines are capped downstream of the valves.

The four test connections for the excess flow check valves were added by a plant modification in May 1986.

These test connections are used to test the excess flow check valve operation on the one inch lines which penetrate primary containment to monitor process conditions inside containment.

These taps are used for an 18 month surveillance which is performed during the annual refueling outage.

Specific steps in the procedure, Surveillance Testing of Containment Atmosphere and Suppression Pool Level Excess Flow Check Valves (7.4.6.3.4.2), call for the test connection valve to be closed after the test and the cap to be replaced on the line.

In addi-tion, the four test connections were identified in the Integrated Leak Rate Test (PPM) 7.4. 6.1.2. 1) which was performed at the end of the 1987 outage.

NAC FomI 36FA (669)(649)

U.S, NUCLEAR REGULATORYCOMMISSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

TEXT CONTINUATION t

APPROVED OMB NO. 31500104 EXPIRES: 4/30/92 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER

RESPONSE

TO COMPLY WTH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REOUESTI 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENTBRANCH (F430), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, ANDTO 1HE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (31600104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENTAND BUDGET, WASHINGTON,DC 20503.

FACILITYNAME (1I DOCKET NUMBER (2)

YEAR LE R NUMBER (6)

SEOVENTIAL NVMSEII REVISION NVM ER PAGE (3)

Mashington Nuclear Plant - Unit 2 TEXT/I/more eoeoe Js rer/Ir/rerL use 4/A/O 'one/ HRC %%drm 3SSA'4) ((7) 0 5

0 0

0 3

9 7

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4 In conclusion, there is a very low probability of these valves adversely affecting containment integrity even though they were not on the checklist.

Similar Events

LER 84-130 was written when 25 valves were found not listed on the primary contain-ment integrity verification surveillance.

EIIS Information Text Reference EI IS Reference

~Ss tern

~Com onent Primary Containment SLC-V-52 SLC-V-53 SLC-FT-1 Containment Monitoring System (CMS)

NH BR BR BR IK V

V FT NRC Forms SSSA ($4)9)