05000397/FIN-2012003-03
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Failure to Properly Control High Energy Line Break Barriers |
| Description | The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures and Drawings, for the failure of the licensee to control impairment of high energy line break barriers in accordance with Procedure PPM 1.3.57, Barrier Impairment, Revision 28. On May 6, 2012, the licensee performed Surveillance Procedure ISP-CIA-Q901, ADS Accumulator Backup Low Pressure Alarm Division 1 CFT/CC, Revision 7. A high energy line break barrier associated with instrument rack E-IR-67 was breached and left unattended during the surveillance. The licensee failed to meet requirements specified in Procedure PPM 1.3.57, Barrier Impairment, Revision 28, which required a barrier impairment permit for the high energy line break barrier that was breached. Additionally, the inspectors determined that the licensee failed to declare inoperable and unavailable, all equipment impacted by the breached high energy line break barrier on instrument rack E-IR-67. As interim corrective action, the licensee initiated Night Order 1379 directing a more complete review of Procedure PPM 1.3.57 prior to work authorization on components that serve as hazard barriers. This issue was entered into the licensees corrective action program as Action Request AR 263274. This performance deficiency was more than minor because it affected the configuration control attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability of systems that respond to initiating events. The inspectors performed an initial screening of the finding in accordance with IMC 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings. The inspectors determined this finding to be of very low safety significance (Green) because it did not result in the loss of a system safety function, did not represent the loss of safety function of a single train for greater than its allowed outage time, did not result in the loss of safety function of any non-technical specification equipment, and did not screen as potentially risk significant due to seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating events. The inspectors determined that this finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with the resources component because the licensee failed to update surveillance procedures associated with high energy line break barriers such that individuals responsible for maintaining those barriers were knowledgeable of the requirements in Procedure PPM 1.3.57 |
| Site: | Columbia  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000397/2012003 Section 1R22 |
| Date counted | Jun 30, 2012 (2012Q2) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.22 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | L Carson W Walker W Sifre J Groom M Hayes W Schaup C Alldredge J Dykert |
| CCA | H.7, Documentation |
| INPO aspect | WP.3 |
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Finding - Columbia - IR 05000397/2012003 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Columbia) @ 2012Q2
Self-Identified List (Columbia)
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