05000397/FIN-2011004-04
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Failure to Comply with Seismic Storage Requirements Procedure |
| Description | The inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, for failure to accomplish activities affecting quality. From July 13, 2011, to July 19, 2011, the licensee failed to accomplish the storage of transient equipment in accordance with the seismic storage requirements in Procedure PPM 10.2.53, Seismic Requirements for Scaffolding, Ladders, Man-Lifts, Tool Gang Boxes, Hoists, Metal Storage Cabinets, and Temporary Shielding Racks, Revision 37. Specifically, a wheeled toolbox and lifting beam were stored in a location, near safety-related emergency diesel generator DG-1 conduits and service water pump SW-P-1A conduits, that did not meet the seismic overturning and sliding requirements. This condition was entered into the licensee's corrective action program as Action Request 244730. The inspectors determined that the failure to meet the seismic storage requirements of Procedure PPM 10.2.53 was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the protection against external events attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and adversely affected the Mitigating System Cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Since the finding affected the safety of the reactor during a refueling outage and entry conditions for residual heat removal were initiated, the inspectors used NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix G, Shutdown Operations Significance Determination Process, to evaluate the significance of the finding. The finding did not require a quantitative risk assessment because adequate mitigating equipment remained available and the finding did not constitute a loss of control, as defined in Appendix G. Therefore, the finding screened as having very low safety significance, or Green. The inspectors determined that the finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance and work practices component, because the licensee failed to ensure personnel practices supported human performance. Specifically, the licensee failed to ensure supervisory and management oversight of work activities such that nuclear safety was supported. |
| Site: | Columbia  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000397/2011004 Section 1R17 |
| Date counted | Sep 30, 2011 (2011Q3) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.17 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | L Ricketson P Elkmann R Cohen G George L Carson W Walker A Fairbanks J Groom M Hayes E Ruesch D Reinert N Greene |
| CCA | H.2, Field Presence |
| INPO aspect | LA.2 |
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Finding - Columbia - IR 05000397/2011004 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Columbia) @ 2011Q3
Self-Identified List (Columbia)
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