05000397/FIN-2012002-05
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Finding | |
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| Title | Failure to Evaluate Reportability Associated with Division 3 Diesel Generator Inoperability |
| Description | The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures and Drawings, for the licensees failure to follow procedure SWP-CAP-01, Corrective Action Program, Revision 21, when evaluating the past operability and reportability of the division 3 emergency diesel generator. On February 28, 2010, the division 3 emergency diesel generator exhibited erratic behavior caused by foreign material. The licensees reportability evaluation was completed prior to receipt of the forensic analysis which provided new information that foreign material had been present in the governor actuator since October 2005. Contrary to licensee procedure SWP-CAP-01, no re-evaluation of past operability or reportability was performed following receipt of this new information. Following identification of this issue by the inspectors, the licensee concluded that the division 3 diesel generator could not operate for its required mission time with the foreign material present and that the component was inoperable for a period greater than allowed by the plant\'s technical specifications. The licensee submitted Licensee Event Report 2012-001-00 on January 13, 2012, and supplemental Licensee Event Report 2012-001-01 on March 13, 2012. This issue was placed in the licensees corrective action program as Action Requests AR 251950251950and 255926. The failure to follow requirements provided in procedure SWP-CAP-01 was a performance deficiency. This finding was more than minor because, if left uncorrected, the failure to follow procedures associated with the corrective action program could become a more significant safety concern. Specifically, the failure to follow corrective action program procedures could result in unrecognized reportable conditions or unevaluated degraded or nonconforming conditions. The inspectors used Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, Phase 1 Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, and determined that the findings was of very low safety significance (Green) because it did not result in the loss of a system safety function, did not represent the loss of safety function of a single train for greater than its allowed outage time, did not result in the loss of safety function of any non-technical specification equipment, and did not screen as potentially risk significant due to seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating events. The inspectors determined that this finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with the decision making component because the conclusions drawn in the root cause evaluation were not communicated to personnel responsible for making decisions associated with reportability such that a required licensee event report could be submitted in a timely manner |
| Site: | Columbia  |
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| Report | IR 05000397/2012002 Section 4OA3 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2012 (2012Q1) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71153 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | W Walker J Laughlin J Groom M Hayes W Schaup S Hedger D Bradley |
| CCA | H.10, Bases for Decisions |
| INPO aspect | CO.2 |
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Finding - Columbia - IR 05000397/2012002 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Columbia) @ 2012Q1
Self-Identified List (Columbia)
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