05000397/FIN-2011004-02
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Finding | |
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| Title | Failure to Follow Maintenance and Lubrication Procedures |
| Description | The inspectors identified a noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a for failure to follow Procedure PPM 10.2.80, CVB and CSP Valve Air Operator Seal Replacement, Revision 4. On May 28, 2011, containment vacuum breaker valve CVB-V-1JK was rebuilt using Procedure PPM 10.2.80. During the procedure, the lubricant used for reassembling the pressure cylinder was not available and a substitute was used that did not meet procedure requirements specified in PPM 10.2.13, Approved Lubricants Revision 57. The same unapproved lubricant was used when rebuilding similarly designed containment supply purge valves CSP-V-5 and CSP-V-6. Consequently, both containment vacuum breaker valve CVB-V-1JK and similarly designed valves CSP-V-5 and CSP-V-6 exhibited signs of high friction after post maintenance testing was complete. Inspector review of the maintenance history for these components identified that an unapproved substitute was used when reassembling the pressure cylinder. This condition was entered into the licensee's corrective action program as Action Request 248154. The finding was more than minor because if left uncorrected, the use of an inappropriate or unevaluated lubricant could become a more significant safety concern. This finding affected the barrier integrity cornerstone. Since the finding was discovered and corrected while in a shutdown condition, the inspectors evaluated the finding using Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix G, Shutdown Operations Significance Determination Process. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) since it was not associated with a finding that degraded the licensee's ability to terminate a leak path or add reactor coolant system inventory when needed, did not significantly degrade the licensee's ability to recover decay heat removal when lost and did not impact a heat removal path to the suppression pool while the vessel head was installed. The inspectors determined that the cause of the finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with the decision making component in that the licensee failed to make a safety-significant decision about lubricant selection using a systematic process and failed to obtain interdisciplinary reviews of the proposed substitute. |
| Site: | Columbia  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000397/2011004 Section 1R12 |
| Date counted | Sep 30, 2011 (2011Q3) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Barrier Integrity |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.12 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | L Ricketson P Elkmann R Cohen G George L Carson W Walker A Fairbanks J Groom M Hayes E Ruesch D Reinert N Greene |
| CCA | H.13, Consistent Process |
| INPO aspect | DM.1 |
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Finding - Columbia - IR 05000397/2011004 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Columbia) @ 2011Q3
Self-Identified List (Columbia)
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