05000397/FIN-2011004-01
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Failure to Maintain Adequate Reactor Core Isolation Cooling Surveillance Procedure |
| Description | The inspectors identified a noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a for the failure of the licensee to maintain an adequate reactor core isolation cooling pump surveillance procedure. Specifically, Procedure OSP-RCIC/IST-B501, RCIC LSFT Surveillance, Revision 9, required that the licensee maintain bearing oil level in the green band during turbine operation per Procedure PPM 3.1.10, Operating Data and Logs, Revision 76. The inspectors found that the licensee staff did not have a common understanding of the requirement to maintain turbine oil level and that Procedure PPM 3.1.10 only provided guidance for bearing oil levels while the reactor core isolation cooling turbine was in a standby condition, not while the equipment was operating. Consequently, when the surveillance was performed, the inspectors noted that the turbine west end bearing oil level had decreased through the yellow band into the red band of the attached sight glass and was allowed to run for approximately 36 minutes after the control room was informed of the low bearing oil level. This condition was entered into the licensee's corrective action program as Action Request 248813. The finding was more than minor because it affected the procedure quality attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, the inspectors determined this finding to be of very low safety significance (Green) because it did not result in the loss of a system safety function, did not represent the loss of safety function of a single train for greater than its allowed outage time, did not result in the loss of safety function of any non-technical specification equipment, and did not screen as potentially risk significant due to seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating events. The inspectors determined that this finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with the decision making component because the licensee failed to verify the validity of underlying assumptions associated with the precaution listed in Procedure OSP-RCIC/IST-B501. |
| Site: | Columbia  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000397/2011004 Section 1R04 |
| Date counted | Sep 30, 2011 (2011Q3) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.04 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | L Ricketson P Elkmann R Cohen G George L Carson W Walker A Fairbanks J Groom M Hayes E Ruesch D Reinert N Greene |
| CCA | H.14, Conservative Bias |
| INPO aspect | DM.2 |
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Finding - Columbia - IR 05000397/2011004 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Columbia) @ 2011Q3
Self-Identified List (Columbia)
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