05000397/FIN-2010005-03
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Finding | |
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| Title | Failure to Promptly Identify and Correct a Condition Adverse to Quality Associated with both Trains of Control Room Emergency Chillers |
| Description | The inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, for the failure to promptly identify and correct a condition adverse to quality involving both trains of control room emergency chillers. The hot gas bypass valves for each train of chillers were installed incorrectly. The inspectors identified that actions to correct the deficient condition were not timely. Procedure SWP-MAI-01, Work Maintenance Process Overview, Revision 20, Paragraph 8.0 stated in part that tests are conducted to verify that maintenance is effective and is correctly implemented, the equipment will function as required and desired improvements were achieved. Contrary to this, the inspectors identified that post maintenance testing conducted on the chiller was not adequate in that adjustments were allowed to be made by procedure throughout the post maintenance testing process which could have masked problems with the chillers, specifically, that the hot gas bypass valves were installed incorrectly. The hot gas bypass valves were installed correctly in both A and B trains of the control room emergency chiller systems and a satisfactory operability test was performed on chiller CCH-CR-1A on October 13, 2010. The finding was greater than minor because it was associated with the configuration control attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone, and it affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The inspectors conducted a Phase 1 screening of the finding in accordance with IMC 0609, Attachment 0609.04, Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, and determined the finding to be of very low safety significance because it was not a design or qualification deficiency; it did not result in the loss of a system safety function; it did not represent the loss of a single train for greater than technical specification allowed outage time; it did not represent a loss of one or more non-technical specification risk-significant equipment for greater than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />; and it did not screen as potentially risksignificant due to seismic, flooding, or severe weather. The cause of this finding was determined to have no cross-cutting aspect due to the fact that the hot gas bypass valves were installed backwards more than three years ago and did not represent a current station performance issue. |
| Site: | Columbia  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000397/2010005 Section 1R19 |
| Date counted | Dec 31, 2010 (2010Q4) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.19 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | R Cohen W Walker M Hayes |
| INPO aspect | |
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Finding - Columbia - IR 05000397/2010005 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Columbia) @ 2010Q4
Self-Identified List (Columbia)
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