05000395/FIN-2011004-02
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Finding | |
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| Title | Licensee-Identified Violation |
| Description | Contrary to requirements, the licensee failed to implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved fire protection program as described in the FSAR for the facility, in that, the Appendix R fire switch test program did not adequately verify that the switches were capable of performing their required isolation function. This finding has been entered into the licensees corrective action program as condition report CR-10-01814. The finding affected safe shutdown and was judged to represent moderate degradation. Because the finding involved main control room (MCR) fire scenarios and scenarios in multiple fire areas, a phase 3 SDP analysis was performed by a regional senior reactor analyst. The finding was determined to have existed since 1983 when a modification temporarily installed the jumper wire; therefore a one year exposure period was utilized for the analysis. Only fires which could lead to MCR abandonment requiring use of the B EDG isolation switch and which also would damage the B EDG output breaker control circuit would contribute to the risk of the performance deficiency. Only fire scenarios in the MCR (within the main control board (MCB)) and in the cable spreading room which impacted the cable tray and main termination cabinet associated with the B EDG represented credible fire scenarios which could lead to risk from the PD. Factors which mitigated the risk from the PD included: the few credible fire ignition sources, use of thermoset cables, the low cable loading in the specific MCB section housing the EDG and offsite power circuit breaker control switches, detection in the main termination cabinet, and the proceduralized actions for local operation of the B EDG breaker. The dominant sequence was a fire in either the MCR or cable spreading room damaging the EDG and offsite power breaker controls requiring MCR abandonment coupled with failure of the B EDG breaker to operate due to the PD and failure of the operator to locally close the B EDG breaker resulting in core damage from inadequate core cooling. The SDP phase 3 evaluation determined that the risk of the finding was an increase in core damage frequency of <1E-6/year, a Green finding of low safety significance. |
| Site: | Summer  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000395/2011004 Section 4OA7 |
| Date counted | Sep 30, 2011 (2011Q3) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | Licensee-identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | |
| Inspectors (proximate) | E Coffman J Reece M Meeks R Hamilton R Kellner S Walker |
| INPO aspect | |
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Finding - Summer - IR 05000395/2011004 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Summer) @ 2011Q3
Self-Identified List (Summer)
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