05000395/FIN-2011003-04
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Inadvertent Safety Injection in Mode 3 Due to Opening C Main Steam Isolation Valve |
| Description | The inspectors confirmed that the operator response to the event was appropriate and consistent with emergency and abnormal operating procedure requirements. Following the SI actuation, all plant systems functioned as designed and emergency core cooling system water was injected into the RCS. The operators were successful in timely termination of unnecessary injection flows and preventing potential pressurizer overfill and adverse RCS overpressure conditions. The plant was effectively stabilized in Mode 3. The licensee correctly determined that no emergency action level entry condition was reached; however, the event was determined to be reportable to the NRC under the 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> non-emergency requirement of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2) for an emergency core cooling system discharge to the RCS. The licensee reported the notification in a timely manner. Based on interviews with the operators following completion of plant recovery actions, the inspectors noted that the operators had failed to recognize that the main steam line header downstream of the MSIVs had been depressurized when the MSIVs and their bypass valves were closed earlier in the shift. In addition, procedural guidance for stroking the MSIV, such as the stroke test procedure (i.e., STP-130.004D, Rev. 1, Main Steam Isolation Valve Full Stroke Test ), was not formally utilized when the valve was opened at the request of I&C. This procedure contained a signoff action to verify current plant conditions will permit performance of the stroke test, and could have provided an opportunity for the operators to have recognized that the main steam line header was depressuried, had this procedure been utilized. The licensee documented this event in their CAP as CR-11-03001 and planned to submit a LER within 60 days of the event date. At the end of the inspection period, the inspectors were awaiting the completion of the licensees root cause evaluation results to understand and properly characterize the potential performance deficiencies associated with this event. This issue is unresolved pending inspector review of the licensees evaluation, proposed corrective actions, and review of the licensees LER in order to characterize the potential performance deficiencies associated with this event. This unresolved item (URI) is identified as05000395/2011003-04, Inadvertent Safety Injection in Mode 3 Due to Opening C Main Steam Isolation Valve. |
| Site: | Summer  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000395/2011003 Section 4OA3 |
| Date counted | Jun 30, 2011 (2011Q2) |
| Type: | URI: |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71153 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | A Sengupta E Coffman G Mccoy J Zeiler R Hamiltone Coffmanj Reece M Meeks R Hamilton R Kellner S Walker |
| INPO aspect | |
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Finding - Summer - IR 05000395/2011003 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Summer) @ 2011Q2
Self-Identified List (Summer)
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