05000361/FIN-2011005-02
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Failure to Implement Required Compensatory Measures Resulted in Inoperable Condensate Storage Tank |
| Description | A self-revealing non-cited violation of Technical Specification 5.5.1.1, Procedures, was identified for the failure of operations personnel to adequately implement the appropriate compensatory measures per alarm response procedure to ensure equipment was maintained as required by technical specifications. Specifically, on September 13, 2011, operations personnel failed to implement the compensatory measures required by alarm response Procedure SO23-15-53.B, to maintain the safety-related condensate storage tank water level within limits required by technical specifications. The issue was entered into the licensees corrective action program as Nuclear Notification NN 201644782. The performance deficiency is more than minor, and therefore a finding, because it was associated with Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attribute of human performance and affected the associated cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Using the Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process, Phase 1 Worksheets, the finding is determined to have very low safety significance because it was not a design or qualification deficiency confirmed not to result in loss of operability or functionality; did not result in a loss of system safety function; did not represent an actual loss of safety function of a single train for greater than its technical specification allowed outage time; was not an actual loss of safety function of one or more non-technical specification trains of equipment designated as risk significant per 10 CFR 50.65 for greater than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />; and did not screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with the decision-making component because operations personnel failed to use a systematic process to effectively communicate and formally establish required compensatory measures to ensure that condensate storage tank water inventory remained within technical specification limits H.1(a) |
| Site: | San Onofre  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000361/2011005 Section 4OA3 |
| Date counted | Dec 31, 2011 (2011Q4) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71153 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | C Alldredge R Lantz P Elkmann D Stearns L Carson J Reynoso G Warnick C Osterholtz M Young |
| CCA | H.13, Consistent Process |
| INPO aspect | DM.1 |
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Finding - San Onofre - IR 05000361/2011005 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (San Onofre) @ 2011Q4
Self-Identified List (San Onofre)
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