05000354/LER-2005-005, Re a Control Room Emergency Filtration (CREF) Train Inoperable for Greater than Allowed Outage Time
| ML052500485 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Hope Creek  (NPF-057) |
| Issue date: | 08/29/2005 |
| From: | Massaro M Public Service Enterprise Group |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| LR-N05-0428 LER 05-005-00 | |
| Download: ML052500485 (5) | |
| Event date: | |
|---|---|
| Report date: | |
| Reporting criterion: | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function |
| 3542005005R00 - NRC Website | |
text
PSEG Nuclear LLC P.O. Box 236, Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038-0236 AUG 2 9 2005 LR-N05-0428
§ PSEG tuclear LLC U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 LER 354/2005-005-00 HOPE CREEK GENERATING STATION FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-57 DOCKET NO. 50-354 This Licensee Event Report entitled, "'A' Control Room Emergency Filtration (CREF)
Train Inoperable For Greater Than Allowed Outage Time," is being submitted pursuant to the requirement of 1 OCFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B).
Sincerely, Michael J. M saro Plant Manager - Hope Creek Attachment BJT C
Distribution LER File 3.7 j e,).a 95-2168 REV. 7/99
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I" NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIO APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 0613012007 6-2004)
, the NRC may for each block) not conduct or sponsor, and a person Is not required to respond to, the digitslcharacters Ior each block Information collection.
- 3. PAGE Hope Creek Generating Station 05000354 1 OF 4
- 4. TITLE
'A' Control Room Emergency Filtration (CREF) Train Inoperable For Greater Than Allowed Outage Time
- 5. EVENT DATE
- 6. LER NUMBER
- 7. REPORT DATE
- 8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED
.FACILITY NAM4E DOCKET NUMBER MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVA MONRH DAY YEAR I
~~~NUMBER NO.
MNH DY YA lFACILIT NAME DOCKET NUMBER 06 28 2005 2005 - 005-00 08 29 2005
- 9. OPERATING MODE 11 THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR§: (Check allthat apply) 0 20.2201(b) 0 20.2203(aX3)(i) 0 50.73(aX2)(i)(C) 0 50.73(a)(2XWi) 1 0
20.2201(d) 0 20.2203(aX3)(ii) 0 50.73(aX2)(i)XA) 0 50.73(aX2)(viiiXA) o 20.2203(aX))
0 20.2203(aX4) 0 50.73(aX2)(ii)(B) 0 50.73(aX2)(viiiXB) 0o 20.2203(aX2)(i) 0 50.36(cXl)(1)(A) 0 50.73(a)(2#if) 0 50.73(aX2)(ix)(A)
- 10. POWER LEVEL 0 20.2203(aX2)(ii) 0 50.36(cX1XiiXA) 0 50.73(a)(2Xiv)(A) 0 50.73(a)(2Xx) 0 20.2203(a)(2Xiii) 0 50.36(c)(2) 0 50.73(a)(2)(vXA) 0 73.71(a)(4) o 20.2203(a)(2Xiv) 0 50.46(aX3)(ii) 0 50.73(a)(2XvXB) 0 73.71(a)(5) 44 0 20.2203(a)(2Xv) 0 50.73(aX2XI)(A) 0 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C) 0 OTHER 0 20.2203(a)(2Xvi) 0 50.73(a)(2Xi)(B) 0 50.73(aX2)(v)(D)
Specify In Abstract below or In NRC Form 366A
- 12. LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER FACILTY NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER (Indude Area Code)
Brian Thomas, Licensing Engineer 856-339-2022CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANU-REPORTABLE I
CAUSE
SYSTEM COMPONENT MANU-REPORTABLE FACTURER TO EPIX FACTURER TO EPIX D
KM Y
- 14. SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED
- 15. EXPECTED MONTH DAY YEAR SUBMISSION o YES (If yes, complete 15. EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) 0 NO DATE ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, I.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines)
On June 28, 2005, a review of logs associated the operation of the 'A' CREF train identified that in January 2005 and February 2005 that the 'A' CREF train was inoperable for greater than the Hope Creek Technical Specification 3.7.2 allowed outage time of 7-days. As discussed in LER 354/05-007-00, the 'B' CREF train was inoperable from January 2005 to June 2005. With both trains of CREF inoperable for greater than one hour the requirement of TS 3.0.3 was also exceeded.
The cause of the inoperability of the 'A' CREF train was the entrainment of air in the chilled water train following maintenance on the evaporator. The entrainment of air in the system was due to inadequate filling and venting of the chilled water train. Procedure HC.OP-SO.GJ-0001, uControl Area Chilled Water System Operation," was revised on April 1, 2005 to improve the venting process for the control room chilled water system and the 'A' CREF train was returned to a fully operable status on June 3, 2005.
This event is being reported in accordance with 1 OCFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) as a, "condition which was prohibited by the plant's technical specifications."
NRC FORM 366 (6-2004)
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, U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (1-2001)
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
FACILITY NAME (1)
DOCKET (2)
LER NUMBER (6)
PAGE (3)
SEQUENTIAL I REVISION IYER NUMBER INUMBER Hope Creek Generating Station 05000354 2 OF 4 2005 005 0o TEXT (If more space Is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)
PLANT AND SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION
General Electric-Boiling Water Reactor (BWRI4)
Chilled Water System {KM}*
Control Room Emergency Filtration System {VI}
'Energy Industry Identification System {EIISI codes and component function identifier codes appear as {SS/CCC)
IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE Event Date: June 28, 2005 Discovery Date: June 28, 2005 CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE During the periods of 'A' CREF inoperability, Hope Creek was in operational condition 1. On January 29, 2005, first day of exceeding TS 3.7.2, Hope Creek was at approximately 44% reactor power. There was no additional equipment out of service that impacted this event.
DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE On June 28, 2005, a review of logs associated the operation of the 'A' CREF train {KM) identified that in January 2005 and February 2005 that the 'A' CREF train was inoperable for greater than the Hope Creek Technical Specification 3.7.2 allowed outage time of 7-days.
A review of maintenance work for the 'A' CREF chilled water system 0/I} identified that maintenance was performed on
'A' CREF train on January 11, 2005 to replace the evaporator vent valve, which required the filling and venting of the chilled water system. On January 13, 2005, the 'A' CREF train was restored to operable following maintenance. The 'A' CREF train was placed in standby on January 15, 2005 until it was placed in service on February 1, 2005.
On February 1, 2005, at 1616 hours0.0187 days <br />0.449 hours <br />0.00267 weeks <br />6.14888e-4 months <br /> the 'A' CREF train tripped shortly after being placed in service when the IAP400 control room chilled water pump tripped. At 0048 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> on February 2, 2005, the 1AP400 control room chilled water pump was placed in service and tripped approximately 30 seconds later. The 'A' chilled water loop was filled and vented and the 'A' CREF train restored to operable at 0147 hours0.0017 days <br />0.0408 hours <br />2.430556e-4 weeks <br />5.59335e-5 months <br /> on February 3, 2005. The 'A' CREF train was placed in standby on February 8, 2005 until it was placed in service on February 25, 2005.
On February 25, 2005, the 'A' CREF train tripped when it was placed in service. Shortly after being placed in service, the 1AP400 control room chilled water pump tripped with an indication of low flow. The 'A' chilled water loop was filled and vented. On February 27, 2005, the 'A' CREF train was returned to an operable but degraded status. The operability determination provided direction that when the 'A' CREF train was placed in standby configuration for greater than 7 days without filling and venting that the train would be declared inoperable. With the train in standby for extended periods of time, the air that was entrained in the system is allowed to come out of solution and collect in various high points throughout the system. These air pockets migrate throughout the chilled water system on a pump start causing either the flow transmitter to sense low flow, or pump performance to degrade which may result in a trip of the chilled water circulating pump.
- - h cU.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (1-2001)
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
FACILITY NAME (1)
DOCKET (2)
LER NUMBER (6)
PAGE (3)
SEQUENTIAL REVISION YEAR NUMBER NUMBER Hope Creek Generating Station 05000354 3OF4 I 2005 005 00.___
DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE (cont'd)
Based on the review of logs and the actions from the operability determination to declare the 'A' CREF train inoperable when in standby greater than seven days without filling and venting, the 'A' CREF train was inoperable during the periods of January 22 to February 3, 2005 and February 15 to February 27, 2005 which exceeds the TS 3.7.2 allowed outage time of 7 days. As discussed in LER 354/05-007-00, the 'B' CREF train was inoperable from January 2005 to June 2005.
With both trains of CREF inoperable for greater than one hour the requirement of TS 3.0.3 was also exceeded.
This event is being reported in accordance with I OCFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) as a, 'condition which was prohibited by the plant's technical specifications."
CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE The cause of the inoperability of the 'A' CREF train was the entrainment of air in the chilled water train following maintenance on the evaporator. The entrainment of air in the system was due to inadequate filling and venting of the chilled water train.
PREVIOUS OCCURRENCES
A review of LERs at Hope Creek for the previous two years was performed. This review identified the following LERs associated with CREF train inoperability: 354/03-002-00, 354/04-002-00, 354/04-003-01, 354/04-005-00, 354/05-004-00 and 354/05-007. Although these LERs were against the CREF system, the reportable occurrences were not associated with improper filling and venting. Corrective actions for these LERs were specific to the events and would not have prevented the inoperability of the CREF train due to air entrainment. There were no LERs in the previous two years for Hope Creek associated with improper filling and venting of a system.
SAFETY CONSEQUENCES AND IMPLICATIONS
During the period of time the 'A' CREF train was assumed to be inoperable, the 'B' CREF train was also inoperable. No plant events occurred during the period of time that the 'A' CREF was assumed inoperable that required the actuation of the CREF system.
As discussed in LER 354/05-007-00, the 'B' CREF train was considered inoperable since the train would not have been capable of clearing the low fan flow trip during a LOP/LOCA. However, the 'B' CREF train was still capable of being started manually. In accordance with the design basis dose analysis for a LOCA event, control room operator radiological doses as evaluated in the analysis would not be exceeded if the control room envelope (CRE) is initially isolated and a CREF train is started within the first 30 minutes of the LOCA to pressurize the CRE. The 'B' CREF train would have isolated the control room envelope, the fan would have tripped on low flow, but the operators were capable of re-starting the CREF train within 30 minutes from the control room.
A review of this event determined that a Safety System Functional Failure (SSFF) has not occurred as defined in Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 99-02. Since the 'B' CREF train was capable of mitigating the consequences of a design basis accident in accordance with the design basis dose analysis, this event did not impact the ability to mitigate the consequences of an accident.
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'U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (1-2001)
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
FACILITY NAME (1)
DOCKET (2)
LER NUMBER (6)
PAGE (3)
SEQUENTLAL IREVISION Hope Creek Generating Station 05000354 4 OF 4 l1 2005 005 00 ____
CORRECTIVE ACTION
- 1. Procedure HC.OP-SO.GJ-0001, Control Area Chilled Water System Operation," was revised on April 1, 2005 to improve the venting process for the control room chilled water system.
- 2.
On June 3, 2005, the 'A' CREF train was returned to a fully operable status.
COMMITMENTS
This LER contains no commitments.