05000354/LER-2002-007
| Hope Creek Generating Station | |
| Event date: | |
|---|---|
| Report date: | |
| Reporting criterion: | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) |
| 3542002007R00 - NRC Website | |
FACILITY NAME (1)
DOCKET
Hope Creek Generating Station 05000354 YEAR
PLANT AND SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION
General Electric — Boiling Water Reactor (BWR/4) Core Spray System {BM}* * Energy Industry Identification System {EIIS} codes and component function identifier codes appear as {SS/CCC}
IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE
Event Date: September 30, 2002 Discovery Date: September 30, 2002
CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE
The plant was in OPERATIONAL CONDITION 1 (POWER OPERATION) at the time of discovery. No other structures, systems or components were inoperable at the start of this event that contributed to the event.
DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE
On September 30, 2002, PSEG Nuclear determined that the instrument root valve for the B core spray loop pressure transmitter {BM/PT} was closed. The transmitter provides input to a core spray system discharge line "keep filled" alarm and to a high/low pressure interface valve leakage pressure monitor. The B core spray loop was declared inoperable. The valve was opened and the B core spray loop was restored to OPERABLE status. Based on a review of plant records, PSEG Nuclear concluded the pressure transmitter had been isolated since September 6, 2002.
Technical Specification (TS) 3.5.1 Action f states that the discharge line "keep filled" alarm instrumentation associated with a core spray subsystem may be in an inoperable status for up to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> for required surveillance testing, provided that the "keep filled" alarm instrumentation associated with at least one low pressure coolant injection (LPCI) or core spray subsystem serviced by the affected "keep filled" system remains OPERABLE. Otherwise, Action f requires the affected subsystem to be vented to verify it is filled with water.
TS 3.4.3.2 Action d permits a high/low pressure interface valve leakage pressure monitor to be inoperable for up to 7 days. If the monitor cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within 7 days, the pressure in the affected line must be verified to be less than the alarm setpoint at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
FACILITY NAME (1)
DOCKET
Hope Creek Generating Station 05000354 YEAR DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE (continued) Since this condition existed for longer than the time permitted by TSs 3.5.1 and 3.4.3.2, it is reportable as a condition prohibited by plant Technical Specifications in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B).
CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE
The apparent cause for this event was less than adequate instructions for restoration and system lineup verification contained in the procedure for core spray pump inservice testing. The procedure instructions are vague and the procedure does not contain a requirement for independent verification of valve position following removal of test equipment installed in parallel with the B core spray loop pressure transmitter. In addition, there was a failure to follow existing standards for control of component configuration.
PREVIOUS OCCURRENCES
A review of reportable events in the last two years identified three events involving conditions prohibited by Technical Specifications due to mispositioned components. LER 354/01-004 reported that reactor building pressure failed to meet acceptance criteria during the reactor building integrity functional test due to the reactor building differential pressure controllers being set incorrectly during a maintenance or surveillance testing activity. LER 354/00-009 reported the inoperability of the Filtration, Recirculation, and Ventilation System Recirculation Subsystem caused by an improperly secured manual damper. LER 354/02-001 reported the inoperability of a residual heat removal pump due to a closed minimum flow manual maintenance valve. The corrective actions taken were specific to the events and systems involved and could not have prevented this event.
SAFETY CONSEQUENCES AND IMPLICATIONS
There were no safety consequences associated with this event. The isolated transmitter provides an alarm only function, not assumed in any event for dependence on operator action. OPERABILITY of the B core spray loop was confirmed when the closed instrument root valve was reopened. During the period the transmitter was isolated, B LPCI discharge pressure transmitter was OPERABLE. The B core spray subsystem and the B LPCI subsystem are served by the same fill network.
This event does not constitute a Safety System Functional Failure (SSFF) as defined in NEI 99-02.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
1. The instrument root valve was reopened and the B core spray loop was restored to OPERABLE status.
FACILITY NAME (1)
DOCKET
Hope Creek Generating Station 05000354 YEAR CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (continued) 2. Lessons learned from this event will be communicated to control technicians.
3. The procedure for core spray pump inservice testing will be revised. Similar procedures will be reviewed and revised as necessary.
COMMITMENTS
The corrective actions cited in this LER are voluntary enhancements and do not constitute commitments.