05000354/LER-2002-006, Operation with Offgas Rad Monitors Inoperable
| ML022480250 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Hope Creek  |
| Issue date: | 08/26/2002 |
| From: | Garchow D Public Service Enterprise Group |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| LRN-02-0307 LER 02-006-00 | |
| Download: ML022480250 (4) | |
| Event date: | |
|---|---|
| Report date: | |
| Reporting criterion: | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function |
| 3542002006R00 - NRC Website | |
text
PSEG Nuclear LLC P.O Box 236, Hancocks Bndge, New Jersey 08038-0236 o PSEG Nuclear LLC AUG 2 6 2002 LRN 0307 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 Gentlemen:
LER354102-006-00 HOPE CREEK GENERATING STATION - UNIT 1 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-57 DOCKET NO. 50-354 This Licensee Event Report, uOPERATION WITH OFFGAS RAD MONITORS INOPERABLE", is being submitted pursuant to the requirements of the Code of Federal Regulations 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B).
The attached LER contains no commitments.
- Sincely, D.
.rn Vi Presnt rations Attachment
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Distribution LER File 3.7 95-2168 REV 7/99
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F NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3160.0104 EXPIRES 7431-2004 (72001)
COMMISSION Estmated, the NRC may
- 3. DAGE HOPE CREEK GENERATING STATION 05000354 1 OF 3
- 4. TITLE OPERATION WITH OFFGAS RAD MONITORS INOPERABLE
- 5. EVENT DATE
- 6. LER NUMBER
- 7. REPORT DATE S. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED U
FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER MO DAY YEAR YRSEQUENTIAL REVMO DAY YE 02 2002-0 M
AFACIUATY NAME DOCKET NUMBER 06 27 02 2002 -
006 -
00 08 21 02 FCLT A
OKTNME
- 9. OPERATING 1.THIS REPOF ' I~ SUBMITTED PURSUANT TOHE REQUIREMENTS OF CFlR 6: fthmIw all fhall Prnn MODE 1
20.2201(b)
I 20.2203(a)(3)fii)
I 50 73(a)(2)(ii)(B) 50 73(a)(2)(rx(A)
- 10. POWER 120 2201(d)
_ 20.2203(a)(4) 50 73(a)(2)OiD 50 73(a)(2)(x)
LEVEL 100 120 2203(a)(1) 36(c)(1)(i)(A)
__50 73(a)M2)Civt)CA)
__ 73 71 (a)(4) 20 2203(a)(2)(1) 50 36(c)(1)(ii)(A) 50 73(a)(2)(v)(A) 73.71(a)(5)
~20 2203(a)( Ali)
- - 50 36(c)(2)
__50.73(a)(2)(v)(13)
- - OTHERAbtcteIorn 20 2203(a)(2)(ihi) 50 46(a)(3)(ii) 50 73(a)(2)(v)(C)
Specify in Abstract below or in
'--20 2203(a)(2)(iv)
_50 73(a)(2)(ji(A)
_50 73 a) 2)(D vR Dr 36 20 2203(a)(2)lv) x 50 73(a)(2)UXB) 50.73 a 2 vii L1~,~,20 2203(a)(2)(Vt)
- - 50 73(a)(2)ni (C) 50.73(a) 2)viii A) 2-20.2203(a)(3)(1) 50 73(a)(2)(i~i)(A)_
50 73(a) 2)viil)B
- 12. LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER Onclude Area Code)
John C. Nagle, Ucensing Supervisor (856) 339-3171III MANU-RE___ALEMII-REPORTABLE
CAUSE
SYSTEM COMPONENT FACTURER TO EPKj AUSE SYSTEM J OMANU-lR TO EPiX
- 14. SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED
- 16. EXPECTED DAY YEAR YES Ifyes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)
I X lNO DATE
- 16. ARSTRACT al Imit In I A w
C I P sirwwvimativ
=i.,inn64rwAi tvngwrdtPn firiP On July 1 at approximately 0200 hours0.00231 days <br />0.0556 hours <br />3.306878e-4 weeks <br />7.61e-5 months <br />, operators declared offgas pretreatment rad-monitors inoperable due to the identification of anomalous readings when compared to the pre-shutdown levels. The plant was starting up and had only recently reached 100% power when the operators noted that the Rad Monitors were reading about one decade lower than immediately prior to the shutdown. Other available plant instrumentation indicated that the system was functioning properly. Further investigation by control room, radiation protection, and chemistry staff revealed that the readings were inconsistent with samples of the process gas stream.
Upon further investigation by a chemistry supervisor and technician, it was determined that a 1/8" system purge valve was off of its normal, fully closed position, resulting in a dilution of the sample flow.
The cause of the valve being in an off-normal position can not be determined, however, it is suspected that water may have caused the displacement of the valve.
This condition is being reported in accordance with the requirements of 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) as "Any operation or condition which was prohibited by the plant's Technical Specifications "
NRC FORM 36 (7.201)U.S NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (1 2001)
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION DOCKET (2)
FACILITY NAME (1)
NUMBER (2)
LER NUMBER (6)
PAGE ()
ISEQUENIIr REVISIONl YEAR E
NUMER HOPE CREEK GENERATING STATION 05000354 2002 0 0 6
00 2 OF 3 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)
PLANT AND SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION
General Electric - Boiling Water Reactor (BWRI4)
Radiation monitoring System Analyzer Solenoid Valve{ILJASV)*
- Energy Industry Identfication System {EIIS) codes and component function identifier codes appear as (SSICCC)
IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE Event Date: June 27, 2002 Discovery Date: July 1, 2002 CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE The plant was in OPERATIONAL CONDITION I (POWER OPERATION) returning to full power after a plant shutdown.
DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE On July 1, 2002 during the performance of a plant startup, at 0200 the Condenser Offgas Pre-treatment radiation monitoring system (RMS) was declared inoperable, due to anomalous readings.
Although all commonly available and required readings for RMS system parameters (system flow, channel check, and source check) indicated satisfactorily, review by control room, radiation protection, and chemistry staff who were monitoring the system revealed readings that were incongruent with samples that were being taken of the process gas stream as well as with the pre-shutdown levels. Evaluation of offgas readings indicate that this condition may have existed when offgas system was placed in service on June 27, 2002. Upon determination that the values were not consistent, the system was declared inoperable and the Technical Specification required actions were implemented. Upon further investigation by a chemistry supervisor and technician, it was determined that a 1/8" system purge valve (SP-SV-F01 1) {ILIAS\\V} was off of its normal, fully closed position, resulting in a dilution of the sample flow thus causing the incorrect readings.
CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE The apparent cause for this event was a partially open system purge valve. Human performance was evaluated as a potential cause. The investigation into the event attempted to determine if the valve had been operated since last known satisfactory system performance. No documentation or indication of system removal from service was identified. In addition, interviews conducted with chemistry, radiation protection and instrument and controls technicians and supervisors revealed that there was no known operation of the valve.
NRC FOPM 366A U.S NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION DOCKET (2)1 I I I SEQUENTIAL l REVISION YEAR NUMER I NUMER HOPE CREEK GENERATING STATION 105000354 2002 0 0 6
00 3 OF 3 TEXT af more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)Although the mechanism for the valve movement is unknown, a potential cause is water intrusion into the system resulting from recent problems with water logging of the off gas system. It is also possible that the failure was exacerbated by valve spring wear. Both of these issues will be addressed in the corrective actions.
PRIOR SIMILAR OCCURRENCES A review of Licensee Event Reports at Salem and Hope Creek generating stations for 2001 and 2002 determined that no other reportable events occurred related to radiation monitoring system inoperability.
SAFETY CONSEQUENCES AND IMPLICATIONS
The offgas rad monitors are but one of the methods in use to detect potential fuel failures.
There was no impact to the operation of the station, with the exception of the loss of one monitoring system for fuel degradation, during the startup of the station with a known minor fuel defect.
In addition to the Technical Specification-required actions, the chemistry and fuels groups were monitoring and assessing the fuel status during the startup in accordance with EPRI guidelines, providing another level of oversight of the condition of the fuel. Therefore, there were no actual or potential safety consequences as a result of this condition, and this condition does not involve a Safety System Functional Failure (SSFF) as defined in Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 99-02.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
- 1) Since the failure mode for the valve cannot be proven empirically, the valve will be replaced during the next system window, and the duty cycle for the valve will be evaluated, to ensure that mechanical wear is ruled out as a factor.
- 2) Corrective actions to prevent water logging of the off gas system should also preclude the recurrence of this event.
- 3) The purge valve was re-seated by mechanical agitation, and the system parameters were restored to normal for current plant conditions. This was verified and validated by comparing monitor readings with samples taken from the process stream.
- 4) Previously established programs to evaluate Human Performance will include this event in the review.
COMMITMENTS
The corrective actions cited in this LER are voluntary enhancements and do not constitute
commitments