Letter Sequence Request |
|---|
|
|
MONTHYEARML0334503822003-06-16016 June 2003 Slides of Meeting with Firstenergy Nuclear Operating Company, to Discuss Licensees Modifications to High Pressure Injection Pumps Project stage: Request ML0335303212003-12-16016 December 2003 License Amendment Application to Revise Technical Specification 3/4.4.5, Reactor Coolant System - Steam Generators, to Permit One-Time Extension of Steam Generator Tube Inservice Inspection Interval Project stage: Request ML0334502922003-12-16016 December 2003 Summary of Meeting on Licensees Modifications to High Pressure Injection Pumps Project stage: Request 05000346/LER-2003-014, Re Steam Feedwater Rupture Controls System Re-Energizes in a Blocked Condition2003-12-16016 December 2003 Re Steam Feedwater Rupture Controls System Re-Energizes in a Blocked Condition Project stage: Request ML0402007502004-01-23023 January 2004 RAI, One-Time Extension of Steam Generator Tube Inservice Inspection Interval Project stage: RAI ML0403402162004-01-29029 January 2004 Supplemental Information Regarding License Amendment Application to Revise TS 3/4.5, Reactor Coolant System - Steam Generators, to Permit One-Time Extension of Steam Generator Tube Inservice Inspection Interval Project stage: Supplement 05000346/LER-2003-002-01, Regarding Potential Degradation of High Pressure Injection Pumps Due to Debris in Emergency Sump Fluid Post Accident2004-01-29029 January 2004 Regarding Potential Degradation of High Pressure Injection Pumps Due to Debris in Emergency Sump Fluid Post Accident Project stage: Request ML0404901982004-02-13013 February 2004 Supplemental Information Regarding License Amendment Application to Revise Technical Specification 3/4.4.5, Reactor Coolant System - Steam Generators (Sg), to Permit One-Time Extension of SG Tube Inservice Inspection Interval Project stage: Supplement ML0404401692004-02-26026 February 2004 License Amendment 262 Regarding One-Time Extension of Steam Generator Tube Inservice Inspection Interval Project stage: Approval ML0405703702004-02-26026 February 2004 Technical Specification Page for Amendment 262 Regarding One-Time Extension of Steam Generator Tube Inservice Inspection Interval Project stage: Other 2004-01-23
[Table View] |
text
FENOC I~~~__*
5501 North State Route 2 FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company Oak Harbor, Ohio 43449 Mark B. Bezilla 419-321-7676 Vice President - Nuclear Fax: 419-321-7582 NP-33-03-014-00 Docket No. 50-346 License No. NPF-3 December 16, 2003 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555 Ladies and Gentlemen:
LER 2003-014 Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. I Date of Occurrence - October 17. 2003 Enclosed please find Licensee Event Report (LER) 2003-014, which is being submitted to provide vritten notification in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B) of an unanalyzed condition due to the discovery that the Steam Feedwater Rupture Control System (SFRCS) has an unexpected potential to re-energize in a blocked condition. The SFRCS is required to be operable in Modes I through 3 by the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Technical Specification 3.3.2.2. In addition, due to the potential for the SFRCS re-energization in a blocked condition, this LER is being submitted in accordance with IOCFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) as a condition prohibited by the Technical Specifications.
Very truly yours, AWB/s Attachments cc:
Regional Administrator, USNRC Region III DB-I NRC Senior Resident Inspector DB-I NRC Senior Project Manager, USNRC Utility Radiological Safety Board
Docket Number 50-346 License Number NPF-3 NP-33-03-0014-00 Attachment Page I of 1 COMMITMENT LIST The following list identifies those actions committed to by the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station in this document. Any other actions discussed in the submittal represent intended or planned actions by Davis-Besse. They are described only as information and are not regulatory
commitments
Please notify the Manager - Regulatory Affairs (419-321-8450) at Davis-Besse of any questions regarding this document or associated regulatory commitments.
COMMITMENTS
DUE DATE Corrective Action to fix the SFRCS logic to prevent the Actuation Channel from re-energizing in a blocked configuration was performed in accordance with the Engineering Change process.
Following the modification, the four SFRCS logic channels were energized using the SFRCS Operating Procedure to verify that SFRCS logic channels do not assume the blocked condition upon restoration of power.
Complete.
Complete.
Abstract
On October 15, 2003, with the plant in Mode 5, the Steam and Feedwater Rupture Control System (SFRCS) Logic Channel 1 re-energized in a blocked condition.
While performing the initial investigation, on October 17, 2003, it was discovered that any of the four logic channels could be re-energized in a blocked condition, depending on different operating configuration conditions.
Therefore, this condition was conservatively reported to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission as required by 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Notification Number 40256.
Subsequent investigation determined that the effect on plant operation is limited to a rupture on Once Through Steam Generator (OTSG) 2 with Logic Channel 4 re-energizing in a blocked configuration. If this postulated event occurred, Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 2 would continue to feed the ruptured OTSG.
This design condition has existed since 1988 following a modification to replace the SFRCS cabinets. Corrective Action has been completed which modified the SFRCS logic module to prevent the undesirable block from becoming enabled until the power supply voltage stabilizes and prevents the block initiation without operator action. Because SFRCS did not meet single failure criterion due to this condition, this event is conservatively reportable as an unanalyzed condition in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B). The condition also represented an operation or condition prohibited by the Technical Specifications and is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B).
NRC FORM 366 (7-2001)
(if more space is required, use additional copies of (If more space is required, use additional copies of (If more space is required, use additional copies of (If more space is required, use additional copies of (If more space is required, use additional copies of (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)
FAILURE DATA:
There have been no License Event Reports submitted by Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station in the last three years, reporting an event due to the SFRCS Logic Channels re-energizing in a "Blocked" condition.
Searches conducted on the Corrective Action Program database and records management did not identify other previous similar events in the last three years for which corrective action could have been expected to prevent this occurrence.
Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) codes are identified in the text as [XX].
NP-33-03-014-00 CRs 03-08917 and 03-08887
|
|---|
|
|
| | | Reporting criterion |
|---|
| 05000346/LER-2003-001, Potential Inability of Air-Operated Valves to Function During Design Basis Conditions | Potential Inability of Air-Operated Valves to Function During Design Basis Conditions | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | | 05000346/LER-2003-002-01, Regarding Potential Degradation of High Pressure Injection Pumps Due to Debris in Emergency Sump Fluid Post Accident | Regarding Potential Degradation of High Pressure Injection Pumps Due to Debris in Emergency Sump Fluid Post Accident | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition | | 05000346/LER-2003-002, Re Potential Degradation of High Pressure Injection Pumps Due to Debris in Emergency Sump Fluid Post Accident | Re Potential Degradation of High Pressure Injection Pumps Due to Debris in Emergency Sump Fluid Post Accident | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | | 05000346/LER-2003-003, From Davis-Besse Unit 1, Regarding Potential Inadequate HPI Pump Minimum Recirculation Flow Following SBLOCA | From Davis-Besse Unit 1, Regarding Potential Inadequate HPI Pump Minimum Recirculation Flow Following SBLOCA | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability | | 05000346/LER-2003-004, For Davis-Besse Unit 1 Regarding Inadequate Calibration of Reactor Coolant System Temperature Instrumentation | For Davis-Besse Unit 1 Regarding Inadequate Calibration of Reactor Coolant System Temperature Instrumentation | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)(2) | | 05000346/LER-2003-005, Containment Gas Analyzer Heat Exchanger Valves Found Closed Rendering the Containment Gas Analyzer Inoperable | Containment Gas Analyzer Heat Exchanger Valves Found Closed Rendering the Containment Gas Analyzer Inoperable | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | | 05000346/LER-2003-006, From Davis-Besse Unit 1 Regarding Potential Errors in Analysis of Block Walls Regarding HELB Differential Pressure & Seismic Events | From Davis-Besse Unit 1 Regarding Potential Errors in Analysis of Block Walls Regarding HELB Differential Pressure & Seismic Events | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | | 05000346/LER-2003-007, AC System Analysis Shows Potential Loss of Offsite Power Following Design Basis Accident | AC System Analysis Shows Potential Loss of Offsite Power Following Design Basis Accident | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | | 05000346/LER-2003-008, Relays Installed in Safety Features Actuation System with Insufficient Contact Voltage Ratings | Relays Installed in Safety Features Actuation System with Insufficient Contact Voltage Ratings | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System | | 05000346/LER-2003-009, Regarding Loss of Offsite Power Due to Degraded Regional Grid Voltage | Regarding Loss of Offsite Power Due to Degraded Regional Grid Voltage | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) | | 05000346/LER-2003-010, Potential Inoperability of Decay Heat/Low Pressure Injection System Due to Loss of Valve Disc Pins | Potential Inoperability of Decay Heat/Low Pressure Injection System Due to Loss of Valve Disc Pins | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | | 05000346/LER-2003-011, Inoperability of Containment Spray Pump 1 Due to Solid State Trip Device Ground Fault False Trip | Inoperability of Containment Spray Pump 1 Due to Solid State Trip Device Ground Fault False Trip | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | | 05000346/LER-2003-012, Regarding Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Turbine Inoperable Due to Degraded Steam Traps | Regarding Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Turbine Inoperable Due to Degraded Steam Traps | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | | 05000346/LER-2003-013, Regarding Trip of Reactor Protection System During Plant Cooldown | Regarding Trip of Reactor Protection System During Plant Cooldown | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation | | 05000346/LER-2003-014, Re Steam Feedwater Rupture Controls System Re-Energizes in a Blocked Condition | Re Steam Feedwater Rupture Controls System Re-Energizes in a Blocked Condition | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications |
|