05000346/LER-2005-001, Re Inadvertent Loss of Essential Bus and Start of Emergency Diesel Generator During Testing
| ML050750408 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Davis Besse  |
| Issue date: | 03/14/2005 |
| From: | Bezilla M FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Co |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| NP-33-05-001-00 LER 05-001-00 | |
| Download: ML050750408 (8) | |
| Event date: | |
|---|---|
| Report date: | |
| Reporting criterion: | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications |
| 3462005001R00 - NRC Website | |
text
FENOC 5501 North State Route 2 FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company Oak Harbor, Ohio 43449 Mark B. Bezilla 41932-7676 Vice President - Nuclear Fax: 419-321-7582 NP-33-05-001-00 Docket Number 50-346 License Number NPF-3 March 14, 2005 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555-0001 Ladies and Gentlemen:
LER 2005-001-00 Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit Number I Date of Occurrence -January 13, 2005 Enclosed please find Licensee Event Report 2005-001-00, which is being submitted to provide vritten notification of de-energization of an Essential 4160 Volt Bus and start of an Emergency Diesel Generator during surveillance testing of undervoltage relays. This event occurred due to inadvertent contact of a test lead with an energized portion of the undervoltage relay circuitry.
This event is being reported pursuant to I OCFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) as an event that resulted in automatic actuation of an Emergency Diesel Generator. Immediate notification of this event wvas made to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission on January 13, 2005 (Event Number 41330).
Commitments associated with this Licensee Event Report are listed in the Attachment.
Very truly yours, GMW Attachment Enclosure cc:
Regional Administrator, USNRC Region III DB-I Senior Project Manager, USNRC DB-I NRC Senior Resident Inspector Utility Radiological Safety Board
Docket Number 50-346 License Number NPF-3 NP-33 001-00 Attachment Page I of 1 COMMITMENT LIST The following list identifies those actions committed to by the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station in this document. Any other actions discussed in the submittal represent intended or planned actions by Davis-Besse. They are described only as information and are not regulatory
commitments
Please notify the Manager - Regulatory Compliance (419-321-8585) at Davis-Besse of any questions regarding this document or associated regulatory commitments.
COMMITMENTS
DUE DATE I. The station administrative procedure governing' the conduct of maintenance will be revised to direct that test leads and jumpers that could affect a critical system function or have a significant plant impact should be protected from inadvertent contact by a combination of shielded plugs and/or two-part test leads/jumpers and/or insulated material. In applications where these types of test leads and jumpers cannot be used, the procedure will direct that a Condition Report be generated to determine appropriate compensatory measures or evaluation of acceptable risk.
- 2. Panel mounted shielded connections will be designed and installed to eliminate the potential for inadvertent contact for the test connections on the Essential Buses C1 and DI.
- 1. April 30, 2005
- 2. Test connections will be installed during the next scheduled Essential Bus outages, which are currently scheduled for the 14th Refueling Outage (Spring 2006) for Bus DI, and the 15 th Refueling Outage (Spring 2008) for Bus Cl.
NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES 6/30/2007 (6-2004)
, the NRC may (See reverse for required number of not conduct or sponsor. and a person Is not required to respond to. the digits/characters for each block)
Infomiation collection.
- 3. PAGE Davis-Besse Unit Number 1 05000346 1 OF6
- 4. TITLE Inadvertent Loss of Essential Bus and Start of Emergency Diesel Generator During Testing
- 5. EVENT DATE
- 6. LER NUMBER
- 7. REPORT DATE
- 8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED SECUENTIAL REV FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER MONTH DAY EAR Y
EARONTH AY YEAR05000 01 13 2005 2005 001 00 03 14 2005 FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER
___05000
- 9. OPERATING MODE
- 11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANTTO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR§: (Check all that apply)
El 20.2201(b)
E 20.2203(a)(3)(i) 0 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C)
El 50.73(a)(2)(vii) 1 a
20.2201(d)
E 20.2203(a)(3)(ii)
E 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(a)
El 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)
D 20.2203(a)(1)
E 20.2203(a)(4)
El 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B)
El 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)
E 20.2203(a)(2)(i)
E 50.36(c)(1)(i)(A)
El 50.73(a)(2)(iii)
Dl 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)
- 10. POWER LEVEL 0 20.2203(a)(2)(ii)
E0 50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A)
Z 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)
D 50.73(a)(2)(x)
E 20.2203(a)(2)(iii)
E 50.36(c)(2)
E 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A)
E 73.71 (a)(4) 100 D 20.2203(a)(2)(iv) a 50.46(a)(3)(ii)
E 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B)
E 73.71(a)(5)
E 20.2203(a)(2)(v)
DJ 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A)
El 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)
El OTHER Specify in Abstract below 0 20.2203(a)(2)(vi)
E 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)
El 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D) or In (If more space is required, use additional copies of (if more space is required, use additional copies of (If more space is required, use additional copies of (If more space Is required, use additional copies of (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A)
FAILURE DATA:
There have been no Licensee Event Reports at the DBNPS involving a de-energization of an Essential 4160 V Bus in the previous three years that were not the result of external causes (LER 2003-009 documented a loss of offsite power at the DBNPS due to degraded regional grid voltage where both EDGs started to re-energize the Essential 4160 V Buses). Three similar events occurred at the DBNPS involving de-energization of Essential 4160 V Buses during undervoltage relay testing in 1988, 1989, and 1990. Following these three events, plant equipment was modified to add a test block to allow better access to connection points and better connection points for undervoltage relay testing.
However, these previously modified connections were not the connections involved in the January 13, 2005, test of the undervoltage relays.
Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) codes are identified in the text as [XX].
NP-33-05-001-00 CRs 2005-00219, 2005-00260