05000346/LER-2003-013, Regarding Trip of Reactor Protection System During Plant Cooldown
| ML033370828 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Davis Besse  |
| Issue date: | 12/01/2003 |
| From: | Myers L FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Co |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| NP-33-03-013-00 LER 03-013-00 | |
| Download: ML033370828 (7) | |
| Event date: | |
|---|---|
| Report date: | |
| Reporting criterion: | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation |
| 3462003013R00 - NRC Website | |
text
FENOC FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company 5501 North State Route 2 Oak Harbor, Ohio 43449 Lew W. Myrs Chief Operating Officer 419-321-7599 Fax: 419-321-7582 NP-33-03-013-00 Docket No. 50-346 License No. NPF-3 December 1, 2003 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555 Ladies and Gentlemen:
LER 2003-013-00 Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. I Date of Occurrence - September 30. 2003 Enclosed please find Licensee Event Report 2003-013-00 which is being submitted to provide written notification of an unplanned reactor trip condition with the reactor shutdown. This trip occurred due to a Shutdown Bypass High Pressure signal. This signal inserted trippable reactivity Control Rod Group 1 while in the process of performing a plant cooldown activity.
This event is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), an event that resulted in actuation of the Reactor Protection System. An 8-hour immediate notification of this event was made to the NRC on September 30, 2003 (Event No. 40208). Commitments associated with this LER are listed in the Attachment.
Very truly yours, PSJ/s Enclosures cc:
Regional Administrator, USNRC Region III DB-I Project Manager, USNRC DB-1 NRC Senior Resident Inspector Utility Radiological Safety Board
Docket Number 50-346 License Number NPF-3 NP-33-03-013-00 Attachment Page 1 of I COMMITMENT LIST The following list identifies those actions committed to by the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station in this document. Any other actions discussed in the submittal represent intended or planned actions by Davis-Besse. They are described only as information and are not regulatory
commitments
Please notify the Manager - Regulatory Affairs (419-321-8450) at Davis-Besse of any questions regarding this document or associated regulatory commitments.
COMMITMENTS
DUE DATE
- 1. Revise procedure DB-OP-06903, "Plant Shutdown and Cooldown," to provide more prescriptive guidance for plant cooldown operation.
- 2. Revise procedure DB-OP-06903, "Plant Shutdown and Cooldown," to incorporate a requirement to conduct a pre-job brief that includes specific operating experience gained from this event.
- 3. Discuss this event with on-shift operating personnel and include guidance on management expectations when differences are encountered between training and actual plant conditions.
- 4. Develop a Case Study of this event for initial and continuing training with a focus on constant cognizance of the proper operating envelope and the need to continually monitor multiple indications for each parameter.
- 5. Develop an Operations Improvement Action Plan and implement items designated for restart.
- 1. Complete.
- 2. Complete.
- 3. Complete.
- 4. January 31, 2004.
- 5. Prior to restart
Abstract
On September 30, 2003, with the plant in Mode 3 following completion of a normal operating pressure test using non-nuclear heat, operators were performing a plant cooldown. The Reactor Coolant System (RCS) was at approximately 1750 psig and 532 degrees F with the Reactor Protection System (RPS) Shutdown Bypass High Pressure Trip of approximately 1812 psig enabled. Control Rod Group 1 (trippable reactivity) was withdrawn. At approximately 2125 hours0.0246 days <br />0.59 hours <br />0.00351 weeks <br />8.085625e-4 months <br />, plant cooldown commenced by opening of the Turbine Bypass Valves (TBVs). The degree of opening of the TBVs exceeded that required for a properly controlled cooldown rate. A decrease in RCS pressure and Pressurizer level was experienced. Recovery efforts then resulted in an increase in RCS pressure which caused an unplanned RPS actuation and reactor trip on a Shutdown Bypass High Pressure signal. The RPS and all components responded as intended.
There were no post-trip response equipment issues identified. The causes of this event were determined to be operator performance, procedural guidance, and a pre-job brief which were all less than adequate. Corrective actions include event-specific training and procedure enhancements. Notification of this event was made on September 30, 2003, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). This report is being provided pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), an event that resulted in actuation of the RPS.
NRC FORM 366 7-201)
(If more space is required, use additional copies of (If more space is required, use additional copies of (If more space is required, use additional copies of (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)
Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) codes are identified in the text as [XX].
NP-33-03-013-O0 CR 03-08374