05000344/LER-1981-005, Forwards LER 81-005/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

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Forwards LER 81-005/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl
ML19347D996
Person / Time
Site: Trojan File:Portland General Electric icon.png
Issue date: 04/03/1981
From: Yundt C
PORTLAND GENERAL ELECTRIC CO.
To: Engelken R
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV), NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V)
Shared Package
ML19347D997 List:
References
CPY-272-81, NUDOCS 8104140593
Download: ML19347D996 (3)


LER-1981-005, Forwards LER 81-005/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl
Event date:
Report date:
3441981005R00 - NRC Website

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7 30 3 a $ 3 6-37 U April 3, 1981 CPY-272-81 Mr. R. H. Engelken, Director Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region V 1990 North California Blvd.

Walnut Creek, CA 94596

Dear Sir:

In accordance with the Trojan Plant Operating License, Appendix A, US NRC Technical Specification, Paragraph 3.6.3.1, attached is Licensee Event Report No. 81-05.

This report describes a situation where the Technical Specification for containment isolation valves was not satisified due to an incorrect valve lineup on the Containment Spray System.

Sincerely, 1

W C. P. Yundt General Manager CPY/RPS:na Attachment <r-c: LER Distribution List tk

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9 REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE 1.

Report No.:

81-05 2.

a.

Report Date:

April 3, 1981 b.

Occurrence Date: March 5, 1981 3.

Facility: Trojan Nuclear Plant, PO Box 439, Rainier, OR 97048 4.

Identification of Occurrence:

Following routine surveillance testing, valves MO-2052A and M0-2069A were incorrectly positioned.

These valves act as the Containment boundary between the recirculation sump in Containment and the Contain-ment Spray System in the Auxiliary Building. Under these conditions, Technical Specification requirements for Containment integrity were not satisfied.

5.

Conditions Prior to Occurrence:

The plant was operating in Mode 1 at 100% power.

6.

Description of Occurrence:

Upon completion of surveillance testing of valves in the Containment Spray System, the system was returned to operation with an incorrect valve lineup. Valve M0-2052A was inadvertently left open with control power deenergized while valve MO-2069A was left closed with control power energized. The normal lineup for these valves is M0-2052A closed and deenergized and MO-2069A open and energized.

These valves serve as the boundary between the recirculation sump in Containment and the Containment Spray System in the Auxiliary Building.

Technical Specifications for Containment isolation valves require that when a single valve is used for Containment isolation, its power source must be deactivated. With the valves in the incorrect lineup, this Tech-nical Specification was not satisified. This condition existed for approximately 5-1/2 hours.

7.

Designation of Apparent Cause of Occurrence:

The cause of this event is attributed to personnel error. The control switches for M0-2052A and MO-2069A are adjacent to each other on the control board. When intending to close MO-2052A, the operator inadvertently positioned the switch for valve MO-2069A.

8.

Significance of Occurrence:

This event had no adverse effect on either plant or public safety.

Containment integrity was maintained with the shut isolation valve.

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- 9. ' Corrective Action:

Plant procedures will be changed to require an indapendent verification of'the position of valves whose power supplies are deenergized following valve operation.

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