05000344/LER-1981-010, Forwards LER 81-010/03L.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
Forwards LER 81-010/03L.Detailed Event Analysis Encl
ML20004F122
Person / Time
Site: Trojan File:Portland General Electric icon.png
Issue date: 05/29/1981
From: Yundt C
PORTLAND GENERAL ELECTRIC CO.
To: Engelken B
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
Shared Package
ML20004F123 List:
References
CPY-428-81, NUDOCS 8106160527
Download: ML20004F122 (2)


LER-1981-010, Forwards LER 81-010/03L.Detailed Event Analysis Encl
Event date:
Report date:
3441981010R00 - NRC Website

text

_ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _

L.

% f Mb ME&

/ -'

+

Portland General Electric Company N

Trojan Nuclear Plant jut { 4 L

b P.O. Box 439 E

Rainier, Oregon 97048

  • (a-(503)S56 3713 9

May 29, 1981 1

CPY-428-81 Mr. R. H. Engelken, Director Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region V 1990 North California Boulevard Walnut Creek, California 94596

Dear Sir:

In accordance with the Trojan Plant Operating License, Appandix A, US NRC Technical Specifications, Paragraph 6.9.1.7, attached is Licensee Event Re-port No.81-010, concerning a situation where Technical Specifications for Containment integrity were not satisfied due to a Containment airlock door being lef t open.

Sincerely.

Of C.

Yundt General Manager CPY mae

/9 Attachments

'll i9'7 JUNJ,3 OSIh c:

LER Distribution g

Q i

  • D 5

w

'q

/

gbY

h 810 6 2 6 0 53 ~f S

6/-/3A

~

i

=

u~

REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE 1.

Report No.:

81-010 2.

a.

Report Date:

June 1,1981 b.

Occurrence Date: May 7, 1981 3.

Facility: Trojan Nuclear Plant, P.O. Box 439, Rainier, Oregon 97048 4.

Identification of Occurrence:

The outer door of the airlock at the 93' elevation of Containment was left open for approximately 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br />. The plant was in Mode 3 at this time and Technical Specifications require that both airlock doors be closed except when the airlock is being used for normal transit. With the outer door left open, the requirements of this specification were not met.

5.

Conditions Prior to Occurrence:

The plant was in Mode 3, Hot Standby.

6.

Description of Occurrence:

A plant security guard had been stationed in the airlock to assist per-sonnel in entering and exiting from the Containment. Security personnel had.been instructed on the requirements for proper operation of the air-lock doors while in this mode. The plant security. guard did not appreciate the significance of these requirements and wanted to leave the outer door open and man his station from outsic; the airlock. The guard asked a mem-ber of the contract radiation protection work force if this was permissible and after receiving what he thought to be an affirmative answer, opened the outer door. The door remained open for approximately 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> when it was noticed by plant Operations personnel and closed.

7.

Designation of Apparent Cause of Occurrence:

The cause of this event is attributed to personnel error. The security guard did not appreciate the signficance of the requirements and did not understand that Operations should have been contacted for permission to change the way in which he -eas instructed to operate the airlock.

8.

Significance of Occurrence:

This event had no effect on either plant or public safety. The other air-lock door was shut during this time period and system interlocks prevent both doors from being opened simultaneously.

9.

Corrective Action

A letter and training guide for security guards manning the airlock has been developed and is being used to instruct personnel. This includes requirements to clear changes with the Shift Supervisor. A copy of this l

is also posted in the airlock for refere nee.

w

,,,e my.

9- -.v-g

- en-,-..,.w,,w--

g

-*e+-

--,+.,+,ys

,,,-,i

.-..m, w.--,.,-,-a--*-..-,---,-s..,e.,,,e.

wsc

---e-w--e.-