05000344/LER-1981-016, Forwards LER 81-016/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

Forwards LER 81-016/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

ML20010F477
Person / Time
Site:	Trojan File:Portland General Electric icon.png
Issue date:	08/27/1981
From:	Yundt C PORTLAND GENERAL ELECTRIC CO.
To:	Engelken R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
Shared Package
ML20010F478	List: 05000344/LER-1981-016, Forwards LER 81-016/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl 05000344/LER-1981-016-03, /03L-0:on 810728,during Operator Insp W/Reactor at 80% Power,Train B Hydrogen Recombiner Was Inoperable.Caused by Inadvertent Activation of Fire Protection Deluge Sys. Control Power Transformer Replaced
References
CPY-644-81, NUDOCS 8109100264
Download: ML20010F477 (2)

LER-1981-016, Forwards LER 81-016/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

Event date:
Report date:
3441981016R00 - NRC Website

text

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0 Portland General Electric Company Trojan Nuclear Plant P.O. Box 439 Rainier, Oregon 97048 (503)S56-3713 August 27, 1981 CPY-644-81 e,i{ R t l e s<f Mr. R. H. Engelken, Director S

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I Nuclear Regulatory Cocnission, Region V g

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1990 North California Blvd.

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Dear Sir:

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In accordance with the Trojan Plant Operating License,e US NRC Technical Specf.fications, Paragraph 6.9.1.9, attache Licensee Event Report No. 81-16, concerning a situation where the "B" train hydrogen recombiner was inoperable.

Sincerely,

i General Manager CPY/MJA:na Attachments c: LER Distribution List l

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P109100264 810827 PDR ADOCK 05000344 S

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t REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE 1.

Report No.:

81-16 2.

a.

Report Date:

August 27, 1981 b.

Occurrence Date: July 28, 1981 3.

Facility: Trojan Nuclear Plant, PO Box 439, Rainier, OR 97048 4.

Identification of Occurrence:

Technical Specification 3.6.4.2 was not met when during a routine operator inspection it was discovered that the "B" train hydrogen recombiner was inoperable.

5.

Conditions Prior to occurrence:

Prior to the occurrence the plant was in Mode 1 at 80% reactor power.

6.

Description of Occurrence:

During steady state operations with the plant at 80% power, the control room operator noticed that control power had been lost to the "B" train hydrogen recombiner.

7.

Designation of Apparent Cause of Occurrence:

The loss of control power was due to inadvertent activation of the fire protection deluge system while welding in the electrical -

penetration area. This caused a short circuit in loss of control-power to the hydrogen recombiner.

8.

Analysis of Occurrence:

This event had no effect on plant or public safety since the redundant train hydroo,en recombiner was operable.

9.

Corrective Action

Corrective action taken was to replace the.lorted control power transformer.

Tt,x hydrogen recombiner was ttan tested and declared operable. In addition, Maintenance per.aon.el were counseled concerning proper ventilation for welding in enclosed areas and burning permits are under reviaion to verify that ventilacion requirements are met.