05000341/LER-1993-009
| ML20056F815 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Fermi  |
| Issue date: | 08/25/1993 |
| From: | Conen J, Gipson D DETROIT EDISON CO. |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| References | |
| CON-NRC-93-0088, CON-NRC-93-88 LER-93-009, LER-93-9, NUDOCS 9308310133 | |
| Download: ML20056F815 (5) | |
| Event date: | |
|---|---|
| Report date: | |
| 3412093009R00 - NRC Website | |
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DouDie, R Gipson
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10CFR50.73 August 25, 1993 NRC-93-0088 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attention: Document Control Desk ,
Washington, D.C. 20555
Reference:
Fermi 2 NRC Docket No. 50-341 NRC License No. NPF-43
Subject:
Licensee Event Report (LER) No.93-009 c
Please find enclosed LER No.93-009, dated August 25, 1993 for a ,
reportable event that occurred on July 26, 1993 A copy of this LER is also being sent to the Regional Administrator, USNRC Region III.
If you have any questions, please contact Joseph E. Conen, Senior i Compliance Engineer at (313) 586-1960. :
i Sincerely, P/27 c/G f" '
/
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Enclosure:
NRC Forms 366, 366A
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t cc: T. G. Colburn ;
W. J. Kropp ,
J. B. Martin l M. P. Phillips P. L; Torpey s
Wayne County Emergency i Management Division j l
nne 9308310133 930825 N '
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ABSTRACT (Lim:t to 1400 spaces, i e, appronmate!v 15 singte-spaced tvoewnt en lines) (16 On July 26, 1993 at approximately 1015, control) room operators noticed i increasing temperatures for heat loads cooled by General Service Water (GSW).
Because drywell pressure was increasing due to increasing temperature, drywell venti'ng was initiated. Emergency Equipment Cooling Water / Emergency Equipment Service Water (EECW/EESW) was manually started to supplement Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water (RBCCW), primarily for drywell cooling. The cooling provided by the EECW system reversed the drywell pressure increase. At 1032 as drywell pressure continued to decrease, drywell venting was terminated and a drywell to suppression chamber vacuum breaker opened briefly as expected. !
At 1050 a valve connecting the circulating water (CW) pond with the GSW intake was found open, diverting 95 degree water from the CW pond to the GSW system. l This had caused the temperature increase in the GSW system. At 1052 the valve was reclosed, and by 1100 plant temperatures were returning to normal. The EECW/EESW subsystems were shutdown and returned to standby by 1253 The valve opened when a painter, thinking that the control switch was an enclosed 120V electrical outlet, pushed the open lever to "open the enclosure".
The switch for this valve is mounted on an I-beam near the wall and had no identification label. The switch is now labelled, and the valve is now deenergized to prevent unintentional operation.
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l Initial Plant Conditions:
l l Operational Condition: 1 Power Operation Reactor Power: 93 Percent Reactor Pressure: 1010 psig Reactor Temperature: 540 degrees Fahrenheit Description of Event:
On July 26, 1993 at approximately 1015 hours0.0117 days <br />0.282 hours <br />0.00168 weeks <br />3.862075e-4 months <br />, control *oom operators noticed increasing temperatures for heat loads cooled by Pr ..al Service Water (GSW)[KG). GSW is a nonessential system which r avides cooling water from Lake Erie for plant equipment and cooling systems required for normal operation, i' including the Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water (RBCCW)[CC] System. RBCCW is a nonessential system which normally provides cooling for both essential and nonessential equipment in the auxiliary and reactor buildings, including nonessential Drywell Cooling [VB]. Because drywell pressure was increasing due to increasing temperature, drywell venting was initiated. At 1020 hours0.0118 days <br />0.283 hours <br />0.00169 weeks <br />3.8811e-4 months <br />, division 1 of Emergency Equipment Cooling Water / Emergency Equipment Service Water (EECW/EESW)[CC,BI] was manually initiated to supplement the (RBCCW) system, primarily for drywell cooling. Division 2 of LER 93-009/ DER 93-0421 Page 2 EECW/EESW was manually initiated approximately 3 minutes later. EECW/EESW is an ESP system designed to automatically provide cooling water for essential equipment if RBCCW is lost. The system can be manually initiated when RBCCW is operating. It will provide cooling water for the essential equipment normally cooled by RBCCW, and is capable of providing cooling water to some of the nonessential equipment served by RBCCW, including drywell coolers.
Drywell pressure stopped increasing and began to decrease as soon as EECW was started. At 1032 hours0.0119 days <br />0.287 hours <br />0.00171 weeks <br />3.92676e-4 months <br /> as drywell pressure continued to decrease, drywell venting was terminated and a drywell to suppression chamber vacuum breaker (T23F400B)[VACB] automatically opened as expected. The vacuum breaker reclosed at 1033 hours0.012 days <br />0.287 hours <br />0.00171 weeks <br />3.930565e-4 months <br />.
At 1050 hours0.0122 days <br />0.292 hours <br />0.00174 weeks <br />3.99525e-4 months <br /> a motor operated valve (P41F601) cross connecting the circulating water (CW)[KE] pond with the CSW intake was found open, diverting water from the CW reservoir (approximately 95 degrees) to the GSW intake, which had been drawing from Lak 2 Erie (approximately 75 degrees). This had caused the temperature increase in the OSW system. At 1052 hours0.0122 days <br />0.292 hours <br />0.00174 weeks <br />4.00286e-4 months <br /> the valve was reclosed, NE FORM ma psa
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and by 1100 hours0.0127 days <br />0.306 hours <br />0.00182 weeks <br />4.1855e-4 months <br /> plant temperatures were returning to normal. The EECW/EESW subsystems were shutdown and returned to their standby lineups by 1253 hours0.0145 days <br />0.348 hours <br />0.00207 weeks <br />4.767665e-4 months <br />. l Cause of Event This event occurred when a painter (contractor, nonlicensed) working in the GSW pump house depressed the "open" lever of the control switch for P41F601. While setting up to paint, the painter was looking for a 120V electrical outlet and thought this switch (mounted approximately 3 feet above floor on an I-beam near the building wall) was an enclosed electrical outlet. He believed that 4 depressing the open lever would unlatch the enclosure, providing access to an electrical outlet. Other than open/close, no component identification label was provided for this switch. The cause of this event was the lack of clear :
labelling of the control switch. While the painter had been instructed not to l operate plant equipment and valves, he was not aware that,he was operating a l valve when he depressed the open lever of the control switch. The painter had seen covered electrical outlets at other facilities that resembled this switch configuration.
Contributing to this event was a lack of administrative control preventing mis-operation of the valve. This normally closed valve is designed to be opened to supply water to the GSW intake from the CW reservoir during abnormally low lake level conditions when loss of normal supply to GSW from Lake Erie is imminent. The valve is operated locally at GSW, and no control, indication, or alarm'of its operation is provided in the main control room.
Work practices of the painter also contributed to this event. The painter had several opportunities to prevent or mitigate this event by asking for assistance when attempting to find an outIct or when the enclosure did not open as expected.
1 Analysis of Event:
This event had minimal safety significance. Operator actions in response to the rising equipment temperatures were appropriate. While not required, the manual initiation of EECW/EESW, an ESF system, contributed to plant stability while the reason for increasing temperatures was being investigated. An engineering evaluation concluded that plant operaticn could have continued during this event '
without reliance on the supplemental drywell cooling provided by EECW/EESW.
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- ru, w n. .o.c. . ,.e,.a a. .-~ en- n8; i ,, nw o r, f Corrective Actions:
The control switch for P41F601 has now been labelled and the valve is now deenergized to prevent unintentional operation. Also, a survey of the outbuildings is being conducted for other important equipment and controls to ensure proper identification and warning labels are installed. This survey will '
also look for cases where additional administrative controls should be applied.
This will be completed by September 30, 1993 An accountability meeting was held with the contractor organization personnel on July 27 The meeting included a discussion of this event and the role that :
self-checking can play in preventing similar events. Additionally, site personnel are being reminded that work outside the power block areas must be conducted to the same standards applied inside to help prevent recurrence of ,
this type of event. .
l Previous Similar Events:
None. ;
s NEC F0FtM 3B6A (5 92)