01-06-2009 | On November 7, 2008, at Nine Mile Point Unit 1 ( NMP1), both channels for the drywell pressure monitors required by Technical Specification (TS) 3.6.11, Accident Monitoring Instrumentation, were declared inoperable.
While performing design and qualification basis validation activities for Environmental Qualification, it was discovered that the power supplies for the drywell pressure monitors credited for TS compliance are not qualified for the required 100-day post-Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) integrated dose. As such, this item is reportable because the drywell pressure monitors were inoperable and the action required by the TS was not implemented.
Per TS 3.6.11, Table 3.6.11-2, Accident Monitoring Instrumentation Action Statements, Action 4.b, a pre planned alternate method of monitoring drywell pressure was initiated upon discovery. The alternate instruments being utilized cover the drywell pressure ranges expected during design bases accidents and are the instruments currently utilized in the NMP1 Emergency Operating and Severe Accident Procedures.
Design modifications to restore the drywell pressure monitoring instruments referenced in TS 3.6.11 to operable status are being evaluated. |
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LER-2008-003, Power Supplies for Drywell Pressure Indication not Qualified for Required Post-Accident Operating DurationDocket Number |
Event date: |
11-06-2008 |
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Report date: |
01-06-2009 |
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Reporting criterion: |
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications |
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2202008003R00 - NRC Website |
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I. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT
A. PRE-EVENT PLANT CONDITIONS:
On November 7, 2008, Nine Mile Point Unit 1 was operating steady state at 100% power.
B. EVENT:
During design and qualification basis validation activities for Environmental Qualification (EQ), the power supplies supporting the post accident drywell pressure monitors were determined to be unqualified for the required post-accident operating duration. These power supplies support drywell pressure monitors PI-201.2-483A and PI-201.2-484A. This deficiency is due to the limited radiation levels to which the reactor trip unit cabinet power supplies, in the Analog Trip System (ATS) cabinets are qualified for under LOCA conditions. This condition does not affect the ability of the ATS cabinets to perform their required trip or interlock function(s) following a LOCA or other Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.97 functions when they are required.
The condition was identified based on a revised point-specific dose calculation for the ATS cabinets. Based on the calculation, a Design Bases LOCA will result in the total integrated dose reaching the qualified radiation levels in less than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. These instruments are required to function for 100 days post-accident.
Upon declaring the monitors inoperable, TS Table 3.6.11-2, Action 4.b, requires a pre-planned alternate method of monitoring this parameter to be implemented within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. Instruments PI-201.2-105A and PI-201.2-106A are wide range drywell pressure indication loops approved as RG 1.97 instruments and are pre-planned alternates for the TS monitors.
C. INOPERABLE STRUCTURES, COMPONENTS, OR SYSTEMS THAT CONTRIBUTED TO
THE EVENT:
The power supplies supporting the post-accident range drywell pressure transmitters were determined to be unqualified for the required post-accident operating duration. These power supplies support instrumentation loops for PI-201.2-483A and PI-201.2-484A. This deficiency is due to the limited radiation levels to which the reactor trip unit cabinet power supplies (ATS cabinets) are qualified for LOCA conditions. This condition does not affect the ability of the ATS cabinets to perform their required trip or interlock function(s) following a LOCA or other RG 1.97 functions when they are required.
D. DATES AND APPROXIMATE TIMES OF MAJOR OCCURRENCES:
September 23, 1981: Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station (NMPNS) informed the NRC that Containment Pressure Monitors as required by NUREG-0737 have been installed (PI-201.2 483A and PI-201.2-484A).
April 1, 1985: Drywell pressure monitors added to Unit 1 Technical Specifications as part of License Amendment 72.
July 28, 1989: PI-201.2-483A and PI-201.2-484A specifically identified as wide range drywell pressure monitors in NMPNS response to NUREG-0737 Supplement 1, Section 6.2.
November 6, 2008, 1553: Engineering recognized that drywell pressure monitors PI-201.2-483A and PI-201.2-484A are not qualified for the required post-accident operating duration.
November 7, 2008, 0129: Both channels of wide range drywell pressure monitors declared inoperable because they are not qualified for the required post-accident operating duration.
Implemented use of pre-planned alternative drywell pressure monitors PI-201.2-105A and PI-201.2 106A per TS Table 3.6.11-2, Action 4.b.
E. OTHER SYSTEMS OR SECONDARY FUNCTIONS AFFECTED:
No other systems or secondary functions are affected by this condition.
F. METHOD OF DISCOVERY:
The condition was identified based on a revised point-specific dose calculation performed for the ATS cabinets.
G. MAJOR OPERATOR ACTION:
No significant Operator action was required to respond to this condition.
H. SAFETY SYSTEM RESPONSES:
No safety system response was required nor occurred as a result of this condition.
II. CAUSE OF EVENT:
The cause of this event was a historical error in the EQ analysis for the post-accident drywell pressure monitors. The analysis failed to consider the potential impact of post-LOCA radiation levels on the power supplies, which are located inside the Reactor Building, as part of the EQ analysis.
III. ANALYSIS OF THE EVENT:
This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) as a condition not allowed by Technical Specifications because:
- Drywell pressure indication loops PI-201.2-483A and PI-201.2-484A are credited for meeting this requirement.
- It has been determined that the power supply for PI-201.2-483A and PI-201.2-484A are not qualified for the required post-accident operating duration, and therefore are inoperable.
This condition has existed since Unit 1 TS Amendment 72 was issued April 1, 1985.
- Use of a pre-planned alternate drywell pressure monitors was not implemented until November 7, 2008.
Drywell pressure monitors PI-201.2-483A and PI-201.2-484A have not been qualified for the required post-accident operating time since they were installed. The channels are scheduled to be restored to an operable condition no later than April 30, 2011. In the interim, pre-planned alternate drywell pressure monitors PI-201.2-105A and PI-201.2-106A will be relied upon to satisfy TS requirements for monitoring post-accident drywell pressure.
Drywell pressure indication is an Emergency Operating Procedure (EOP) key parameter for design basis conditions. However, other drywell pressure instrumentation than the TS instrumentation, narrow and wide range, is credited in the EOP Bases Documentation as EOP key parameters that provide the same functions. The other drywell pressure instrumentation loops are not affected by this issue. These instruments remain fully capable to meet the required design functions during accident conditions, and provide indication of the full range of expected pressures in the drywell.
These instruments are EOP key parameters.
Technical Specification Section 3.6.11 requires two channels of Drywell pressure to be operable.
Both the normal and wide range instrumentation loops include two channels. Both are fully capable of meeting the required plant conditions through the narrow range (0-4 PSIG) loops supporting indicators PI-201.2-13A and PI-201.2-01B and the wide range (0-75 PSIG) supporting indicators Pl 201.2-105A and PI-201.2-106A.
The actual safety significance of this condition is low because the alternative drywell pressure monitors being used, PI-201.2-105A and PI-201.2-106A, are the monitors used in the EOPs and Severe Accident Procedures (SAPs) for monitoring post-accident drywell pressure rather than the TS monitors.
IV. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:
A. ACTION TAKEN TO RETURN AFFECTED SYSTEMS TO PRE-EVENT NORMAL STATUS:
Use of a pre-planned alternate drywell pressure monitors has been implemented. There is no time limit specified in TS for maximum duration that a pre-planned alternative can be used.
B. ACTION TAKEN OR PLANNED TO PREVENT RECURRENCE:
Actions required to resolve this issue for PI-201.2-483A and PI-201.2-484A include an alternative analysis to determine the best design change solution. Design change options to restore the originally intended monitoring capabilities include, but are not limited to:
a) provide new/different power supplies to PI-201.2-483A and PI-201.2-484A instrument loops, b) change the range of PI-201.2-105A and PI-201.2-106A instrument loops and add recording capability, to meet NUREG-0737, and make them the designated TS monitors, c) install shielding to the existing ATS cabinet power supplies sufficient for Environmental Qualification.
This analysis will be complete and the selected method implemented no later than April 30, 2011.
This activity is being tracked by CR-2008-008383. This completion date is appropriate because:
- An outage is required to implement any of the proposed solutions.
- There is limited time to analyze the options and prepare a design change for installation during the spring 2009 refueling outage. If the modification cannot be completed in the 2009 outage, the next planned outage is in the spring of 2011.
Design and qualification basis validation reviews were recently completed to ensure compliance with 10 CFR 50.49 for all existing Unit 1 EQ components. No other reportable conditions were identified as a result of this review.
V. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:
A. FAILED COMPONENTS:
No failed components are associated with this condition.
B. PREVIOUS LERs ON SIMILAR EVENTS:
Nine Mile Point Unit 2, LER 2008-001, submitted 04/10/2008, Unqualified Relays Installed Since Original Construction Result in an Unanalyzed Condition C. THE ENERGY INDUSTRY IDENTIFICATION SYSTEM (EIIS) COMPONENT FUNCTION
IDENTIFIER AND SYSTEM NAME OF EACH COMPONENT OR SYSTEM REFERRED TO IN
THIS LER:
COMPONENT IEEE 803 FUNCTION�IEEE 805 SYSTEM IDENTIFIER�IDENTIFICATION Drywell Pressure Indicator PI� IP Power Supply RJX IP D.SPECIAL COMMENTS:
None
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| | Reporting criterion |
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05000413/LER-2008-001 | | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability | 05000334/LER-2008-001 | Control Room Envelope Air Intake During Normal Operation Higher Than Assumed In Design Basis Accident Dose Calculations | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000315/LER-2008-001 | Unit 1 Manual Reactor Trip due to Main Turbine Vibrations | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation | 05000272/LER-2008-001 | Inadvertent Start of an Emergency Diesel Generator During Testing | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation | 05000251/LER-2008-001 | Manual Reactor Trip due to High Level in the 4A Steam Generator | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation | 05000247/LER-2008-001 | Manual Reactor Trip Due to Decreasing Steam Generator Levels Caused by Loss of Feedwater Flow as a Result of Feedwater Pump Speed Control Malfunction | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function | 05000530/LER-2008-001 | Manual Reactor Trip when Removing a Degraded CEDM MG Set from Service | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function | 05000457/LER-2008-001 | 2A Essential Service Water Train Inoperable due to Strainer Fouling from Bryozoa Deposition and Growth | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000454/LER-2008-001 | Technical Specification Non-Compliance of Containment Sump Monitor Due to Improper Installation During Oriainal construction | | 05000440/LER-2008-001 | ' Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications Due to Unrecognized Reactor Core Isolation Cooling Inoperability | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000483/LER-2008-001 | Containment Cooler Inoperability | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000412/LER-2008-001 | Unplanned Actuation of the Auxiliary Feedwater System During Plant Startup | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation | 05000374/LER-2008-001 | High Pressure Core Spray System Declared Inoperable Due to Failed Room Ventilation Supply Fan | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident | 05000323/LER-2008-001 | Reactor Trip Due to Main Electrical Transformer Failure | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000305/LER-2008-001 | Pressurizer PORV and Reactor Coolant System Vent Valves Appendix R Spurious Operation Concern | | 05000271/LER-2008-001 | Crane Travel Limit Stops not Installed as Required by Technical Specifications due to an Inadequate Procedure | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000269/LER-2008-001 | Gas Void Found in High Pressure Injection System Suction Piping | | 05000263/LER-2008-001 | | | 05000261/LER-2008-001 | Appendix R Pathway Impassable due to Lock Configuration | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor | 05000361/LER-2008-001 | Valid actuation of Emergency Feedwater system following Main Feedwater pump trip | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation | 05000335/LER-2008-001 | Unattended Ammunition Discovered Inside Protected Area | | 05000456/LER-2008-001 | Technical Specification Non-Compliance Due to Inadequate Design of Auxiliary Feedwater (AF) Tunnel Access Covers Causing AF Valves Within the Tunnel to be Inoperable | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000423/LER-2008-001 | Postulated Fire Scenario Results in Unanalyzed Condition - Pressurizer Overfill | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition | 05000369/LER-2008-001 | Potential Failure of Containment Isolation Valves (CIV) to Remain Fully Closed and Ino erable loner than allowed bCTechnical S ecification 3.6.3. | | 05000220/LER-2008-002 | Manual Reactor Scram Due to Loss of Reactor Pressure Control | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation | 05000261/LER-2008-002 | Manual Reactor Trip due to High Turbine Vibrations | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation | 05000270/LER-2008-002 | Main Steam Relief Valves Exceeded Lift Setpoint Acceptance Band 050002 | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000305/LER-2008-002 | 5 . Blocked Open Steam Exclusion Door Results in Postulated Inoperability of Safety Systems | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition | 05000336/LER-2008-002 | Unplanned LCO Entry - Three Charging Pumps Aligned for Injection With the Reactor Coolant System Temperature Less than 300 Degrees F. | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000354/LER-2008-002 | BLOWN lE INVERTER MAIN FUSE WITH ONE EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR INOPERABLE CAUSES LOSS OF CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY FILTRATION LOSS OF SAFETY FUNCTION | | 05000395/LER-2008-002 | Control Room Normal and Emergency Air Handling Systems Inoperable Due to Pressure Boundary Breach | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000382/LER-2008-002 | Inoperable Steam Generator Narrow Range Level Channels | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000369/LER-2008-002 | 'Energy® BRUCE H HAMILTON Vice President McGuire Nuclear Station Duke Energy Corporation MGOIVP 112700 Hagers Ferry Road Huntersville, NC 28078 704-875-5333 704-875-4809 fax bhhamilton@duke-energy.corn August 21, 2008
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTENTION: Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555
Subject: Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC
McGuire Nuclear Station, Unit 1
Docket No. 50-369
Licensee Event Report 369/2008-02, Revision 0
Problem Investigation Process No.: M-08-03862
Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73 Sections (a)(1) and (d), attached
is Licensee Event Report (LER) 369/2008-02, Revision 0,
regarding the Unit 1 Reactor trip on June 26, 2008 due to
the 1B Reactor Coolant Pump Motor trip which was caused by
a failed surge capacitor.
This report is being submitted in accordance with 10 CFR
50.73 (a)(2)(iv)(A). This event is considered to be of no
significance with respect to the health and safety of the
public. There are no regulatory commitments contained in
this LER.
If questions arise regarding this LER, contact Lee A. Hentz
at 704-875-4187.
Very truly yours,
Bruce H. Hamilton
Attachment
www. duke-energy. corn U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
August 21, 2008
Page 2
cc: L. A. Reyes, Regional Administrator
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region II
Sam Nunn Atlanta Federal Center
61 Forsyth Street, SW, Suite 23T85
Atlanta, GA 30303
J. F. Stang, Jr. (Addressee Only)
Senior Project Manager (McGuire)
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Mail Stop O-8G9A
Washington, DC 20555
J. B. Brady
Senior Resident Inspector
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
McGuire Nuclear Station
B. 0. Hall, Section Chief
Radiation Protection Section
1645 Mail Service Center
Raleigh, NC 27699
NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVEDBYOMB:NO.3150-0104 EXPIRES: 08/31/2010 (9-2007) Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 50 hours. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Send ' LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) comments regarding burden estimate to the Records and FOIA/Privacy Service Branch (T-5 F52), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by internet e-mail to infocollects@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a (See reverse for required number of means used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control digits/characters for each block) number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to,' the information collection. 1, FACILITY NAME 2. DOCKET NUMBER I 3. PAGE 05000- ' 1 8McGuire Nuclear Station, Unit 1 _ 0369' OF .4, TITLE . . Unit 1 Reactor Trip due to the 1B Reactor Coolant Pump Motor Trip which was caused by a
failed Surge Capacitor | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation | 05000440/LER-2008-002 | Inoperable Emergency Closed Cooling System Results In Condition Prohibited By Technical Specifications | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000454/LER-2008-002 | Technical Specification Non-Compliance Due to Inadequate Design of Auxiliary Feedwater (AF) Tunnel Access Covers Causing AF Valves Within the Tunnel to be Inoperable | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000298/LER-2008-002 | Technical Specification Prohibited Condition Due to Safety Relief Valve Test Failure | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000237/LER-2008-002 | Unit 2 High Pressure Coolant Injection System Declared Inoperable | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident | 05000272/LER-2008-002 | | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000361/LER-2008-002 | Disturbance on the Pacific DC Intertie cause offsite power frequency to dip below operability limits | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident | 05000362/LER-2008-003 | Missed TS completion time results in TS Violation | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000220/LER-2008-003 | Power Supplies for Drywell Pressure Indication not Qualified for Required Post-Accident Operating Duration | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000529/LER-2008-003 | Technical Specification - Limiting Condition for Operation 3.0.3 for Greater Than 1 Hour | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000293/LER-2008-003 | | | 05000263/LER-2008-003 | | | 05000423/LER-2008-003 | Automatic Reactor Trip During Shutdown for Refueling Outage 3R12 ., | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation | 05000251/LER-2008-003 | . Class 1 Weld Leak Due to Fatigue and Completion of Technical Specification Required Shutdown | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown | 05000282/LER-2008-003 | Loss of AFW Safety Function and Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications Due to Mispositioned Isolation Valve | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000286/LER-2008-003 | Automatic Actuation of Emergency Diesel Generator 33 During Surveillance Testing Caused by .Inadvertent Actuation of the Undervoltage Sensing Circuit on 480 Volt AC Safeguards Bus 5A | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function | 05000361/LER-2008-003 | Disturbance on the Pacific DC Intertie cause offsite power frequency to dip below operability limits | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident | 05000305/LER-2008-003 | Door Bottom Seal Failure Results in Inoperability of Control Room Ventilation System | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat |
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