05000324/FIN-2010002-02
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Finding | |
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| Title | Inadequate Risk Evaluation for Removing the 1A South Condenser from Service |
| Description | The inspectors identified a Green NCV of 10 CFR Part 50.65 (a)(4), Requirements for monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants, after Unit 1 experienced a loss of normal reactor feedwater as a result of an abnormal plant configuration during shutdown of the reactor on February 26, 2010. The licensee did not adequately manage the increase in risk that resulted when the 1B reactor feed pump (RFP) was made unavailable while the 1A south condenser was isolated in the hours leading up to the reactor shutdown. This plant configuration led to a high level in the 1A south condenser hotwell soon after the reactor shutdown, which prevented adequate draining of the 1A RFP turbine casing, and led to the loss of the 1A RFP. After the loss of normal feedwater to the reactor, the licensee restored reactor level using the reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) system. The licensee entered the issue into its corrective action program (AR #383636). The failure to adequately evaluate and manage risk associated with equipment configuration during the Unit 1 shutdown is a performance deficiency. This finding is more than minor because it is associated with the initiating events cornerstone attribute of configuration control and it adversely affected the cornerstone objective of limiting the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions. Specifically, plant stability was upset by the loss of normal feedwater to the reactor. In accordance with IMC 0609, Appendix K, Maintenance Risk Assessment and Risk Management Significance Determination Process, this finding is of very low safety significance (Green) because the Incremental Core Damage Probability Deficit is <E-6 and the Incremental Large Early Release Probability Deficit is <E-7. The inspectors determined that this finding had a crosscutting aspect in the area of human performance, work control component, because the licensee did not appropriately plan work activities by incorporating risk insights (H.3(a)). Specifically, activities scheduled prior to the reactor shutdown were not properly evaluated to determine their impact on the normal reactor feedwater system. |
| Site: | Brunswick  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000324/2010002 Section 1R20 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2010 (2010Q1) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Initiating Events |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.2 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | A Nielsen R Hamilton H Gepford G Kuzo R Musser G Kolcum B Collins J Sowa |
| CCA | H.5, Work Management |
| INPO aspect | WP.1 |
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Finding - Brunswick - IR 05000324/2010002 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Brunswick) @ 2010Q1
Self-Identified List (Brunswick)
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