05000324/FIN-2010002-01
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Finding | |
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| Title | Failure to Follow Procedures During Reactor Head Disassembly |
| Description | A self-revealing Green NCV of Technical Specifications (TS) 5.4.1, Procedures, was identified when reactor head piping was disconnected prior to swapping shutdown range reactor water level transmitters resulting in inaccurate water level indication. The plant procedure for disconnection of the reactor head piping, 0SMP-RPV501, Reactor Vessel Disassembly, used in conjunction with 0GP- 06, Cold Shutdown to Refueling, specifies that prior to removal of head piping, the Shutdown Range Reactor Water Level Transmitters shall be swapped from level transmitters, B21-LT-N027A and B21-LT-N027B, to level transmitters, B21-LT-7468A and B21-LT-7468B. Contrary to this requirement, the common reference leg to the level indicators was disconnected prior to swapping transmitters which resulted in loss of accurate indication of current reactor vessel water level. The licensee reinstalled the disconnected piping, refilled the reference legs for the transmitters, and entered the issue into their corrective action program (AR #383779). The disconnection of the reference leg flange of the reactor vessel head piping prior to realignment of level instrumentation as required by plant procedures is a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was more than minor because it is associated with the configuration control attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone because it inappropriately altered the reactor level instrumentation reference leg piping. It affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The inaccurate level indication degraded the operators ability to control the reactor vessel water level in the prescribed procedural band and would inhibit their ability to diagnose and prevent loss of residual heat removal (RHR) scenario. In accordance with NRC Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, Appendix G, Shutdown Operations Significance Determination Process, Attachment 1, Checklist 8, the inspectors conducted a Phase 1 SDP screening and determined the finding required a Phase 2 analysis. The Phase 2 analysis determined the finding is of very low safety significance (Green) because adequate mitigation capability was maintained. The cause of this finding was directly related to the supervisory and management oversight cross-cutting aspect in the work practices component of the Human Performance cross-cutting area because plant supervisors failed to ensure an adequate pre-job brief, failed to enforce proper communications methods at the job site, and failed to properly supervise workers executing procedure steps (H.4(c)) |
| Site: | Brunswick  |
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| Report | IR 05000324/2010002 Section 1R20 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2010 (2010Q1) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.2 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | A Nielsen R Hamilton H Gepford G Kuzo R Musser G Kolcum B Collins J Sowa |
| CCA | H.2, Field Presence |
| INPO aspect | LA.2 |
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Finding - Brunswick - IR 05000324/2010002 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Brunswick) @ 2010Q1
Self-Identified List (Brunswick)
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