05000324/FIN-2009004-01
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Finding | |
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| Title | Inadequate Annunciator Response Procedure for HPCI Vacuum Tank High Level |
| Description | A self-revealing Green non-cited violation of TS 5.4.1, Procedures, was identified for an inadequate annunciator response procedure to respond to a high level in the high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) vacuum tank when the barometric condensate pump is not operating. As a result, on January 27, 2009, the Unit 2 HPCI vacuum tank was not drained prior to the HPCI turbine exhaust drain pot filling to the point that operators could not ensure that water was not in the HPCI turbine casing. Without this assurance, the Unit 2 HPCI system was rendered inoperable because starting the HPCI pump with water in the casing could result in damage to the turbine. To correct this condition, operators later identified another valve, valve E-41-F5003, that was used to successfully lower water level in the HPCI exhaust line to below the HPCI exhaust line drain pot. Water level was above the exhaust line drain pot high level alarm, and therefore potentially in the HPCI turbine casing, for approximately two hours. Maintenance personnel later corrected the malfunction for the barometric condensate pump and restored the system to normal. This finding was entered into the licensees corrective action program as NCR #316695. The finding was determined to be more than minor because it is associated with procedure quality attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone. It also adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the incorrect HPCI annunciator response procedure led to an unplanned period of unavailability of the Unit 2 HPCI pump. Using NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, Determining the Significance of Reactor Inspection Findings for At-Power Situations, the inspectors determined that the finding required a phase two evaluation because the finding represents a loss of system safety function. Using the significance determination phase two pre-solved worksheet, loss of HPCI function for less than three days, the increase in core damage frequency was determined to be less than 1E-6. Therefore, the finding is of very low safety significance (Green). The finding affects the cross-cutting area of human performance, resources component, complete and accurate documentation aspect because the licensee did not incorporate adequate guidance for draining the HPCI vacuum tank when the HPCI pump is in standby and the barometric condensate pump is unavailable in plant procedures (H.2(c) |
| Site: | Brunswick  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000324/2009004 Section 4OA3 |
| Date counted | Sep 30, 2009 (2009Q3) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71153 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | P Capehart G Kolcum S Rose J Polickoski J Reece C Welch R Musser R Clagg |
| CCA | H.7, Documentation |
| INPO aspect | WP.3 |
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Finding - Brunswick - IR 05000324/2009004 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Brunswick) @ 2009Q3
Self-Identified List (Brunswick)
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