05000324/FIN-2009002-03
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Finding | |
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| Title | Failure to Follow Procedures During Reactor Head Disassembly (Section 1R20) |
| Description | A self-revealing Green NCV of TS 5.4.1, Procedures, was identified when reactor head piping was disconnected prior to swapping shutdown range reactor water level transmitters resulting in inaccurate water level indication. The plant procedure for disconnection of the reactor head piping, 0SMP-RPV501, Reactor Vessel Disassembly, used in conjunction with 0GP-06, Cold Shutdown to Refueling, specifies that prior to removal of head piping, the Shutdown Range Reactor Water Level Transmitters shall be swapped from level transmitters, B21-LT-NO27A and B21-LT-NO27B, to level transmitters, B21-LT-7468A and B21-LT-7468B. Contrary to this requirement, the common reference leg to the level indicators was disconnected prior to swapping transmitters which resulted in loss of accurate indication of current reactor vessel water level. The licensee reinstalled the disconnected piping and entered the issue into their corrective action program. The disconnection of the reference leg flange of the reactor vessel head piping prior to realignment of level instrumentation as required per procedure was identified as a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was more than minor because it is associated with the configuration control attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone, and it affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The level indication inaccuracy degraded the plant operators ability to control the reactor vessel water level in the prescribed procedural band and would inhibit their ability to diagnose and prevent a Loss of RHR scenario. In accordance with NRC Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, Appendix G, Shutdown Operations Significance Determination Process, Attachment 1, Checklist 8, the inspectors conducted a Phase 1 SDP screening and determined the finding to require a Phase 2 analysis. The Phase 2 analysis determined the finding to be of very low safety significance (Green) because adequate mitigation capability was maintained. The cause of this finding was directly related to the work activity coordination cross-cutting aspect in the work control component of the Human Performance cross-cutting area because the plant operators and maintenance personnel failed to effectively communicate and coordinate the activities associated with the vessel head disassembly (H.3(b)). (Section 1R20 |
| Site: | Brunswick  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000324/2009002 Section 1R20 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2009 (2009Q1) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.2 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | A Nielsen G Kuzo R Chou R Musser G Kolcum K Ellis B Davis M Corsey R Jackson |
| CCA | H.5, Work Management |
| INPO aspect | WP.1 |
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Finding - Brunswick - IR 05000324/2009002 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Brunswick) @ 2009Q1
Self-Identified List (Brunswick)
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